Russia's army of robots: how Moscow is using ground drones

Ukraine has conducted 22,000 missions using ground robotic systems over the past three months alone. The systems evacuate the wounded, deliver supplies and perform combat tasks in areas where a human would almost certainly not survive.

This year, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence aims to transition 100% of frontline logistics to robotic platforms.

What about Russia's use of this technology? Which side has been more successful in applying it – Ukraine or Russia?

Ukrainska Pravda has looked into Russia's ground-based robotic systems and how they are used. Meanwhile, State Watch, a Ukrainian think tank, has also analysed the market and the companies behind their production.

Read on to see how Russia is developing this cutting-edge technology and the fundamental problems it has encountered in scaling it up.

An army without robots

Until 2022, the topic of military robots in the Russian military was largely a propaganda tool used to project the image of an "army of the future". At that time, Russian design offices were pursuing two distinct paths.

Some were revisiting the Soviet-era concept of a remotely controlled tank, while others were developing ground robotic systems capable of performing a variety of battlefield tasks.

Most remote-controlled tank designs never made it beyond the conceptual stage. Several prototypes were built, such as the T-90M Platforma-M and BMP-3 Vikhr, but they were never deployed in combat. After Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian engineers instead turned to the T-55 "kamikaze tank". In one reported case, it was packed with up to 3 tonnes of explosives and used in an attack on Ukrainian positions.

Russian ground robots are a different story. The most prominent example is the Uran-9, unveiled in 2016 as a breakthrough in ground-based military robotics. It carried a 30mm cannon, a machine gun, anti-tank missiles and flamethrowers. In practice, it looked more like an infantry fighting vehicle than a robot. It was also intended to compete with infantry fighting vehicles for a battlefield role.

In practice, that competition never materialised. Trials in Syria exposed a series of critical issues. In urban environments, communication with the Uran-9 was limited to 300-500 m, and even then, it was frequently interrupted for periods ranging from one minute to an hour and a half. The running gear and weapons systems often malfunctioned, while optical devices struggled to provide a clear view of targets.

Ultimately, the Russians themselves admitted that such ground robots would not be capable of performing combat missions for the next 10-15 years.

There were also more successful developments, such as the Uran-6 mine-clearance robot, based on the Croatian MV-4 from DOK-ING, which proved effective, notably in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been almost no information on the use of these robotic systems. The only known case is the deployment of the Uran-6 for mine clearance in Mariupol, which resulted in the loss of one system. Other developments from the same period, including the Uran-9, Nerekhta and Kungas, have since disappeared from view.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, the absence of these systems was not a major problem for Russia. There was limited need for ground robots, and the battlefield was not yet saturated with drones striking targets from dozens of kilometres away. That soon changed.

The rebirth of Russian ground robots

The rise of first-person view (FPV) drones and reconnaissance UAVs has accelerated the emergence of a new generation of Russian ground robots.

Reports of Russian troops deploying new ground robots first emerged in 2023. Throughout the year, they experimented with their use for carrying supplies and evacuating the dead and wounded, and at times deployed them as kamikaze units. Most of the systems in use were modified versions of Chinese-made robots.

In 2024, the situation began to change. Russia obtained its first mass-produced, domestically developed ground robots. Among them was Kurier, a tracked system similar to the Ukrainian-made Termit and Numo. Notably, it was built not by specialised design offices but by volunteers from Ulan-Ude, who later handed over production to NRTK KAPS.

Meanwhile, new manufacturers have emerged in Russia, both private and state-owned. State Watch has identified at least 20 companies producing 29 types of ground robots, while the makers of a further three systems remain unknown. Twelve of these companies are subject to sanctions in at least one Western jurisdiction. Others, however, can still source components globally, particularly from China.

As a result, the Russian arsenal has gradually expanded to include a range of new systems. The Kurier has become one of the most widely deployed ground robots. Russian propagandists claim that thousands have already been distributed to dozens of units. The system regularly features in videos in various configurations.

Initially, the Kurier came in a logistics version and a combat variant equipped with either a machine gun or an AGS-17 30mm automatic grenade launcher, used to strike Ukrainian positions at close range.

Engineering variants later appeared, capable of laying and clearing mines and equipped with electronic warfare systems.

The Kurier was also adapted in improvised ways, particularly by mounting them with grenade launchers and multiple-launch rocket systems. The most ambitious project was the Ignis robot, fitted with a combat laser for engaging drones.

In parallel, other unmanned ground systems appeared: the tracked Impulse-M, Omich and Bogomol, the wheeled Depesha and the Chelnok heavy towing platform.

Communication issues

Russia is currently testing the capabilities of these systems. They are being used for assaults and diversionary tactics, as well as for mine laying and clearance, logistics and evacuation. In deployment, Russian forces are running into the same problems already familiar to the Ukrainian military.

Ukrainska Pravda has obtained internal Russian military documents outlining their forces' experience with ground robots. The documents point to faults in the running gear of the Kurier and Bogomol systems, which have led to overheating and failures of electronic components. The systems experience mobility issues in the rain, as well as camera and battery malfunctions. The Russians are fixing some of these faults directly at their positions or sending the units back to the manufacturers.

However, there is one problem that cannot yet be easily fixed – communication.

Like the Ukrainian military, Russian forces actively used Starlink terminals, which provided stable communications without range limitations. After the terminals were blocked in February, most Russian units lost access to Starlink. As a result, they were forced to revert to radio control, which has limited range and stability at the front due to signal obstruction from the terrain and Ukrainian electronic warfare operations.

To compensate, Russian forces are installing signal repeaters to form mesh networks and deploying Mavic UAVs to escort vehicles. Fibre-optic communication is also used in some areas, despite the risk of cable breakage. In isolated cases, operators control the platforms directly from within, undermining the core principle of robotic systems – operator safety.

Communication limitations are also restricting deployment tactics, keeping ground robot use in combat zones to a minimum. Russian forces mainly deploy them for logistics and evacuation in rear areas, or for mine clearance ahead of offensives. According to one document, a ground robot covers an average of 3 km per week, indicating rear-area use rather than deep penetration into the kill zone, a heavily contested frontline area under constant surveillance and fire.

Outlook for future use

The frequency of Russia's use of ground robots varies across individual military units.

"In comparison, the defence forces carry out thousands of operations using ground robotic systems, whereas Russia's use of them still appears to be experimental," says Pastor, commander of an unmanned systems company in the Boryviter battalion, who has encountered Russian ground robotic systems on the battlefield.

The relatively low rate of ground robot use is also reflected in recorded losses. Ground robots are expendable assets, and their destruction is inevitably captured on video. According to the Oryx portal, which tracks losses based on online photos and videos, at least 69 Russian ground robots have been recorded as destroyed. By comparison, Ukraine has lost 247 ground robots, as documented in photos and video, suggesting significantly wider use.

The use of horses and other pack animals by Russian forces also indirectly points to shortcomings in technical solutions for frontline logistics. Ukrainska Pravda has covered this issue in a separate article.

However, it is still too early to draw conclusions. Russia may instead focus on scaling up its basic models to achieve parity in ground robot use.

That effort could be supported by Russia's plans to increase the number of operators in its equivalent of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces to 101,000 personnel, rising to 165,500 by the end of the year. Russian universities have even launched recruitment campaigns to bring students specifically into these new units. Within Russia's "unmanned systems forces", personnel are also being trained and assigned specifically as ground robot operators.

Communications technology may ultimately have the greatest impact on the further proliferation of Russian ground robots. At present, the suspension of Starlink services has complicated Russia's efforts to develop their use.

One possible solution could be mesh repeaters or the Rassvet satellite constellation, a Russian satellite communications programme in which Russia is actively investing to build its own equivalent of Starlink. Whether it succeeds remains to be seen.

Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn

Edited by Susan McDonald