"Parliament's broken down! There aren't enough votes," fretted Andrii Motovylovets, the generally quiet deputy leader of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction, at a recent meeting with the president.
Sources at the President's Office told Ukrainska Pravda that the meeting had been convened so that parliamentary leaders and officials from the government and the President's Office could discuss key bills that MPs were due to consider shortly.
The attendees were unsettled by Motovylovets' remark, given that the agenda included initiatives that IMF and Ukraine Facility funding are dependent on.
Warnings that Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, might be unable to pass even legislation vital to the country's survival were confirmed just days later. During the plenary week of 10-13 March, MPs failed to gather enough votes to pass a bill on taxing income earned through digital platforms – a structural benchmark in Ukraine's IMF financing programme.
Ironically, it was Motovylovets whom the president later tasked with preparing a plan for how parliament should operate if Ukraine has to keep fighting "for another three years". Ukrainska Pravda learned this from sources within parliament.
The phrase "three years" may sound like a figure of speech. But the president clearly understands that a diplomatic end to the war will come either now, or only after US President Donald Trump's term is over. That will be in about three years' time.
In recent weeks, the framework on which the peace talks have been built since the beginning of the year has revealed its limits. The trilateral process has ground to a halt since the US launched its military operation against Iran.
As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has remarked, the dates and topics of upcoming meetings are beginning to resemble the neverending soap opera Santa Barbara. But if new episodes stop airing, Ukraine risks being left completely and definitively without US support.
Can Ukraine survive when its main legislative body is already close to paralysis and the chief executive body – the Cabinet of Ministers – is run by people whom MPs rather condescendingly describe as "graduate students" in terms of competence? It's a question worthy of not just a TV drama, but a full-scale Greek tragedy.
Ukrainska Pravda set out to discover what happened during the latest round of Ukraine-US talks, whether the risk of the US withdrawing from the process is real, and whether the authorities can bring parliament and the government back into working order, faced with the prospect of fighting on without American support.
Single-issue negotiations
The current iteration of the talks formally began with the emergence of the so-called Dmitriev-Witkoff plan last autumn, but in reality it was set in motion at last summer's meeting between Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Anchorage.
Communication within the Kyiv-Washington-Moscow triangle has intensified since changes were made to Ukraine's negotiating team following the dismissal of Andrii Yermak and the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov as head of the President's Office. Yet even the new team has been unable to overcome what the Russians refer to as the "spirit of Anchorage".
"It feels like there are three sides present at the meetings, but Ukraine is constantly arguing with this 'Anchorage' issue. Whatever is discussed, everything comes back to the Americans saying something like: 'Withdraw from Donbas and we will build a paradise for you, as agreed in Alaska,'" one member of Zelenskyy's team familiar with the negotiations says with unconcealed frustration.
The entire negotiating framework essentially revolves around a single issue: the status of the unoccupied parts of Donbas. For nearly six months now, Trump's envoys, together with the Russians, have been trying in various ways to present this idea to Ukraine as a path to ending the war. All other issues – whether energy-related or humanitarian – largely serve to create the appearance of "movement" and "progress".
The central question remains whether Ukraine is willing, in any format, to withdraw its forces from Donetsk Oblast.
"Our side is spending a lot of time trying to steer the Americans away from the idea of withdrawal towards creating economic zones of some kind or whatever. But at some point everything is dropped and once more we hear: 'You need to withdraw.' And it goes round in circles," another source involved in the talks told Ukrainska Pravda.
The fact is that since Anchorage, the US has not only ceased to be an ally – it is no longer even a neutral mediator for Ukraine. A mediator does not hold a position that has been pre-agreed with one side, nor does it exert pressure on the other to the point of threatening to cut off intelligence sharing or weapons supplies.
To some extent this behaviour can be explained by the transactional logic of US policymaking, according to which it may seem obvious that Ukraine should give up a relatively small piece of territory in exchange for security guarantees and money pouring in for reconstruction.
But for Zelenskyy, Ukrainian politicians and the Ukrainian public, it's not that simple.
The first obstacle to accepting the US-Russian plan is that Ukraine's leadership does not see how, from a military standpoint, withdrawing from Donbas would guarantee an end to Russian aggression. Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders who currently hold high ground in Donetsk Oblast cannot be persuaded that defending the open steppe terrain beyond those heights would be easier or more advantageous. For them, it simply doesn't add up.
But it's clear what Russia would stand to gain. In an interview with Italian journalists, Zelenskyy put it bluntly.
"He [Putin] wants us to believe him and simply withdraw from our well-fortified territories. These fortifications limit the capabilities of Russian forces. Putin understands that if we withdraw, he will preserve between 300,000 and a million of his soldiers, depending on the intensity and duration of offensive actions in Donbas. Why, then, should we suddenly trust him and hand him such gifts?"
Moreover – and this is the second factor undermining the logic of a quick concession – Ukraine is gradually regaining the initiative on the battlefield.
With the arrival of a new team led by Mykhailo Fedorov at the Defence Ministry, both the ministry and the overall management of the war have undergone rapid transformation. Among the changes: removing clan-based influence from drone procurement, cutting off Russia's access to Starlink systems, introducing full digital battlefield control, building a layered short-range air defence system aimed at neutralising long-range Russian drones, and more.
After testing tactics in Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine has begun deploying drone-assisted assault units in counteroffensives in the south as well, and for the first time in a long period has recaptured more territory than Russia has seized.
In addition, following the US operation in Iran and Tehran's retaliatory drone and missile strikes against American allies in the Gulf, technologies like interceptor drones are no longer just a Ukrainian priority, but a global necessity. It's no exaggeration to say that demand for them is through the roof.
If Zelenskyy's team manages this process wisely and doesn't miss the moment, it's entirely possible that Ukraine could become a global exporter of turnkey security solutions.
But that undermines the narrative of Ukraine as a defenceless victim with no chance of winning the war – one that must therefore concede Donbas sooner rather than later.
The third factor that makes the Dmitriev-Witkoff proposals particularly difficult is the political situation in Ukraine.
Even if the idea of withdrawing from Donbas could somehow be made acceptable to the military, it would be almost impossible to implement politically in Ukraine right now. Any decision to end the war, withdraw troops or formalise a line of contact would require parliamentary approval.
In a parliament that struggles even to pass tax increases, who would gather the votes to approve a referendum on territory, for instance – and how?
It's so hard to imagine that it's easier to picture the famously none-too-bright MP Mykola Tyshchenko conducting Lyatoshynsky's First Symphony without a score.
In short, from Ukraine's perspective, it does not look as though the negotiations can proceed strictly within the confines of the "spirit of Anchorage".
Ukraine would like the space to explore a broader framework, secure more realistic guarantees and achieve better terms. But what Kyiv certainly doesn't want is to be left entirely without a partnership with the US.
Particularly given the strategic unpredictability of its key partner: the European Union.
As one of Trump's advisers put it, officials in Brussels and other European capitals are world champions at making grand statements. When it comes to concrete decisions such as agreeing on a €90 billion loan for Ukraine, however, Europe's unity looks far more fragile.
"The Europeans insist that the funding will be provided and they will find a way around Hungary's resistance," a senior member of Zelenskyy's team told Ukrainska Pravda. "We are managing within our current budget for now. But if the EU doesn't come up with a solution, by the second half of the year we may still have funds for the armed forces, but not for social payments. And it is completely unclear what we'll do then.
So clearly Budanov and [Davyd] Arakhamiia [leader of the Servant of the People party and the ruling parliamentary faction] have to keep travelling, talking and searching for the right wording for as long as it takes. Otherwise the war could drag on for several more years, this time without the US. Are people ready for that? I fear not," the source added.
The prospect of Ukraine being left without US assistance now feels more real than at any point since Russia launched its full-scale invasion.
A member of Zelenskyy's team familiar with the outcome of the latest round of talks on 21-22 March told Ukrainska Pravda: "The Americans don't think we can reach agreement on the main issue. That could push them to walk away from the process altogether and switch to Iran, their own elections and so on. They are even prepared to offer us real security guarantees if we withdraw from Donbas. But I just can't imagine how that could be implemented in Ukraine."
Is there life without America?
The possibility of being left without US support, and with a less-than-solid EU as a partner, is forcing the Ukrainian government to plan for a near future in which funding is secured for months, not years.
You'd think this ought to be a time for MPs to rally round. Yet the Ukrainian parliament is going through its deepest crisis since the current convocation began in 2019. Ukrainska Pravda recently reported that the core of the president's "mono-minority" has shrunk from 170-180 votes to 120-130.
Sometimes this is driven by fear of investigations by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), sometimes it's different varieties of populism colliding. Parliamentary populists don't see why they should raise VAT for sole traders at the IMF's request only for the government populists and the president to then distribute the proceeds through voter-friendly programmes. They ask why there's no money in the budget to raise soldiers' pay, yet Yuliia Svyrydenko's government always finds funds for presidential initiatives such as the fuel cashback (an extension of the National Cashback programme, which offers a refund of up to 10% on purchases of Ukrainian-made products).
But the scale of the challenges the country is facing is such that the Servant of the People party leadership has no choice but to stabilise the parliament.
"We understand that the trilateral negotiations will most likely be put on hold because neither side is ready to make concessions," a senior Servant of the People source told Ukrainska Pravda off the record. "So we need to prepare a plan for the current parliament to function for another one, two or three years. Andrii Motovylovets is working on this. He is not limited by a timeframe, but is actively drafting the plan."
Sources in the Servant of the People faction told Ukrainska Pravda that talks are underway about the conditions on which the faction could operate in the long term. For now, they are looking for a stabilising resource within Servant of the People itself. But it is already clear that this won't be enough. Eventually, as in 2023, Arakhamiia will have to meet with different groups in the Verkhovna Rada to secure extra votes from outside the faction.
The next step is to improve coordination between the different centres of influence – the government and the President's Office. One representative of Team Zelenskyy said that since Andrii Yermak's departure from the President's Office, there have been "fewer intrigues and more work done" in the partnership between the presidential office and parliament.
Budanov is still not fully up to speed with the inner workings of the government quarter. Even routine tasks like getting all the committee chairs together for a meeting have proved challenging. But once he learns that it's quicker to invite the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada in person instead of getting his secretary to send a text, things should start to move faster.
Even so, the patchy coordination between parliament and the President's Office is a minor issue compared with the state of relations between MPs and government ministers, where mutual understanding is virtually non-existent. Motovylovets is in conflict with Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko. He has shown little enthusiasm for arranging a meeting between her and the committee chairs, and has been known to raise his voice during meetings with ministers and to leave early.
"Yuliia is forcing ministers to attend committee meetings, but it would be better if they didn't. The more they speak at committee sessions, the more the MPs clutch their heads," a senior parliamentarian told Ukrainska Pravda.
Another source close to Team Zelenskyy told Ukrainska Pravda with obvious frustration: "Government ministers sit in their own sandpit and throw sand at one another. They don't consult MPs on anything. You can see the outcome of that kind of 'cooperation' on the electronic board [that shows the results of votes] in the Verkhovna Rada."
Despite their poor relationship with the government, MPs are still unable to get rid of ministers, even ones they openly dislike. The education committee, for example, has repeatedly called for Education Minister Oksen Lisovyi to be dismissed, without success. It's not as if people are lining up to replace them – and in any case, the sacking or appointment of ministers is unlikely to be voted through.
Alongside the attempts to save the sinking ship known as the Verkhovna Rada, there have been subtle attempts to undermine the anti-corruption agencies, NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), which could also be seen as an attempt to show MPs that their greatest fear is being "worked on".
After last July's attack on the anti-corruption system, few expected Kyiv to go down that road again. The Verkhovna Rada passed the controversial draft law No. 12414, which made NABU and SAPO dependent on the prosecutor general – a move that ended up being one of the main destabilising shocks to the country's political system. Yet the President's Office has repeatedly displayed a remarkable degree of political blindness.
That is the only way to make sense of what Ukrainska Pravda has heard from sources within NABU. In mid-March, Taras Kachka, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, unexpectedly put forward a draft resolution to establish a commission to conduct an independent audit of NABU. This is significant, because a negative conclusion from the audit could serve as grounds for dismissing NABU's director.
"There was an audit last year. The experts gave us recommendations to improve our work, and we began implementing them. The draft resolution Kachka wanted to submit came as a big surprise to us. In the end it all came to nothing – the government never considered the resolution – but it's not clear what will happen next," one Ukrainska Pravda source at NABU said, not hiding their confusion.
In addition, internal media monitoring by the anti-corruption bodies indicates that waves of discreditation campaigns targeting the leadership of NABU and SAPO have intensified online, evidently moderated by pro-government forces.
"Since mid-January, Telegram channels have been flooded with posts calling the NABU director and detectives 'idiots', alleging that some have problems with asset declarations or have been illicitly enriching themselves," a source at NABU told Ukrainska Pravda. "Around the same time, a social media campaign began claiming that the anti-corruption agencies are too dependent on the Americans."
Meanwhile, government representatives have reportedly been complaining to Ukraine's foreign partners that MPs are reluctant to pass legislation related to EU integration and IMF and Ukraine Facility commitments "because of suspicions raised by NABU and SAPO".
For now, this does not appear to be a systematic and coordinated attack on Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, but it is clearly keeping NABU and SAPO staff in a state of "toxic tension".
***
"Everything is difficult. Everything is falling apart," a senior Servant of the People MP told Ukrainska Pravda half-ironically, summing up the mood in the Ukrainian parliament. "Somehow we have to piece it back together. This is no longer a parliament of peace. It is unlikely to survive a vote on any agreement, or anything like that. We aren't even a parliament of European integration any more. We'll be doing well if we can just remain a parliament of survival.
Things are bad with the government too, but there you can at least appoint two or three people to key posts and it will work. That doesn't work with parliament," the MP added.
As Ukraine enters the fifth year of Russia's full-scale war, its central problem is strategic. The country has to plan for years ahead, yet without outside support it can only secure resources for a few months at a time.
Ukraine cannot accept its partners' terms, but it can't reject them outright either, as doing so would mean losing part of the already scarce support it needs to survive.
On a chessboard, this is the definition of a stalemate. But in a country at war, there is no option to declare a draw and start a new game. That is why the Ukrainian authorities are now desperately searching for a move strong enough to break the deadlock.
Roman Romaniuk, Anhelina Strashkulych, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Ganna Bryedova and Tetiana Buchkovska
Edited by Teresa Pearce