A large-scale attack involving 1,560 drones over the past 36 hours, with strikes on residential buildings, has once again confirmed that Russia has not abandoned its terror tactics and is continuing to scale up kamikaze drone production.
Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) says that Russia plans to produce 60,000 long-range strike drones and a further 50,000 decoy drones this year.
But rising numbers are not the only threat. Alongside conventional Shaheds, Russia is making increasingly active use of new jet-powered long-range drones that are significantly harder to intercept. DIU notes that Russia intends to focus specifically on jet-powered UAV production, gradually raising their share to 50% of total output.
The emergence of high-speed kamikaze drones is a logical evolutionary step in long-range strike warfare. It also poses a challenge to Ukrainian interceptor drones, which currently have their own speed limitations.
Ukrainska Pravda spoke with military personnel, DIU, the Come Back Alive foundation and the Brave1 cluster. Here we explain what makes jet-powered drones dangerous and how Ukraine can counter them.
The birth of Geran-3/4/5
The first reports of jet-powered Shaheds emerged back in 2023, when Iran's Ashura Aerospace University unveiled the new Shahed-238 jet-powered strike UAV.
In 2024, a group of hackers leaked documents detailing Shahed production in Russia and referencing new drone models the Kremlin had expressed interest in. Among them was the M-237 jet-powered variant, which was effectively the Shahed-238.
Visually, the Shahed-238 retains the same airframe as the conventional propeller-driven Shahed-136, but fitted with a jet engine. According to the leaked specifications, the drone was designed to reach speeds of up to 600 km/h, carry a 50 kg warhead, and cover up to 1,000 km. The unit cost of such a Shahed was stated at US$1.4 million.
However, it appears the proposal did not interest Russia at the time. Only one documented case of Shahed-238 use against Ukraine is publicly known – in January 2024.
After that, news of jet-powered Shaheds went quiet for a period. Only in February 2025 did DIU report that Russia was establishing production of its own Shahed-238 equivalent, called the Geran-3. And in early June 2025, wreckage of these drones was found in Ukraine for the first time.
Visually, the Geran-3 differs from the Shahed-238 in that its engine is externally mounted – on the Iranian drone it was concealed within the airframe.
As Brave1 explains, the Geran-3 is similar to the Shahed-238, fitted with an engine that allows it to reach speeds of up to 370 km/h. By comparison, the standard Geran-2 (Shahed-136) flies at up to 250 km/h. Maximum range remains 1,000 km, while warhead weight can vary between 50 and 90 kg.
Brave1 also described other jet-powered modifications. The Geran-4 features a more powerful engine and improved aerodynamics, bringing it closer to the performance of the Iranian jet-powered Shahed. This UAV can reach speeds of up to 500 km/h while retaining the characteristic Shahed-like airframe.
Another model, the Geran-5, departs from this concept entirely and is effectively a small cruise missile, or missile-drone as they are referred to in Ukraine. According to DIU, this drone is a copy or equivalent of the Iranian Karrar UAV. The Geran-5 is capable of reaching speeds of up to 600 km/h, with its remaining specifications matching those of the Geran-3.
For now, Russia is producing these drones in limited numbers. DIU stated that the Geran-4 and Geran-5 have already entered mass production, with existing capacity allowing output of up to 500 such drones per month. Mass production of the Geran-3 is planned to begin in the second half of this year. The ultimate goal is to raise the share of jet-powered drones to 50% of total Shahed output.
The jet-powered threat
Our sources note that Russian jet-powered drone launches remain largely experimental in nature. OSINT analysts from the Oko Hora project, citing their own sources within the Air Force, report that Russia is currently launching 10-12 jet-powered drones consistently on a daily basis.
"They are experimenting and trying to understand what works and what does not. Depending on the effectiveness of the jet-powered Shaheds, they will either adjust their tactics, increase drone numbers, or look for new solutions," says Danylo Shynhelskyi, project manager for the Dronefall initiative at the Come Back Alive Foundation.
DIU confirms that the use of jet-powered drones remains predominantly experimental at this stage. For launches, Russia is using so-called "drone-drome sites" in Oryol Oblast, as well as areas such as the territory around Donetsk airport.
However, even with relatively limited use, jet-powered drones already pose a serious threat, especially to regions located closer to Russia and the occupied territories.
"The main advantage of jet-powered Shaheds is their speed, which allows them to break through the first echelons of defence and effectively avoid interception by drones," Shynhelskyi explains. "Meanwhile, deploying anti-aircraft missile systems in the near rear is dangerous because of the risk of them being struck.
But such drones do not maintain their maximum speed throughout their entire flight path. If they are flying over a long distance, they reduce their speed to the level of conventional Shaheds, and at that point they can already be intercepted by drones."
Video of a Geran-3 being intercepted by an interceptor drone
Jet-powered drones are forced to reduce their speed because of their high fuel consumption at maximum velocity, which limits their range. As a result, the Russians often use them against frontline cities located only a few hundred kilometres from the launch point. Under such conditions, the drone can cover most of its route at high speed, significantly reducing the response time available to the defence forces.
However, speed is not the only advantage of these drones. Jet-powered Shaheds are quite often equipped with radio-control modules, allowing the operator to alter the route in real time. This complicates interception and increases the risks both for mobile fire groups and for civilian infrastructure.
The Russians are attempting to compensate for the loss of Starlink terminals, which were widely used on drones earlier this year until Ukraine succeeded in having them disabled, by using radio-control modules. In response, they are increasingly switching to mesh communications and a relay network system, which they are now rapidly scaling up to control drones.
"The Russians use radio modems on drones that relay the signal between each other. One unit receives the signal and passes it further on, which makes it possible to extend the control range. In addition, they have deployed a large number of ground-based relay stations along the Ukrainian and Belarusian border. For now, they are managing to transmit the signal to a distance of up to 150 km from the first relay station," Maksym Skoretskyi, Head of the Electronic Warfare Department of Ukraine's Ground Forces, told Ukrainska Pravda.
According to Skoretskyi, drones with remote-control capability currently account for around 30% of the total number of Russian drones. Meanwhile, Ukrainian electronic warfare systems continue to effectively jam their communication channels.
However, even if communication is lost, such a drone is still capable of continuing its flight towards its target thanks to backup systems – inertial, navigational and optical – which allow it to maintain spatial orientation.
New challenge
Ukrainian military personnel and engineers are already searching for ways to counter the new jet-powered threat. In a comment to Ukrainska Pravda, Brave1 stated that developing means of combating jet-powered drones is one of their priorities, and work is already under way on a number of solutions.
These include high-speed and jet-powered interceptor drones capable of reaching speeds of more than 450 km/h, as well as low-cost surface-to-air missiles. Pavlo Yelizarov, Deputy Commander of the Air Force, who is responsible for the development of short-range air defence, says Ukraine already has drones capable of accelerating to 700 km/h, effectively turning them into air defence missiles.
In addition to speed, weapons developers are also working on increasing drone autonomy. This involves creating systems that would minimise operator involvement – from launch to target engagement. Such systems would provide greater accuracy at high speeds, where human reaction time may no longer be sufficient. Autonomous systems would also reduce the number of operators required simultaneously.
However, technological solutions alone are not enough to solve the problem. Building a layered air defence system and destroying Russian production facilities remain equally important.
"When we talk about layered air defence, we mean creating a defensive line along the entire front. Units deployed there would be fully equipped and capable of intercepting targets while they are still approaching. Other tiers would then come into play – the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Air Force and so on," Shynhelskyi says.
A similar model is already beginning to be implemented. For example, 412th Nemesis Brigade uses uncrewed surface vessels from which interceptor drones are launched. This makes it possible to destroy kamikaze drones while they are still massing over the Black Sea and to disrupt attacks on coastal cities. In effect, the brigade is forming a new tier of defence at sea.
For frontline regions, where flight time amounts to only a few minutes, early detection using various radars and sensors remains critically important. Without such systems, even effective interception assets will not have enough time to respond to the threat.
However, the factor that could have the greatest impact on Russia's ability to launch drones is strikes by the defence forces against the Russian military-industrial complex. Such operations are already taking place. In particular, on the night of 4-5 May, Ukrainian forces struck the Russian plant VNIIR-Progress with an FP-5 cruise missile. The plant manufactures navigation systems used, among other things, in drones and missiles. The impact of the strike on drone production will become clear later.
By Illia Volynskyi
Translated by Anastasiia Lipara and Anna Kybukevych
Edited by Susan McDonald