Robots taking the place of soldiers: how ground robotic systems armed with machine guns are replacing people on the front lines
Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have made it increasingly challenging for Ukrainian forces to resupply their positions. To save lives, the Ukrainian military has turned to ground-based robots for logistics and evacuation tasks.
Many military units have established logistics systems based on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Undoubtedly, the pinnacle of military robotisation lies in integrating ground drones into combat operations alongside infantry – the most demanding task to date.
The military aims to partially replace machine gunners and grenade launcher crews with ground platforms that can occupy positions, detect enemy forces and engage targets on command. This dream of robotisation has taken on added urgency due to a chronic shortage of infantry.
Ukrainska Pravda reported earlier that Ukrainian troops have to modify the majority of UGVs used on the battlefield due to shortcomings in meeting operational demands. Just five out of 13 manufacturers passed a live-fire test run by Ukraine's 3rd Assault Brigade and the Snake Island Institute.
Nevertheless, some models are already in active combat and delivering consistent results. Read this Ukrainska Pravda report on how combat robots are being used on the front lines today and the challenges that remain for the military and manufacturers.
Scepticism towards UGVs is fading
Like drones before them, ground-based robotic systems are moving from initial mistrust by commanders to mass roll-out.
Yurii Poritskyi, CEO of DevDroid, a Ukrainian company that develops UGVs and combat modules, explained to Ukrainska Pravda how scepticism towards UGVs has given way to their critical use on the front lines.
Poritskyi recalled that early on, some soldiers joked about their fellow troops operating UGVs, as the robots moved so slowly they were passed by pickup trucks again and again.
"When Rubicon [Russia's most advanced drone unit] entered the fray, three or four burned-out pickups would already be in the area, yet the operators kept going on their UGVs," he said. "Now everyone wants a UGV – no one wants to carry ammunition in a pickup that could be the next target for FPV drones."
Effective mass use of UGVs requires an established system, which in turn depends on specialised units.
The Ukrainian military established its UGV staff in 2024, and by 2025, the country had procured nearly 15,000 systems. This partially covered logistics requirements and gave the military a chance to refine its tactics.
Logistics is just the start. The robots are now planting landmines, evacuating the wounded and performing reconnaissance.
The key demand from frontline troops, however, is to replace the rifleman in the trenches. Creating a robot able to fight even roughly on a par with infantry is now the most complex challenge Ukrainian engineers are working to tackle.
The purpose behind combat UGVs
Ground drones take the place of soldiers in high-risk situations. The benefits are clear: they can be deployed quickly while keeping lives out of harm's way.
For example, using an Mk19 grenade launcher means dismantling the weapon and hauling it, along with ammunition, to the firing position. This is a slow and dangerous task, as the group may be detected and wiped out along the way. A robot eliminates that exposure, transporting everything at once and arriving ready to fight.
The Russians push forward in numbers and infiltrate in small groups. Speed is the decisive factor in countering them. Infantry units are vulnerable when they are camouflaging their positions, but a drone can open fire instantly. Even if the platform is hit, its operators remain unharmed, as they control it from a relatively safe distance.
Through direct cooperation with the military, developers are refining the platforms and equipping them to handle new weapons.
Armament of ground robots
The most common weapons used in UGVs are large-calibre machine guns. Poritskyi emphasises that the critical point is preserving the weapon's original design: the platform must be designed so the machine gun works without any modifications.
Engineers use transition brackets to secure the machine gun without affecting the platform's body, enabling quick weapon changes on the module. The only mechanical modification is the addition of an electric trigger. The turret is controlled by electric motors and actuators.
In advanced configurations, specialised software transforms an ordinary machine gun into a high-precision weapon. Developers tailor ballistic calculations to each system, accounting for distance, ammunition type, wind and the target's angular velocity. Ammunition is also tracked automatically: operators always know how many rounds are left.
AI-powered modules spot enemies using movement and heat signatures. They can track targets independently, but firing is controlled by a human to avoid friendly fire.
"We employ artificial intelligence in combat modules and machine vision to support patrolling and target spotting," said Makar, Commander of the NC13 UGV Company in the 3rd Assault Brigade. "Once a sector or angle is set, the turret patrols automatically. When it detects a moving object or heat signature, it begins tracking and alerts the operator: 'Look, someone is coming.' These auxiliary features are already proving useful to operators."
Communications and mechanics are the technology's weakest links.
Signals can be unreliable, but artificial intelligence helps offset this limitation, said Matematyk, commander of the Combined UGV Unit at the Khartiia unit, 2nd Corps of Ukraine's National Guard.
The mechanical side is no less problematic. A jammed round renders the drone helpless, as it cannot be cleared without a human nearby to intervene. This places a premium on meticulous weapon preparation before combat, although engineers have begun installing remote reloading systems on some Ukrainian UGVs to reduce the risk.
Weapon selection is largely driven by ammunition availability. The most common choice is the US-made Browning M2 chambered for .50 BMG ammunition, regularly supplied by Kyiv's partners and now more prevalent than Soviet-era alternatives.
Although the heavy calibre requires a reinforced turret and stiff dampers to cope with recoil, it is valued for its range and armour penetration. Shortages of 12.7mm weapons, however, have pushed units to mount 7.62mm machine guns – PKMs and M240s – or PKTs, which are often salvaged from damaged armoured vehicles.
In addition to effectively destroying light equipment, as shown in a recent video of a Russian MT‑LB being hit by the 5th Brigade, large‑calibre machine guns also have a psychological impact:
"When the enemy hears a large‑calibre machine gun, they immediately think heavy equipment is nearby," Poritskyi said. "They realise that no ordinary soldier could carry a 50‑kg gun.
If enemy units are hiding in buildings, they get very uneasy: they are aware that they will eventually be wiped out and that they need to flee. On intercepts, our fighters even heard the enemy report: 'Large armoured vehicles are engaging us!' – when in fact it was only a camouflaged ground robot systematically hitting targets."
Automatic grenade launchers (AGLs) are another weapon option for ground robots. Their advantage over machine guns is the ability to engage targets from covered positions, firing overhead and beyond their direct line of sight.
Integrating grenade launchers is more complex than mounting machine guns because of their weight and recoil. The US-made Mk 19 weighs 35.2 kg, compared with 18 kg for the Soviet AGS-17. Such heavy weapons require platforms equipped with powerful electric motors and actuators.
The recoil from grenade launchers can destabilise light platforms. Firing on the move requires stabilisation systems to compensate for vibration. Makar says no AGL modules currently on the market are capable of doing so.
The software used in Ukrainian grenade launcher turrets, such as the Wolly 40 module, reacts faster than a human operator and automatically calculates the barrel's angle of elevation needed to hit a target.
"The turret can be positioned in a forested area or in open terrain, while the soldier remains under cover and controls it remotely," Makar said. "For grenade launchers, the system lets you memorise between 10 and 15 targets. You can set the boundaries of a forested area, and if there is infantry moving there, the turret will independently engage targets across that zone in a zigzag pattern.
This really simplifies targeting. Once the turret is in position, you enter the coordinates, and it locks onto the target in a split second and fires accurately."
Operators of UGVs cannot see the target directly, so the platform and turret rely on a complex system of four to five sensors: compasses, gyroscopes and GPS antennas. If GPS is jammed, the system detects this and switches to alternative methods to determine its position.
The ammunition feed is the most mechanically complex unit on ground robots armed with grenade launchers, and there are currently no widely available technologies for the automatic replacement of grenade boxes.
Vibration is another common problem for combat ground drones. Movement and firing can loosen bolts and damage electronics, so after every mission, crews have to inspect the equipment and secure all connections. Assemblers must keep this in mind when building the drones.
Tactics and doctrine for combat UGVs
The effectiveness of ground platforms is constrained not only by technical limitations but also by the lack of proven tactics. Ukrainian troops say infantry combat planning procedures are applied to combat robots, but coordinating an attack that includes them is more difficult than commanding only human forces.
Matematyk points to a command-and-control issue: headquarters sends combat UGVs into action without always factoring in their technical limits. To avoid mistakes, commanders need UGV experts to adjust tasks to what the machines can actually do. That makes planning harder and raises the bar for officer skills. Until crews gain experience, coordinating robots in fast-moving assaults will be tricky.
"Up to now, the systematisation of combat experience has mainly come from the bottom up, at brigade and corps level," Matematyk said. "But higher command is supportive: they show interest, allocate resources and, most importantly, listen to those working in the field to build a unified model of use.
The problem is that different units have very different experiences and views, so it's hard to bring everything under one standard quickly. You can't do everything at once. But I think that over the next year this will scale up, and we'll reach a clear understanding of the standards – who uses ground drones, where and how."
Matematyk said combat ground robots are already operating at distances of one to two kilometres from enemy positions, which is why securing the low-altitude airspace is of utmost importance. He noted the main threat to such platforms comes from Russian FPV drones, particularly fibre‑optic ones.
Combat robots show their greatest value in defensive operations. They support or replace infantry, helping hold positions with fewer personnel and reducing risk to soldiers. Lines of UGVs arranged in layers form a dense, hard-to-breach fire system.
Large platforms are typically positioned on the second or third line from the zone of immediate combat to reduce the threat posed by FPV drones. There, they act as remote observation and firing points: they can wait for days, automatically detect the enemy and track targets. This enables one operator to control three to four sectors at once from a safe shelter. When stationary, the UGV must be dug in, or it will be destroyed quickly.
"We converted a former infantry position and put a UGV armed with a Browning machine gun there," Makar said. "Basically, it would go on combat duty nearly every day to keep an eye on the enemy and deliver fire strikes whenever the battalion command asked."
However, the tactics for robot attacks are still taking shape, as offensive operations are far more complex than defence. For now, their most effective role is in reconnaissance-in-force operations, where robots advance without personnel to draw enemy fire. During assaults, they serve as a fire shield or escort element, pinning the enemy down.
"We planned an operation around ground robots providing the main fire support for the assault group," Makar said. "It was a comprehensive setup: two kamikaze robots carrying MON‑90 mines, a combat module armed with an Mk 19 grenade launcher, and an evacuation platform.
The first kamikaze robot blew up the enemy position before the assault started. The second moved parallel to the infantry across the field and, on command, attacked the enemy at the coordinates provided during the fight. The grenade launcher module provided cover in open terrain as our guys were moving in – the robot fired its full ammunition load accurately at the target.
Sadly, we lost one soldier to artillery fire. As soon as the area was secured, the logistics robot moved in and evacuated the body."
The experience of the 3rd Assault Brigade proves that robots are capable of effectively supporting assaults, destroying fortifications and manpower before close combat. In another case, a kamikaze UGV forced Russian fighters to surrender by threatening to blow up their position.
The cases cited by Charter and the 3rd Assault Brigade represent the cutting edge of UGV use. They have training systems in place, a clear staff structure, full freedom from commanders to develop capability and the necessary personnel and equipment. Other units in Ukraine's defence forces have also seen success with combat UGVs, but most are still just getting started.
Can ground robots partially replace infantry fighting vehicles?
UGV manufacturers are currently introducing more powerful combat platforms designed to fill a wider niche on the battlefield. These robots carry more ammunition and heavier modules.
Heavy-duty UGVs include the Protector and T-700 Browning, both capable of carrying 700 kg, and the Vatag, which carries up to 2 tonnes.
The T-700 Browning is armed with two machine guns: a 12.7mm Browning M2 and a 7.62mm PKT.
The Vatag was developed for the 25mm Bushmaster cannon, like the one on the US-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Its developer says the chassis can even carry a whole load of 40 rockets for Grad multiple-launch rocket systems.
Ukrainian developers are preparing repeaters and platforms to carry and deploy small kamikaze drones, as well as new weapon carriers for 2026: anti-tank missile systems, man-portable air defence systems, autocannons and flamethrower rocket launchers. The development of artificial intelligence to increase drone autonomy is also expected.
"We don't have enough people," Poritskyi said. "The Russians throw their men into the meat grinder, we send robots to the scrap heap. We storm with them, lose them, but swap money and metal for enemy manpower."
Author: Sviatoslav Nakonechnyi
Translation: Artem Yakymyshyn
Editing: Susan McDonald