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Winter danger. How many missiles and Shahed attack UAVs has Russia amassed for airstrikes on Ukrainian cities in autumn and winter?

Tuesday, 31 October 2023, 05:30

September 2023 set a record for the number of Shahed-type kamikaze attack drones launched towards Ukraine.

Analysts at a Ukrainian Defense Express portal have estimated that Russia launched 503 drones to attack Ukraine last month. This is considerably more than the previous peak figure, observed in May of this year when around 400 UAVs were deployed.

The statistics this month are more modest. However, what speaks volumes is that there was a significant drop in the number of cruise missiles launched by Russia towards Ukrainian cities in October.

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There is a good reason for all this, as Moscow is stockpiling missiles for upcoming attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure in the autumn and winter.

Ukrainska Pravda analysed how many missiles and Shaheds Russia might have amassed for the coming winter and what tools Ukraine has at its disposal to shoot them down effectively.

Winter 2022-2023 missile campaign

Russia's first missile attack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure took place in September 2022, when three missiles hit the Kharkiv Combined Heat and Power Plant No. 5.

However, the true starting point of the winter 2022-2023 missile campaign is considered to have been 10-11 October 2022, when Russia fired over 80 cruise and ballistic missiles on Ukraine, claiming 23 lives and injuring over 100 civilians, in retaliation for severe damage to the Crimean Bridge.

At that time, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry estimated that the Russians had 609 of their 1,844 precision-guided missiles left, meaning that 2/3 of the Russian arsenal had apparently been used up since the start of the full-scale war.

 
Data from the Ukrainian Defence Ministry as of October 2022

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly noted that Russia "has enough missiles for several massive attacks". Between 10 October 2022 and 9 March 2023, the Russian Federation carried out 14 heavy missile attacks, with intervals ranging from a week to several weeks.

Over that period, around 900 long-range missiles of various types had been launched against energy and civilian infrastructures alone, and the total number (including strikes on military targets other than those on the contact line) stood at roughly 1,100 pieces.

Moreover, Russia fired some 600 more cruise missiles on Ukraine between May and August, following the massive spring attack on energy infrastructure (9 March 2023).

 
DEFENSE EXPRESS INFOGRAPHIC

A simple calculation reveals a certain discrepancy between that number and the figures reported in the Ukrainian MoD's statements.

What lies behind the discrepancy?

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Sanctions have been imposed, yet the missiles never end

The answer to this question emerged in the summer of 2023, when Politico reported that Russia had managed to reach pre-war rates of high-precision weapons production.

This happened despite Western sanctions, which the aggressor state has learnt to skilfully circumvent through "grey market" schemes.

The necessary microchips and other high-tech components for missiles were still being supplied through third countries (the lion's share through China, with half coming from Hong Kong; Thailand, Türkiye, the Maldives, UAE, Kazakhstan and others are also among the leaders), which in most cases formally adhere to "neutrality".

Suppose we follow the estimates of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (DIU). In that case, Russia has not only reached pre-war levels but further increased production since the spring of 2023, when it was producing 60 to 70 long-range missiles per month.

Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Head of DIU, said the Russian Federation had 585 missiles with a range of over 500 kilometres in its arsenal as of the end of August 2023.

These included roughly 270 Iskander ballistic missiles, 140 Kalibr cruise missiles, and a total of about 100 Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-55 with warheads.

The Russians also had about 75 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and 150 Kh-22 missiles, which they were seeking to upgrade.

Ukrainska Pravda's sources in the Ukrainian Air Force and the DIU believe Russia can produce roughly 100-120 long-range missiles of various types per month.

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Open-source information suggests that Russia launched over 100 missiles to attack Ukraine in September and about 40 in October. This means that Russia entered the "economy mode" that experts say it has only last month. That is, the pace of missile use is not very different from that of spring and summer.

Considering the probable volume of monthly production, Russia can currently be assumed to have approximately 700 long-range missiles at its disposal.

Nevertheless, as is often the case, nuances are crucial.

Although Russia has indeed begun to use fewer long-range missiles launched from strategic aircraft or from the sea, the vast majority of attacks are now being carried out against grain and port infrastructure in Ukraine's southern oblasts.

The Russians use a combined approach for these strikes, employing attack UAVs along with anti-ship and medium-range air-to-ground missiles (Kh-59, Kh-35 and Onix), which are not included in the statistics provided by the DIU. One of the challenges in estimating the number of these missiles is that there is not much open data on them, and their actual stockpiles in Russia are unknown.

Attacks from S-300 and S-400 air defence systems on the border and adjacent to the combat zone areas remain another danger.

The range of ground strikes carried out by these systems is relatively short (100-250 km). However, the catch is that the missiles fly at high velocity along a ballistic trajectory, making them virtually impossible to shoot down.

Russia began using them amidst a missile shortage in June 2022, and subsequently increased its attacks. There were around 7,000 missiles in storage as of early 2023, so it's too early to assume these stocks have been depleted.

Shahed kamikaze drones are still a headache

An unusual line emerged in the reports of the Ukrainian Air Force on 22 October 2023: "attack UAV (type not defined)".

Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force Command, explained that it was a quick-and-dirty drone, and that its engine could be purchased on AliExpress with no trouble at all.

Afterwards, a video from Kyiv Oblast emerged on social media, supposedly featuring an aircraft operating with a distinctive sound, leading users to call it a lawnmower.

Russian telegram channels, and later the US Institute for the Study of War (ISW), widely disseminated information that Russia had begun using new Italmas UAVs.

These drones were said to have characteristics representing a hybrid between Russian Lancets and Iranian-made Shaheds. They are supposedly lighter than their Iranian counterparts but use the same engine concept.s

However, there has been no official confirmation that such a drone was launched to attack Kyiv Oblast, let alone that it is being produced on an assembly line. The Ukrainian Air Force advises against rushing to conclusions.

"We have had a lot of this kind stuff use by the Russian side. And you should not immediately make a big deal out of everything that they send over here. We'll see," Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force Command, told Ukrainska Pravda.

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Ihnat said the Ukrainian air defence forces are currently facing much more genuine and confirmed threats, which are often a real "headache", and not only because of the sound.

"We have learnt how to bring down Shaheds, but they still remain a tricky target. When there are many of them in the skies, they use different routes and fly low to the ground, so reaching them is tricky," explains Ihnat.

The DIU reported in early spring that Russia had only 200 Shaheds left, but further statistics indicated that Iran had never ceased supplying them.

In late August, reports emerged that Russia had set up the assembly of Shaheds in Tatarstan (Russia) and plans to produce 6,000 UAVs there by the summer of 2025,with 1,300 to be ready by the end of this year.

The DIU initially doubted that Russia was capable of implementing such ambitious plans, but September and October have shown that either the production targets were being met or Russia had received another batch of drones from Iran.

Yurii Ihnat noted the need for Western components in order to produce these drones in Russia, even though sanctions have not been highly effective so far.

Patriot, Gepard, FrankenSAM systems and Soviet Utes machine guns on pickup trucks

Unlike last year, Ukraine is entering this winter with a significantly upgraded air defence capability to counter cruise and ballistic missiles.

Ukraine has two US-made Patriot systems and one French-made SAMP/T system deployed in the field. A German-made IRIS-T and the US-Norwegian NASAMS have also proved to be excellent. Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of Ukraine’s Air Force, recently posted a video of the effectiveness of the Hawk air defence system.

However, given the size of Ukraine’s territory, the number of systems we have received so far is insufficient to be able to say that Ukraine is fully protected. To protect a city of one million people, for example, you need at least two Patriot batteries. Ukraine has only two so far, so claiming complete security is premature.

"We are now in a situation where we are forced to rely on local defences for large cities that have critical infrastructure facilities and nuclear power plants. The enemy will be looking for ways to bypass the defences," says Ihnat.

Russia has even more room for manoeuvre when it comes to using kamikaze UAVs, given their mass production and low cost.

"A Shahed costs tens of thousands of dollars, while a single guided anti-aircraft missile from Western sources costs hundreds of thousands," Ihnat pointed out.

The spokesman emphasised that although Shaheds can inflict extensive material damage upon impact, it would be more rational to destroy them with anti-aircraft guns, such as the German-made Gepards, which have a range of almost 4.5 kilometres and are often referred to as "small air defence".

However, the problem with these anti-aircraft guns is that their production has been discontinued in Germany, so Ukraine cannot expect to receive the necessary number of these vehicles.

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Although the UK and Australia are also planning to provide assistance with "small air defence", another problem is the use of Soviet-era Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems. The reason is simple: there is a lack of ammunition for the Buk and Strela systems.

To address this challenge, Ukraine and the United States have developed a programme called FrankenSAM, which combines modern Western-calibre surface-to-air missiles with converted Soviet-era launchers or radars already in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The first version of this programme integrates Soviet Buk launchers with US Sea Sparrow missiles. The second combines Soviet-era radars with US Sidewinder missiles. The third combines the Hawk missile system with Soviet equipment.

These "hybrid systems" will be assisted by what are known as Shahed hunters –  mobile teams that intercept and bring down Shahed drones.

The operating principle of such groups is quite simple. Upon receiving a warning signal, the soldiers get into pick-ups or trucks equipped with Soviet weapons such as the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannon, large-calibre DShK and Utes machine guns, thermal imagers and searchlights to help them locate their target.

F-16 fighters would be extremely useful in countering missiles. However, Ukrainian pilots have only recently begun training to fly these aircraft. The most optimistic forecast considers that they will appear in Ukrainian skies no earlier than the end of the first half of 2024.

***

Ukraine and its partners have obviously drawn certain conclusions from last year's autumn and winter. And it is very much hoped that the readiness for another energy terror has been raised to a high level.

But it's equally clear that Russia has learned from its mistakes, significantly diversifying its tactics and combinations of potential strikes from the sky. So we can't expect this winter to be any easier than the last.

Yevhen Buderatskyi, Ukrainska Pravda

Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn

Edited by Monica Sandor

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