Original article by Volodymyr Pavliv
The noisy dismissal of the government amid an atmosphere of scandal and political crisis did not have to be that way. And not only if, after a quick inquiry, Poroshenko and Tretiakov were found to be more honest than angels, of had Zinchenko received more access to the president in exchange for keeping quiet. But it could have been avoided if the Ukrainian elites had finally learned one of the main rules of democracy – the media must be taken into account.
A week before the scandalous resignation of the chief of the president’s secretariat Oleksandr Zinchenko, direct allegations of corruption against members of the president’s entourage were made by one of Ukraine’s richest businessmen Ihor Kolomoiskyi in an interview with “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” (“Mirrow Weekly”).
In the civilized world, allegations of corruption against those closest to the head of state – made by a businessman of considerable stature in an authoritative newspaper – would not have passed without greater resonance.
Then again, a wise government would itself be interested to see the scandal (already ripening in the lobbies and bubbling over into public view a few times) taking shape around its leaders turn into a “paper scandal” and not a political crisis. This would surely be done and has been done more than once in European countries and in the United States.
In this way, a “soft” way out of the scandal could have been realized, in so far as the main players were suspect people, a “suspicious” businessman and a widely-distributed weekly newspaper. One could have found a quiet way to do what was done in an atmosphere of scandal.
A newspaper wrote it – we will respond; a businessman made an accusation – we will look into it; those closest to the president are suspected – we will suspend them until the circumstances are brought out into the open. This is normal in stable democracies. This way, the head of the secretariat, the president and the prime minister became “heroes” of the scandal. This is extraordinary, and therefore abnormal.
In a democracy, the media plays the role of safety valve in the system of power. Nevertheless, Viktor Yushchenko has never understood this – not as the head of the National Bank, not as the prime minister, not as a candidate for president. President Yushchenko also does not understand this, and the most recent incident is not the only evidence of this.
But when speaking today of “President Yushchenko,” one speaks not only of the persona of the president (he may not even read newspapers, but prepared briefings), but of the so-called “president’s team,” or that part of it that is responsible for the press and public opinion. It can be said with certainty that the “reformist team” has underestimated the importance of its relationship with the press.
This would not have happened if today’s Ukrainian reform team had learned from the experience of the reform team headed by “the father of Polish reform” Leszek Balcerowicz. Already in October of 1989 people from Balcerowicz’s circle had formed a group for sociological analysis, which not only researched public opinion, but also monitored the press and maintained contact with the mass media.
These contacts were not limited to regular press conferences, but took many forms.
First, Balcerowicz’s people held numerous personal meetings with various journalists and maintained contact with them. Second, several so-called “background” meetings were held with those journalists writing about the economy.
At these meetings, Balcerowicz’s people attempted to explain in an unofficial manner the steps taken and problems faced by the reformer team. Third, people from Balcerowicz’s team initiated new media projects continued to exist long after, such as the TV show “Economic Express,” Radio “Business,” or Balcerowicz’s regular column in the journal “Wprost.”
In this way, a group of media and journalists was cultivated that supported the entire government of the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and defended his economic program. Therefore, according to Boguslawa Dobek-Ostrowska, a researcher of the Polish mass media, the great merit of Balcerowicz’s staff was that they sensed the importance of “the media’s legitimization of [their] actions among a civil society that is modernizing.”
And while on the subject of Poland, it is worth mentioning another instructive example. Recently, Viktor Yushchenko participated in a commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the appearance of the legendary anti-communist movement “Solidarity.”
At that time, in Gdansk, he met with many of the founders of that movement, including its leader – and the first president of post-communist Poland – Lech Walesa. I do not know what Yushchenko and Walesa talked about, and that’s why it’s not clear whether the current Ukrainian president learned the lesson that history taught the legendary leader of Solidarity ten years ago.
In 1990, when Lech Walesa became president of Poland, it seemed as if a “serious and lasting” new power had arrived after decades of communist oppression. Nevertheless, within a year, the nationalist-populist circle around President Walesa had come into sharp conflict with the liberal-intelligentsia circle of Prime Minister Mazowiecki.
This “war in the higher echelons” appeared afterwards to be very damaging to both camps. In 1995 the “post-communists” came to power in Poland, a result few people could have foreseen on the eve of the election. Walesa himself so believed in his victory over the young post-communist Alexander Kwasniewski that during the decisive televised debate he refused his competitor’s offer of a conciliatory handshake, saying “To you I can only offer my foot.”
Walesa lost the presidential election to Kwasniewski by a narrow margin. Since then, Alexander Kwasniewski has been president of Poland twice and remained the most popular politician in his country.
Walesa is also popular, but only as a “legend,” and that is mostly outside the borders of his country. In Poland itself, Walesa’s attempts to run for president or for parliament have received between 1.5% and 2.5% of the vote.
From this lesson, the president of Ukraine ought to draw the corresponding lesson. Specifically, he must rid himself of the manner of a “messiah” or “hero” – of the idea that for his suffering Ukrainians (and Europeans and Americans for that matter) ought to be grateful and obedient to him the rest of their lives – and most importantly get down to the hard work of being an active president.
Otherwise, in four years at the latest, Viktor Yushchenko will become a walking museum piece with a 1.5% approval level.