The collapse of sacred authority: Why Iran is erupting again
In a world that too quickly becomes accustomed to violence, current events in Iran are often presented in isolation from their broader context. At the same time, Iran's political course has long extended far beyond the region: Tehran's cooperation with Russia, Belarus, and North Korea has become one of the key factors directly affecting Ukraine's security. This cooperation translates into virtually daily attacks on Ukrainian cities that claim lives and destroy infrastructure.
My own experience of "cooperation" with the Iranian authorities, beginning on 8 January 2020, is linked to a tragic episode – the downing of passenger flight PS752 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). At that time, I was involved in the negotiation process as the head of the investigative team, which allowed me to become closely acquainted with Iranian tactics: from outright denial and attempts to explain the tragedy as a "technical error," to admitting the launch of two missiles only under pressure from the international community. Even then, the influence of the IRGC over Iran's justice institutions was clearly visible; it was evident that all decisions and statements were coordinated with the Corps. Today, there is a strong sense that the current situation may only further strengthen the IRGC's influence.
What is happening today on the streets of Tehran, Tabriz, Kermanshah, or Shiraz is not a random outburst, but rather the third stage of the same historical process: a deep crisis of political legitimacy.
The renowned German sociologist Max Weber once described three main sources of legitimacy – traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. It is important not to confuse legitimacy with legality, because in this context we are speaking about the very foundations of political power. Weber himself did not believe that these "pure" forms could exist in reality, emphasizing that in practice they are usually mixed.
The key insight, however, is that power endures only as long as society believes it has the right to rule. When this belief collapses, no coercive apparatus can sustain the system for long. Repression may delay collapse, and force may maintain order, but neither the army nor the police can restore lost legitimacy – especially in the context of mass human rights violations and corruption.
Iran's history shows that when a government is unable to govern effectively, it is replaced; when it loses public trust, the regime begins to crack from within. This is precisely where Iran finds itself today.
The First Crisis: The End of a Weak Monarchy
The Qajar dynasty ruled Iran from 1787 to 1925. Formally, the country was governed by a shah, but in practice chronic inefficiency led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, after which Qajar power became largely nominal. The state remained decentralized: tribal leaders, local governors, and the clergy often wielded more real power than the shah, and the country was heavily dependent on foreign powers. The central government was unable to carry out reforms, ensure development, or assert control over key regions.
As a result, in February 1921 a military coup took place, during which units under the command of Reza Savadkuhi entered Tehran and took control of the government. He quickly rose through the ranks, first becoming Minister of War and later Prime Minister. In 1925, the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) legalized the coup, deposed the Qajar dynasty and its last ruler, Ahmad Shah Qajar, and transferred power to Reza Savadkuhi, who became Reza Shah Pahlavi. Thus ended the first stage of the legitimacy crisis.
The Second Crisis: Modernized but Illegitimate Authoritarianism
The Pahlavi dynasty sought to build a strong state, and ultimately suffered because of the very means by which it came to power. The political elite increasingly imposed decisions on citizens, ignoring their customs, traditions, and religious principles.
Although Pahlavi rule was the complete opposite of Qajar weakness, it failed to deliver the substantive changes Iranians desired. There were, however, selective successes: Reza Shah and later his son Mohammad Reza Shah built a centralized state, pursued large-scale modernization and secularization, and reformed education, infrastructure, and the military.
Yet these transformations sharpened internal contradictions, most notably during the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh. Elected by parliament in 1951, Mossadegh quickly became a symbol of Iranians' democratic aspirations. His key reform – the nationalization of the oil industry, previously controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (today's BP) – enjoyed broad public support but triggered an acute international conflict and economic pressure on Iran. Mossadegh also sought to limit the monarch's power by strengthening parliament. In August 1953, however, his government was overthrown in Operation Ajax, organized by the CIA and MI6 with the support of parts of the Iranian political elite. After the coup, Mossadegh was convicted and placed under house arrest, where he spent the rest of his life.
The overthrow of Mossadegh became a turning point: it decisively undermined trust in the monarchy, intensified anti-Western sentiment, and laid the foundations for the ensuing crisis of legitimacy.
What outwardly appeared as a transition to modernity proved to be a façade. The Pahlavis relied on a repressive apparatus, suppressed political opposition and the media, and the SAVAK security service became a symbol of fear. At the same time, social inequality, corruption, discrimination against national minorities, particularly Azerbaijanis and Kurds, and the intensifying alienation between the authorities and citizens intensified.
In 1978, protests swept dozens of cities – from Qom and Tabriz to Tehran. The killing of demonstrators by security forces only deepened public anger. In the autumn and winter, strikes paralyzed key sectors, including the oil industry, significantly weakening the regime. A large part of Iranian society united around the religious leader Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was the most consistent and outspoken opponent of the shah's regime. For decades, he had criticized authoritarian rule, Western dependence, and repression; he enjoyed authority among the clergy and, through sermons and addresses from exile, managed to unite diverse groups – from religious constituencies to secular opposition figures – around the demand to dismantle the monarchy. In January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah left the country, and on 1 February Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran. Within days, the army declared neutrality, and the monarchical regime effectively ceased to exist.
The Third Crisis: The Erosion of the Sacred Foundations of Power
The Islamic Republic of Iran more closely resembles a theocratic-hybrid imitation of a republic. Its legitimacy rests primarily on sacrality: the idea of religious morality, revolutionary justice, and the special spiritual authority of the ruling power.
Over recent decades, the country has faced problems the regime is unable to control or resolve. Corruption has become not an exception but a component of the political system: preferential treatment for businesses close to power, opaque budgetary flows, and the IRGC's role in the economy have all generated chronic distrust. Economic crises – periods of hyperinflation, high unemployment, and declining real incomes – have hit the country in waves since the 1990s and intensified after international sanctions in the 2010s. In addition, systemic human rights violations dating back to the early years after the revolution: suppression of political opposition, censorship, restrictions on women, security force violence, and mass arrests during protests in 1999, 2009, 2017–2018, and 2019 – have created a long historical line of tension that is once again surfacing. The clergy, which long served as a unifying factor, is now itself weakened in favor of the IRGC.
The protests of 2025–2026 were not a response to a single law, but to an entire complex of problems, including the sharp depreciation of the national currency, the Iranian rial, extremely high inflation, and the rapid rise in the cost of living. As before, the authorities responded with violence: thousands killed and detained, internet shutdowns, and information blockades. When a state relies solely on fear, it begins to collapse from within.
The generation of 1979 is gradually passing, and with it an era for which the revolution was a source of legitimacy and obedience. Contemporary Iranian youth no longer regard the values of the Islamic Revolution as grounds for unconditional submission. Religious rhetoric, which for decades served as an instrument of control, no longer functions as a language of persuasion: it cannot respond to the demands of a new generation seeking rights, dignity, and opportunity rather than imposed dogmas.
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Today, it is important not only to understand the causes of the protests in Iran, but also to reflect on their possible political consequences, as these will determine the direction in which the state develops after this wave of violence and repression.
In this context, it is worth emphasizing once again the significant role of the IRGC, which is already one of the most influential institutions in Iran. It possesses its own ground, air, and missile forces, controls internal security, and maintains an extensive autonomous economic infrastructure. This concentration of coercive, political, and financial resources makes the Corps not merely an element of the state apparatus, but an independent center of power capable of exerting substantial influence over strategic decisions and the internal configuration of the regime.
Unfortunately, the current protests may not lead to fundamental change, which would mean the continuation of the legitimacy crisis. The brutal suppression of the protest movement only heightens concerns that the most likely scenario is a further strengthening of the IRGC's role. At the same time, the regime's religious framework, embodied by the Supreme Leader and the clerical institutions associated with him, is likely to be preserved, at least formally, to maintain the illusion of legitimacy. In reality, however, power is likely to rest increasingly on fear, with real levers of governance becoming ever more concentrated in the hands of the security apparatus. Even external intervention would most likely produce similar outcomes. The question is: for how long?