Barriers at every turn: why the Ukrainian government is holding back drone exports to the Middle East

In February, Ukraine showcased some of its military equipment at the World Defence Show 2026 in Saudi Arabia, in what now has proved to be a very timely presentation. Buyers from Arab countries were especially interested in interceptor drones and other systems designed to counter kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Less than a month later, that interest has shifted and is now a pressing demand. As war with Iran broke out and hundreds of low-cost kamikaze drones started striking oil infrastructure facilities, military commanders across the Arabian Peninsula scrambled to comb through existing contacts and turned to Ukrainian companies.

For Ukrainian manufacturers, the situation is a clear business opportunity. For the government, it is primarily a political one. These competing approaches have led to contradictions that have kept companies from launching operations in this region for over a month, forcing them into a holding pattern.

Yet companies are already willing to tailor their products to the needs of Arab countries, integrate them into local defence systems and start generating revenue for both their own operations and Ukraine's coffers – funds that would ultimately support Kyiv's defence forces.

Meanwhile, the central government is in no hurry to issue export licences. The Ukrainian President's Office is effectively keeping the technology export pipeline closed and is seeking to extract political leverage from its Western and Arab partners in exchange for opening it – a move that is crucial in the context of negotiations with the US and Russia.

Both approaches have their merits, but they are at odds with one another. As a result, a situation has emerged in which, on the one hand, Kyiv's security services are warning manufacturers against any sales to Arab countries, while on the other, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is publicly saying that Ukraine is willing to supply drones to shoot down Shahed loitering munitions over Dubai.

Major drone companies surveyed by Ukrainska Pravda are putting negotiations with customers on hold due to the ongoing uncertainty, awaiting clear guidance from the authorities.

Meanwhile, the market is not standing still and is turning to alternative solutions. In many cases, these are products either copied from Ukrainian designs or tested in the defence of Ukrainian airspace.

Ukrainska Pravda has spoken with key players in the defence market. Read on to find out why exports of domestic interception systems have so far remained little more than headlines.

Be realistic

To begin with, we need an honest answer to the question: are Ukrainian drones truly needed in the Middle East?

At first glance, the need may seem urgent. A well-established misconception has taken root in Ukrainian media, suggesting that Arab monarchies rely exclusively on scarce and costly US Patriot missiles to shoot down Iranian Shahed drones, and that these systems are close to running out.

This is, to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Patriot systems are indeed being used in large numbers, but Gulf states also have other, more cost-effective interceptor systems at their disposal for countering drones.

Dylan Malyasov, editor-in-chief of The Defence Blog, a news outlet covering military and technological trends in the Iran conflict, said in a comment to Ukrainska Pravda: "One of the most widely used weapons for intercepting kamikaze drones in the Middle East at present is the APKWS air-to-air rocket, which accounts for the majority of shootdowns. There is also a range of less sophisticated systems, such as anti-aircraft guns. Costly missile systems are deployed against drones only when there is an immediate threat to military facilities or to air defence positions themselves."

That said, the need for Ukrainian solutions should not be overlooked. Estimates from OSINT analyst MarioLeb79 suggest that the number of Iranian drones launched has fallen sharply since the early days of the war. While hundreds of drones were deployed at the outset, that number has now fallen to just a few dozen. Even so, the attacks persist and occasionally cause significant economic repercussions.

There remains a risk that Iran could expand its drone terror into something consistent and sustained, as Russia has already done against Ukraine, or that Tehran's cronies from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a Russian industrial hub associated with drone production, or from Beijing might join in to manufacture UAVs. In such a scenario, a war of attrition would follow, in which countries on the defensive would require cheap, mass-produced interception capabilities. In this context, Ukraine would have the upper hand.

Selling new types of military equipment is more complex than exporting drones alone, as it requires not only providing the product but also establishing the niche itself as a ready-made solution. In practice, this means military commanders must be persuaded that the system is promising enough to justify committing funds, personnel, infrastructure and time to build a short-range air defence capability from the ground up.

The operation of interceptor drones is more complex than it may seem at first glance. Ukrainska Pravda has outlined the infrastructure required for their use in a separate article. In the Arabian Gulf, however, the systems will also need to be adapted to local climatic and tactical conditions.

Major Ukrainian manufacturers are able to offer turnkey solutions to international customers. Heneral Chereshnia (General Cherry) and another major manufacturer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Ukrainska Pravda that, provided the state grants approval, they are willing to train personnel, integrate interceptors into local radar systems, provide maintenance and adapt the drones for operation in desert conditions if needed. However, they emphasised that their priority will remain supporting Ukraine's defence forces.

Furthermore, Ukraine has a comprehensive arsenal beyond interceptor drones to counter kamikaze UAVs: electronic warfare (EW) systems, small radars, visual and acoustic sensor systems, and software for analysing enemy tactics and coordinating mobile units to counter them. All of these are produced by Ukrainian companies and could, subject to available capacity, be supplied to friendly nations.

Taken together, these factors point to a promising outlook for Ukraine as a security provider for its Western allies and a quick way to make a name for itself on the global market.

There has also been favourable media coverage, as leading Western outlets have been running extensive reports on Ukrainian interceptor drones. One notable example was a Fox News segment on Sting drones produced by the Ukrainian company Wild Hornets. Representatives of General Cherry also conducted a demonstration for journalists from Al Jazeera.

Evidently, Ukrainian drones have been a big hit in the media. Wealthy international clients are already keen to establish partnerships with Ukrainian companies. At least, that is suggested by the large number of emails and calls received from Arab representatives in March.

"As soon as the war in Iran began, we started receiving calls from our contacts in Arab countries whom we had met at exhibitions," Serhii Honcharov, director of the National Association of Ukrainian Defence Industries (NAUDI), told Ukrainska Pravda. "These were usually representatives of defence ministries or state-owned companies interested in cooperation.

They are interested in everything, not just drones. Often, they are already intent on purchasing. One high-ranking client asked just two questions: whether the product has been tested in combat and whether we have an export licence for supply."

Although the combat-proven track record of Ukrainian companies' products is not in doubt, major challenges persist in securing export licences. These arise either from excessive regulation or from the government's deliberate reluctance to rush into selling weapons abroad.

Exports permitted, yet restricted

Since the end of last year, a consensus has emerged in Ukraine that a controlled arms export scheme should be introduced. The aim is to allow companies that fulfil all contracts for the defence forces on time and have spare production capacity to sell military equipment to a limited number of countries. This is seen as an important step towards attracting resources for the development of new equipment, the modernisation of factories and the replenishment of strained state finances.

In practice, however, things proved more complicated. At a time when manufacturers' inboxes were filling with offers from the Arab world, one of Ukraine's security services sent a letter to arms associations effectively warning that the State Service for Export Control (SSEC) was suspending the processing of applications for arms exports to Gulf countries.

The formal basis for this is the Council of the European Union's Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, under which EU member states must refuse to issue licences for the export of military goods or technology that could provoke or prolong armed conflict, or aggravate existing tensions in the country of final destination.

This legal justification raises a number of questions. Ukraine can comply with certain EU regulations without being a member, although such practice is not mandatory, particularly in the production of arms. The interpretation also raises doubts: if EU countries were to apply these standards as written, they would be unable to provide military assistance to Ukraine's defence forces.

Even more notably, the letter did not come from the SSEC itself, but from another security agency effectively speaking on its behalf. Ukrainska Pravda sought clarification from the SSEC. It neither confirmed nor denied the information, suggesting instead that inquiries be directed to the relevant security service that had sent the letter to the arms manufacturers.

The letter in question has no legal force. It rather reflects the position of an agency which, alongside others, takes decisions on granting export licences within the Interdepartmental Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation. However, the situation is indicative of the uncertainty affecting manufacturers, which in turn hinders serious business negotiations. The underlying reason for this uncertainty may be that the authorities have deliberately decided to slow down the export process.

The president's reasoning seems clear. Rather than simply selling drones for money, Ukraine could also try to leverage them politically, presenting itself as a saviour of Arab countries and securing additional political or material rewards from interested parties in return.

For example, President Zelenskyy initially alluded to the possibility that Arab countries could influence Russian leader Vladimir Putin to call a ceasefire, and only then would Ukraine be able to provide the necessary resources and experts to combat Iranian drones. Later, in a comment to The New York Times, the Ukrainian leader said he was willing to trade solutions to counter drones for scarce Patriot missiles. Subsequently, Intelligence Online, a news outlet focusing on intelligence and diplomatic affairs, reported that Ukraine has asked Qatar to transfer 12 decommissioned Mirage fighter jets in exchange for interceptors.

This appears to be a source of irritation for US President Donald Trump, who has declared outright that he does not need Zelenskyy's assistance in his campaign in Iran. Political negotiations may nonetheless be ongoing not only with the US, but also with Israel, directly with Arab countries, and with the UK acting as an intermediary.

In other words, a process of political bargaining is underway, in which Ukraine is seeking to secure the best possible terms in return for genuinely opening up drone exports.

On the one hand, this approach makes sense if Ukrainian negotiators take a sober view of the value of domestic drones, set realistic objectives for the negotiations and achieve tangible short-term results.

On the other hand, dragging out this process is placing significant strain on manufacturers. Although they can now submit applications to the SSECU, mixed signals from the state and a lengthy, multi-agency approval procedure are hindering constructive negotiations with potential customers.

What's more, Ukrainian companies are not even able to export their products for testing or demonstration to verify their specifications.

A senior defence sector source told Ukrainska Pravda that the government has promised simplified procedures for exporting weapons for demonstration purposes. In reality, however, the SSECU is unwilling to take responsibility or make independent decisions, instead sending multiple requests to other departments. As a result, approving the transport of a drone for demonstration can take months rather than the one to two weeks the process should take.

Major manufacturers are currently in a holding pattern. Various industry sources speaking to Ukrainska Pravda have not lost hope that Ukraine will soon begin concluding international agreements, which would effectively give the green light to start substantive negotiations.

What gives cause for hope, in particular, is the work of 230 Ukrainian experts in the Middle East. According to the BBC, they have successfully shot down their first Shahed drones in the region. Although the purpose of their presence is unknown, it could serve as a compelling demonstration of the capabilities of Ukrainian manufacturers and instructors.

"We're not ruling out that the government may have a bigger view than we do," Honcharov said. "But further delay will lead to foreign companies entering the market in our place – companies that have also tested their products in Ukraine. These are not Patriot PAC-3 systems; they are solutions that, with sufficient determination and investment, can be replicated, improved and scaled up. If we keep waiting like this, we'll end up being of no use to anyone at all.

As things stand, there is still a place for us on the global market. We do not know where the next conflict will break out. Our advantage is that we can meet any need not in 2030, but within a matter of months. We still have the opportunity to make our mark, but that window is narrowing with every passing day."

There is also a second path: liberalising arms exports to Kyiv's partner countries without prior political conditions and allowing manufacturers to find their own buyers, thereby strengthening Ukraine's position in this market. But this scenario would require not only political will but also reforming the system.

The problem runs deeper

The stagnation of Ukrainian arms exports is not limited to the situation with Middle Eastern countries. The issue is a general slowdown in the process. Some companies manage to transfer technology and are already legally setting up joint ventures abroad. Others are unable to do so.

For example, sources told Ukrainska Pravda that the drone company Ukrspetsystems is currently unable to obtain permission to begin operations in the UK, even though its plant has been built in partnership with Ukraine's partners under agreements reached at the highest level.

A high-ranking source told Ukrainska Pravda that arms manufacturers receive no updates on the status of their applications or the reasons for rejection, whether technical, security-related or otherwise. They are simply presented with the Interdepartmental Commission's collective decision as a fait accompli. The lack of clarity over the next steps risks leaving manufacturers disillusioned from the outset of opening up exports and undermining their confidence in the authorities.

Back in September last year, Zelenskyy officially said Ukraine needs to resume weapons export. Yet looking at the situation as a whole, obstacles, ambiguities and corruption risks arise at every turn. Over the past seven months, the actual results have been almost negligible compared with the potential of Ukraine's defence industry.

It is becoming clear that the arms export system, in its current form, is dysfunctional and requires reform on two fronts: political and procedural. Politically, this would address the buck-passing and the shifting of responsibility that undermine the process. Procedurally, it would create a system that is predictable, transparent and does not deter manufacturers.

Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn

Edited by Susan McDonald