The world of hard power and the future of war against Ukraine

Recently my name appears in the news more often than the weather forecast changes in London. And, to be honest, sometimes with such a level of creativity that I begin to suspect: somewhere there is a separate department that wakes up every day with the thought – "What is Zaluzhnyi thinking today? Even if he doesn't know it yet."

Against the backdrop of another wave of political showdowns, high-profile leaks, the Epstein files, and global conspiracy theories, perhaps it's really worth talking about something less exotic. For example, about the war in Europe.

Moreover, Ukrainians have a certain advantage in this topic – we live in it.

I was asked to speak in Ukrainian today. Because it is the language of a country at war. And it is important to me that this speech is heard not only by experts, but also by those for whom we are speaking here today. That we are heard not only in think tanks, but also in bomb shelters.

I also understand that in the current atmosphere, any word I say can be dissected into quotes faster than a drone dissects a horde of orcs. Therefore, I want to reassure you right away: today there will be no sensations or political statements that could make a headline. Or rather, it is possible, but not desirable.

There are people in this world to quote.

Just one simple thing: reality.

The reality is that the war in Ukraine has long ceased to be just Ukrainian history. It has become the laboratory of the future. And, like any laboratory, it doesn't ask if we are ready for the experiment.

I know I am often described as a "general who thinks in terms of technology." It is true. But I think even more in terms of responsibility. Because technology is changing the way war is fought. And responsibility determines whether this war will be the last or just an introduction to the next one.

And as I'm being discussed so actively in the news, let me take advantage of this opportunity. Not to explain rumors or the influence of someone's thoughts on air temperature. But to explain trends that are changing the whole world. Too bad it's not someone's thoughts.

Because today the question is not who said what. The question is what the world will be like if we pretend nothing is happening.

So let's talk about serious things.

No conspiracy theories. No illusions. And, if possible, no Munich 1938. At least it's not for me.

In 1947, due to the particular excitement of humanity regarding the newly developed atomic bomb, Albert Einstein said the famous phrase: "I don't know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."

With a quote from this smart man, we will begin our dialogue, namely about what Albert Einstein did not know back in 1947.

I believe I have a grand opportunity to tell you what weapons World War III is already being fought and will be fought with, and what should we all do?

Modern, and even more the future warfare has long gone beyond long trenches, powerful tank battles, and air battles.

The desire to survive, the rejection of imposing someone else's will, exceptional creativity and freedom of thought have become the exceptional incentive for Ukrainians to technical progress. And so modern warfare already integrates unmanned and robotic systems, distributed sensor networks, and the entire electromagnetic spectrum, that is, virtual, informational, electromagnetic, and partially physical in a single area of ​​combat operations. All of this is rapidly becoming "intellectualized" under the influence of artificial intelligence technologies.

I have given many lectures, written a large number of articles, about how war has changed and continues to change. I spoke about it here, in this place almost two years ago. Almost no one wanted to believe it, many criticized me. However, now this reality has passed.

Today, it no longer matters who still thinks in terms of peace and lives in the illusions of the past. Today's war between us and the Russian occupiers is what it is. And we know for sure that right now, no country has enough military power to somehow prevent this war.

Summing up the four years of war, I will briefly focus on the main conclusions:

In modern warfare, the battlefield has become completely transparent. This has led to the creation of a robotic kill zone, the depth of which is now at least 25 kilometers, and the ability to destroy logistics is constantly increasing. And today it already leads to the impossibility of using the so-called rear zone up to 50 kilometers deep. The classic logistical "noose", which was successfully invented by us during the liberation of the Kherson region, received a new impetus. All this led to the impossibility of conducting classical offensive or defensive actions. The number of people who can physically perform tasks in a combat zone is minimal. It continues to decline and is actually tending to be replaced by robots.

What about mobilization or the possibility of improving it?

Both Russia's and our experience show that the traditional approach to mobilization in modern warfare has completely exhausted itself.

Firstly, it was this war, long and highly intense, that showed: strangely enough, the most expensive resource in such a war is human, because it takes too much time to restore it, which will be much longer than the production cycles. Such a resource simply cannot be quickly replaced on the battlefield.

Secondly, based on the fact that the battlefield has become transparent and is controlled automatically by robots, the probability of survival of a person no longer depends on the quality of his or her training and leads to inevitable losses, which requires distancing the person from this kill zone.

Thirdly, our own experience also confirms that the issue of mobilization is a sensitive one and one that affects society's resilience in a war of attrition and its willingness to support such a war. That's why Russia is not announcing the mobilization that they sometimes threaten us with. For Russia, fighting with mercenaries and army volunteers and fighting with forcibly mobilized people are different wars, and the political consequences in such wars are different. So, future wars are definitely not multi-million mobilizations of the entire population. It is more about technological and economic mobilization as a guarantee of an inextricable process of ensuring and maintaining technological superiority over the enemy.

Robots today not only perform auxiliary functions, but also conduct individual assault operations and even take live enemy soldiers prisoner. The use of any technology in these kill zone, like with humans, has turned into real suicide.

So the conclusion about demography and war.

The Russian-Ukrainian war has taught countries with their demographic challenges a critically important lesson: the model of warfare that involves exchanging human lives for tactical successes is no longer a logical and affordable option. Only for Russia, although any resource for Russia is exhausted.

On a modern high-tech battlefield, saturated with high-precision weapons systems, such an approach is unacceptable not only from a moral point of view, but also from a tactical point of view. Because, paradoxically, with the increasing manufacturability of the battlefield, it is humans who become the most scarce and the only fundamentally non-renewable resource on it. This is especially true for developed countries, where demographic trends are making traditional approaches to warfare increasingly less acceptable. For example, on the European continent, not a single country, without exception, has a positive fertility rate, and every loss of manpower on the battlefield has not so much military, but primarily socio-economic significance. Thus, the technological evolution towards the "robotization" of war offered an alternative, which allows maintaining combat effectiveness while radically reducing human participation and, as a result, human losses.

The super-expensive precision weapons, which were a real game-changer of the 20th century, have been replaced by weapons of attrition. This is a cheap and mass-produced, yet highly accurate weapon that quickly wears out expensive weapons systems. Systems on which, by the way, the entire NATO doctrine is built. This weapon of attrition is being developed consistently and effectively. Clearly, no country today can handle such an invasion on its own, especially those that are politically cautious. As a result, this calls into question the ability of even resource-rich countries to wage war against smaller ones over a long period of time. And vice versa – it is physically impossible to build rational defense using old approaches, even if there is a resource.

For example, the war in Ukraine showed that there is no particular difference in how many frigates, corvettes, submarines, and even missile cruisers you have in combat readiness. All this can be neutralized by a country that does not have a navy, since it was effectively destroyed at the beginning of the war. And let's be honest, who really controls the Black Sea now?

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that security in the era of new wars is not guaranteed by purchasing expensive and unique products.

And most importantly. Success in a high-intensity war of attrition, in the face of cheapening offensive means and their high effectiveness, depends on the stability of the economy and its ability to be constantly replenished. We will return to it later. Simply put, the ability to maintain military potential for a long time in conditions of constant tension, complex logistics, and accelerated technological change.

It is the economy, combined with political and social readiness, that becomes the lifeblood of war. And it is precisely this that is the main goal of the opposing sides. How to make the economy lead to Victory? To do this, there are two stages in the war for the economy. First, it is transferred to military tracks, mobilized, and then it is fueled. The most difficult issue today for Ukraine. And what does it mean to mobilize or put the economy on a state of war? It's simple. To ensure that, as a result of the implemented set of measures, military production planning becomes part of military operations planning and does not depend on external supplies. Without pathos and loud statements. Do we see this in Russia? Yes. There are all signs that the Russian economy has been put on military rails and is part of state policy. We already feel the consequences of this every day and every night. By the way, when we talk about the future, remember that it is almost impossible to stop such a military machine. It can only be destroyed. That is why every war was inevitably followed by an arms race.

More about the economy. I assure you that traditional defense-industrial models – centralized factories, long supply chains, rigid production cycles – are no longer suitable for modern conditions. In addition to creating a large number of critical vulnerabilities, they are almost incapable of adapting to real operational conditions.

When talking about the brutal war of attrition in Ukraine, it is of course necessary to remember that this is a war against economic opportunities. The most vulnerable part of this economy energy was revealed. Energy infrastructure in Ukraine has traditionally been built according to a centralized model: large power plants and a single network connecting the regions. However, this war clearly showed that such a system is vulnerable to targeted attacks. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, strikes on power plants and grids became the main tool of war. The aggressor's goal became cutting off power to the cities. By the end of 2024, up to 80% of the capacity of thermal power plants in Ukraine had been taken out of service, and energy transmission to the population had been halved. As a result, in 2026, millions of people found themselves in the cold and without electricity in the winter.

Centralized facilities (large thermal power plants, hydroelectric power plants, nuclear power plants, power lines) become the "Achilles heel" of national security during war. If the enemy destroys several key nodes, entire regions are plunged into darkness. Therefore, energy security is inextricably linked not only to the stability of the economy during war, but also becomes part of national security. The protection of energy facilities is becoming as important as the protection of territories.

To fully understand the current situation, we need to focus on some more aspects.

First of all, nuclear weapons. What about them?

In my personal opinion, today this super-powerful weapon most likely resembles a fig leaf on the body of an Atlantean, which hides the true capabilities of the one who carries it. It only says that there is something behind it, but doesn't show any real abilities. It is a weapon of self-destruction, first and foremost. But it is certainly not a weapon of deterrence. For example, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, while absolutely dangerous, has today become more a hostage to economic and political pressure than a danger.

Next aspect. Missiles. Yes, they remain in active use, despite the significant cost of production. At the same time, their functional purpose has changed from purely military use to participation in the so-called "missile terror", which is intended specifically to strike at the economic capabilities of the state. This type of weapon will likely remain the most expensive in a war of attrition, not only because of the cost of production, but also because of the impossibility at the current stage of using other defense solutions, besides anti-missile systems, which, of course, will be more expensive than the means of attack themselves.

Missiles are becoming another weapon of state attrition. This is obvious. On the other hand, their limited quantity in production will always provide predicted needs for air defense equipment, which, with the correct tactics of application, can bring results by limiting the attrition effect. Of course, the very presence of such missiles will encourage the enemy to have more expensive air defense systems, which will have quite a noticeable impact on the economy. That is why some are quite cautious about the possibility of Ukraine having such weapons. Because this is indeed the path to our victory, and also part of the forgotten theory of non-nuclear deterrence.

Separately, to understand the full picture, I will focus on airplanes. The Russian military space forces are the second most powerful in the world, second only to the United States. So, in terms of the total number of combat aircraft, Russia has a huge advantage over Ukraine. However, Russian aircraft very rarely dare to enter deep into Ukrainian territory, due to the threat of being shot down by air defense systems of the same Western production. Classic air battles are also rare in this war. All because of the cost. For example, a 4th generation Su-30 fighter costs about $50 million and can be easily shot down by a missile to the PATRIOT system costing $4.5 million. Such simple arithmetic shows that this weapon cannot be a weapon of attrition, but as a platform for using such weapons it is used quite effectively. So today, the role of attack aircraft still remains as a platform for striking ground targets with weapons of attrition and as a carrier of air defense systems. However, without entering the zone of contact with enemy air defense systems. We can confidently state the emergence of own kill zone for manned aviation and only confirm that humans are moving further and further away from this zone. This situation in the sky makes it possible to conduct an operation to break through the enemy's air defense system precisely by exhausting it with other means. Of course, this will require resources.

All of the above only describes in general terms the changes that occurred after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the largest conflict in Europe since World War II. I would like to note once again that as a result of the development of scientific and technological progress, each domain (marine, air, land, space, cyber) has already undergone a profound transformation and continues to rapidly transform under the influence of the development of artificial intelligence technologies. This process has fundamentally changed the role of traditional weapons and has undoubtedly influenced not only the nature of combat operations, but also the process of training, organization, and formation of defense capabilities.

All this forces military strategy, tactics, and operational art to adapt. It is the emergence of new technological solutions that leads to the most revolutionary changes in the conduct of hostilities. In the past it was gunpowder, airplanes, or nuclear weapons. Today it is unmanned systems and artificial intelligence.

So, when we talk about the war of the future, we must state that the revolution in military technologies based on unmanned systems and artificial intelligence provides unprecedented tools for war and the destruction of the enemy's military-economic potential. However, it is already possible to see the main trends in the development of these technologies. The main functions that are constantly developing, including through the introduction of artificial intelligence into the process, and pose a threat are the swarm application function and the autonomy function.

Simply put, in the near future, with the development of the resource base and hardware, we will see smarter and cheaper drones attacking in dozens and even hundreds from different directions and altitudes, simultaneously from the air, land, and water.

At the same time, the autonomy of these drones will develop in two main directions. Or in a single centralized digital space, in a common system of management and interaction in real time. Where all actions and processes are still controlled by a person, albeit with the help of AI. Or through fully autonomous, robotic complexes ("swarms"), both combat and support. Such drones will be endowed with a high level of individual artificial intelligence that learns and develops in real time within the limits necessary to perform combat missions, do not require constant communication with each other or with command nodes to carry out their assigned missions.

This is actually a transfer of responsibility to a separate tactical system (drone).

Of course, it is possible to consider the option of combining these basic architectures. Namely, to take advantage of the network when possible and go into autonomous "darkness" when there is simply no other choice.

Then, logically, the most urgent task for those who need long-term security guarantees is, among other things, work on improving swarm intelligence algorithms on the one hand and finding ways to struggle and opposition drone swarms on the other. Of course, the "laboratory" itself, where all this is being tested now, is located in Ukraine. Let me remind you that on the night of September 6-7, 2025, Kyiv was attacked simultaneously by 862 drones – Shahed-type kamikaze.

So whether we agree or not, the future of war is a war of autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic systems. It is the competition to use the full potential of autonomous swarm UAVs that will obviously be able to provide a decisive advantage both in direct combat effectiveness and in the possibilities of security guarantees. Of course, the prospects for developing drone swarm technologies (UAVs, ground-based, surface, underwater) in Ukraine need to be considered due to the critical dependence on global microelectronics supply chains. Therefore, future security alliances will likely be built on the resource-security principle. Unfortunately, for Ukraine, the development of relevant national capabilities is impossible without the full implementation of a sustainable partnership and the implementation of an appropriate policy in the field of digital products and services for military purposes.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is currently in a transitional period from a technological point of view. This is a period when technologies are rapidly developing, but their development is still insufficient to, for example, completely eliminate the presence of humans in a combat zone or ensure the complete autonomy of unmanned systems.

However, the implementation of operational tasks of a classic war has been completely impossible for more than two years. Traditional weapons and structures are still used, but are gradually being phased out or transformed. In the face of Russia's failure to achieve the political goal of the war and Ukraine's refusal to surrender, Russia is increasing the intensity of attacks on infrastructure, energy systems, transport hubs, and other key elements of state governance and life support. Therefore, the strategy of war is no longer aimed at capturing territories, but rather at exhausting the enemy's resources and capabilities precisely to achieve own goals.

All this is happening against the backdrop of the expected imbalance of the old world order. This is also exacerbated by the US policy of non-compliance with the international legal framework, which could lead to the ultimate destruction of the existing international system. A system that could, purely theoretically, take measures against an aggressor country and serve as a future support for, for example, a peace treaty. In particular, the above-mentioned steps by the United States exacerbate contradictions within NATO and lead to a decrease in both the real effectiveness of the Alliance and coordinated assistance to Ukraine.

Russia is using this situation to reduce sanctions, deploy its military-industrial complex, accumulate the necessary technologies, and receive additional support from China. By inviting Ukraine to negotiations, is starting a war at a much higher strategic level. A war against women, children, and the elderly, without sparing neither expensive missiles nor "Shaheds", forcing them to freeze in cold cities, hoping for a quick surrender.

In such a situation, when the tension and intensity of the war of attrition are growing, of course, it is necessary to find a solution that would not only not harm the current geopolitical situation, but also become the basis for future peace, a peace based on the strength of potential opportunities, not obligations.

Such a solution may involve performing three parallel tasks.

The first and most difficult task is to maintain the maximum number of partners and respect their interests, without which it is impossible today to withstand Russian strikes, exert pressure, and actually build a future defense alliance, without harming future allies. This is a delicate and balanced diplomatic work that had no analogues in world history due to the absolutely unprecedented conditions in which all participants in this process found themselves.

Because the old rules no longer work, but there are still great hopes, and the new ones have not even been formulated yet. And when this will happen, in what perspective, is unknown.

Perhaps the main condition for this process is the preservation, first of all, of democracy and freedom and the standard of living, which is the main asset of, for example, Europe. At the same time, there is a great risk of reaching situational agreements, cynical arrangements, and short-term interests without any common framework.

However, this must be done. Because the lessons of this war indicate the need to join forces to create defensive capabilities. This war, as well as an analysis of the current development of the military capabilities of the world's leading countries, demonstrate the following: individual states will be able to independently create a technological advantage in certain areas, but no state will be able to ensure self-sufficiency in the entire spectrum of critical military technologies. Therefore, the search for alliances and partnerships to jointly develop and share advanced technologies and strengthen production capacities will become an absolute necessity not only for us, but also for countries that will seek to ensure their own technological advantage and competitive capabilities in potential conflicts. Of course, I am talking about Europe, where Russia will remain a source of danger for an indefinite period.

We will need technological alliances, not treaty articles, where countries will unite their resources, technologies, and innovation potential with us to achieve a shared strategic advantage and, as a result, gain the power of potential opportunity.

The second crucial task is to stabilize the front line and protect critical facilities and infrastructure. It is precisely the achievement of tactical successes, even through own high losses of manpower and energy terror, that is the main subject, on the one hand, of pressure on those who can influence, if not the end of the war, then at least the lifting of sanctions and our support and intimidation of future partners, on the other.

When it is already clear that this is a war of attrition, where the main goal is the survival of the economy, it is necessary to move away from the classic strategy of inflicting maximum losses and consistently defeating the enemy. In addition, probably due to the impossibility of resolving the issue of improving mobilization and the mismatch of demographic indicators with Russia, the only strategy is not a symmetrical response and following the logic of the enemy, but replacing the very essence of war. It is necessary to make the war more expensive for Russia and, as a result, lead to inevitable defeat. Then, it is obvious that today the task of stabilizing the contact line is possible only through maximum defense technologization. But the transition to high-tech defense is possible only if there are stable defensive positions. If these positions are at unfavorable frontiers and the front line is not stable, this can negate the possibilities of technological advantage. For example, through the dispersion of efforts to eliminate tactical breakthroughs. Stable defensive positions can also provide reduced stress and fatigue for those who are there, as well as allow for the preparation of necessary reserves and the scaling of optimal technological solutions.

It is also important to understand that all of this must occur with the acquisition of the necessary management discipline, which will provide the necessary advantage. That is why Russia constantly uses the tactics of infiltration and control of rear areas, not only to seize additional territories, but also to prevent us from gaining the technological initiative. The situation is similar with the protection of critical infrastructure. The problem is not even that more air defense and innovative solutions are needed to protect it, but that this system, such as energy supply, can no longer exist and be protected in the form in which it was created in the 1950s. Presumably, in such conditions, more attention should be paid to energy decentralization strategies as a way to increase the country's resilience to any strikes.

It was the military actions and their consequences that gave this concept urgency: decentralization turned from a question of efficiency into a question of the country's survival. Energy decentralization involves a transition from a few large energy sources to many small ones distributed across the territory. This is the implementation of the concept of distributed generation: electricity and heat are produced closer to the consumer at local low-power power plants, renewable power plants, micro and mini-grids. It is this architecture that will significantly increase the survivability of the power system in the face of the threat of weapons of attrition. This is an extremely complex process, but obvious and predictable, unlike promises not to destroy such a system or produce more air defense systems.

Presumably, the reconstruction process should begin now, without waiting for a "peace deal", which may not happen, and launch a new format of peacekeepers who do not fight, but rebuild.

The main conclusion is that the energy system has become a new front in the war, and its stability determines the outcome of the confrontation. The transition from the Soviet centralized network to a modern decentralized, hybrid system is not only modernization, but also the country's ability to survive, and therefore win.

In any case, the preservation and protection of critical infrastructure must be based on real, not expected and uncontrolled, capabilities.

The third task is to convince our partners of the need to impose tangible sanctions and not to reduce the sanctions regime against Russia. In a war of attrition, this is the only effective mechanism for ending the war, which consists in depriving the aggressor of the very possibility of waging war.

Russia's recent activity in the United States and increased terror of our cities indicate tangible problems in the Russian economy. This is a real signal that is actually coming from within the Russian state apparatus. The worsening economic situation and the threat of civilian deaths in the war are gradually creating a fundamentally different situation in the perception of the ruling regime by Russians and calling into question the stability of the entire totalitarian regime. It was this kind of explosion of the "economic crisis" that once forced the Soviet Union to end the war in Afghanistan and led to a phase of loss of control.

The military economy, filled with huge spending on defense orders and mercenary payments, must be reaching a breaking point.

It is very important for us to continue to strike at the sources of Russian revenue, in parallel with the sanctions support of our partners. Among the main measures should be reducing purchases of Russian energy resources and combating the shadow fleet, especially in the Baltic Sea.

Of course, Russia will have money for the war to the last. However, the understanding that the restrictions of its economic opportunities and isolation must be irreversible and the only thing that can lead to the end of the war.

Any war is another mistake of humanity and a huge tragedy. And although the causes of war are easily ascertained and always understandable, its consequences are completely unpredictable.

Every war is unique in its own way. Each of them has always required its own unique strategy. However, the one thing that unites all wars is their essence – they are always an act of violence, and the fact that they end. It is precisely because of its essence, because of violence, that humanity, guided by the instinct of self-preservation, has always tried to end and has ended war. Even the Hundred Years' War, which lasted almost 116 years, has ended. It is obvious that the war, which has been going on for 13 years in Ukraine, must end. This is an inevitable process that must finalize and consolidate the achievement of the political goals of the warring parties. It is important that human suffering in complete conscious violence almost never ended wars. Not always in history, and if at all, then with great exception, someone managed to achieve their goals. Therefore, each side has the right to justify its losses and only its own inherent historical justice. And this is what sometimes encourages more and more participants to war, which is why wars eventually become not only long, but also global. And now, trying to satisfy the appetites of another aggressor, the world stands on the threshold of another war, which, as we know, is completely unknown how it will end.

Therefore, the world community has a choice. Whether to become the "Munich traitors" of the 21st century and accept all the suffering of war, or stop the war in such a way as to avoid another one. There is still no need to send one's own soldiers to war.

For now, it is enough for our friends to at least show their will and show their attitude towards the fact that yesterday's murderers of Ukrainian children will participate in the Paralympic Games. By the way, every disaster began after such Olympics, where sport seemed to be outside of politics.

We, Ukrainians, have no choice. We will either perish or survive. The formula for survival is simple: keep fighting, strengthen the economy, and maintain unity.