Reaching Alabuga and Grozny: how Ukraine extends drone strikes beyond 1,000km
Since the advent of long-range drones, Ukrainian engineers and military planners have been working to extend their maximum strike range to the fullest extent possible.
Many of Russia's most high-value targets sit more than 1,000 km away, including airfields, oil and gas infrastructure, defence plants and permanent garrisons. Even the mere possibility that they can be reached forces Russia to react and reallocate resources to protect facilities across a much wider area.
Among OSINT analysts who log hits on Russian sites using open-source reporting and satellite imagery, the term "longstrike" has become a common shorthand.
For a long time, these long-range strikes amounted to sporadic one-off operations, noticed by only a small circle of observers. In 2025, the pattern shifted as Ukrainian drones began turning up in Russia's deep rear airspace month after month.
In October and November 2025, open sources logged nine Ukrainian drone strikes launched from more than 1,000km behind the front line, and that tally covers only the incidents captured in the public domain.
OSINT analyst Harbuz (Pumpkin) from the Dnipro OSINT channel has outlined for Ukrainska Pravda (UP) how Ukraine's long-range strike campaign evolved, how effective the earliest raids proved and how Ukrainian drones have increasingly been showing up over parts of Russia where they are least expected.
First strikes and their effectiveness
In early 2024, Ukraine's defence forces began fielding the flagship of its unmanned fleet in meaningful numbers: the Liutyi (Fierce) drone, initially credited with a reach of up to 1,000 km. That puts plenty of targets in European Russia within range but still falls short of several high-value sites farther afield.
One such target sits in the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan, about 1,200 km from the line of contact, where Russia has set up production of Iranian-designed Shahed-136 drones used to terrorise Ukrainian cities. There, it has established domestic production of components and moved on to producing modified variants.
At that point, Ukraine lacked any weapon with the reach to disrupt Russia's effort, but 2024 saw the first attempts to overcome that range constraint.
On the morning of 2 April 2024, students at Alabuga Polytech, a technical college also linked to combat drone production, ran from their accommodation while workers in the special economic zone and military personnel scattered in panic. A Ukrainian one-way attack drone flew more than 1,200 km for the first time before diving into the accommodation blocks at Alabuga.
OSINT analysts later identified the platform from published images as an Aeroprakt A-22, a Ukrainian light civilian aircraft converted into an unmanned system, in what is regarded as the first recorded Ukrainian long-range strike.
Attack by a Ukrainian drone on Alabuga Polytech student accommodation (top) and OMON barracks in the Chechen city of Grozny (bottom)
The strike's effectiveness was questioned almost immediately. Many analysts believed the drone was intended to hit the main Shahed assembly workshops rather than the student accommodation and that something went awry. Yet even a direct hit on the production workshops might have delivered limited results, as drone strikes rarely inflict decisive damage on hardened defence industrial facilities. The operation's true objective is known only to the military.
Experiments with long-range strikes continued. On 6 November 2024, the same drone flew more than 1,100 km and struck a mooring area used by military vessels in the Russian Republic of Dagestan. The impact was difficult to judge: no ships were reported damaged but satellite imagery taken afterwards suggested that almost all warships of the Russian Caspian fleet left the port in the wake of the attack.
In December 2024, a similar Ukrainian drone made it to an OMON base in the Chechen city of Grozny, about 900 km from the front line.
By 2025, a different drone was turning up in Russia's deep airspace: the E-300 Enterprise, built around the Skyranger Ninja civilian aircraft and first unveiled in 2022.
In technical terms, the E-300 is a step on from the earlier A-22 conversion. Images of debris posted by Russian sources suggest it carries dedicated mounts, electro-optical sensors and a targeting and observation turret, enabling the operator to release munitions. In effect, it is a remotely piloted strike drone-bomber, capable of being flown and tasked against a range of targets.
The most concentrated use of these drones came on 23 April 2025 at the by now familiar Alabuga site. The Telegram channel Nikolaevskyi Vaniok reported that five strike drones carrying heavy warheads hit Shahed-type drone production facilities that morning. The author added that the route and tasking were unconventional, with the flight distance put at roughly 1,700 km.
Reports of six UAVs were partly backed up by footage shot by local residents, showing several drones in the same frame.
However, the claim of five successful hits is difficult to accept at face value. Satellite imagery posted later paints a different picture: there appears to have been just one impact and it landed in open ground between buildings rather than striking a workshop.
Another drone attack on Alabuga took place on 15 June 2025. Footage later emerged showing an aerial bomb striking a car park near a checkpoint. Whether this location was the intended target remains unclear.
It appears that accuracy remains a significant challenge when using this type of UAV. Another drawback is the relatively low cruising speed and large physical size of the drone, which makes it an easy target for air defence systems. This is why Russian units have increasingly been deploying FPV interceptor drones against Ukrainian fixed‑wing UAVs.
In addition to the main attack drones, the Russians have on several occasions posted photographs of a Ukrainian glider drone that was transported on a "trailer" attached to a large UAV. This configuration was observed during one of the subsequent attacks on Alabuga on 15-16 June 2025. At present, it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of strikes conducted in this setup.
Despite the lack of clear data on results, these efforts marked an important starting point. Alongside these experimental strikes, Ukrainian developers began upgrading existing strike drones to achieve longer ranges. This involved changes to internal layout, warheads aerodynamics and onboard equipment.
One notable example is the Liutyi UAV. In its long‑range strike version, the most visible external change is the removal of landing gear, which improves aerodynamics and reduces weight. The first confirmed successful use of the long‑range Liutyi was recorded on 7 July 2025. On that day, two drones attacked the Kupol Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, some 1,300 kilometres from the line of contact. The factory produces surface‑to‑air missile systems and long‑range drones. Two workshops were destroyed in the strike, one used for metalworking and another for soldering microchips. According to the ASTRA Telegram channel, three Russian employees were killed and 45 injured.
Following this, the new modification of the Liutyi began appearing more frequently in Russian airspace. At least four confirmed cases have been recorded in which it successfully struck targets at distances exceeding 1,000 kilometres. Its key advantage is accuracy.
Another entrant in the long‑range strike niche is a product from the well‑known company Fire Point – the FP‑1 drone. Its stated strike range is up to 1,600 kilometres. This extended range is likely achieved, at least in part, by reducing the size of the warhead.
Only one successful long‑distance use of the FP‑1 has been confirmed so far. In September 2025, the Polkovnyk GSh ("Colonel of the General Staff") Telegram channel reported an attack using these drones on a pumping station and an oil tanker near the Transneft‑Port oil terminal in the city of Primorsk which is approximately 1,000 kilometres from the line of active hostilities.
Long‑range strikes have become systematic
It is important to note that the examples above include only those cases where both the drone model and the fact of a successful strike could be identified using open sources. In reality, the range of Ukrainian drones is broader and the number of strikes at distances beyond 1,000 kilometres is higher. This is also reflected in the statistics.
The author of this analysis has collected open‑source data on Ukrainian drone strikes at distances of 900 kilometres or more since 2024 as well as all reported instances of Ukrainian UAVs flying at such distances. These reports come primarily from Russian monitoring Telegram channels.
As the chart shows, in 2024 long‑range strikes appeared to be sporadic and incidental. From 2025 onwards, however, they resemble a systematic campaign, reaching a peak in October and November.
More than half (56%) of the recorded attacks resulted in actual strikes, meaning the drones were not merely detected but successfully reached strategic targets.
Targets hit at distances of over 900 kilometres included 14 attacks on oil and gas infrastructure – oil refineries, pumping stations and offshore oil platforms in the Caspian Sea – and eight attacks on defence industry facilities, including chemical plants and infrastructure used to assemble long‑range Shahed drones. The remaining targets included military barracks in Chechnya, vessels and a logistics centre in Tatarstan.
The ability to strike oil infrastructure at such distances is particularly significant, as more than half of Russia's refining capacity lies within a 1,000-3,000 kilometre radius of the line of contact.
In addition to oil and gas facilities, critically important facilities of Russia's defence industry are also located more than 1,000 kilometres away. These include Uralvagonzavod, Uraltransmash, the Perm Powder Plant, the Kazan Aircraft Production Association and many other key facilities.
Disabling defence industry plants is far more difficult than damaging oil refining infrastructure. Refineries remain more vulnerable targets: in some cases, minimal damage to critical equipment is sufficient to halt individual units.
By contrast, defence industry facilities require either a prolonged, systematic campaign or several precisely targeted strikes using high‑powered munitions, something long‑range drones are not designed to deliver. There is no evidence of the systematic use of such weapons so far, although experimental launches are continuing.
The success of long‑range – and other – drone attacks depends heavily on the quality of planning, particularly in identifying and bypassing Russia's air defence system. The first defenсe layer is the most challenging, as it is protected by short‑range systems such as the Tor‑M1/M2 and Pantsir‑S1. This area sees the highest interception rate due to the high density of air defences along the border and near the line of contact.
Strikes deep inside Russia always require extensive preparation by Ukrainian forces. Firstly, suitable strike assets must be available. These are limited in number, far from perfect and Russia is already learning how to counter such deep penetrations. Secondly, a detailed flight plan must be drawn up, with careful selection of the optimal route.
The Russians are observing patterns in the routes and targets of Ukrainian drones and are trying to strengthen their defences accordingly. This can be seen clearly in the Alabuga area after just three Ukrainian UAV strikes. Satellite imagery taken on different dates shows 11 Pantsir‑S1 air defence positions deployed across an area of 24 sq km.
This demonstrates not only Russia's defence capabilities, but also the fact that the mere possibility that Ukraine can strike at long range is enough to force Russia to redeploy air defence systems away from the line of contact and other areas in order to protect facilities within a strike radius that has continued to expand over the past two years.
Translation: Ganna (Anna) Bryedova, Tetiana Buchkovska
Editing: Susan McDonald