The collapse of Ukraine’s Orange Coalition – once an inspiration to others – has deflated democratic forces around the world. It has also heartened those in Russia, Vladimir Putin included, who hate and fear the “colored” revolutions. Yet there is some good news in the current political mess. Multi-party democracy is alive in Ukraine. It can be bare-knuckled and, at times, ugly and corrupt. But it also involves give-and-take negotiations over how to advance Ukraine’s development as a unitary state that has both growing ties to Euro-Atlantic community and decent relations with Russia. For that to happen, however, Ukraine’s principal political actors have to give more weight to national interests and less to the politics of personality and personal power.
On the surface, developments over the past two years are a story of failure. During fall 2004, the Orange Revolution brought millions to Kiev’s Independence Square to fight against electoral fraud and for the candidate they chose. This public outpouring lifted Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency in January 2005. Nine months later, allegations of corruption between Yushchenko and populist Premier Yulia Tymoshenko brought down the “Orange government.” When parliamentary elections were held in March 2006, public frustration with Yushchenko produced a first place finish for the party of Viktor Yanukovych, the loser in the 2004 presidential race. As of mid-July 2006, Ukraine’s political parties are still bickering about forming a government while WTO membership and an invitation to NATO’s Membership Action Plan hang in abeyance.
Less visible but no less important is the welcome demise in Ukraine of what in Russia is called “managed democracy”: no longer can elections be won by the party in power dictating the results. Voters have learned that power and accountability come out of the ballot box, not from the office of the sitting president. In championing the ability of the people to challenge leaders through an opposition movement, the Orange Revolution secured a future for political opposition.
The mixed results of the parliamentary elections also produced paralysis. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych and other figures still have not formed a functioning government. They have spent more time trying to destroy, or at least marginalize each other, than in bringing about the stability, economic prosperity, political openness, accountable governance, and social responsibility that voters want. No wonder many who flocked to the orange cause have a sour taste in their mouths. This is not the democracy they hoped for.
Ukraine now faces three prospects: 1) a coalition of Yanukovych’s party with Communists and Socialists; 2) Yushchenko and Yanukovych forge a coalition that unites the country; or 3), if a government is not formed, another round of elections that would extend the period of political turmoil another four to six months. Ukrainian politicians will ultimately decide, but they might consider two questions: Will anything change in a few months with a new round of elections? What “brand” of governance do they want to market to the nation and internationally?
The political crisis has already dragged into its fourth month. Recent polls suggest that if there is another election, voters will punish Yushchenko with yet a smaller share of the vote. That would give Yanukovych an even bigger margin. Yet some form of coalition between Yushchenko and Yanukovych would be needed to govern credibly. Aternatively, the Orange team may try to reunite in opposition and block Yanukovych. That carries the risk that the “politics of no” could thwart progress for the country and leave President Yushchenko looking yet more ineffectual. It’s hard to be a president in opposition.
The question of branding is fundamentally tied to perception. Do Ukrainian politicians want a government that is perceived as moving to the future or rooted in the past? If the latter, then bring the Communists into a coalition. Do Ukrainian politicians want a country that is perceived as uniting or torn between East and West? If the latter, then put Yanukovych or Tymoshenko in the prime minister’s slot. Right or wrong, the main political figures have become identified with geopolitical agendas, even if their published programs are copied from one another. Boring as it may seem, this is a time for technocrats to address the business of governance.
As these politics sort themselves out, policy makers need to remember that they have lost public trust as politics have become perceived as an extension of business interests. Any new gas deals with Russia, including talk of a consortium to manage Ukraine’s pipelines, should be subjected to public scrutiny and conducted through formal tenders when relevant. Leaders must counter perceptions that the quest for governance is merely a contest for the right to steal from the gas sector. In the international community we should accept that this is Ukraine’s mess to fix. Ukraine’s friends should certainly make clear that the door to NATO is open and that the EU will still contemplate expanding, as such prospects shape incentives for cooperation among political parties.
Finally, there is Russia. Russia should not be an issue in this domestic drama. Ukraine should have good relations with all its neighbors – and its neighbors should recognize that a sovereign, democratic and prosperous Ukraine is an asset, not a threat. Even with its political growing pains, Ukraine’s economy surged ahead in May at an annual rate of 8.5%. Ukraine’s 47 million people, Russia and Europe would all be better off with the political accountability that could sustain such performance.
The author is Vice President of the Brookings Institution and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.
