How reception of Ukrainian refugees varies across the Nordics
The Nordic countries have adopted markedly different approaches to hosting Ukrainian refugees. Sweden, in particular, stands out with its restrictive policy, which has pushed many Ukrainians into the informal economy. This has implications for the refugees themselves, for their host societies, and could affect potential future return to Ukraine.
Diverging Nordic approaches
From being one of Europe’s most liberal countries in terms of immigration, Sweden has over the past three years taken a sharp turn. The current goal of Swedish authorities is to implement the most restrictive immigration and integration policy possible within the boundaries of international law. Ukrainian refugees have experienced these changes firsthand.
As part of an ongoing research project, we have compared policies and the lived experiences of Ukrainian refugees in four Nordic countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. We conducted a survey in the autumn and winter of 2024/5 of more than 3,000 Ukrainian refugees across these countries, as well as a number of in-depth interviews. Differences between the countries are striking.
Minimum rights
In Norway and Denmark (and to some extent Finland), Ukrainian refugees have gained access to language courses, integration programs, and financial support similar to that available to other refugee groups. In Sweden, however, Ukrainians for a long time held a status resembling that of asylum seekers: low financial assistance, no registration in the population register, and limited access to integration measures.
As of November 2024, Sweden introduced some liberalising changes. Ukrainians will now be registered in the population register after one year instead of three, which gives earlier access to integration rights. At the same time, however, the government introduced new restrictions on certain welfare benefits, including child allowances.
A shift in numbers
Sweden was initially the primary destination for Ukrainian refugees in the Nordic region following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. However, this situation has changed markedly. Today, Sweden has received significantly fewer Ukrainian refugees than both Norway and Finland, and many of those who did arrive have already left. Around one-third of those granted temporary protection in Sweden have departed—compared to less than 10 percent in Norway and Finland.
At the same time, Ukrainian refugees in Sweden report higher levels of economic self-sufficiency. More than half of our respondents in Sweden say they are economically independent, while in Norway—where the share is lowest—only one in four say the same.
At first glance, the situation in Sweden may seem like a dream scenario for advocates of strict immigration policy. But our research reveals the other side of the coin.
Poverty, disillusionment, and regret
Ukrainian refugees in Sweden report living in poverty to a greater extent than those in the other Nordic countries. A quarter of respondents in Sweden say they struggle to make ends meet or live in poverty, compared to only about one in ten in Norway. They also consistently give lower ratings of how the Swedish reception system, public authorities, and services have functioned, compared to their compatriots who sought protection in neighbouring Nordic countries. And while only 6–7% regret coming to Finland, Denmark, or Norway, as many as 17% of Ukrainians who fled to Sweden say they regret that decision.
While Sweden has seen declining arrivals, Norway has received record-high numbers of Ukrainian refugees over the past three years, leading to capacity strains in many municipalities. A key issue in the Norwegian debate has been the concern that Norway might appear too attractive to Ukrainian refugees, which in turn has led to restrictions on this group’s rights.
In such situations, politicians advocating a more restrictive approach have pointed to other countries—often highlighting Sweden’s tough stance as a model. But Sweden’s example clearly shows that reducing integration rights and financial assistance to a bare minimum can have unintended consequences.
Most importantly: Very low benefits and minimal rights can lead to hardship and insecurity, creating the conditions for parallel societies and increasing the risk of exploitation of vulnerable groups.
More work in the shadows
Getting reliable data on the extent of undeclared work and exploitation in the labour market is challenging, as these are highly sensitive issues. However, in our interviews and survey of Ukrainian refugees in the four Nordic countries, one clear finding emerges when comparing across them.
When we ask whether Ukrainian refugees have been offered or have worked in the informal labour market (e.g., without a contract or without paying taxes), Ukrainian refugees in Sweden are twice as likely to report that they themselves – or other Ukrainian refugees they know of – have done so, compared to respondents in Norway, Denmark, and Finland.
The main reason is often financial distress. As one interviewee explained:
"If we had the chance to get a job with a contract, most of us would take it. But we’re just trying to survive – the main issue is how to make ends meet."
When rights are reduced, the most vulnerable end up outside the regulated labour market. This threatens not only their security, but also the social model upon which Nordic societies are built.
Also about Ukraine’s future
And this is not just about the fate of Ukrainian refugees—it is also about Ukraine itself. Millions of Ukrainian citizens currently live in Europe as temporary refugees. The way they are received, the rights they are given, and the possibilities they have for living with dignity affect not only their integration, but may also affect whether they want—or are able—to return home.
Perhaps Sweden’s restrictive model will indeed prompt some Ukrainians to return. But this raises deeper dilemmas. If refugees are pushed into the informal economy or into jobs where their skills and qualifications go unused, we risk deskilling and wasting valuable human resources. By contrast, when refugees are given the opportunity to apply and further develop their competencies, they can become assets—not only for their host countries, but also for Ukraine’s rebuilding and further development.
Vilde Hernes, Senior Researcher, and Aadne Aasland, Research Professor at Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo Metropolitan University
