"I wouldn't send my son to die..." Are Europeans ready to defend themselves against Russia?

A few nights ago I hosted a closed livestream with some of my subscribers. Most of them being immigrants living in the West, scattered across Germany, the United States, France. We ended up discussing Ukraine, Georgia, and whether the West should even bother helping. The conversation grew quite heated, but one line kept resurfacing: "I wouldn't send my son to die in Ukraine."

And you know what? I agree. I wouldn't either. The instinct for self-preservation is entirely valid, nobody wants their child shipped off to some frozen trench to bleed out for a country they've never ever visited. That's not cowardice, rather just being a parent.

But here's where it gets complicated. The same Europe that won't send its sons to die for Ukraine spent years convincing Ukrainians that the West had their back. They pushed for democratic revolutions, cheered from the sidelines, gave speeches about European values. Then when Russia actually invaded, it turned out that "support" meant keeping Ukraine on life support rather than arming it to win. The pattern is consistent: give just enough to prevent collapse, never enough for victory. The Georgians learned this too. In 2024, tens of thousands filled the streets of Tbilisi waving EU flags. The government cracked down, police fractured skulls. The Western response amounted to statements and travel bans, which I'm sure made a tremendous impression on the riot police.

One subscriber pointed out that if NATO were actually attacked, then they'd respond. I asked him what constitutes as an "attacked," because NATO territory has already been hit. In November 2022, a missile landed in Poland and killed two people, Poland then responded by invoking Article 4, a consultation that allows members to bring an issue "for discussion" and amounts to little more than a scheduled meeting. Two citizens died from a missile strike during active combat on their border, and the response was to convene. In September 2025, Poland recorded 19 drone incursions in a single night. Prime Minister Tusk called it a "large-scale provocation" but carefully added that "there is no reason to claim we are at war." Nineteen drones, but apparently that's not a conflict. So where's the threshold? Or is the threshold simply whatever allows continued inaction?

Europe could act without sending soldiers. Russia operates a "shadow fleet" of tankers moving oil around the world, evading sanctions, bankrolling the war. Sixty percent of Russia's seaborne crude exports pass through the Baltic Sea and the Danish Straits, right through European waters. Europe could blockade these vessels tomorrow but won't because of "deep concerns about Russia's possible reaction." Meanwhile, the US and France seized tankers, and Russia's response was diplomatic protests with nothing behind them. When the US boarded the Marinera in January 2026, Putin stayed silent and the foreign ministry complained about piracy. Russia won't escalate when you push back, but Europe won't push back because Russia might escalate. A vicious circle.

Then there's energy. In the third year of the invasion, the EU paid Russia more for fuel than it gave Ukraine in aid. In 2024, Russian LNG imports hit a record high, in the middle of a war Europe supposedly opposes. There's cyberwarfare, which Europe has barely touched. There are sanctions that could be enforced rather than circumvented. The toolkit exists, the will to use it doesn't.

This brings me to the most dangerous assumption I encountered: that Russia would never attack NATO. Look at the countries Russia has invaded or subjugated since World War II: Finland, the Baltics, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine since 2014. This is not a country that respects borders when it senses weakness. German intelligence warns Russia could be ready for large-scale war by 2030. Baltic officials estimate readiness for a limited operation within two to three years after Ukraine. A RAND wargame showed Russia could capture Tallinn in 60 hours.

But surely Article 5 would kick in? Here's what it actually says: each state must take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." No automatic obligations, no requirement to send troops. A country can decide that "necessary action" means sanctions or expressing concern. If Russian bombs flatten hospitals in Tallinn and Estonian children lie dead under the rubble, does anyone seriously believe Lisbon will feel compelled to act? That the Portuguese parliament will decide their sons must die for a country most of their voters couldn't find on a map? "Such action as it deems necessary" is functionally equivalent to nothing when a country has no stake in the outcome.

Remember the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, where the US, UK, and Russia guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine kept its end. The guarantors didn't. I see no reason to believe Article 5 would work any differently, because both documents share the same nature: suggestions dressed up as obligations, worth exactly as much as the signatories are willing to pay.

Why would a German die for an Estonian? That's not an insult, it's a strategic question. If Russia bites off a piece of Estonia tomorrow, what compels Berlin to send soldiers? A treaty with a discretionary response? European solidarity that couldn't even agree to stop buying gas? The real deterrent has always been American bases, and Russian strategists have openly said they don't fear NATO, they fear the US presence.

I wouldn't send my son to die for Ukraine. But understand what you're preserving with that choice. A Europe that encouraged democratic movements but won't defend them. That funds its aggressor to the tune of billions annually. That responds to missiles with consultations. The comfortable illusion that if you don't provoke, the problem stays far away. History says otherwise. Russia doesn't stop when you fail to push back; it stops when you push back. When the US seized tankers, Russia protested but did nothing. When Turkey shot down a Russian jet, Russia threatened but backed down.

The question isn't whether you'd send your son to die for Ukraine. The question is whether you'd send him to die for Estonia, Latvia, or Poland, because that question is coming. And for now, Europe's answer seems to be that it would rather schedule a consultation.