Russia lost access to Starlink and is building a replacement. What is known about the Rassvet system?
Russia is actively developing its own satellite internet system – a technology that has become well known to Ukrainians since 2022 thanks to Starlink terminals.
If Russia were a normal state, such a project would be seen as a logical step in technological development. In a country with such a vast territory, satellite internet could genuinely provide connection even to the most remote regions.
However, in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine, the story takes on a very different meaning. For Ukraine, it represents a significant potential threat to national security.
After losing access to Starlink, the Russian military has been searching for an alternative. Although Russia's attempts to develop its own systems have not always been successful, Moscow is trying to build a Starlink equivalent called Rassvet.
Little has been publicly disclosed about the project, which is being developed by Bureau 1440, but within a year it could become a major topic. If Russia succeeds, it will significantly improve military communications and, in the future, could use satellite internet to control drones – an idea that Kremlin ruler Vladimir Putin himself voiced in the spring.
If that happens, Russia's occupation forces will gain a new autonomous communications capability that is less dependent on ground infrastructure, foreign services and vulnerable communication channels. Can Moscow really build a Starlink equivalent? What threats would such a system pose to Ukraine? And what is known about Bureau 1440?
Project 1440
Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 was established in 2020 as a project of MegaFon, Russia's second-largest mobile network operator. Initially, it was called MegaFon 1440 and operated as part of the IT company X Holding.
MegaFon's initiative was not Russia's first attempt to create a satellite internet system. The Kremlin had been trying to launch a satellite communications constellation called Efir (Ether) since 2017. At the time, the plan was to spend RUB 300 billion (about US$5.1 billion) to deploy 288 satellites into polar orbit.
In 2018, Russia announced the creation of the Sfera (Sphere) programme, which envisaged launching more than 600 satellites for communications, navigation and Earth observation. Efir was intended to become part of that programme by serving as its satellite internet component.
However, a year later, Efir was removed from the programme. The Russian government had hoped to attract private investors but failed to do so. The Sfera programme retained various satellite systems, ranging from the existing Ekspress and Luch constellations to planned projects such as Marathon-IoT and Skif.
After 2022, it became clear that Moscow was incapable of delivering on its original plans. Against this backdrop, Bureau 1440 effectively became Russia's flagship project in the field of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet.
The original concept behind MegaFon 1440 was to assess the capabilities of LEO satellite systems for high-speed data transmission. In its early stages, the mobile operator financed the core work, including developing the business model, selecting technologies, and later building prototype satellites and ground infrastructure.
In 2021, the now-sanctioned VTB Bank joined the project, investing RUB 2 billion (about US$27 million) in exchange for a 15% stake in the company. MegaFon envisioned the system as a hybrid orbital-ground network that would become a more cost-effective alternative to laying fibre-optic cables in Russia's sparsely populated regions.
By the end of 2021, MegaFon 1440 began transforming from a research project into a standalone company. Its mission was to develop and manufacture the key components of the system, including satellites, user terminals and ground infrastructure.
At the time, MegaFon and X Holding were part of the telecommunications group USM, owned by sanctioned oligarch Alisher Usmanov, who is linked to the Kremlin. In 2022, Usmanov sold his stake in X Holding to its founder, Anton Cherepennikov, causing the company to leave the USM group. The MegaFon 1440 project was subsequently renamed Bureau 1440. In February 2023, X Holding was placed under US sanctions.
Scaling up the project
In June 2023, Bureau 1440 launched the first three experimental satellites of its Rassvet-1 mission. Their purpose was to test communications technologies, ground stations and onboard systems. A year later, the company launched another three satellites as part of the Rassvet-2 mission. These were full-scale prototypes of the production satellites.
One of the objectives of the second launch was to test laser inter-satellite communications. Without this technology, a satellite cannot relay data when it is outside the coverage area of a ground station – for example, while passing over the ocean.
Laser inter-satellite links make it possible to create a unified orbital network and provide broader coverage without relying on a large number of ground relay stations. Starlink uses the same principle.
Bureau 1440's data suggests that tests of the satellite system successfully transmitted approximately 200 GB of data, with peak connection speeds reaching 10 Gbps. The company also reported successfully establishing communication between a satellite and its own user terminal using 5G NTN (Non-Terrestrial Network) technology.
In March 2026, the company launched its first operational group of 16 satellites, and at the end of July announced that a second group had been placed into orbit. Once testing is completed, the satellites are expected to reach their designated operational orbit.
According to Serhii Beskrestnov, an adviser to the Ukrainian president better known as Flash, there are currently up to 40 Rassvet satellites in orbit.
Bureau 1440 plans to begin commercial operation of the network in 2027. By then, it intends to expand its constellation to 250 satellites. In Flash's assessment, at least 200-250 satellites are needed to provide continuous and stable data transmission. By 2030, Bureau 1440 aims to deploy around 730 satellites, increasing the constellation to more than 900 elements by 2035.
But will Roscosmos actually be able to launch all of Bureau 1440's satellites using its own launch vehicles? And can the ambitious figures announced for the coming years realistically become a fully operational constellation capable of providing broadband satellite internet to Russia?
On one hand, the sanctions imposed on Russia's space industry after 2022 raise doubts about its ability to carry out such a technically demanding programme. On the other hand, before the full-scale invasion, Roscosmos had extensive experience launching large numbers of satellites.
Between February 2019 and February 2022, the Russian state corporation launched 648 satellites developed by OneWeb, one of Starlink's main competitors, into orbit. Despite that, OneWeb's attempt to enter the Russian market failed. The company had established a joint venture with Russian satellite operator Gonets in 2017, but never received the necessary radio frequencies.
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) opposed the project, calling it a threat to national security. In 2020, OneWeb withdrew from the venture, and after the start of the full-scale war, Roscosmos refused to launch additional OneWeb satellites without guarantees that they would not be used for military purposes.
What are low-Earth-orbit satellites?
Low-Earth-orbit satellites operate at altitudes of 300 to 2,000 km and are primarily used to provide broadband internet access. The main drawback of the technology is that reliable coverage requires a large satellite constellation. At least one satellite must always be positioned above any given area, and because LEO satellites gradually lose altitude over time, they must be replaced regularly.
This is the operating principle behind both Starlink and OneWeb. Rassvet is also designed as a low-Earth-orbit system, but its satellites operate at an altitude of around 800 km – significantly higher than Starlink's. Another important difference between the Russian project and Starlink is its geographical coverage.
"Russia's Rassvet satellites operate in slightly different orbits, both in terms of altitude and incline. This is intended to provide better coverage of northern latitudes, particularly the Arctic. For Russia, this is important not only for communications in remote regions but also for supporting ships, icebreakers and infrastructure in the far north," says telecommunications expert Oleksandr Hlushchenko.
Hlushchenko explains that Starlink was designed with a different strategy in mind. Its primary markets were countries with vast territories and high demand for internet connectivity, such as the United States, Australia and other countries that do not require constant high-capacity coverage near the North Pole. Starlink's highest-capacity operational zone is centered around 53 degrees latitude in both the northern and southern hemispheres. While some satellites provide polar coverage, these are a relatively small part of the overall constellation.
Rassvet's ground terminals weigh 15 kg and measure 60×60 cm. Each terminal is designed to deliver data transfer speeds of up to 1 Gbps. The equipment has been engineered to withstand Russia's climate and is expected to operate in temperatures ranging from -40°C to +40°C.
Challenges for Ukraine
According to Dmytro Khmara, co-founder of the Space Cossacks, Lunar Research Service, and MySat UA aerospace engineering projects, Russia may need far fewer satellites than it has announced for the commercial launch of the network in order to provide military communications on the battlefield.
"The Russians can reposition satellites and concentrate their coverage over specific areas. One of those areas could be Ukraine's east and south," he explains.
Telecommunications expert Oleksandr Hlushchenko added that one of Rassvet's primary military applications could be providing communications within Russian military formations. For the Russian armed forces, the system could partially replace Starlink, access to which Russian troops lost earlier this year. It would also allow Russia to shift military communications from geostationary satellites to LEO satellites.
However, Khmara notes that because Rassvet satellites operate at a higher altitude than Starlink, signal latency will inevitably be greater despite the project's official performance claims. As a result, its application may be more limited.
Nevertheless, he says the system would still be highly valuable for Russian forces.
"The system could be used for communication, transmitting video to command posts, controlling drones, and operating ground robotic systems," Khmara says.
There are few quick or straightforward ways to counter such a threat. Khmara points out that even Russia itself has not always been able to effectively counter Starlink, despite possessing powerful electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and attempting to jam satellite communications.
Having its own satellite constellation would reduce Moscow's dependence on foreign services or other vulnerable communications channels. In Khmara's assessment, Russia has little choice but to pursue this path. "For them, autonomous communication is a strategic objective," he says.
That could pose a serious challenge for Ukraine. Experience with satellite-connected drones has shown that even advanced electronic warfare technology is not always capable of effectively disrupting such systems.
According to Hlushchenko, the key question is how the West will respond to the creation of a satellite communications system that Russia may use for military aggression against it.
"The West can slow this process down. The available levers include sanctions on components, restrictions on access to critical technologies, and radio-frequency licensing. If the International Telecommunication Union blocks Russia's frequency allocations or initiates a review process, it could significantly complicate the deployment of such a network," he says.
Instead of a conclusion
Whether Russia will achieve its stated objectives remains an open question. It is difficult to assess the true capabilities of Russia's space industry under sanctions. It is equally unclear whether Roscosmos will be able to launch all of the required satellites aboard Soyuz launch vehicles.
Nonetheless, the project will be extremely expensive both to build and to operate. According to Khmara, a Russian satellite terminal could cost hundreds of times more than a Starlink terminal.
The biggest challenge will be scaling. SpaceX was able to deploy thousands of satellites and mass-produce user terminals because it industrialised the manufacturing process. This enabled the company to build a constellation of more than 10,000 satellites and expand the network rapidly.
Russia is unlikely to replicate that success. The Rassvet programme was included in the latest package of EU sanctions. Those restrictions are expected to limit the project's capabilities, complicate its implementation, and significantly increase costs.
However, the experience of Russia's war against Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is willing to absorb enormous financial costs if military objectives are at stake.
Russia may fail to achieve its plans within the announced timeframe, but it is still likely to continue pursuing its own satellite internet network. The key question is when that capability will become operational – and whether Ukraine and its partners will be prepared when it does.
Ihor Pylypiv
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Iryna Moskaliuk