Ukraine does not have enough air defence missiles to destroy hundreds of Russian aerial targets every day. No country in the world produces such large numbers of expensive air defence systems.
Ukrainian mobile fire groups equipped with machine guns create problems for Russian drones, but they shoot down only a small portion of the targets. The same applies to helicopter pilots who repel some threats, but they cannot cover everything.
Interceptor drones have become one of the innovative solutions complementing Ukraine's air defence system. They are simple to manufacture, can be scaled up quickly and cost far less than anti-aircraft missiles or expensive gun systems. Most importantly, they are far cheaper than Russian Shahed drones. On the Brave1 Market defence tech platform, the price of a single interceptor usually ranges from UAH 50,000 to 100,000 (from about US$1,140 to US$2,275).
Volunteers are raising billions of hryvnias to purchase such drones, while the state is reforming the air defence system to incorporate new small-scale capabilities. A sign of major change is the appointment of Colonel Pavlo "Lasar" Yelizarov, commander of the legendary Lasar's Group, as First Deputy Commander of the Air Force for small air defence.
According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, around 1,000 interceptor drones are being produced in Ukraine every day, based on figures from January. However, far more are needed to respond to all Russian threats.
Meanwhile, interceptor drones alone are not enough to build an effective small-scale air defence system. Their deployment requires trained crews, supporting technical infrastructure, and a well-organised command and logistics system.
Ukrainska Pravda journalists visited the training centre of the Serhii Prytula Charity Foundation, where they spoke with the foundation's specialists about this technology. As part of the largest defence fundraiser – the Yedynozbir ("One United Fundraiser") worth UAH 1 billion – the foundation is helping procure everything needed for interceptor operations.
In this article, we explain how small air defence works against Russian targets and why it is more complicated than simply manufacturing interceptor drones.
All the data and photographs published were approved by the military and representatives of the foundation.
What types of interceptor drones are there?
Interceptor drones are used for two main tasks. The first is intercepting Russian reconnaissance drones near the line of contact at high altitudes, and the second is shooting down Shahed and Gerbera UAVs.
These two tasks require different tactics, coordination and equipment. In other words, an interceptor capable of shooting down a Russian Orlan at an altitude of 5,000 m over a frontline city may not cope with a Shahed near Kyiv or Lviv.
There are two types of interceptors: fixed-wing drones and multicopters.
Fixed-wing drones resemble small reconnaissance aircraft. They carry a warhead and additional target detection and tracking systems, and they are launched using a catapult.
A fixed-wing interceptor has a relatively low speed of up to 160–180 km/h. However, such an aircraft can remain in the air longer and reach higher altitudes.
If a mission fails, the drone can be used again by safely landing it, restoring it and launching it a second time. To make this possible, the detonation initiation board is designed so that the drone explodes not on contact but on the operator's command.
Multicopters are drones similar to standard FPV systems in terms of control and launch. They take off vertically from solid platforms and can reach high speeds of 350 or even 400 km/h. Such drones can be controlled either with a standard FPV controller and goggles or via an expensive control panel in a case with a screen.
The main drawback of multicopters is their short time in the air. If a fixed-wing drone misses its target, it may still have time for a second attempt or simply return to base. A multicopter, however, may not have enough battery power for additional manoeuvres. Moreover, landing a copter equipped with explosives for reuse is dangerous.
Nevertheless, preparing fixed-wing drones for launch takes about 15 minutes. This includes longer checks, pre-flight procedures, work with the warhead, adjustments and preparation of the catapult. After the first launch, reloading the catapult takes about the same amount of time, which makes it impossible to create a mass launch of interceptors in one direction.
A multicopter, in contrast, can be launched within one minute after being placed on the launch pad. It is much simpler to prepare for take-off, and several dozen such UAVs can be launched within a short period of time.
As a result, fixed-wing drones are better suited for hunting slow, high-flying Russian reconnaissance drones, while multicopters are used to intercept groups of faster Shahed drones flying much lower.
Radars, vehicles and situation centres
However, a drone alone is not enough for successful "hunting". Effective interception requires a system – rapid decision-making, mobility of interceptor crews and supporting infrastructure.
Interception is possible only if there is a ground station with a control console, a catapult for launching aircraft-type drones, the interceptor drones themselves, specialised vehicles for mobile teams, and access to radar data that tracks both the target and the interceptor drone.
An interceptor crew consists of three or four people: the pilot, who directly controls the drone; the navigator, who tracks the target's movement and assists with targeting; the technician, who prepares the drone for launch; and an engineer, who equips the warhead before the flight.
Three-coordinate radars are primarily used to detect drones. These radars can identify Russian aerial assets at distances of tens of kilometres, determine their altitude and simultaneously track the interceptor drone itself.
This allows operators to know the locations of both their own and Russian drones. The objective is to "match" the drones before the interceptor's battery runs out or the Russian UAV disappears from radar.
Each crew operates within a designated zone linked to a fixed radar, through which they receive all information about Russian aerial assets.
Overall data from dozens of radars is sent to situation centres, where representatives from various units, including interceptor crews, work together. These centres coordinate operations between crews and determine which air defence assets to deploy.
Crews take up their positions before Russian drones enter Ukrainian airspace.
Interceptors are housed in specialised vehicles equipped with racks and mounts that protect the drones from damage during transport. Mobility and reaction speed are crucial factors in ensuring crews can begin operations before Russian drones appear.
Operations against Russian reconnaissance drones
"Everything began with intercepting reconnaissance drones using ordinary FPV drones, which were either detonated remotely or rammed into the enemy," explains Kyryl Liukov, Head of the UAV division at the Serhii Prytula Charity Foundation. "We studied this and decided to switch to fixed-wing interceptor drones. This platform can carry more systems, stay in the air longer, cover greater distances and operate even when GPS is jammed."
The foundation's Clear Sky project purchased these fixed-wing interceptors along with the necessary infrastructure, raising nearly 151 million hryvnias [about US$3.46 million]. The drones can stay airborne for over an hour, are equipped with digital cameras and have secure radio communications over 35 km.
Unlike fixed cameras, these drones have gimballed cameras that move at certain angles, keeping the Russian aerial asset in sight.
Since the foundation began operating these interceptors, over 830 Russian reconnaissance drones have been downed, including Supercam, ZALA, Orlan and others.
Russian drones typically operate at altitudes of 2,000 to 5,000 m, though cloud cover sometimes forces them down to 1,000 to 1,500 m, which can make them easier to engage.
Because reconnaissance drones are small, they can disappear from radar. Accurate calibration of ground-based radars is essential to track such small, slow aerial assets continuously.
Over time, Russian drones have become equipped with evasion systems. When a Ukrainian interceptor approaches, the reconnaissance drone will manoeuvre left or right.
Manoeuvring an interceptor aggressively is risky, as it can stall. In some cases, Russian evasion tactics still succeed, though they usually abort the mission afterwards.
Confirmed records include the interception of Russian drones over 50 km from their launch point and the downing of an Orlan-10 at an altitude of 5,500 m.
"Sometimes, after the detonation command, the drone didn't explode. The pilot would then use it to ram the target. There are many cases where the drone could be recovered and reused," Liukov recalls.
"We have a unit that flew a single interceptor 50 times – taking off, failing to find an aerial asset and landing again. Imagine landing a polystyrene plane 50 times and still being able to fly it again!" adds the foundation's specialist.
Even if an interceptor fails to destroy a Russian drone, the crew's work affects Russian reconnaissance. In areas where they lose many drones, they conduct reconnaissance in a limited way or temporarily suspend flights of costly UAVs.
Hunting Shahed drones
The main difference between a Shahed or Gerbera UAV and a reconnaissance drone is that their larger size makes them far easier to detect on radar. They fly predictable routes and don't manoeuvre, which reduces the time from launch to detection by an interceptor.
When Shaheds operate in groups rather than individually, interceptors must be launched en masse – achieved using multicopters.
The pilot must perform a high-precision strike on the drone's warhead, located at the front. Videos often show the interceptor flying alongside or slightly ahead of the Shahed before it is detonated. An aerial explosion guarantees destruction in mid-air. If the drone is only knocked off course, it can fall unpredictably and detonate on the ground – a risk interceptors always try to avoid.
Serhii "Varshava", commander of the interception company of the Darknode battalion of the 412th Nemesis Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade, told Oboronka that the Russians have begun launching Shahed drones at extremely low altitudes. Previously, they flew above 500 metres, which reduced the effectiveness of our mobile fire groups, but now they are flying at extremely low altitudes, sometimes as low as 100 metres.
"When the enemy started losing large numbers of drones because of our work, they began flying very low. This makes them difficult to detect," Varshava explains. "There are situations when the drone appears almost directly above us, yet it is not visible on radar. This happens because they are concealed by trees and the natural landscape. That is why mobile fire group crews must be positioned along such sections of the route."
In January, the Nemesis unit shot down 276 Shahed drones. This is a record among all units of the defence forces.
The Russians are improving their Shahed drones, making them controllable. Control is carried out from ground control stations on the territory of Russia, as well as through a mesh network whose nodes include the same Shahed and Gerbera drones. This provides the Russians with stable and reliable communication.
A controllable Shahed can be visually identified by its distinctive antenna. However, "Varshava" says that the proportion of such drones remains quite low. Most of them still fly pre-programmed missions.
"Another technical improvement installed on the Shaheds is a rear-view camera. When it detects our interceptor, the drone performs a manoeuvre similar to the one programmed in reconnaissance drones," explains the commander of the Darknode battalion's interception company.
He says that the unit also has experience in shooting down jet-powered Shahed drones. The Russians use these for particularly important targets. The radar immediately shows what type of drone is approaching the unit, allowing the soldiers on site to prepare in advance to intercept a high-speed target.
"We have shot down Shaheds equipped with PTM-3 mines, which they release from special containers. This is how the Russians have mined roads and railway lines," the commander emphasises.
The unit has also shot down drones armed with R-60 air-to-air missiles and with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). "Varshava" notes that it is impossible to determine from radar whether a Shahed carries additional equipment or not. For this reason, such technical upgrades used by the Russians remain dangerous for our helicopters and aircraft.
Problems and technological development
Like any rapidly developing technology, interceptors have also encountered their own challenges.
One of the main bottlenecks for crews remains the flight time of the interceptors. This significantly ties the crews to launch locations, which must be positioned close to the flight paths of the Shahed drones. On the fixed-wing interceptors, batteries last no more than one and a half hours. While this is generally sufficient to destroy a target, it does not allow for the idea of maintaining constant interceptor patrols in the air near the front.
Another sensitive issue is the overlap of radar coverage. While the radar system in the rear operates in a stable fashion, near the front the military frequently has to relocate radars due to constant attacks. Their coverage zones overlap with one another, creating interference and complicating the work of the interceptors. This problem is expected to be addressed by the newly established Air Defence Unmanned Systems Command.
To counter Shahed drones, the launch rate needs to increase significantly. This depends on timely detection. Kyryl Liukov, a UAV specialist at the Serhii Prytula Charity Foundation, says that reliance should not be placed on radars alone but also on a large-scale system of sensors that can be installed on towers, tall buildings or specialised masts.
As "Varshava" notes, the implementation of automated interception of enemy drones may be hindered by weather conditions, to which all drones remain sensitive. For this reason, Darknode is currently scaling up the simplest and most effective piloted solutions.
"Right now I see two main tasks that must be completed before we can talk about automating interception. The first is saturating the defence line with a large number of crews and systems, which is already possible. This would cover most directions from which enemy UAVs approach," says the commander of the interception company in Darknode, outlining his view.
"The second is that Ukrainian manufacturers need to develop an all-weather interceptor drone that does not lose effectiveness in difficult weather conditions. Even if, at first, it is piloted."
Meanwhile, manufacturers continue to improve their unmanned systems, aiming for maximum autonomy. The goal is for them to take off independently, reach the target, identify it, and then automatically engage it once a command is given. The control system is also evolving and becoming more efficient.
Some elements of such autonomy have already proven themselves on the battlefield, while others still need to be refined and brought into operational use. In any case, the technology continues to evolve and is far from having reached its limits.
All Oboronka photos were taken by Anna Shtopenko
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Support for the defence of Ukrainian cities and the development of "small air defence" can be provided right now. Interceptor crews need more equipment and high-quality training to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones and Shaheds. You can support the development of this complex and innovative drone interception technology via the link to the Yedynozbir fundraising campaign initiated by the Serhii Prytula Charity Foundation, the 412th Nemesis Brigade and the Ukrainian World Congress.
As of 3 March, the Yedynozbir campaign has raised more than 40% of its target – UAH 431,356,486 (about US$9.8 million). As part of the campaign, more than 30 units of Ukraine's defence forces have already received 1,286 interceptor drones along with the necessary equipment.
Vladyslav Khrystoforov
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska, Tetiana Buchkovska and Anna Kybukevych
Edited by Susan McDonald