For decades, the Russian military has relied on an extensive network of ground-based space infrastructure to support global communications, reconnaissance and relatively accurate navigation. Positioned deep behind the front lines and protected by layered air defences, these strategic sites were long regarded as untouchable by Ukrainian weapons.
That has begun to change. Ukraine's defence forces are now seeking to inflict ever greater damage on Russia's space programme. Read this Ukrainska Pravda story to find out whether the effort could succeed.
How space communications centres work
A space communications centre (SCC) is a ground-based facility used to operate satellites and communicate with them. It collects telemetry, oversees spacecraft systems, sends manoeuvring commands, corrects orbital trajectories, adjusts satellite orientation and ensures solar panels remain aligned with the Sun. Nick Kovalski, founder of the space consultancy East Front Solutions, told Ukrainska Pravda that the centres also calibrate navigation satellites.
In addition to managing satellites, a centre receives, processes and transmits data. It handles military and government communications, intelligence data and missile warning information and also supports the operation of navigation systems such as GLONASS.
A centre consists of an antenna array and a computing centre. Its antenna dishes are mounted on rotating mechanisms that keep them aligned with satellites, and destroying these systems can render the facility inoperable. Even so, the office buildings are the primary targets, as they contain the control consoles, decoders and satellite modems.
Russia inherited a network of parabolic antennas, computing centres and satellite control centres from the Soviet Union and uses it for both civilian and military purposes. The infrastructure has been used for everything from broadcasting the 1980 Olympics to supporting the command and control of Russia's nuclear triad of land-, sea- and air-based nuclear forces.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces each have their own infrastructure. These are used to transmit sensitive data and conduct intelligence operations, including the interception and decryption of enemy satellite communications and the early detection of intercontinental ballistic missile launches.
Russia's intelligence services use their own space infrastructure to maintain a secure communications network. Encrypted channels shield data transmissions from cyber-attacks and electronic warfare (EW) measures. "This is done to ensure that the data cannot be intercepted, tampered with or jammed," Kovalski says.
Russia also uses civilian infrastructure for military purposes. Facilities operated by the Russian Satellite Communications Company can be repurposed for the Ministry of Defence without major modifications. As Andrii Kolesnyk, a former adviser to the head of the State Space Agency of Ukraine, explains: "A civilian facility can easily be adapted for military use. The antenna and tracking systems function in exactly the same way. To repurpose the station, all that is needed is to replace the electronics."
It is precisely this ease of conversion and the use of civilian space communications centres for military purposes that have made them targets on a par with purely military facilities.
The impact of Ukrainian strikes on space infrastructure facilities
Western-supplied Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles have enabled Ukraine's defence forces to strike Russian space infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The first confirmed strike came on 20 December 2023, when two Storm Shadow missiles hit the Russian Aerospace Forces' 40th Separate Command and Measurement Complex (Deep Space Communications Centre) in the village of Vityne, according to Krymsky Veter (Crimean Wind), a Telegram channel covering developments in Crimea.
Before Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine used the base for civilian purposes: the Lybid satellite programme and Earth observation. Russia has since used it to control GLONASS satellites and support the Russian Navy's Liana maritime surveillance system, which intercepts radio signals and records the coordinates of radars, air defence systems and ships.
On 24 May 2024, six ATACMS missiles hit an FSB communications hub near Alushta. They struck the base in Vityne once more on 23 June.
June 2026 saw Ukrainian drones take the campaign against Russia's space infrastructure beyond occupied Crimea. Strikes on 22 and 30 June hit the Dubna space communications centre and the Vladimir station. On 26 June, drones also targeted the Rubin communications hub of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in Beloomut and the 476th Military Intelligence Information Reception Centre Meshcherino-1, which receives and processes data from Russia's electro-optical reconnaissance satellites used to detect and track military targets, equipment and infrastructure.
Destroying a ground hub does not result in the immediate loss of satellites, as modern spacecraft can continue operating autonomously. According to Kolesnyk, their onboard systems independently regulate thermal conditions and orient the spacecraft towards the Sun to recharge their batteries.
"If that were to happen while all ground-based control infrastructure had been disabled, the satellite could be lost, although the likelihood of that is quite low," Kolesnyk said. "There have been cases in both the Soviet and US space programmes where satellites thought to be lost were rediscovered by amateur radio operators years later. Once contact was re-established, the spacecraft continued operating."
Strikes on fixed infrastructure disrupt, but do not paralyse, the command and control of Russian forces. The destruction of satellite teleports – ground stations that relay communications to and from satellites – forces Russia to reroute communications through backup facilities, which is slowing the flow of orders between headquarters.
The loss of command and measurement centres hampers the calibration of the GLONASS navigation system. However, its accuracy would only begin to deteriorate two to four weeks after the hypothetical loss of all ground control infrastructure.
Kovalski explains that Russia relies on ground-based centres to adjust the position of its satellites in orbit. If all of these facilities were disabled, GLONASS's accuracy would begin to degrade within a few weeks.
Kolesnyk emphasises that even this would not completely blind Russian weapons. Guided munitions typically use several navigation systems at once, so if GLONASS were to fail, Russia could still rely on GPS, BeiDou or inertial navigation, which operates independently of satellites.
How Russia could replace its destroyed space communications centres
Russia has a multi-layered backup system for satellite control. Satellite signals can be received by stations in Siberia, the Russian Far East and abroad, including Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, South Africa, Nicaragua and Antarctica. These overseas facilities were established to replace the Soviet fleet of space communications ships, which was sold off in the 1990s.
The last line of defence consists of mobile command centres mounted on vehicle chassis. Russia tested the concept while working with the Iranian reconnaissance satellite Khayyam. When Israel destroyed Khayyam's stationary command post in March 2026, Iran retained control of the satellite thanks to these mobile platforms.
Rebuilding destroyed infrastructure is both costly and time-consuming. Rotating mechanisms for large antenna arrays are no longer mass-produced, meaning repairs depend on dwindling Soviet-era stockpiles.
"Last autumn, the mobile service tower at the Baikonur Cosmodrome broke down during a Soyuz launch," Kolesnyk said. "They found a replacement from the 1970s in storage that had been sitting there for half a century and installed it. If the required mechanisms are no longer in stock, manufacturing new ones would take a long time."
The only realistic way for Russia to quickly shore up its own space programme is through cooperation with China. But that cooperation has its limits – and it certainly does not come free.
Recent problems with satellite production in Russia bear this out. The country's import-substitution programme failed to produce space-grade microchips capable of operating at temperatures ranging from -180°C to +220°C. Manufacturers relied on Soviet-era stockpiles until 2016, after which satellite production largely ground to a halt until 2020.
China refused to supply the electronics unless Russia agreed to transfer technology for its RD-180 rocket engines. Unable to obtain the required components, Russian manufacturers instead began fitting satellites with military-grade microchips and replacing imported parts with larger, heavier domestically produced alternatives. Engineers were then forced to redesign the spacecraft and switch from Soyuz launch vehicles to the heavier Proton rockets, significantly increasing launch costs.
In theory, if Russia's control centres were to sustain critical damage, Moscow could attempt to operate its satellites through partner control centres located in China.
However, Kovalski argues that this would be a slow and undesirable solution. Few countries would be willing to control their military satellites from abroad, as doing so requires sharing highly sensitive encryption keys with a foreign partner.
How Ukraine can step up pressure on Russia's space programme
Russia continues to expand its satellite capabilities. Among its latest projects is Rassvet, a planned satellite constellation designed to function as a military equivalent of Starlink.
To effectively disrupt Russia's space programme, Ukraine must continue striking space communications centres, although completely disabling the network is likely to prove extremely difficult. As a result, Ukraine's defence forces are targeting not only satellite communications facilities but also launch sites, disrupting the deployment schedule for new spacecraft.
Over 70 military and reconnaissance satellites have been launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. This spring, the head of Roscosmos, Russia's state space agency, said the facility had come under an attempted drone attack during the launch of 16 Rassvet satellites. Late last year, Russian sources also reported drones being shot down near Plesetsk during the launch of a radar reconnaissance satellite. Attacks on launch infrastructure and satellite control stations are compelling Russia to reinforce air defences around facilities located more than 1,000 km from the front line.
Russia's space infrastructure is unlikely to suffer a significant loss of capability as a result of UAV strikes on space communications centres alone. It has redundant systems beyond the reach of Ukrainian weapons, spare parts stored abroad and mobile control stations.
However, every strike forces Russia to divert air defence systems to protect these centres or allocate funds to rebuild damaged infrastructure. As a result, Moscow must spread its air defence resources more thinly while bearing higher costs to maintain its satellite constellations.
If Ukraine's military command decides that investing additional resources in disrupting Russia's satellite capabilities before they reach orbit is worthwhile, the next phase could see regular strikes not only on control centres but also on launch sites. This would mark a fundamentally new stage in the space confrontation between Ukraine and Russia.
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Susan McDonald