How a Chinese UAV has become a Ukrainian long-range weapon: the story of the mysterious MICH 2000 drone
In early August, Ukrainian forces hit the cargo ship Nadezhda near the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.
Footage of the strike soon circulated across social media and Telegram channels. Yet the drone at the centre of it looked nothing like a Liutyi or an FP-1, two systems widely used by the Ukrainian military in long-range strikes on Russia. Instead, it bore a striking resemblance to the Iranian-designed Shahed, leaving analysts scratching their heads over what exactly they were looking at.
This was not the first time Shahed-like drones had been used in attacks on targets inside Russia. Among the possible candidates were the Egyptian-made Jabbar-150, Türkiye's Troy T20 Block 20 and China's ZTK-150.
The drone in question is, in fact, the Ukrainian MICH-2000. But those who thought footage of the strikes showed Chinese-made ZTK-150s were not entirely wrong either.
This drone's story began thousands of kilometres from the front line – not in a Ukrainian garage or design office, but at a factory in China. In late 2023, Ukrainian UAV developers travelled there to acquire ready-made civilian UAVs for military use. Nobody at the time could have known that the mission would lay the groundwork for a Ukrainian long-range drone – the kind of system the military, engineers and politicians in Ukraine commonly call a "deep-strike" UAV.
Today, the MICH is no longer simply a Chinese-made drone, but a system operated exclusively by the Security Service of Ukraine's Special Operations Centre Alpha. Capable of flying up to 2,000 km and carrying as much as 60 kg of explosives, it is building an ever-longer record of targets struck inside Russia.
Ukrainska Pravda has visited the factory producing the MICH-2000 to tell, for the first time, the story of how a trip in search of Chinese-made drones kick-started the production of a Ukrainian long-range drone for the Alpha.
All material presented in this story has been cleared for publication by the manufacturer and the Security Service of Ukraine.
A MICH 2000 striking its target. Video: Exilenova+, a Ukrainian Telegram channel
A "little plane" from China
The use of Chinese-made drones as long-range weapons dates back to 2022. Ukraine was then only taking its first steps towards developing systems of its own, such as the Liutyi and FP-1. But the need to reach targets deep behind enemy lines was already there. Until its own drones were ready, the simplest answer was to buy off-the-shelf aircraft from China.
The Ukrainian military adapted civilian Mugin-5 PRO drones for military use, fitted them with explosives and launched them on targets far behind Russian lines. At around US$15,000 apiece, the aircraft could carry up to 25 kg of explosives to targets as far as 500 km away.
The use of unidentified Chinese-made drones to strike targets inside Russia did not remain under the radar for long. Media reports began to draw attention to them, and China eventually responded. In the summer of 2023, the Communist Party imposed restrictions on the direct export of civilian drones. With the aircraft suddenly harder to obtain, Ukrainian buyers had to find ways around the new barriers.
Towards the end of 2023, a team of Ukrainian UAV engineers received an assignment from the military: travel to China, buy what they referred to simply as "little planes" from local manufacturers, and bring them back to Ukraine.
When the team arrived in China, dozens of ZTK-150 drones were being produced before their eyes. They looked strikingly similar to the Iranian-designed Shaheds that Russia deploys in daily terror attacks on Ukrainian cities and communities. The only obvious visual difference was a pair of small canards at the front.
"We visited a very large production facility and saw how everything was done," recalls a member of the team who travelled to China. "We then spent several days negotiating with Chinese intermediaries, until they suggested selling us the technology so we could manufacture everything ourselves. That was when the idea took root: instead of buying and importing drones, we could build them in Ukraine. Those were the first steps towards creating the MICH-2000."
The Ukrainian command was receptive to the idea. However, when the team returned to China to buy the technology, the deal had fallen through: the factory's management had forbidden the sale.
Nevertheless, the Chinese intermediaries were still keen to make the deal happen and found a workaround. Their solution was to assemble the drones elsewhere, where the export restrictions did not apply. The offer also included pilot training, an opportunity the MICH team eagerly took up.
"We went there to train our pilots to fly Chinese drones," a source tells Ukrainska Pravda. "And while the training was underway, we photographed everything we could – from the production process to the arrangement of the shelves and cupboards."
The team returned to Ukraine with eight Chinese-made drones and a group of newly trained pilots.
First test flights
Back home, the team began taking the new drones apart, studying their design and uncovering their flaws. The MICH-2000's first test flight came in the summer of 2024. Its maiden flight lasted only one kilometre before the aircraft crashed because the weight distribution was wrong.
The second test was a step forward: the drone remained airborne for about an hour. But near the end of the flight, one of its propellers came off when vibrations from the engine sheared the bolts that held it in place.
The MICH 2000's first flight
During the third flight, electronic warfare interfered with the drone, revealing another weakness: it was ill-suited to operating amid disrupted communications. Each subsequent launch helped the team identify further changes needed to the design. By the end of the summer, they had mastered airframe production and moved on to experimenting with different electronics.
The company's owner tells Ukrainska Pravda: "When we first began making our own airframes, we made countless mistakes – aerodynamic and structural – and kept running into one problem after another. But every trip to the test range gave us more experience.
For a month and a half, maybe two months, we kept crashing drones at the test range until our client finally said: 'Enough. It's time to put them to work.' We replied that we hadn't even properly got them flying yet – there was always some new problem. But Alpha didn't want to hear it. They wanted results."
A nighttime launch of a MICH 2000
The first combat mission came in October 2024. Three MICH drones were launched: one was shot down, and the other two missed their targets by about 10 m. For Alpha, that was enough. The unit gave the green light for production.
When it comes to aviation, every detail matters
At first glance, the MICH manufacturing plant looks much like any other. But the assembly process has its own peculiarities. It begins with the airframe and the installation of the fuel tank. The MICH is a flying-wing design, meaning it has no separate wings – the aircraft's body performs that function.
The fuel tanks first undergo leak testing. The completed fuselages are then painted black and fed into a specialised robot, which cuts openings for the electronics and other mechanisms. After that, they are sanded, given a final coat of paint and weighed.
Weighing is one of the key quality-control stages. The manufacturer told Ukrainska Pravda that the final weight reveals how accurately the production technology has been followed. Dozens of other checks take place along the way, each governed by its own set of requirements.
The company's owner says: "For me, consistency is everything. The lighter the drone's airframe, the more fuel it can carry, and the less likely it is to run into problems during flight.
Everything we have learned so far shows that there are no small details in manufacturing. A single millimetre out of place, or even a misplaced comma in the code, can cause an error."
After passing the scales, the drones enter the final stage of assembly, where the electronics, motors and combat components are put in place.
In the company's catalogue, there are eight MICH variants designed for either long- or medium-range missions. The MICH can fly up to 2,000 km and carry a payload of 25-60 kg. Operators can select the communications system – analogue, digital, or Starlink – along with the warhead, fuel tank size and guidance assistance for the final stage of the flight.
According to the company, the Chinese MICH and its Ukrainian successor now share little more than an external resemblance. Their prices differ as well: the Chinese predecessor costs US$50,000, while a basic Ukrainian-made MICH costs US$48,000. The final price depends on the configuration – the guidance-assistance system, the number of CRPA antenna channels used to protect navigation against electronic warfare, and other components.
In the past two years, the company has built a network of dozens of manufacturers producing everything from engines, warheads and fuselages to initiation boards, rocket boosters and even the fuel that powers them.
"We had a few painful incidents where third-party boosters destroyed equipment worth US$1 million," the company's owner recalls. "After that, we were no longer allowed to launch aircraft using those boosters. It was probably the most stressful time, because we had only just started developing our own boosters and had not yet tested them in flight.
We knew there was a chance they would not work, but there was no other option. We arrived at the test site and launched the first drone. The booster was not working properly and was producing more thrust than it should. Chemists and engineers spent the night modifying the rockets right there at the site. The next day, the team took part in the launches, and three drones successfully took off. That was when we began scaling up and moving to our own boosters."
Although the company has brought engine and warhead production in-house, it still relies on overseas suppliers for certain components.
CRPA antennas are one example. Only a few companies in Ukraine have mastered their production. Without one, up to 85% of the drone's cost can be localised in Ukraine – that is, covered by domestically sourced components. Once a CRPA antenna is added, that figure drops to 55%. The antennas themselves are expensive, costing as much as US$20,000-25,000 depending on the number of modules.
The MICH 2000's combat path
The company can produce around 6,000 drones a year. Compared with another prominent Ukrainian manufacturer, Fire Point, which has set a target of producing 100,000 drones annually, that figure may seem modest. But there is a reason for the difference.
Unlike the FP-1, which is widely used by various Ukrainian units, the MICH currently has only one user: Alpha.
"We know our drones won't simply disappear into the swamps [Russia]. They will be sent towards a specific target, because Alpha is all about analytics and effectiveness," the company says, demonstrating the analysis behind the strikes.
Ukrainska Pravda has analysed dozens of videos showing attacks on Russian assets using Shahed-like drones. We identified at least eight videos in which the MICH was either in flight or striking its target.
The actual number of MICH strikes is far higher. The company's director says Alpha personnel have launched thousands of the drones, hitting hundreds of targets in both the temporarily occupied territories and Russia.
Since its inception, the MICH has been used in raids on Moscow, destroyed a Tu-95MS strategic bomber at Engels airfield, and struck a logistics hub operated by Russia's largest online retailer, Wildberries, in Ryazan Oblast. It has also destroyed an electronic warfare system used to interfere with Starlink communications in Gelendzhik, near Putin's palace, and taken part in an attack on a naval base of Russia's Baltic Fleet.
The largest-scale MICH strike came at the port of Ust-Luga, where more than 20 drones reached their target.
"During one MICH attack, so many drones made it through to the target that we ran out of targets for them. They started chasing a Pantsir [air defence system] along the road after it had run out of ammunition," the company's director says, laughing.
Most MICH attacks are never captured on camera, but that does not stop the company from monitoring the outcome of each operation through trackers fitted to the drones. The data is then fed back into the development process, helping the team refine the drone's design and software. New changes are introduced almost every week.
MICH 2000 flying in Moscow Oblast
MICH+
The company plans to raise annual production to 10,000 drones in the near future. To make that possible, it is recruiting new staff, seeking additional production sites and expanding its network of suppliers. It is also putting around US$1 million of its monthly profits into R&D.
"We have an R&D department that operates continuously. We conduct trials at the testing ground at least three times a week and work closely with the team," says the company's owner.
The company is currently working on the MICH+, a new medium-range drone that will look different from the MICH-2000 and have no front canards. It is being designed to carry a 70-kg warhead, travel up to 600 km and receive guidance during flight. The expected price is up to US$40,000. The company sees the drone as a way to carve out its own niche in the market.
The company sees organic growth as a more sustainable path than rapid expansion, which can leave production exposed to force majeure events. Growing at a measured pace also gives the company time to build the reserves needed to keep operating if a crisis strikes.
There is also a financial reason for the cautious approach. With essentially just one single customer, the company cannot easily finance a rapid increase in production. It is now looking for additional sources of funding to support expansion.
One option is joint production. The company is considering cooperation with the Baltic states through the Build with Ukraine programme, which could significantly increase drone production with funding from European grants.
"To be honest, I don't want to speculate about what happens after we reach 10,000. I just want the war to end. But if we have to keep working, then we'll keep working," the company's director concludes.
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Susan McDonald