Ukrainian drones in Germany: how Frontline Robotics has become Ukraine's first exporter of military technology

"This project is like a wedding after which the couple moves into the parents' house. Because there are two businesses, but also two states that have to reach an agreement with each other."

This is how Frontline Robotics describes its partnership with Germany's Quantum Systems – a story in which business, international politics and complex bureaucratic procedures for exporting military technology converge.

The Ukrainian company, which develops robotic systems for the battlefield, has concluded a strategic agreement with the German manufacturer. In less than a year of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement to establish a joint venture in Germany. In February 2026, they unveiled the first jointly produced drone, and by spring, they had already delivered the first batch of Ukrainian drones manufactured at a German plant to Ukraine's defence forces.

The case is notable as it represents the first public and official transfer of Ukrainian military technology abroad since the start of the full-scale invasion. Frontline Robotics was the first to navigate complex bureaucratic procedures and to find a business model that was politically acceptable to both Ukraine and the partner state.

The opening of a Ukrainian plant in Germany currently looks more like a "showcase" than the beginning of a systemic process (gaps in the export system have been outlined by Ukrainska Pravda in a separate article).

A visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the company's new German site ahead of the Munich Security Conference appeared to be part of a broader signal of Ukraine's willingness to integrate into the European security system through joint production.

However, this agreement is the result not only of political will, but also of carefully considered actions by both the German and Ukrainian companies, seeking their place within a complex system of state interests and tightly regulated procedures.

Against the backdrop of the first export deals, Ukrainians have understandable concerns that companies may move abroad, taking all their technologies and specialists with them. However, Frontline Robotics' management insists that it aims to keep the "core" in Ukraine, meaning the domestic industry will only benefit, while intellectual property will remain protected.

Ukrainska Pravda spoke with Frontline Robotics Business Development Director Mykyta Rozhkov about the path to the first export agreement. At least in part, this may pave the way for other arms manufacturers seeking international partnerships.

The Germans liked the idea of opening a Ukrainian drone plant

Why do you need a foreign company at all, and how did you come to partner with Quantum Systems?

We were looking for a partner who could provide a boost to our development, help with access to the European components market and share manufacturing expertise. Quantum Systems is already a mature defence company that has grown in a different context and is at a different stage of development.

We met them at a defence exhibition at Brave1 and presented our solutions. These piqued the interest of Quantum Systems' representatives, who took the next step and proposed they have a discussion about strategic cooperation.

When we began communicating, they were most interested in our anti-FPV solutions. We develop robotic systems for the battlefield. We have solutions in the airborne domain – reconnaissance and logistics drones, often compared to the Mavic drone series. We have ground systems – robotic turrets for the MK-19 and the M2 Browning machine gun. We also have anti-FPV solutions. As they became more familiar with our product line and the demands at the front, they also grew interested in other products.

As a result, we have developed quite a strong technological overlap. We have tactical attack and reconnaissance copters and ground systems; Quantum has fixed-wing reconnaissance UAVs. And these complement each other well.

We signed a memorandum that established close commercial collaboration as the core idea of the project. In parallel, negotiations regarding investment were underway on their side – and by the time of signing, we had already agreed on the amount and the share in Frontline that Quantum would acquire. Ten per cent was a comfortable share for us at that stage.

There is also an option to increase it to 25% – it's within the partner's rights to invest further if the company performs well and we launch new funding rounds. Meanwhile, the investment did not include anything excessively controlling. There are standard investor information rights – finances, product development and plans for one to two years. But nothing that would limit our decision-making.

Did you have to negotiate separately with the German government?

In August, the first thing we did was pitch this idea to the German Ministry of Defence. We asked whether they would support the creation of such a production facility on their territory for Ukraine's needs and whether they would be ready to finance it.

There were many interesting coincidences and a great deal of work done on this project. For example, we had only just discussed the idea with Quantum Systems, and four days later, we had the opportunity to present it to the German Ministry of Defence. They liked the proposal. We saw that the German government had the resources and that such a contract volume could realistically be covered on the German side.

What appealed to them most was the underlying logic: not simply to finance the supply of products needed by Ukraine, but also to finance the creation of production capacities for this purpose.

Several processes then ran in parallel. On the one hand, we were negotiating between ourselves as businesses – what the cooperation would look like, how production would be organised and how it would function in B2B terms. On the other hand, the Ukrainian and German ministries of defence had to agree between themselves on how this cooperation would take place at the intergovernmental level.

It is like a wedding after which the couple moves in with the parents. Because there's our relationship as two industrial players, and then there is a higher level above us – two governments, two ministries, which also have to agree on everything between themselves.

What role did the Build with Ukraine initiative play?

At that time, the Build with Ukraine initiative had already been announced. It provided for the possibility of establishing joint weapons production, but this requires a bilateral memorandum between the countries. In other words, there must be a specific agreement between Ukraine and Germany that they are ready to cooperate in the field of military technology.

Accordingly, the first step was the signing of a framework agreement on joint production between Ukraine and Germany. This process was actively driven by the German side, while the Ukrainian side supported it fairly quickly. And in about three weeks, the agreement was signed. Essentially, this was the OK that meant we could begin joint production.

Next, there had to be a separate agreement between the ministries of defence which would regulate the specific project: what exactly is produced, in what quantities, within what timeframe, at what price, what the conditions are regarding intellectual property, and so on. We were no longer involved in those negotiations.

In parallel, within this framework, we were assembling our own layer of business agreements – everything required to establish a joint venture in Germany under German law: the founding agreement, the articles of association, the distribution of responsibilities, and so forth.

For us at Frontline Robotics, it was important to remain the licensor for the production of our products and to safeguard our critical innovations. The most sensitive aspect is quantity control. That is, you grant the right to produce your drones, but you must strictly control how many are produced. This is important both for Ukraine and for us as a company.

When we proposed a mechanism that would limit production to exactly the number specified in the contract, it resolved many issues in both our agreement and the overall cooperation model.

After that, we signed the joint venture documents and the licensing agreement – and were able to move forward. It was at that point, in December, that the public announcement was made.

One European company offered to transfer the technology "under the table"

Why did you choose to carry out the technology transfer through a state-owned intermediary – a special exporter – rather than doing everything independently?

Export legislation stipulates that if you are transferring military technology across the border, you must have the appropriate authorisation.

We had two options: obtain it independently – which would take about six months – or work through a special exporter. We chose the latter and went through Spetstechnoexport.

To be honest, at first we didn't even know who to approach – we asked colleagues in the market. Someone who knew how to quickly prepare documents for exporting defence technologies was recommended to us. They worked at Spetstechnoexport, so we reached out – and it was the right decision.

For us, this was our first experience of this kind, so it was important to have a team alongside us that had gone through this process many times. Because a mistake here would be very costly: if something is wrong with the documents, the application is not rejected "partially", but in its entirety.

That is precisely why Spetstechnoexport's role was critical. We had very tight deadlines: the creation of the German joint venture company was announced in December, and we aimed to begin production as early as the first quarter of 2026. We asked them to speed up the process – and they responded. In the end, the package of documents was prepared and submitted within a week, whereas this normally takes a month and a half to two months. It was literally around-the-clock work – by our team and theirs.

Spetstechnoexport now acts as the specialised exporter responsible for supplying the joint venture with the components and technologies that are transferred from Ukraine.

Were there other routes for export?

We have been working on the international circuit for about a year and a half and during that time we have seen a great deal.

On one occasion, a European company representative began telling us that it would be great for us to begin production abroad right now. The argument was that sooner or later the permits would start being granted and we would already be ready for that.

I asked: "How will we be ready if we cannot obtain a permit?" And he said: "Well, perhaps you could transfer the technology under the table?"

We simply laughed at that. Of course, we transferred nothing "under the table".

Which government representatives did you consult during the preparation of this project? And what role did the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry and Oleksandr Kamyshin play in this?

In the early stages of this project, we approached the Council of Defence Industry and showed its director, Ihor Fedirko, our concept – and specifically the way we wanted to implement it. After the presentation, he said: "Well, this is Build with Ukraine. This is exactly how it is supposed to work."

Since this was potentially one of the first export projects of its kind involving a technology transfer, it was important for us to get an assessment of whether this model was viable at all. Because on the one hand, we as manufacturers see a business opportunity and want to take advantage of it. But on the other hand, we understand that when it comes to exporting military technology abroad during martial law, at the end of that process someone has to put their signature on it to say that this is permissible. And that makes it a political question.

We also wanted to communicate separately that we have no desire to take anything out of the country, but on the contrary – to produce FOR Ukraine.

We consulted with both the Council of Defence Industry and Oleksandr Kamyshin, who serves as chairman of the association's board. We presented this project to the Ministry of Defence, received feedback from them, and the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine was also kept informed. In other words, we tried to be as transparent as possible with all government stakeholders – we explained what this project was, what its advantages were and sought to receive as much feedback as possible.

What's more, at the outset we were not even certain ourselves that a joint venture was the best structure. And it was precisely in the course of these consultations that we arrived at the final model: that it should indeed be a joint venture, with the right level of governance and with additional intellectual property protection for the Ukrainian side.

And in essence, this feedback genuinely made the deal stronger, in terms of protecting Ukrainian production, technologies and the position of the Ukrainian side overall.

How long did it take to get approval for the technology transfer application?

After the documents are submitted to the State Export Control Service, the standard inter-agency approval procedure is launched. The application is reviewed by several bodies – the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Intelligence Service, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, counterintelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each assesses the deal from its own perspective – primarily in terms of risks.

Representatives of these agencies then contacted us directly and some also contacted the international partner. Communication was fairly transparent, but there were many questions, most of which came from counterintelligence. This makes sense, since their task is to ensure that the technology is transferred without the risk of a leak. We explained the model in detail: exactly how the technology is transferred, how the volume of production is controlled, and where the finished products ultimately end up.

And here our interests aligned completely with those of the state. We were equally interested in protecting our intellectual property and preventing any technology leak. In the end, the structure of the deal satisfied all the agencies.

The final step was the approval by the Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (ICMTC). A key nuance was that this had long been one of the biggest barriers for Ukrainian exports: the ICMTC was simply not functioning.

I don't know whether our case contributed to this in some way, or whether the time had simply come, but the commission was established. It reviewed the first applications, including ours, and approved it. After that, the decision returned to the State Export Control Service, which issued the permit – the piece of paper stating that our products had been cleared for export.

It was a very emotional moment.

All the intellectual property remains in Ukraine

What does "technology transfer" mean in practice? How will the technology reach Germany?

In our case, we are talking about a limited non-exclusive licence for the joint venture.

We transferred three key elements: the assembly technology – literally the information on how to manufacture the product; critical components with Ukrainian intellectual property rights that provide the core combat characteristics; and a production launch package – training and process configuration. At the same time, all the intellectual property remains in Ukraine.

How is the question of intellectual property protection resolved in this model?

The technology has been transferred, but production is only possible using the components that we supply. Accordingly, we immediately control both quality and quantity: we agree on a specific volume – and it is precisely for that volume that we supply the components.

In essence, this is a licence to produce a specific product – the Linza bomber drone – together with a set of key elements for its assembly.

What's more, these components are supplied as a black box: they are already programmed and ready to operate, with no access to the software on the production side. This was a matter of principle for us – to protect our intellectual property.

And importantly, it was precisely this model that was well received by the government agencies, specifically because of the control it provides and the minimisation of the risk of technology leaks.

Is there a risk that the partner could eventually reproduce the product without you?

With this technology and these components – no. But it is important to understand that one of the safeguards in this model is that everything is transferred to the joint venture. And in a joint venture, both parties hold a stake. So in essence, we are transferring it to ourselves.

How does Ukraine's economy benefit from this deal?

For Ukraine, the value lies in the fact that the components that will be installed in the German drones are manufactured in Ukraine.

To this end, we are even considering opening a separate production line that will directly manufacture components for this joint venture. And the joint venture will purchase them from the Ukrainian manufacturer.

This means that we can open a new line here, create new jobs and the money essentially comes into Ukraine and stays here.

One interesting point– when hiring in Germany, we are trying to prioritise Ukrainians, especially to begin with so that there is less cultural friction. At the start, we need to move very quickly to ensure deliveries, and we want to prioritise creating jobs specifically for Ukrainians abroad. We have already hired dozens of employees.

The core of the company remains in Ukraine

What are your production plans going forward?

The plan for 2026 is 10,000 bomber drones. An initial small batch in the first quarter, and then a gradual ramp-up to 10,000.

One of the main challenges is finding the right contractors on the ground. Because in Ukraine, approximately 75% of the materials are sourced locally, and there is simply no point in shipping everything from Ukraine abroad. Some things need to be local.

Linza has both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian components. The critical ones will come from Ukraine, while others can be produced in Germany or other European countries.

Other challenges include test flights of the new product, recruiting staff and personnel training.

But at this stage, the most important thing for us is not to compromise on quality. That is why we are investing separately in product testing. And we in Ukraine will be responsible for the maintenance of these systems.

Many people now have well-founded concerns that companies will begin transferring technologies abroad and then leave themselves after the war, taking their management and engineers with them. What would you say to that?

Honestly, we are among those who do not believe the war will end soon. Therefore, the need for defence technologies in Ukraine will persist for a long time. And looking at it more broadly, this is no longer solely a Ukrainian issue – it is a security question for the whole of Europe, at the very least.

That is why we see our future as a company that creates cutting-edge innovations and strengthens Ukraine's defence capability. All our developments and all our activities are directed at giving Ukraine more value, more products and more means of defence.

On the other hand, we want to build a long-term strategy. And for that reason we understand that international production sites and partnerships are necessary if only to ensure greater stability in the long term.

We also consider international partnerships necessary in order to remain relevant beyond Ukraine – through joint ventures, better access to European components and to European scientific potential in general.

But we firmly believe in the development of the defence industry in Ukraine, we believe in Ukraine and we see the core of the company as being here – primarily through the presence of our R&D.

Iryna Lutsak

Translated by Elizaveta , Anastasia

Edited by Susan McDonald, Artem Yakymyshyn, Zechariah Polevoi