Original article by Stanislav Belkovskiy
The war between Russia and Ukraine about natural gas is over, but this is not the end of the drama.
Already fires up a bluish light of the new conflict – except this time, the conflict is Ukraine vs. Ukraine. The opposition is serious and determined to prove that Victor Yushchenko, Yuriy Yekhanurov and Co. did not win at all (as is perceived by many), but instead embarrassingly lost [the recent Russia-Ukraine energy conflict]. And consequently, they deserve obstruction, ostracism and a full defeat at the March parliamentary elections.
Yesterday’s enemies – Yulia Tymoshenko and Inna Bohoslovska, Natalya Vitrenko and Oleksandr Moroz – united in a “holy” attack against Ukraine’s gas victory. For Yekhnurov’s cabinet there is an immediate dismissal and for the president – a speedy impeachment is threatened.
The highest achievement of this polit-technological fantasy ought to be recognized an offer by the Block of Yulia Tymoshenko to cancel the recent natural gas agreement at the Pecherskiy Regional Court.
If that is how things will continue to evolve, we may smell the gas burning at the Maidan; and on Kyiv’s streets, we may witness thousands of opponents with broken pieces of Gazprom’s natural gas pipes held in skillful and hardworking hands.
Actually, the opposition’s logic is clear. If you cannot jump on the victory wagon, you must declare it “the wagon of extreme failure.” In all, it is suggested to disregard Ukraine’s victory while those responsible for the success ought to be turned over to the people’s court.
The history of world democracy teaches us that voters are, unfortunately, too trusting; and, often a pretty picture wins over clever arguments and sound evidence. Thus there is a need to figure out and receive a pure, like a freshly made Moonshine, answer to the question: who won the short cold Great Natural Gas War of 2005-2006?
Unquestionably, Ukraine won. Also won our dear friends V.A. Yushchenko and PM Y.I. Yekhanurov.
First of all, the price of $95 per 1000 cubic meters is a pretty good result especially after taking into consideration the nauseating comment made by Moscow that the minimum price will be $230.
Several professionals at the Gazprom were expecting the price to drop from $230 to $145, but then Putin intervened and Ukraine got a price that was $50 less than the one which the Gazprom was claiming. Needless to say, the Gazprom folks were not too happy.
At $95 and transit fees tripled, Ukraine will be able to keep the lowest European tariff for its population.
With all their flaws, why were Yushchenko-Yekhanurov able to quickly receive victory? This is because the two correctly understood the philosophy of the war.
In this conflict, Ukraine as the nation-state faced not the grand Imperial Russia, but a small band of thuggish businessmen headed by Putin and always concerned with one and always burning problem: how to transfer Russia’s economic or political resources into personal offshore accounts.
Such people can only be spoken to with a language they understand. In our case, there was a need to suggest a corrupt offer which would reflect private interests. The correct numbers in the proper accounts appeared, and RusUkrEnergo was born.
Dresdner Bank, an ultra Putin friendly organization, will acquire from Gazprom one-half of RusUkrEnergo. The second-half is owned by Raiffeisen Investment S. A. of Switzerland.
Yushchenko, Yekhanurov and their friends in arms correctly assessed the opponent and made him an offer he could not refuse. The end result is that RusUkrEnergo will be supplying Ukraine its natural gas.
It is not difficult to calculate that 34 billion of cubic meters of Russia-Turk-Uzbek natural gas cocktail (Gazprom = $230 and Central Asian natural gas = $65) will cost the Switzerland’s partner $1.67 billions per year.
But of course, behind the scenes and under the mahogany table of negotiations, these costs will be compensated. The tsarist owners of RusUkrEnergo will end up earning around $2.3 billions per year.
How do you mean? Very simply.
RusUkrEnergo will receive from Gazprom a couple of dozens of Central Asian gas at the price of $65 per 1000 cubic meters. It will then turn around and sell this heavily discounted but valuable natural resource to the Western Europe for around $250-$270. The difference of some meager 4 billion dollars will be given NOT to the Russian state.
What is created is a genius scheme of its kind: Gazprom spends $1.67 billions in Ukraine’s favor and then $2.3 billions on Russian (some Finnish and Israeli) individuals.
This arrangement is very favorable for Ukraine. And very not favorable for Russia – as a state. But as to the latter, a simple Russian citizen will not become aware. Should he find out then the most honest in the world Russian State Television will explain: everything that Vladimir Putin stole from the state was stolen for the benefit of the country and in the name of national interests of the Grand Russia as she rises from her knees.
Was there a smarter alternative to the above arrangement? No, not at all.
The usual logical arguments that Ukraine and Russia ought to be dealing directly with one another and without a middle man strike a painful note to the supplier, in this case the current Russian governing elite.
It is a sort of an intellectual reasoning: if…then. If there is no middle man then there is no theft. And when there is no theft then Putin becomes bored as when watching a poorly made Western. Without a middle man, Ukraine would have had to pay $160 and no questions asked. Therefore, however criminal and terrible RosUkrEnergo company may be, for Ukraine as a state, this company fared well. Others will answer before God for Russia and her lost money.
“The Tymoshenko Plan,” as secretive as it was marvelous, proposed a solution similar to RosUkrEnergo with only two amendments:
-- the middle man under the “Tymoshenko Plan” was supposed to be an offshore company “Itera” based in the U.S. and known to be friendly with Yulia Volodymyrivna for a couple of years now.
-- the natural gas in the end would have cost a little bit more, closer to $115-120; although “Iter” does have good relations with Turkmenistan, its Gazprom contacts are further away than those of RosUkrEnergo.
The sad result for “Iter” is obvious. It will not be returning back to Ukraine’s market thanks to Yushchenko-Yekhanurov solution of the natural gas crisis. However, the problems of “Iter” are not enough to leave Ukraine without the natural gas by utilizing the court system and expensive lawyers.
As to the numerous talking-heads proclaiming “Russia’s Victory,” those ought to be ignored. If the party says so, those same people will praise Chinese immigration or a meteorite’s devastation of Moscow.
For the Putin’s cat, the most important task of this year is to will for a magic disappearance of those four billion dollars from the balance sheets.
The Kremlin went so far as to activate the dormant Mother Vitrenko in order to show to the Russian people that: look Ukrainians are not happy, therefore WE won and THEY lost.
The sudden resolution of the conflict was a slap on the face to the last year’s losers and today’s opposition. After all, the conflict provided fertile election year campaign ground. There were many expectations and hopes that Yushchenko just might slip to fall on this one and then…
But having won the first war, Yushchenko may lose the second.
After all, the president is a type of person who occasionally and not always by accident lets the victory slide through his fingers. A nice exception was the Orange revolution. Will this exception repeat itself on March 26th and will it become the rule, we will know soon enough.
And while the second war has not reached its peak, there exist all grounds to congratulate the Ukrainian government with success of the previous war. The celebration of victory should be understood as one government beating a commercial structure which due to a historical accident carries the name – “Russia.”
