Children for the state: Why the Kremlin's demographic policy is fueling social conflict

The Kremlin promises financial incentives for having children, expands benefits for large families, and demonstratively "cares" about pregnant students and schoolgirls. The amounts involved are enormous: by 2030, the national "Family" project is set to spend an amount comparable to two years of Ukraine's state budget expenditures. This money is intended for measures that are supposed to encourage higher birth rates — from subsidized mortgages for young families to propaganda promoting large families.

But there is a problem. Our monitoring of two of Russia's most popular social networks — Telegram and VKontakte — conducted in early 2026 shows that absurd legislative initiatives and intrusive demographic propaganda are openly irritating the Russian population. The policy that the Russian authorities call "family support" is becoming yet another source of conflict between the state and society.

If Russia wants to wage aggressive wars in the future, it needs people above all. That is why it is critically important for us to understand how successful the Kremlin is in implementing its demographic programs.

More than two-thirds of the world's population lives in countries where birth rates are below replacement level. Population decline has been a problem for Ukraine since independence, but it became catastrophic after the full-scale war and the mass migration it triggered. Today, Ukraine's total fertility rate has fallen below one.

Our enemy is in a better position, but the situation is far from simple. In 2024, 1.22 million children were born in Russia, one of the lowest figures in its modern history, while the total fertility rate stood at 1.4 children per woman at the end of 2025. It is worth recalling that simple replacement requires 2.1.

After the invasion of Ukraine, the issue acquired strategic importance for the Kremlin. Enormous battlefield losses and the outflow of young people have turned the old Soviet slogan "women will give birth to more" into a new political priority. Just recently, Putin once again stated that the "long-term task is to preserve and increase the population of Russia." Regional birth rates have also been included in assessments of governors' performance.

Senior Russian officials, including Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, repeat the same message: "For successful economic and social development, to build our country and ensure security, there must be many more Russians. … A person's success should be measured not by how much money they earn or what car they drive, but by how many children their family has." Such statements are hardly isolated. Virtually every Russian state patriot periodically stresses the need to "have more children."

The "Carrot and Stick" of Family Values

Russia has sufficient resources to actively influence its demographic policy. The Kremlin has a broad set of tools for increasing birth rates — from financial incentives to outright restrictions.

There are plenty of "carrots": maternity capital, family mortgages, tax benefits, support for large families, and so on. The Kremlin is not sparing money in its effort to "produce" new soldiers. The "Family" national project is expected to spend 17.9 trillion rubles (about $200 billion at an exchange rate of roughly 90 rubles to the dollar) in 2025–2030, including 3.2 trillion rubles (about $36 billion) in 2026. Most of the program consists of various financial incentives and benefits for families, including subsidized mortgages and maternity capital.

However, the Russian authorities understand that this is not enough. The program's target is to raise the total fertility rate to 1.593 — still far below the 2.1 replacement level.

For those who are not tempted by financial incentives, the Russian authorities have a "stick": propaganda promoting childbirth and various restrictions. These include Putin's law banning the "promotion of refusing to have children," penalties for "inducement to abortion," a ban on private clinics performing abortions, and, more recently, discussions in the State Duma and the Russian Orthodox Church about requiring a husband's consent for a woman to have an abortion.

The state's "concern" for citizens' reproductive health sometimes reaches the absurd. Among the latest initiatives are referring women who do not plan to have children to psychologists, while men who are fond of saunas are to be sent for sperm tests.

No matter how comical these initiatives may look from the outside, the Kremlin is using them to relentlessly pursue its goal of overcoming the demographic crisis. At the same time, the initiatives are viewed critically — and sometimes even hostilely — by the population, creating yet another deep conflict within Russian society.

"Nravitsya, ne nravitsya — rozhay, moya krasavitsa" ("Like it or not — give birth, my beauty")*

At Join Ukraine, we analyzed discussions about childbirth in more than 700 Telegram and VKontakte communities across virtually all Russian regions. The scale of the sample allows us to identify both isolated bursts of discontent and clear broader social trends.

The greatest wave of outrage was triggered by announcements about payments to pregnant students and schoolgirls: 72% of reactions on Telegram were negative, while only 3% were positive. The "support" was perceived not as assistance to young women, but as an incentive for early pregnancy at the expense of education and professional development. Dissatisfied users asked: "When are they supposed to study?" Some even wondered: "Are women being pushed to have children instead of pursuing a career? And if the marriage doesn't work out, what happens next? Will the state take care of the children? Of course not."

The second-most negatively received issue was abortion restrictions. Users were particularly concerned about the proposal that a married woman should only be allowed to terminate a pregnancy with her husband's consent. For example, one post in a Rostov-based community received 1,473 negative reactions, while another similar post in Voronezh received 2,023. Commenters pointed to overcrowded orphanages and argued that banning abortions does not eliminate the reasons why women seek them.

Russians also strongly disliked the Russian Health Ministry's idea of encouraging women to become pregnant through psychologists. Posts about introducing mandatory consultations for women who say they do not plan to have children — in March 2026 — received tens of thousands of forwards and overwhelmingly negative reactions.

Purely economic programs did not generate much enthusiasm either. Posts about family mortgages were predominantly met with negativity. The main reason is that these mortgages are becoming increasingly inaccessible due to constantly changing terms and rising housing prices. Russians reacted relatively calmly to posts about maternity capital, although attempts by the authorities to restrict how the money can be used also faced sharp criticism.

"Sami rozhayte!" ("Have children yourselves!"): Why Russians Reject the Authorities' Demographic Initiatives

The main criticism of the Kremlin's demographic initiatives was rooted in distrust of the authorities and the conviction that they are hypocritical. This was reflected in the sarcastic slogan "Sami rozhayte!" — "have children yourselves!" This line of argument accounted for roughly a quarter of reasoned comments on Telegram and VKontakte.

Next came entirely practical arguments: poverty, high prices and unaffordable housing. Commenters also condemned the cynicism of calls to have more children while schools, maternity wards and clinics are systematically being closed and infrastructure remains underdeveloped.

A noticeable xenophobic strand was also present — an entirely predictable consequence of years of state propaganda that has taught Russians to blame migrants and other "outsiders." Nearly one in seven substantive comments on Telegram and VKontakte argued that childbirth benefits supposedly go to "the wrong people."

Direct references to state interference in private life were less common, but remained consistent. The war was mentioned even more cautiously: only 5.8% of Telegram comments and 7.5% of VKontakte comments directly linked calls to have more children with the need to replenish the army and compensate for Russia's losses in the so-called "special military operation."

However, given the censorship and repression prevailing in Russia, even these figures matter.

Women's rights were mentioned least often. One could joke that women's rights in Russia are so securely protected by the state that they are never actually issued to the women themselves. On a more serious note, the reason is the scale of "traditional values" propaganda and religious pressure, as well as the dominance of patriarchal ideas about the family, particularly outside cities of more than one million people.

The Kremlin's Demographic Plans — What Does This Mean for Ukraine?

Knowing your enemy means trying to stay at least one step ahead. That is why Russia's demographic policy has not only a social but also a direct security dimension for Ukraine. Behind campaigns to increase birth rates and promote large families lies the Kremlin's desire to preserve its human and mobilization resources for future wars. The Russian authorities themselves make no secret of the fact that they associate population size with military power, state strength and geopolitical status.

Even after the current war ends, Russia is likely to remain imperial and aggressive as long as it exists as a unified political system. Rebuilding its mobilization potential through new generations could eventually result in another war for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's population is shrinking rapidly due to wartime casualties, migration and low birth rates. We have no time for complacency. We need to prepare now for the possibility of future confrontation — combining stronger defense with family support, the return of Ukrainian citizens, economic development and the creation of a country that people will not be afraid to tie their own future to.

The Kremlin is actively trying to address its demographic crisis. Yet it is proving more successful at deepening the conflict between the population and the state.

Our task is even harder. At the very least, we must avoid repeating Russia's mistakes in responding to demographic challenges.

• The phrase echoes Vladimir Putin's 2022 remark about the Minsk agreements, itself a paraphrase of a crude Russian rhyme.

All quotations from Russian officials and social media users are translated from Russian.

Liubov Tsybulska is an expert in strategic communications and a specialist on hybrid threats in Ukraine. She is the founder and current director of the NGO Join Ukraine