Russia's winter campaign against energy infrastructure has begun. Will Kyiv be left without electricity, heating and water?
On the night of 29-30 September – ten days earlier than last year – Russia's winter campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure officially began. Ekonomichna Pravda (EP) sources say Russian ballistic missiles and drones have been primarily targeting energy facilities in Kyiv and the surrounding region. Their targets include thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, hydroelectric power plants and electricity transmission infrastructure.
Last winter demonstrated the problems that massive strikes on critical infrastructure can cause in people's everyday lives. This year Ukraine is heading into the heating season better prepared. Power generation has been restored, backup power sources secured, security measures strengthened, equipment stocked up, and repair crews replenished.
But as everyone knows, no level of protection can fully shield the power grid from Russian attacks, meaning that Ukraine is highly unlikely to get through the winter without some disruptions to electricity, heating and water supplies.
Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin has no desire, and certainly no plans, to agree to an energy truce any time soon, given that he sees further strikes as a means of exerting pressure on the Ukrainian authorities and influencing Kyiv's position ahead of possible negotiations.
Moscow is likely to focus its attacks on Kyiv, Ukraine's most densely populated city, in an attempt to influence the public mood in the capital – something the Ukrainian authorities cannot afford to ignore.
The Kremlin's overall objective is to bring about a humanitarian catastrophe and render the Ukrainian capital uninhabitable. Read on to find out how Kyiv is preparing for the heating season, what challenges lie ahead, and what its residents should expect.
Resilience Plans
In early March, Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council approved Comprehensive Resilience Plans for regions and major cities. The plans set out step-by-step roadmaps to prepare critical infrastructure for the next heating season.
EP has looked at what the plans involve, how much they are expected to cost to implement, and whether they can all feasibly be put into practice before the cold weather arrives. The plans cover four key areas, some of which may overlap.
- The first area concerns protection for critical infrastructure. It covers air defence measures and the completion of Level 2 protective shelters at facilities belonging to Ukrenergo (Ukraine's state-owned electricity transmission operator), Naftogaz (the largest national oil and gas company), the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine, and regional electricity distribution companies.
- The second area involves building 1.5 GW of distributed generation capacity, primarily in the city of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava and Kyiv oblasts. Distributed generation refers to smaller power generation facilities located closer to consumers, rather than centralised in a small number of large plants.
- The third and fourth areas are about ensuring uninterrupted heating and water supplies.
At the heart of the plans is a simulation of a total blackout, designed to answer a crucial question: how would the city keep its heating and water systems running if that were to happen? "The concept has been dubbed 'Dark, but warm.' In other words, the lights might go out after a bombardment, but there must always be water and heating," Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Centre for Energy Research, told EP.
Immediately after the government adopted the Resilience Plans, energy sector sources told EP they were overly ambitious and optimistic and said they doubted that all the measures could be implemented before winter.
Three years would be a more realistic timescale for completion of the work, the sources said. What has been achieved so far, and how is Kyiv preparing to go into the heating season?
What will happen to the electricity supply?
Before Russia began to attack its power grid, Ukraine had a significant electricity surplus. Generation comfortably exceeded domestic demand.
Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal says Ukraine currently has over 15 GW of generating capacity available during the evening, when demand is at its highest. And that's with only six of Ukraine's nine nuclear reactors in operation (the other three are undergoing maintenance). The plan is to increase available generation capacity to 19.6 GW by 1 November and 21.4 GW by the end of the year.
Meanwhile, electricity consumption last week ranged from 6,800 MW at its lowest to 10,200 MW at its peak. The sharp drop in consumption across the country is linked to Russia's constant attacks on major metals companies, which have been forced to halt production.
Electricity consumption will obviously go up in winter, but if all the planned repairs are completed, power generation should be sufficient to keep the system balanced in normal winter temperatures, a source at an energy company told EP.
"However, we have to factor in that the energy sector will come under attack," the source noted. "We had enough generation capacity on paper at the end of last September too, but after several waves of attacks, we ended up with a shortfall of 5,000-6,000 MW."
So the main risk this winter is not a shortage of generation capacity at the outset, but how quickly that capacity could be lost due to further Russian attacks.
For Kyiv, this is particularly important. Russian attacks have already destroyed a significant portion of the capital's power generation capacity. Some of that capacity is slated to be restored, but once brought back online, the facilities will become priority targets again.
The second major area of preparation is therefore to ensure a reliable electricity supply for the capital. The Kyiv energy ring is built around four 330 kV substations, supported by dozens of smaller 110 kV substations.
The Resilience Plan envisages providing Level 2 protection for these sites. According to sources who spoke to EP, some of the work is already complete and the remainder is due to be finished by the end of the year, despite government statements about a freeze on capital expenditure. Level 2 protection is designed to withstand drone attacks, but not ballistic strikes.
Another part of Kyiv's Resilience Plan is establishing backup power sources. A document seen by EP puts the capital's peak winter load at 2 GW. Critical infrastructure accounts for around 280 MW, and a reserve of generators and cogeneration units is to be set up specifically to keep those facilities supplied.
EP sources say around 150 MW of the planned 200 MW of distributed generation capacity has already been commissioned. According to an energy market source, the city could have 180-185 MW available by the end of the year. Privately owned facilities with a combined capacity of 55-60 MW could also come online before winter; around half of them are ready to start operating.
The main function of distributed generation is to keep critical infrastructure running if the main generation sources or the grid are damaged.
In other words, if there is an electricity shortage, priority will be given to water supply systems, boilerhouses, hospitals, communications, transport and other essential services. For ordinary consumers, emergency or hourly power outage schedules will be in place, as they were last year. What will this mean for the public?
A senior manager at a state-owned energy company told EP: "If temperatures fall below -10°C and some generation capacity can't be brought back online in time, we could be looking at around eight to ten hours of power cuts per day. That's assuming there are no further attacks.
Then there's the pessimistic scenario – heavy strikes and widespread destruction. In that case there might be only four hours of electricity a day, leaving Kyiv without power for up to 20 hours," the source added. Even so, EP sources say Russia will not be able to plunge Kyiv into a total blackout.
In other words, the worst-case scenario for the capital is prolonged power cuts for most consumers, but critical infrastructure kept powered up.
The source concludes: "No one can give an accurate forecast right now. The situation depends on many factors. It will depend on where and how the attacks happen, which power plants are still working, and how quickly they can be brought back online."
What are the risks to Kyiv's heating supply?
Heating is a more complex issue. Kyiv's heat supply system has historically been highly centralised: around 70% of the city is heated by three large combined heat and power (CHP) plants.
That is why backup heat sources are one of the key priorities of the Resilience Plan: modernising old boilerhouses, building new ones, installing cogeneration units, and creating connections between different sections of the heating network.
The idea is that if a major CHP plant goes down, individual districts will be able to receive heat from alternative sources. The problem is that Kyiv's huge CHP plants cannot be fully replicated in just a few months.
"Kyiv's CHP plants have a capacity equal to that of several regional capitals. They were built over decades, when the Soviet Union had virtually unlimited resources," a source in the Kyiv city administration told EP.
For that reason, Kyiv will not be able to fully protect its heating supply system from losing heat this year. An EP source close to the government said that between 2,500 and 3,000 apartment blocks may be left without a backup heat supply this winter. Another source believes the number could be even higher. There are 12,000 apartment blocks in Kyiv.
"It's hard to say exactly which apartment blocks might be left without heating, but potentially the areas at risk are parts of the Solomianskyi, Holosiivskyi and Pecherskyi districts, Teremky, Berezniaky, parts of the Dniprovskyi district, part of Troieshchyna, and even the Obolonskyi district," Kharchenko says.
As with the power supply, what happens next will depend on the scale of the attacks.
The optimistic scenario assumes that the main heat sources will be partly operational and any damage would be repaired quickly, in which case Kyiv should get through the winter without widespread heating disruptions. Backup boilerhouses and bypasses should help localise any problems.
But if the Russians launch massive strikes on thermal power stations and large boilerhouses, heating problems are inevitable. "There are three major plants in Kyiv that have already been attacked. You don't need a crystal ball to know that they're going to be attacked again," says an EP source at an energy company. On 30 September, Russian forces launched relentless strikes on one of the capital's CHP plants.
If this happens, the city will switch to emergency mode. Backup boilerhouses, generators, emergency response teams and mobile equipment will be deployed wherever possible. Critical infrastructure will be prioritised above all else.
But some residential buildings will have no backup heat supply. In the worst-case scenario, the city will have to rely on electricity to make up for the shortfall in heating.
"As a last resort, if some areas have no heating, they should be exempt from rolling blackouts, or at least the power cuts there should be shorter than in the rest of the city. And people will rely on electric heaters to keep warm, just as they did last year," the source explains.
"There are no guarantees that Kyiv will have heating," the source in the city administration told EP. "Ballistic strikes mean there can be no guarantees in principle. A lot will depend on how intense the attacks are."
But one thing is different from last winter. According to Kharchenko, Kyiv will be more resilient to attacks even in the most challenging scenario, as backup boilerhouses, generators, hospitals, staff and invincibility centres are now better prepared. [An invincibility centre is a heated premises stocked with food and power banks to assist residents facing hardships due to power cuts – ed.]
Kyiv will not be left without water, but there are some caveats
Water is another critical part of the picture, as Russia could target the capital's water supply in an attempt to trigger a humanitarian disaster.
Kyiv's Resilience Plan focuses on keeping the water utility running even if the power goes out. To achieve this, pumping stations and other key water supply and drainage facilities must be equipped with backup power sources.
According to EP sources, almost half of the planned 40 MW of backup power has now been commissioned. The rest is due to be completed by the end of the year.
The good news is that most of Kyiv's water infrastructure is underground, so it is more resilient to attacks. However, the water supply system cannot be fully protected from the effects of massive strikes.
"Most of the infrastructure is underground," an EP source in the government notes. "Even at water intakes and large water treatment plants, a significant part of the infrastructure is underground. But concentrated ballistic strikes could still cause serious damage."
According to the source, even major damage to the system would not automatically leave the entire city without water. In the worst-case scenario, the problem would be water quality and the supply to some districts.
Another EP source did not rule out the possibility that in certain circumstances, some areas of the city could be without water for a week or longer. Residents are therefore advised to ensure they have stocks of drinking water at home.
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To sum up, Kyiv is heading into this winter objectively better prepared than it was a year ago. The city has more backup generation capacity, better-protected facilities, alternative heat sources, generators, and well-rehearsed plans for dealing with large-scale attacks.
But that doesn't mean the winter will be easy. None of these measures offers a cast-iron guarantee, because the scale of future attacks and the damage they will cause cannot be predicted in advance.
So the main question is not whether there will be problems – there will be. The question is how quickly the city can bring damaged facilities back online and whether its backup capacity and reserves will be enough to prevent local problems from turning into a city-wide crisis.
For Kyiv, as for the country as a whole, the biggest unknown is something that can't be predicted or controlled: the scale and intensity of future Russian attacks.
Mykola Topalov
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Teresa Pearce