Have the masks fallen?
In recent weeks, significant events have taken place in Ukraine regarding the fight against corruption, which can lead to serious problems in Ukraine’s efforts to join the EU and the OECD. What is striking is the fact that events unfolded in such a sequence and in such a short time that they were clearly well-thought-out moves, which, nevertheless, did not achieve their ultimate goal – dismantling of state anti-corruption system - due to the resistance of domestic and international actors. For now.
First, the Cabinet of Ministers, in direct opposition to the law, refused to appoint the legally and properly selected winner of the competitive recruitment process, Olexandr Tsyvinsky, as the Head of the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU). They used very fragile, long-known, and essentially silly arguments from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), expressing doubts about Tsyvinsky’s compliance with the criteria required for candidates for this position. Given that the SBU usually operates quite professionally, it is clear that after all attempts to eliminate the best and truly independent candidate—similar to the attempts in the selection processes of heads of SAPO and NABU—failed during the selection process, the SBU was manipulated to prevent the appointment of a candidate who would probably not blindly follow the wishes of the country’s political elites.
A draft of Law No. 13423 was registered in the Ukrainian Parliament on June 26, 2025. It effectively decriminalizes corruption offenses committed by defence sector enterprises and undermines the capacity of specialized anti-corruption bodies to combat corruption in public procurement. This draft law risks undoing many years of progress in enforcing corruption-related offenses in Ukraine and could easily undermine Ukraine’s path toward the OECD Working Group on Bribery, OECD accession, and EU integration.
On July 11, armed police raided the home of Vitaliy Shabunin, the most well-known and vocal Ukrainian civil society anti-corruption expert, who has been charged with evading military service and fraud. Prosecutors alleged that while on secondment from the front lines to continue his activism in Kyiv, he engaged in activities unrelated to his military service. These weak arguments against an important representative of Ukrainian civil society—which for decades first fought against Ukrainian corruption alone and today, together with specialized state anti-corruption agencies (NACP, NABU, SAPO, HACC), represents a crucial link in the unified national anti-corruption front—are met with disbelief both in Ukraine and abroad. No one believes these feeble justifications. Even more, everyone agrees that this is an attempt to silence not only Shabunin but the entire civil society.
On July 21, 2025, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the SBU, and the SBI conducted at least 70 searches at premises linked to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). The investigation targeted at least 15 NABU employees—most for traffic accidents, one over suspected business ties with Russia, and another for possible espionage. It is very telling that these searches were conducted without court orders. It is obvious that the SBU was misused again: no intelligence agency in the world, especially during wartime, would spend time acting against individuals over traffic accidents! While no one is above the law, it is not the role of intelligence agencies to investigate minor legal infractions. Next time, they might as well investigate jaywalking or speeding! While this sounds ridiculous, the events of July 21 show that it’s not such a crazy idea—if someone instructs the SBU to do so in the name of "national interests".
In addition to their professional intelligence activities during wartime, the SBU is clearly becoming a political tool to settle scores with those who think differently from their political leaders. The fact that searches were carried out without court orders—that is, without fulfilling the mandatory procedural requirements—means that, if challenged, all procedures based on these searches will likely be deemed unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights. It’s clear that the General Prosecutor’s Office, SBU and SBI were more interested in something else than the legal outcome of their showy operations.
This "something else" came very soon: the very next day, July 22, 2025, just over 24 hours after the actions described above, the Verkhovna Rada, citing these events, passed a law that abolished the independence of both NABU and SAPO, subordinating them entirely to the General Prosecutor, who is still personally hand-picked by the President of Ukraine.
If anywhere, it is evident from the position and role of the State Prosecutor’s Office in Ukraine that the country was once part of the Soviet Union, where the General Prosecutor was always and exclusively an extension of the top state leadership. Even the current Ukrainian president, like all his predecessors, selects the General Prosecutor solely based on personal preferences, not professional criteria. This was evident in the recent appointments of General Prosecutor Kravchenko a few weeks ago and General Prosecutor Kostin in 2022. Interestingly, neither of these two general prosecutors met the criteria for lower positions—Head of SAPO and Head of NABU, respectively—according to the independent recruitment commission. This implies that they were suitable not for the lower but exclusively for the highest position in the prosecution service, which is the President’s exclusive legal prerogative. However, subordinating NABU and SAPO to a General Prosecutor chosen in a described way fundamentally eliminates their most crucial characteristic: independence.
Ukraine has many excellent lawyers, yet they cannot produce such important legal provisions in less than 24 hours. This strongly suggests that the mass searches on 21 July were staged solely to prepare the ground for legislative changes that subordinated NABU and SAPO to the political elite. The speed at which the law was sent from Parliament to the President and the even faster speed at which it was signed by him further confirms this.
Regarding this operation, its main actors seem to have forgotten an important point: a list of seven requirements necessary for Ukraine to begin EU accession negotiations. Number 3 on this list is "strengthening the fight against corruption", and all independent observers agree that with the law of July 22, Ukraine has significantly deviated from fulfilling this criterion.
Reactions from domestic and international stakeholders— including countries vital to Ukraine’s wartime efforts such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and international organizations like the EU and G7—have clearly demonstrated this. The OECD, however, seems to have fallen asleep—while Ukraine’s leaders discussed these issues with the EU Commissioners and top officials, mainly presidents and prime ministers, from various countries, the OECD sent a letter to Kyiv, signed by a division head of the organization? This either indicates a complete lack of awareness of the problem’s scope by OECD leadership or their absolute unwillingness to take any decisive action during their tenure.
Domestic and foreign public pressure has borne fruit: a draft law has been prepared that aims to restore the situation to what it was before July 22. However, the author of this text, with over 25 years of experience working with Ukrainian governments on anti-corruption efforts, fears that before returning to the previous state, there will likely be some unpleasant surprises—such as amendments between the first and second readings, delays in adopting the law, or hidden ambiguities in legislation that will later be interpreted in line with the law of July 22. There are many options, and those responsible for the recent corrupt coup will surely try to destroy Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts in other ways. It would be wise for the public, international partners, and organizations—especially the IMF and the EU—to be prepared for further attempts to circumvent Ukraine’s already committed obligations.
But what could be the motives behind the recent anti-anti-corruption moves? It’s difficult to determine the final plan of those behind these actions, but there is no doubt we have witnessed a well-planned attack against Ukraine’s most effective and successful anti-corruption individuals and institutions. One possible reason for this attack might be the belief that, during major war challenges, the West will overlook what may seem like a "minor" issue—namely, anti-corruption efforts in a country defying Russia. In other words, the political reasoning could be: if we want to destroy Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure, let’s do it now, when everyone’s attention is on the critical phase of the war. Based on past experience in Afghanistan, I fear this plan might even succeed.
It also appears that the authors of the coup no longer care about the opinions of the populations of other countries—or even Ukraine itself. They obviously believe that the level of people’s hatred against Russia is stronger than anything else, including doubts on some questionable activities in Ukraine. But they forget something very important: until now, the top political leaders of Ukraine have been perceived as the "good guys" in all mainstream Western media. After recent events, two simple questions have started to arise: why are these "good guys" afraid of anti-corruption efforts within their own country? And does all the Western money truly end up in the hands fighting Russia, or does it also go into the pockets of those orchestrating the latest moves against anti-corruption fighters?
The authors of the attack on anti-corruption organizations also seem to forget that Ukrainians hate corruption above all else. They forget that they won the last elections on a promise to fight corruption. What Shabunin, civil society, SAPO, NABU, and other institutions uncovered and exposed before and during the war was far from these pledges but the majority of people remained quiet because of the war. The era of silence is clearly over now, because people are afraid that someone might be trying to bring back exactly the same corrupt system they fought against during the last Maidan. They expect the West to help them in fighting these tendencies and if that help is not forthcoming, they may abandon not only their leaders but also their trust in the West. There is one, very simple reason for the strong determination and emotions of people in the country when it comes to fighting corruption: Ukrainians will never accept the possibility that they can win the war against Russia but lose their country to corruption by their own politicians.
Drago Kos, Anti-Corruption Expert