Journalists have uncovered a channel through which high-precision EU-made equipment that's critical for the production of missiles and drones has been making its way to Russia. How has it been possible for machines made in a Polish factory to end up in Russia's military-industrial complex?
"But please, in no contract, in no letter – okay, in WhatsApp is fine, but in no contract and in no letter mention the military or anything like that, okay?" Bilal insisted. Bilal is a Turkish citizen who set up a system for supplying EU-made machine tools to Russia at the start of the full-scale war.
I had introduced myself as a manager at a Russian company that works with the Russian military-industrial complex and was looking for a regular supply of equipment to be used in manufacturing weapons for the war against Ukraine. Bilal's interest was instantly captured.
This story began at the end of 2025. Journalists from StateWatch had been analysing customs data with regard to supplies of sanctioned equipment from the EU to Russia – equipment that is used to manufacture missiles, Shahed drones and other weapons deployed by the aggressor state on the front line and against civilians.
Among the tens of thousands of daily transactions, one business stood out: Famot Pleszew in Poland, a company with an impeccable reputation in the EU. For decades, the factory has been producing high-precision metalworking machine tools that can handle complex geometric parts which are critical in manufacturing components for missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The equipment in question falls under HS Codes 8458.11 and 8457.10 – horizontal lathes and multi-functional machining centres, numerically controlled. In the international classification they are designated as High Priority Items – products with a heightened risk that may be used in military production. The customs data indicated that at least US$1.2 million worth of equipment produced by the Polish factory had been delivered to Russia during the full-scale war up until 30 November 2024.
Journalists from the Polish media outlet Frontstory joined the investigation, and the scheme for circumventing sanctions through third countries was gradually unravelled.
Pleszew: a town of machine tools
A small town of 16,000 people, Pleszew is largely centred around industry. Among other plants, it is home to Famot Pleszew, which manufactures Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools. The factory has been operating since 1877 and was privatised in 1999.
It was acquired by DMG Mori, a German-Japanese corporation founded in Tokyo. Famot was renamed DMG Mori Poland in April 2024, but the factory is still referred to by its old name in everyday use and in customs documents.
The company is now the largest manufacturer of machine tools in Poland and Central Europe. The Pleszew factory is undergoing rapid development, supplying lathes, vertical milling machines, universal milling machines and innovative automation systems. At present, it employs around 600 people. It is also a strategic supplier of components for other plants within the DMG Mori Group.
Between 2017 and 2021, Russia started buying up machine tools from the EU. Roughly half of these supplies came from Germany. About half of the identified machine tools in Russia were also of German origin.
Data from Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) indicates that the largest number of German-made machines – 148 units – were produced by DMG Mori Seiki. At least 36 such machines are in use at UEC Saturn PJSC, a Rostec-owned company that produces engines for cruise missiles and military aircraft.
The machines were mostly imported by a Moscow-registered company, DMG Mori Rus LLC. Deliveries continued even after the start of the full-scale war, meaning the company maintained its representative office in Russia.
In the summer of 2022, the Russian subsidiary supplied machine components to UEC Saturn, after which Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention added DMG Mori to the list of international sponsors of war. At the time, the corporation stated that it had exited the Russian market and had no involvement in the supplies. This is not entirely accurate, as the investigators identified over US$1.2 million worth of such transactions.
St Petersburg: a cigar company with defence industry contracts
On 19 July 2024, vertical metalworking centres worth more than US$100,000 were imported into Russia. The customs documents contained the standard wording: "Not for military use." The country of origin was Poland, and the manufacturer was Famot Pleszew Sp. z o.o. According to the labelling, these machines are on the EU's list of high priority items that may be used in weapons production.
The recipient was a Russian company, Saturn EK LLC, which is based in St Petersburg and has been on the US sanctions list since 2023. Its founder and director, Anna Ivanova, is also the owner and director of Edlaud LLC (food retail) and the director of Havana Cigar Club LLC (tobacco sales). Judging by Ivanova's social media, she frequently travels abroad to conduct wakesurfing training courses and is most likely a front person.
Until 2016, Yuri Skrotsky was listed in the Russian register of legal entities as the founder of Saturn EK. He is also the owner of GK Snabzheniye LLC, which he co-owns with Vladimir Gavrilov and Dmitri Arkhipov. The latter are also co-owners of the aforementioned Havana Cigar Club, where Ivanova serves as director. All these companies are therefore interconnected.
Based on the data available (public procurement in Russia became non-transparent after the start of the full-scale war), GK Snabzheniye regularly fulfilled state contracts worth hundreds of millions of roubles. Its largest clients were:
- Concern Morinformsystem-Agat JSC, a Russian shipbuilding company specialising in the development, production and maintenance of combat information and control systems, as well as integrated systems for the automated command of naval formations and fire control systems for cruise and ballistic missiles
- Izumrud JSC, a developer of radar equipment
- Systems of Precision Instrument Making Scientific and Production Corporation JSC, one of Russia's leading defence industry companies, which produces aviation systems used in Su-27 military aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters
- Novosibirsk Instrument-Building Plant JSC, a Russian manufacturer of small arms and surveillance optics which is part of the Rostec Corporation
- Shtil Hydroacoustic Communications Research Institute (NII Gidrosvyazi Shtil) JSC, the only company in Russia specialising in the development of hydroacoustic communication systems and hydroacoustic search and rescue systems for the Russian Navy.
All these companies have been sanctioned by various countries due to their involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine.
Prior to 24 February 2022, GK Snabzheniye positioned itself as a highly qualified supplier of electronic components and modules from leading foreign manufacturers (Altera, Xilinx, Analog Devices, Texas Instruments and Atmel, whose products are used in Russian missiles and drones to this day).
The company's official website was taken down in 2022. Data from the Russian legal register Fedresurs indicates that in July 2022, GK Snabzheniye leased equipment manufactured by DMG Mori.
After the full-scale war started, GK Snabzheniye supplied equipment to the Polyot radio plant in Chelyabinsk, which produces aviation equipment, including for the Russian Ministry of Defence. This is stated in a ruling by the Chelyabinsk Oblast Arbitration Court.
On 25 December 2023, the court partially granted a claim in a case concerning a large contract within the framework of the state defence procurement programme. The court found that GK Snabzheniye had supplied goods worth US$868,000 to the Polyot radio plant. The ruling also lists the delivery dates under the defence contract.
It is clear that the individuals connected with Saturn EK are also linked to Russia's defence contracts. Another indirect piece of evidence is the dramatic improvement seen in the company's financial results after the full-scale war began.
High-precision equipment from Famot Pleszew was supplied to Saturn EK by a Turkish company, OTL Uluslararasi Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, which has been sanctioned by the EU, Ukraine and Switzerland since 2025.
According to the sanctions authorities, the company is involved in re-export schemes used to conceal the Russian end recipients. The company has imported US$2.5 million worth of products into Russia during the years of the full-scale war.
Domodedovo: corks with defence industry ambitions
According to the available customs data (up to and including March 2025), the last delivery of equipment manufactured by Famot Pleszew took place on 30 November 2024. The value of the shipment was almost US$82,000. The equipment in question was a horizontal CNC turning and milling machine manufactured in 2017. It was declared to be "for non-military purposes".
The recipient was Kortisa (or Cortiça) LLC, a company registered in 2023 in Domodedovo near Moscow. According to Russian corporate registers, the company specialises in the production of plywood, wooden boards and panels, but according to the company's website, it makes wooden corks.
In theory, the horizontal CNC turning and milling machine delivered during the full-scale war could be used to process wood.
In practice, however, it would be ridiculous both technologically and economically to use equipment designed for steel and titanium, with cooling systems, a rigid structure and industrial-level loads, to produce an ordinary wooden cork. Machines of this type are designed to manufacture shafts, bushings, housings and complex components with micron-level precision. They are meant for heavy engineering, not woodworking.
Despite officially having only two employees, Kortisa reported revenue of almost RUB 100 million (roughly US$1 million) in 2024.
The investigators discovered another company in the Russian register of legal entities with a similar name to Kortisa: Kortis LLC, which supplies machine tools and equipment from abroad. The company specialises "primarily in state and municipal procurement". Products from DMG Mori have appeared on its website.
The company's revenues soared after 2022 and now amount to billions of roubles. Before the full-scale war, materials about the DMG Mori Academy in Russia were posted on this website.
According to the customs data, the declarant is listed as Dmitry Kurashov, who is named as the company's general director on its website. In addition, according to the Russian register of legal entities, he is also the owner and director of Kortis.
Istanbul: don't mention the military and everything will be fine
It remains unclear whether this particular machine tool was supplied to a business that manufactures weapons for the war or cooperates with Russia's military-industrial complex. However, the investigators identified the Turkish intermediary company – Pyramid Muhendislik Ticaret Limited Sirketi – which supplied the Polish Famot equipment to Kortisa.
According to the information on its website, the company was registered in Istanbul in 2011, but according to the Turkish register, it was established in May 2023 by Bilal Ipek.
The company's website lists Bilal's contact details in one of the messaging apps. A journalist immediately dialled the number, posing as the manager of a Russian company that works closely with the Russian military-industrial complex.
The telephone conversation with Bilal began in the usual way but quickly moved to the sensitive subject of sanctions and military contracts. After a brief introduction, the journalist explained the purpose of her call.
"Our company supplies equipment for the military in Russia, and we are currently trying to find suppliers of European equipment due to well-known situation if you know what I mean. We are trying to find a CNC machine tool for our work, model CLX-350, Famot."
Without missing a beat, Bilal immediately asked for more details.
"You want new one or used one?"
After hearing that either option would be possible, he swiftly moved on to the main issue.
"And what about the payment transfer? You know there is sanctions?"
The journalist reassured him: "We will try to find a solution. We have partners in other countries who can transfer money to your company."
The Turkish manager then outlined his own experience in getting round the restrictions.
"Sometimes I work with other Russian companies also. I work with one bank. Sometimes we are allowed to bring the money from the bank as roubles. I also sold CNC machines to Russia last year. I bought them in Europe and arranged the export transfer. In the end we sold them. There are agents, do you understand?"
The journalist mentioned the CLX-350 made by Famot. Bilal confirmed that he was familiar with the brand, but asked for clarification of the configuration and even suggested an alternative. Then he stipulated a key condition for cooperation. "But please, in no contract, in no letter – okay, in WhatsApp is fine, but in no contract and in no letter mention the military or anything like that, okay?"
Bilal sent a list of the equipment that was in stock and available for sale. Most of the items on the list were labelled as DMG Mori products.
Bilal said supplying new equipment from DMG Mori would be difficult, but still possible. Moreover, he confirmed that it had been done before.
Thus, the Turkish supplier confirmed that he had experience of supplying EU-manufactured machine tools to Russia after the introduction of sanctions and was willing to seek out financial solutions through banks and agents, and emphasised the need to avoid any mention of the military purpose of the equipment in official documents.
Journalists from Frontstory sent inquiries to the Polish plant and its parent company. DMG Mori responded that it could not rule out the possibility that third parties may have purchased equipment and illegally exported it.
The response stated: "As a manufacturer of machine tools, we take determined action against the unauthorised relocation of machines. For this reason, we developed RMS technology. RMS stands for 'Relocation Machine Security': a sensor makes it possible to detect the relocation of a machine tool and automatically disables the machine. It can only be put back into operation at the new location once it has been released by a DMG MORI service technician.
We developed the RMS technology in Japan many years ago, continuously refined it, and have gradually deployed it throughout the world. Since 1 January 2024, all DMG MORI machines worldwide are equipped with RMS as standard. We are neither able to trace nor control the whereabouts of older machines that do not have RMS."
Despite DMG Mori's official statements that it completely withdrew from the Russian market back in 2022, high-precision machine tools from the Polish plant in Pleszew continue to reach Russia through Turkish intermediaries specialising in sanctions circumvention.
The Turkish traders explicitly suggest schemes to conceal the military purpose of the equipment in the documentation, while the end recipients in Russia are shell companies connected with state contracts for key businesses within the military-industrial complex. This demonstrates that there is a systemic vulnerability in the EU sanctions regime with regard to dual-use products.
Translated by Anna Kybukevych and Tetiana Buchkovska
Edited by Teresa Pearce