"Every third sortie results in a hit": How the 412th Nemesis brigade destroys Russian air defence with mid-range drones
Over the past year, Ukrainian drones have become a real nightmare for Russian air defence. The military conducts reconnaissance and destroys targets up to 200 kilometres away, controlling the drone and watching the explosions in real time.
This has been made possible by mid-range drones, commonly referred to by Ukrainian weapons engineers and soldiers as "middle-strikes". They are capable of destroying important Russian facilities and equipment at distances considered to be deep rear areas.
Many units are now mastering the use of this type of UAV, while arms manufacturers are constantly improving their products. As a result, even rear areas will become dangerous for the Russians, potentially disrupting logistics, slowing down offensives and thinning out surface-to-air missile systems, opening the way to the enemy's oil infrastructure.
Pavlo Laktionov, deputy commander of the 412th Nemesis Brigade, told Ukrainska Pravda how these drones are developing and why they may soon change the rules of the game on the battlefield.
When did you start using mid-range drones?
We began doing this in our unit even before it had a name. We would simply take a heavy bomber and send it one way when we knew for sure there was an important target there. No return. That was our "middle-strike".
We have had a confirmed hit on a Buk air defence system at a distance of 50-57 kilometres. At the time, these were unattainable distances. It was one of the first such cases, and we then began developing this approach further.
One of the key targets for mid-range drones is air defence. How many Russian surface-to-air missile systems have you already destroyed or struck?
The brigade had hit and destroyed 83 enemy air defence systems, including various types of surface-to-air missile systems – from Tor and Buk systems to S-300 radar stations – as well as different elements of these systems, such as launchers, command vehicles, transporter-loaders and so on, as of 2 May 2026.
Why can't Russian air defence protect itself from drones?
Based on the number of air defence systems destroyed since the beginning of the invasion and the approximate pace of production, Ukraine's Defence Forces are destroying far more than the Russians can produce. As a result, their air defence is becoming less dense and less effective.
They are also forced to pull some of their systems back to protect decision-making centres, defence facilities, oil depots deep inside Russia, and so on. So there are even fewer systems left at the front.
Another factor is that Soviet-designed radars are not very well suited to shooting down small aircraft with composite airframes.
In reality, Russian surface-to-air missile systems do shoot down our drones quite often, using up missiles in the process, but we are adapting our tactics too. We fly at low altitudes, making the assets less visible to radar. Some of their missiles have a minimum altitude for interception, and we fly below it.
Overall, the small size of the aircraft, the right tactics, the dispersal of air defence systems and the depletion of their missile stocks give us a significant advantage.
Are the Russians developing their own drone interceptors?
Russian interceptor drones are causing us serious problems. Ukrainian manufacturers should already be thinking about developing countermeasures.
What does the typical use of mid-range drones look like in practice, from target selection to strike?
It all starts with reconnaissance, which produces a list of targets. Then comes planning: the military determines what exactly will be used against the targets, how to approach them, and what supporting actions will be carried out.
Physically, it looks simple: there are assets, crews, targets and a mission. But in reality, there is a great deal of coordination behind it. It is not a case of "launching one drone and hitting the target". Often, it is complex work, with different types of assets operating at the same time.
For example, mid-range drones can "thin out" air defence, after which other assets move in – reconnaissance or deep-strike capabilities. Or the opposite: everything is planned as a single operation, with some working against air defence, others against logistics, and others against infrastructure.
If there is an important target, it takes only a few hours from planning to strike. The only thing that can really disrupt such work is the weather.
It is often said that mid-range drones serve to "open corridors" for longer-range assets, which then fly hundreds of kilometres deep. How does this work?
This is one of the approaches, and it is not new. Some assets may be launched to distract air defence, detect its response and force it to engage. But the main strike may not necessarily be there. It may come from another direction, or at a different time altogether.
In the beginning, it often looked like this: mid-range drones would enter the area, work against air defence, force the systems to fold up, switch off their radars and move – and at that moment, other assets would move in.
But this no longer works as a clear template. The war has become much more complex and multifaceted. Assets are used in different combinations, at different times and from different directions. In other words, this is no longer a linear logic of "first mid strike, then deep strike", but a complex game with many variables.
Are mid-range drones already a mass-produced weapon?
I would not say this is a mass-scale story. Mass-scale use is when artillery fires hundreds of shells. Mid-range drones do not work like that. They are a tool for high-precision strikes on expensive and important targets. To find such a target, reconnaissance has to put together a very complex puzzle. And then several assets are launched specifically for this task.
How do you conduct reconnaissance at depths of tens or hundreds of kilometres?
With the emergence of mid-range drones, there has also been demand for reconnaissance UAVs capable of flying 100+ kilometres, operating by day and by night, in different weather conditions, and still providing a high-quality image. Technologically, this is already possible: modern cameras allow targets to be seen in great detail even from a long distance.
But mid-range drones have one distinct advantage: they can see the result of their own strike. If they operate in pairs, the second asset can observe the first one's hit, adjust its trajectory and finish the target off. This provides an entirely different level of control compared with long-range strikes, where you do not always see the result of your work.
An attack drone is fast, making it harder to shoot down. A separate reconnaissance aircraft hovering in the air, by contrast, is much more vulnerable to air defence. So reconnaissance is not just a "picture from a drone"; it is a complex system: visual, technical and human intelligence.
How effective are your strikes at the moment?
In our case, roughly every third sortie ends in an effective hit.
At the same time, there is a difference between "hit" and "destroyed". "Hit" means the target has been damaged and may be repaired. "Destroyed" means it no longer can be. So effectiveness is not just about whether the asset hits the target. It is also about whether it reached the area, whether it found the target, and whether a strike took place.
Another important point: the mere fact of a mid-range drone entering the target area already has an effect. It is similar to Shaheds: even when they are shot down and do not reach their targets, they still create tension, force air defence to respond and distract resources. It is the same here – every sortie puts pressure on the Russians and affects their actions.
Is it difficult to learn to operate a mid-range drone?
Mid-range drone operators require a different level of training than those who work with smaller UAVs. These are expensive assets, and the aim is for them to be used as effectively as possible. That is why the operators are usually people with experience.
Such UAVs have now come very close to conventional aviation, and the approach is the same: pilots constantly train on simulators and practise different scenarios. Roughly speaking, one hour of actual flight time can be replaced by two hours on a simulator. So even with a limited number of sorties, operators' skills remain active.
Where should you start? You come to us, work with simpler and cheaper drones, where the cost of a mistake is lower. You gain experience and then move on to more complex and expensive ones. It is like aviation: first a light aircraft, then a more complex one, and only after that – larger aircraft. You cannot just jump straight into a Boeing, because the difference is very noticeable.
You may know how to fly a small aircraft – understand the basic principles and aerodynamics. But when you move on to a larger aircraft, it is a completely different level: working with systems, mission planning, autopilot and other control modes.
It is the same here: people gradually grow within the unit and move on to more complex tasks.
How long does it take to train an operator?
Just a year ago, systems of this class essentially did not exist, and now we are already building a training system for them. A person can learn the basics in 30-60 days.
Some people progress very quickly. Within a year, they can reach a very high level. And, conversely, there are cases when a person can fly, but simply doesn't get the hang of it. A lot depends on individual ability too.
In what direction will mid-range drones develop technologically now? Warhead, guidance systems, autonomy?
In general, these drones have several key elements.
The first is the weight of the warhead. The second is range. The third is self-sufficiency. The fourth is communications. And the fifth is manoeuvrability.
Mid-range drones cover different types of missions. There are systems that can operate against dynamic targets – for example, when vehicles are on the move. In such cases, manoeuvrability is needed to catch up with and strike the target.
And there are systems that operate against stationary targets – warehouses, bases, command posts. They may not be manoeuvrable, but they can carry a large warhead and strike large targets.
Personally, I expect to see a greater variety of munitions and a more detailed categorisation of them. In other words, not just high-explosive or shaped-charge munitions, but more diverse, more "creative" solutions for different missions.
Secondly, an increase in the weight of the warhead while maintaining range and manoeuvrability. In my opinion, that is something that will definitely emerge.
As for guidance systems, they are already a must-have. Optical guidance – when you designate a target and the system then reaches it on its own – already exists and will continue to develop.
As for guidance towards radar emitters, that is also possible, and I would like to see it become a more widespread option. But there is one caveat: the Russians use radars very cautiously. They switch them on for short sessions – "click-click" – and then switch them off, because they understand they can be seen. So "catching" an active radar is already almost a jackpot.
In general, we expect that in the near future – I think within this year – there will be truly revolutionary changes on our side in the class of mid-range drones. Revolutionary changes.
The point is that some systems will be able to fly much farther. Accordingly, we will be able to strike targets deeper behind the lines. This will lead to a redistribution of the Russians' efforts and an increase in our pressure on rear facilities.
How do you assess the quality of aircraft from Ukrainian manufacturers? Do you have to refine them in workshops, and do companies respond quickly to your comments?
I will start with feedback: manufacturers respond very quickly. This is a new class of asset, and we are essentially going through this experience together. They are interested in making a better product, so they listen and make changes quickly.
This often happens almost in real time: either the manufacturers work alongside us in a workshop in the rear, or we pass on feedback remotely, and it is already taken into account in the next deliveries.
We make it quite clear: if certain things are not fixed, we will not accept such equipment. And then it is their job to find a solution.
As for quality, manufacturers are making an effort, but these are new solutions that are being developed and introduced at the same time. So we check everything.
Overall, the quality is "satisfactory plus".
There are manufacturers who work very closely with units: they choose one or two core units, test their equipment there, quickly receive feedback and quickly make changes. These are the ones who move faster and make a better product.
Because if you simply make something and try to sell it to everyone at once, it doesn't work. The right approach is when you work with specific crews, know the people, receive direct feedback from them and quickly refine the product.
How would you assess the supply of mid-range assets? What is the bottleneck now: pilots, high-quality targets or the drones themselves?
The situation is this: we understand how to do it and we have the experience, but we lack the equipment itself. With the current volume of deliveries, we have enough pilots. But the brigade's staffing structure provides for a larger number of crews, and we are continuing to fill those roles. In other words, if we get more equipment, we will form more crews and be able to scale up our work.
Another important point is that this is an expensive tool. The state is investing a lot of money in it, so it needs to be used against high-quality targets. Simply "hitting anything anywhere" with such assets is not the right approach.
But if deliveries increase twofold or threefold tomorrow, we will adapt, and targets will certainly be found. We should not forget that "middle-strike" is not one specific weapon. It is a whole "zoo" of different solutions for different tasks.
Can mid-range drones change the rules of the game in the war?
The rules of the game are changing constantly. Every day – a little; every month – significantly; every quarter – very significantly; every year – radically. And the emergence of such assets has already changed the war. The main thing is that there are now no safe zones anywhere. Both we and the Russians are forced to hide infrastructure, move it further into the rear, bury it and disperse it.
How do mid-range drones affect the front?
Imagine there is a section of the front that you want to influence. What do you do? You take out fuel depots, oil storage facilities, large logistics bases and command posts – brigade, regimental and divisional ones. You force them to move constantly and lose stability.
How do the Russians feel this? They pull everything further back, and their supply lines become longer. It becomes harder to bring in fuel and ammunition and to carry out troop rotations. And this directly affects the front line. Because if there is nothing to refuel equipment with, if resources cannot be brought in quickly, this is immediately felt at the front.
And here, there is an important point. This is not a full replacement for other assets, such as HIMARS. They are available, but in limited numbers, and they cannot always operate at such distances. So mid-range drones add another layer of influence – at depths that were previously harder to reach.
The same applies to the Russians: their long-range assets cannot operate without restrictions either, because we are trying to find and destroy them. So this creates a situation where both sides are trying to move their critical elements further and further back. And this has a direct impact on the front. Because when there is no fuel, when rotations cannot be carried out quickly, and when it becomes harder to supply units, all of this accumulates and the offensive slows down.
In other words, mid-range drones are not only about striking targets. They are about having a systemic impact on the war.
Read more about mid-range drones in Ukrainska Pravda's articles:
Hitting the rear and easing the load on HIMARS: Ukraine's new mid-range drones
A scalpel against air defences: no more asking "Where's Ukraine's Lancet?"
Translated by Viktoriia Yurchenko
Edited by Susan McDonald