Ukrainian counteroffensive forces Russians to change command system

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have noted that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has forced the Russians to change their command and control system and adapt their electronic warfare systems to protect against Ukrainian drones.

Source: ISW

Quote: "Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration."

Details: Thus, as the Centre for Security and Emerging Technologies (CSET) has stated, Russian troops have moved their headquarters beyond the range of most Ukrainian strike systems and placed forward command posts in well-protected positions.

In addition, experts pointed out that the limitations of Russian artillery in Ukraine are prompting the Russian military to change its "fire doctrine", which switches the priority from volume of attacks to their accuracy.

The CSET says that Russian troops have strengthened communications between intelligence systems and artillery units to improve the accuracy of fire, "as Russian forces face growing constraints on their ability to leverage mass indirect fire".

Analysts say the Russians lack ammunition to conduct large-scale indirect fire. This is because the occupiers "have difficulties transporting a large volume of ammunition to the frontline, and see diminishing effectiveness with mass strikes".

The review also points to the fact that the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) stated that the Russian occupiers are trying to improve signals through the wider use of app-based C2 services without special training.

It is noted that Russian troops are adapting the deployment of electronic warfare systems. As the RUSI stated, Russian forces are distributing Pole-21 systems and treating them as disposable electronic warfare systems to provide broad protection against Ukrainian UAV attacks.

To quote the ISW's Key Takeaways on 8 September:

• Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration.
• Artillery constraints in Ukraine are reportedly prompting the Russian military to accelerate longstanding efforts to implement a fire doctrine prioritising accuracy over volume.
• Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare complexes.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Bakhmut and south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on 8 September.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of 7-8 September.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly responded to recent indications that the Armenian government may be questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupiansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not make any confirmed advances on 8 September.
• The New York Times — citing Western, African and Russian sources — reported that Russian intelligence structures are competing for control of the Wagner Group’s assets and operations in Africa.
• Russian occupation officials continue to hold illegal regional elections in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts announced the start of in-person voting in occupied territories on 8 September.

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