The war that changed everything. On historical mistakes, the role of progress and the new world

The Russian-Ukrainian war has become the first major war on the territory of Europe, that has no analogues since the Second World War, and it is already part of human history. This is a history not only of events, facts, and the number of victims. This is also the story of the people who stood behind it, people who do not yet realize that they have already entered history. A history that is ruthless toward human feelings because it operates with facts.

However, today this history is only being written. It will be reread and studied much later, in 50 years, when the last witnesses of those events have themselves passed into history, allowing others, people with a cool mind and honesty, to draw conclusions and never repeat the mistakes. To step into history, not get mired in a mess. It was precisely the mistakes that led to this war that prevented it from being brought to a timely end and most importantly failed to predict its consequences.

It is not just a war that has changed so much. In fact, it has changed the most important thing – the world order amidst the applause of absurdity and eccentricity. The world order that our grandfathers built with their own blood over eighty years ago and which we, the generation that still read books, lacked the strength to preserve.

This is a war that, like the Second World War, began due to the cowardice of those who were not being killed at that particular moment. They believed the best course of action was not to disturb the beast.

This is a war that could have ended with far fewer casualties, yet the very people who feared the beast would not sate its appetite and would attack them next simply pretended that these were not their red lines. Because the main thing is to avoid nuclear war.

A war that ultimately became a theater of sympathy for the daily killing of an entire nation choking on its own corruption.

And above all, this is a war that has surrendered itself to marketers and wheeler-dealers – people who, driven by a lack of understanding and strategy, merely stoke the flames of this in pursuit of quick profits, all while increasingly flaunting the rapid pace of technological progress.

A war that came as a surprise, because progress exists not to shape the contours of its conclusion, but precisely to prolong it. For some, it is the conviction that the matter does not concern them, while for others, it is a way of life and a means of earning a living.

A war where strategy and global decisions were left to history while the conflict was still at its peak. And yes, history will not forgive this, because it is people, not machines, who stand behind it all.

This is what the current war means for human history.

However, when speaking specifically about progress as a path to victory and the end of the war, it is necessary to remember: military affairs have their own science, historically developed and still based on established principles, regardless of what content fills TikTok. It is a pity that, due to that very same progress, an understanding of this is increasingly becoming accessible only to a narrow circle of people, and we cannot reach those whose strategy consists solely of social media views and the latest sensational headline.

It was the end of the Second World War that determined two important things that will also characterize the conclusion of this war, which is steadily gaining momentum. The end of the Second World War determined the place and time for the start of the next war, as well as the forms and methods by which that war would begin. And while the first is merely a repetition of mistakes by politicians and their voters, the second undeniably belongs to progress, which will inevitably use these mistakes.

It was precisely this development that lost its intensity with the end of that war and could not lead to anything fundamental. Thus, both the start of the expansion and the restoration of the Russian Empire began as a war in many respects similar to the major conflicts of the 20th century, drawing specifically on the experience of the Second World War. There is nothing surprising or unnatural about this, except for the fact that it was possible to prepare for it at least to avoid it, even if only for a short while.

Then, in the summer of 2023, as military operations within Ukraine intensified and required to survive on the battlefield, the wheel of progress started turning after standing still for nearly 80 years.

My initial thoughts on this in the autumn of 2023 sparked political objections within Ukraine itself and met with absolute incomprehension from representatives of the world's former leading armies.

In Ukraine today, it is politically and financially advantageous to move away from trading in curtains and become a representative for technologies. Those who, just three years ago, formulated their grievances against me now insist that technology is the only right choice for them.

Today, every arms exhibition resembles a scene from science fiction movies and a museum of past wars all at once. Back then, however, everyone thought otherwise. Apart from the progress that was gathering momentum and awaiting the emergence of a new empire to tame it. However, unfortunately, things turned out differently. Progress has become available to our enemies as well, just as it did nearly a century ago, from Verdun and the Somme to Robotyne and Bakhmut. There is nothing wrong with drawing this analogy.

Having gone static, the front brought to life not industrial horrors, but technological ones. And once again, nothing surprising occurred in the evolution of the art of war. The only surprising thing remains that, just as in 2023, using these patterns is still politically disadvantageous here and financially impossible for the world's former leading armies.

This was once the case with cavalry and the famous red trousers worn by the soldiers of one army before the First World War, which were supposed to help against repeating rifles, machine guns, long-range artillery, and the use of smokeless powder, which had been invented there as well, and later against tanks and aircraft. My generation knows how it ended.

And today, the current illusions of collective security, much like that soldier more than a hundred years ago in his dark-blue greatcoat and red trousers, despite being an obvious target on the battlefield, are, regrettably, perceived almost as a symbol of national identity and a source of national pride.

This war has, of course, changed the forms and methods of its conduct, yet it has left its essence unchanged. It is an act of violence, but now violence against the entire country. Violence that, just as in the Second World War, placed on the same level the infantryman physically unable to leave his trench and a newborn baby in another part of the country. Because both of them are constantly in the crosshairs of someone who wants to kill them both. Today's technology of warfare is precisely that it turns an entire country into a vast wasteland, sparing no one – neither those in the trenches nor those in supposedly peaceful places, such as a supermarket. Everything remains the same, yet the bombing process itself has changed, becoming more effective and, consequently, excessively cruel. Do those moving tanks and artillery closer to the crisis zone understand this? Apparently not. The red trousers taught them nothing.

This is no longer a drone war. Someone is about three years behind the times when it comes to drones. They simply no longer exist on their own. They evolved into weapon types more familiar to us, while reducing costs and increasing accessibility and effectiveness.

It is correct to consider that 2026 is a time of war of technologies, and not only technologies. It is also a war of strategies and doctrines that are constantly evolving under the pressure of progress. Therefore, it is a major mistake to focus on individual technologies and their promotion merely as weapons that complement the Soviet strategy and, of course, require specifically Soviet-style executors. Weapons that need to be produced and sold profitably in time and, better yet, used to de-occupy some territory in the process.

It was precisely the desire to liberate the territories and hold them using Soviet methods and strategies, only now with new weapons, that drove mobilisation into a dead end. Mobilization offered only one chance, and fewer and fewer people were willing to take it. But we are not capable of enduring a war of machines against a vast Soviet country, where people are effectively turned into machines and sent to fight against real machines. Damn marketing that kills.

Recognizing technology as a new weapon, it is essential to consider the patterns of the evolution of the art of war and, based on this, invariably shape new forms and methods of its employment. Only then should organizational changes be implemented within the structure of the Armed Forces that employ this new weaponry using new forms and methods of application. This is precisely where mobilisation fits into the new strategy, based on new weapons and specifically on new, rather than Soviet, forms and methods of their employment. Only in this way can we approach the improvement of mobilization and most importantly create systemic pressure and an advantage over the enemy. Of course, this takes time.

These changes are absolutely irreversible and affect the conduct of war at all levels – tactical, operational, and strategic, as well as the development of the military-industrial complex. Logically, all of this inevitably leads to the emergence of a word that some today find rather strange – doctrine. It is doctrine that provides the foundation for systematically influencing the adversary and shapes a strategic vision focused solely on future victory. In whom we observe this systemic influence, and who is closer to victory today – that question remains politically correctly open. However, assessing this in Ukraine through the scale and systematic nature of the strikes and the duration of air-raid alerts is quite straightforward. And a static front certainly cannot reassure those who see it only within the boundaries of operational zones.

It is a pity that many still do not realize or perhaps do not want to realize the scale of these changes. However, this cannot in any way stop scientific and technological progress or the evolution of the art of war.

The old rules no longer apply. The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrates this daily, and any new major conflicts erupting amidst the reshaping of the old world order will inevitably demonstrate it as well.

The challenges of adapting to new conditions, such as the increased capability and availability of strike assets, the deployment of robotic systems and artificial intelligence, the protection of logistics and ports, effective and uninterrupted communications, space technologies, the digital dimension of security, and the adjustment of personnel training to meet the demands and challenges of modern warfare are challenges that no longer face national armies today, because they should already be prepared for them a priori. These are challenges for governments and alliances, which must unite around technologies that defend their own future.

Modern warfare requires new doctrines. To focus on rapid scientific and technological progress while failing to formulate these doctrines is so shortsighted that it is unlikely to allow us to cast off those same red trousers and see the future. Some still believe it is possible to formulate a truly effective doctrine for the use of drones and robots, while others think it is impossible.

Meanwhile, a war of technologies is already underway, and Ukraine is experiencing systemic pressure resulting from the implementation not only of technologies but also of a new doctrinal approach to their application, including production and research, as an integral part of the strategy. It is precisely this that gives Russia the right to issue us ultimatums through well-known intermediaries. This is precisely what is being targeted, and it could lead to a whole series of crises. Even though some people in a country at war still find it funny, the majority do not need to have it explained to them exactly which crises are involved. Let me remind that a war of attrition involves not only battles but also societal upheavals. The key is who triggers them first.

And if this is obvious, then why do the laws of war once again give way to forecasts, and strategy to marketing? Because capturing general trends for rough forecasts is precisely what curtain marketing requires. Quickly and in large quantities. However, whether this creates systemic pressure on Russia, or increases Russia's systemic pressure on us, remains an unanswered question, even though the ways to understand it are more than obvious.

Thus, to find a way out of this entirely predictable situation, it is necessary to understand the need to seek and implement a systemic response to Russia's systemic pressure. This systemic response must be based on a strategy in which the joint production and implementation of new technological solutions become part of systemic measures both to defend and to impact on Russia's ability to continue the war. For this, of course, the search for resource and technological alliances capable of ensuring this production, including to meet their own defence needs, remains relevant. This production must be doctrinally incorporated into the strategy for victory, where what is produced is not some magic weapon, but the entire new arsenal required, including for civilian purposes, in accordance with the conditions of technological progress.

Ukraine and Russia have turned into real-time testing grounds. Therefore, analyzing and understanding this new logic of war should help not only to shape new doctrines, tactics, and strategies but also, above all, to provide a vision of how peace and people's security can be preserved while we, Ukrainians, are paying for it with our blood.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021-2024)