Vulnerable industries and the Soviet legacy: How Russia’s air defence is structured, and can Ukraine exhaust it?

Daily strikes by Ukrainian drones and missiles on Russian warehouses, oil refineries and fuel depots have led to the widespread perception that Russia's air defence is "leaky".

By contrast, for decades Russian propaganda has cultivated the image of an "impenetrable" air defence, which, according to statements by Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, is capable of intercepting 97% of targets.

In the reality of a full-scale war, the truth has proved far more complex and lies somewhere in between. Ukraine has not managed to destroy Russia's air defence as an integrated system, but it has succeeded in exposing its real limits.

The war has shown that Russia's air defence is a complex system whose effectiveness directly depends on industry, logistics and the constant replenishment of resources.

It rests on a production base that is heavily dependent on imported and scarce components. In addition, due to ongoing combat operations, Russia is forced to use missiles more quickly than it can produce them, particularly in the short-range area of air defence.

As a result, Russia's air defence formally remains effective "here and now", but the system's long-term resilience directly depends on the Russian industrial capacity to sustain production, repairs and modernisation under conditions of sanctions and battlefield losses.

To understand how Russia's air shield functions, where its strengths lie, and where it is vulnerable, Oboronka, Ukrainska Pravda's defence industry-focused outlet, has analysed research by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and analysts from the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU).

The "Red" legacy

Russia's modern air defence system is largely based on Soviet-era developments. In the 1970s, the USSR realised that it could not compete with NATO's pace of aviation and technology development. This was further reinforced by the so-called "precision revolution", when Western air forces acquired long-range, high-precision weapons.

Nonetheless, NATO's air superiority was not only a strength but also a critical dependency – the success of military operations was heavily reliant on supremacy in the air. This pushed the USSR towards an asymmetric response: creating an air defence system that would prevent aircraft from approaching Soviet forces.

The decision fully matched the needs of the USSR, with its vast territory and near-hysterical fear of nuclear bombers and missiles. Moreover, a layered, multi-tier air defence system was more economically viable than aircraft. Ground-based anti-aircraft missile systems could be kept on constant alert to protect key facilities without the need for extensive infrastructure.

This was how one of the world's most complex air defence systems began to take shape.

Broadly speaking, it can be divided into several layers, the highest of which is missile defence – a protective ring around Moscow that integrates strategic intelligence, long-range early-warning radars and launchers.

Below this sit anti-aircraft missile systems of the S-300 family (S-300/350/400/500), capable of engaging targets at ranges of over 100km while simultaneously forming an integrated airspace surveillance network.

Further down are tactical systems with a range of up to 50 km, designed to cover ground forces, while the lowest layer consists of short-range systems (up to 30 km) that serve as the last line of defence.

A key element of Russia's strategic air defence systems is over-the-horizon radar, capable of detecting targets far beyond Russia's borders. These include the Rezonans-N (Resonance-N) system and the 29B6 Konteyner (Container), which became a target for Ukraine's defence forces in April 2024.

These are complemented by a network of other radar stations, some of which provide long-range early detection, while others operate at shorter distances but with greater precision for missile guidance.

Radar stations are the central link in the entire architecture of Russia's air defence, as without them the detection and tracking of aerial targets – and therefore the use of surface-to-air missiles – would be impossible.

In effect, Russia inherited one of the world's most complex air defence systems from the USSR and launched its offensive on Ukraine under the shield of this legacy.

A shield with cracks

In recent years, Russia's air force has lost more aircraft to its own air defence than to Ukraine's. Today, much of what appears in Russian airspace is perceived as hostile. But this was not always the case.

In the first days of the full-scale invasion, Russian air defence units were ordered to treat all aircraft and other aerial targets as "friendly". This overconfident decision quickly turned into humiliation: Ukrainian Bayraktars and Su jets struck Russian convoys with little resistance.

However, the first combat losses quickly forced Russian air defence into a defensive posture, which immediately led to losses among Ukrainian aircraft. Ukrainian pilots rapidly learned a new rule: fly at ultra-low altitudes (below 100 m), because anything higher would result in death.

Flying even this low hasn't been a guarantee of safety. There is at least one known case in which Russian air defence shot down a Ukrainian aircraft from a distance of 150km while it was flying at an altitude of less than 15m.

Meanwhile Russia's air defence has proved far from all-powerful. The introduction of GMLRS, AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles and ATACMS ballistic missiles into Ukraine's arsenal made it possible to inflict significant losses on Russia, particularly in the early stages of their use.

Over time, the Russians began to adapt, making greater use of electronic warfare and improving the performance of their air defence systems.

The effectiveness of GMLRS strikes fell from around 70% in 2022 to roughly 8% in 2025. In some cases, up to ten ATACMS missiles were required to destroy a single radar station. As for HARM missiles, which fly towards sources of electromagnetic emissions, air defence operators learned to respond quickly by switching off radars, changing positions, or simply shooting the missiles down.

On the one hand, this highlighted the importance of intelligence, planning and coordinated operation between different systems. On the other hand, it became a clear example of how the Russians learn from their own mistakes.

The next challenge Russia's air defence proved unprepared for was Ukraine's deep-strike drones.

Here, Ukraine was greatly aided by Russia's sheer size: targets are scattered across an enormous territory. As a result, Ukraine prioritised sites without dense air defence coverage, especially those containing flammable or other sensitive materials. Even a handful of drones with relatively small warheads often caused serious, cascading damage.

Not all facilities were left unprotected. Striking targets covered by dense air defence is significantly more difficult, although in some cases Ukraine managed to outmanoeuvre Russian defences through well-planned attacks.

However, the cost of such operations is high. From a launch of 100–150 drones costing between US$20,000 and US$80,000 each, only around 10% reach the target area, and even fewer actually hit their target.

By comparison, according to OSINT researcher Shaheed Tracker, since the beginning of the year Ukrainian defenders have intercepted approximately 87% of Russian drones (out of nearly 50,000 launched).

To increase the chances of destroying a target, Ukrainian forces are forced to launch hundreds of UAVs in its direction to exhaust air defences, after which missiles or the remaining strike drones are employed.

These tactics have resulted in Russia rapidly burning through its missile stocks, especially for short-range systems such as the Osa and Pantsir.

In addition to depleting missile reserves, air defence systems themselves are being destroyed. According to the Oryx portal, which tracks losses based on photo and video evidence, since 2022 Russia has lost more than 360 air defence assets and systems, as well as at least 112 radars.

Some of these losses were quickly replenished by the Russians, particularly through the use of existing stockpiles.

OSINT analyst Athene Noctua has identified 948 radars of various types in Russia, more than half of them Soviet-era. Meanwhile, some radars that had for many years been stored in the Central Military District have disappeared.

Initially, most losses inflicted on Russia's air defence were caused by Western-supplied weapons. Over time, this role has increasingly been taken over by mid-range (often referred to as "middle strike") drones capable of delivering precise deep strikes.

A significant role in this was played by the Ukrainian intelligence unit known as "Prymary" (Ghosts), whose activities became public in March this year. According to Oboronka's calculations, during its operations the special forces unit managed to strike more than 40 radars, five launchers and six anti-aircraft missile systems, most of them in temporarily occupied Crimea.

All in all, the war has demonstrated two simple truths.

First, Russian air defence can be both bypassed and destroyed. Second, the Russians learn quickly and adapt to new threats. Therefore breaking this air defence shield requires not only force, but also a systematic and intelligent approach.

Reliance on production

To a large extent, Russian air defence systems rely on domestic companies which, despite sanctions and economic pressure, remain capable of producing missiles and radars for these systems.

This production structure itself resembles the defensive system created in the USSR: a network of dozens of companies and contractors on which missile supplies depend.

For example, the production of missiles for the S-400 is a multi-layered system with its own critical hubs. Design work is carried out at Fakel JSC in Khimki near Moscow, while final assembly takes place at the Avangard plant in Moscow. Avangard also coordinates interaction between manufacturers of engines, airframes, control and guidance systems, and warheads.

Each of these elements, in turn, depends on suppliers of raw materials and components. For instance, to manufacture rocket motors, Salyut JSC uses ammonium perchlorate supplied by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Anozit – the only producer of this substance in Russia.

Radar production for the S-400 is concentrated within the Almaz-Antey industrial group. Almaz designs and assembles the key radar systems – the 92N6 and 96L6. As with missile production, this manufacturing process is critically dependent on a limited circle of suppliers of electronics and specialised materials.

Moreover, new radars incorporate Western microelectronics:Russia has carried out procurement systematically through Electroavtomatika JSC, using supply chains from Taiwan, South Korea, and Western countries transiting through China.

Asymmetric strikes

Russia's dependence on foreign suppliers gives Ukraine and its partners significant leverage. For instance, radars for the S-400 system use the Elbrus-90micro computing system, manufactured using a 28-nanometre process.

However, Russian industry is unable to produce such systems domestically, so it's clear that they are manufactured abroad.

The imposition of sanctions on companies linked to the production of these chips – including MCST, Mikron and the Elvis Research and Production Centre – would at the very least disrupt the manufacture of individual air defence modules, as Russia has no fully fledged alternatives.

In addition, Russian radars are critically dependent on US-made materials for printed circuit boards produced by Rogers Corporation. In 2024 alone, Russia imported laminates worth approximately US$1.1 million.

Similar dependencies can be seen at almost every stage of production – from ceramics for microwave electronics to testing equipment and software.

As a result, sanctions pressure on these companies may have a disproportionately large effect, slowing or even temporarily paralysing the production of radars and missiles.

Additional pressure can also be exerted by Ukraine's defence forces. Such manufacturing facilities are extremely vulnerable to physical strikes due to fragile materials and complex technologies. However, they are usually concentrated in a single location and well protected by air defence.

For example, assembly facilities for the Pantsir systems are located in Tula, approximately 350km from Ukraine. These sites are heavily protected by air defence, and Ukrainian strike drones currently lack warheads powerful enough to reliably damage industrial targets.

However, as Ukraine's stockpiles of domestically produced cruise missiles grow, it will have increasing opportunities to inflict damage on such facilities, at the very least.

So, can the shield be pierced?

The researchers conclude that the most effective way to weaken Russia's air defence is not to try to destroy the systems head on, but to combine sanctions pressure with precision strikes against critically important production hubs.

Striking factories is particularly important as many of them are critically dependent on Western machine tools, components and maintenance, which cannot be quickly or fully replaced.

Under these conditions, disruption of Russian surface-to-air missile production as early as 2026 could multiply the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory.

And while Russian air defence remains a serious instrument, its real strength is directly tied to industrial resilience – and it is precisely this that represents the Achilles' heel of the entire system.

Author: Illia Volynskyi, Oboronka

Translation: Myroslava Zavadska

Editing: Shoël Stadlen