Experts in high-level corruption cases are facing threats. Ukraine needs an independent forensic institution

The forensic expert in the so-called "Dynasty" case was repeatedly urged to withdraw from the criminal proceedings. To deliver the message, an unknown man waited for her outside her home one evening. Later, intermediaries passed along further "greetings" — threats to mobilize her relatives and strip her of her right to practice her profession.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) are currently investigating the incident. One line of inquiry suggests that individual officers of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) may have been involved.

Unfortunately, pressure on forensic experts is nothing new in Ukraine's law enforcement system. Across different political eras, expert examinations have remained one of the tools through which the outcome of criminal proceedings can be influenced. Today, at least some of these attempts can be documented and investigated.

The scale of the problem is larger than it may appear. Expert examinations are conducted in virtually every NABU and SAPO case. In investigations involving embezzlement of public funds, abuses in construction projects, or procurement schemes, experts determine the value of assets, assess completed works, and calculate damages or losses.

Without such conclusions, investigators often cannot substantiate suspicions, bring cases to court, or secure convictions. Control over expert examinations therefore translates into significant influence over the outcome of investigations. And there is no shortage of people interested in obtaining that influence.

How Pressure Is Exerted on Experts

At times, the pressure is entirely direct.

In the proceedings concerning the misappropriation of UAH 141 million from Ukrzaliznytsia, the investigation recorded conversations among the accused regarding the possibility of reaching an arrangement with forensic experts to obtain, in exchange for an unlawful benefit, an opinion favourable to the defence. The participants in those conversations cited specific sums, which varied depending on the forensic institution concerned.

When the examination was assigned to a specialist from a private institution and the customary methods of influence proved ineffective, the defence sought to have him subjected to disciplinary proceedings and attempted, through the courts, to obtain legally protected information about the expert.

Other forms of pressure are less visible. During a search of a state forensic institution, detectives discovered handwritten notes in management offices referencing the case on the alleged damages caused by the "Rotterdam+" pricing formula. The note effectively instructed staff that if an examination in the case were assigned to the institution, certain interested parties should be informed immediately.

Such circumstances are difficult to reconcile with the concept of an independent forensic examination.

Years of Waiting for a Single Conclusion

Pressure is only part of the problem. A further systemic challenge concerns the time limits for conducting expert examinations.

For example, in the case concerning alleged corruption during the reconstruction of Kyiv's Shuliavskyi overpass, investigators waited years for a final assessment of damages. During that time, the proceedings were effectively stalled because the expert examination was a key piece of evidence.

This is far from an isolated case. In the investigation into the procurement of altimeters for military aircraft, each computer forensic examination took between two and a half and three and a half years.

In another case, eight construction valuation examinations assigned in December 2024 took a state institution more than sixteen months to complete. Detectives' repeated reminders about statutory deadlines went largely unanswered.

Such delays have real legal consequences. Most notably, statutes of limitations expire. Cases are closed, and the state is deprived even of compensation for damages.

In the altimeter case, experts allegedly provided a knowingly false conclusion. Subsequent examinations conducted by several other institutions contradicted their findings. Yet holding those experts criminally liable is no longer possible because the statute of limitations has expired.

Today, there are virtually no effective tools to counter unjustified or deliberate delays in expert examinations. As a result, both corruption suspects and those who help obstruct investigations may escape accountability.

Contradictory Opinions from a Single Institution

The third problem concerns the quality and objectivity of expert examinations.

NABU and SAPO have repeatedly encountered situations where the same state expert institution issued completely contradictory conclusions regarding the same subject matter.

In a case involving the misappropriation of land plots near Fastiv, Kyiv oblast, two examinations conducted by the same institution assessed the value of the same plot of land, as of the same date, first at UAH 1.5 million and later at UAH 219,000 — a difference of more than sevenfold. The same discrepancy appeared across all 462 plots involved in the case.

The reason lay in the use of vastly different comparators and valuation coefficients. Formally, both documents qualified as expert conclusions. In substance, however, they presented the court with two mutually incompatible outcomes.

A similar situation arose in a case concerning Ukrzaliznytsia's procurement of power supply equipment. The institution initially established one market value for the equipment and, four years later, arrived at a substantially different figure. A repeat examination ordered by the court and conducted by another institution ultimately concluded that determining the equipment's market value was impossible.

In yet another proceeding, contradictions between expert opinions commissioned by the prosecution and the defence were so significant that the court refused to rely on either of them. Instead, it calculated damages independently based on primary documentation.

Another recurring issue involves expert opinions that fail to provide a clear answer. Experts are expected to respond directly to the questions posed by detectives or prosecutors. If this is impossible, they must state so explicitly. Such cases should be exceptional. Yet ambiguous conclusions have become increasingly common, forcing investigators to commission additional examinations and wait months — or years — for answers.

The same consequences arise where an expert exceeds the scope of the questions posed, assesses legal matters falling outside their competence, or frames the opinion in a manner that creates additional scope for manipulation in court.

There have also been instances giving grounds to suspect outright falsification.

In one investigation, detectives withdrew an order commissioning an examination, and the institution returned the case materials. Three months later, the defence presented in court a conclusion from the same institution, dated as if it had been prepared before the withdrawal of the order.

Investigative actions have provided grounds to believe that the document may have been produced later and backdated to create the appearance of legitimacy.

Why the System Reproduces The Problem

The cause lies in the very model of governance of state forensic examination.

The heads of state forensic institutions are appointed on a contractual basis without an open competition. Under such a system, a dependent or "compliant" director may emerge under any government.

Certification of experts and disciplinary proceedings are overseen by a commission under the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, government officials and ministry representatives may themselves become subjects of NABU and SAPO investigations.

As a result, experts who produce conclusions unfavourable to influential individuals risk losing their professional credentials, while those who delay examinations or provide desired outcomes often face no consequences at all.

The system creates incentives under which professional independence becomes a personal risk, while dependence becomes the safer model of conduct.

What Needs to Change

The problem of access to high-quality and timely forensic examinations is recognised both in Ukraine and by the European Union.

Ensuring anti-corruption institutions have effective access to reliable forensic expertise is one of the conditions attached to Ukraine's receipt of EUR 124 million under the updated Ukraine Facility programme. Ukraine has committed to fulfilling this requirement by the end of 2026.

In addition, one of the EU's interim benchmarks in the accession process is the delivery of tangible results in combating high-level corruption: investigations, indictments, and convictions. Progress will be assessed regularly, not merely at the end of negotiations.

Without addressing the dependence of forensic experts, fulfilling both commitments will remain at risk.

In my view, the solution is the creation of an independent forensic institution dedicated to high-level corruption cases. Its mission would be to provide professional, impartial, and timely examinations regardless of the office, status, or political influence of those under investigation.

Such a reform should rest on three pillars.

1. A Specialised Independent Institution

Experience with Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies demonstrates that institutional independence begins with a transparent selection process for leadership involving international experts.

One possible model is a state-owned enterprise overseen by an independent supervisory board with international participation. The board should have the authority to select the institution's director through an open competition, assess performance, and respond to attempts to pressure experts.

The institution must be newly established and organizationally separate from the existing network of state forensic institutions, as well as from the Ministry of Justice to the greatest extent possible.

Its mandate should be narrowly focused on high-level corruption cases. Otherwise, it risks being overwhelmed by the broader flow of examinations. Importantly, access to the institution should be available to all parties in criminal proceedings, including defence lawyers.

The risks faced by experts working on high-profile corruption cases differ significantly from those encountered in ordinary criminal matters. They require a distinct model of governance and protection.

2. Real Safeguards for Experts

Experts handling high-level corruption cases should receive competitive remuneration and be protected from unfounded criminal, administrative, and disciplinary proceedings.

They must be able to stand by their professional conclusions even when facing pressure from management, government officials, or participants in criminal proceedings.

Without such safeguards, it will be impossible to attract and retain highly qualified professionals willing to take responsibility in complex and politically sensitive cases.

Equally important is access to modern equipment, professional databases, and certified software. These resources directly affect the accuracy, evidentiary value, and timeliness of forensic examinations.

3. Independence Guaranteed by Law

The institution's establishment, leadership selection process, and safeguards for expert independence should be enshrined in legislation rather than regulated through ministerial decrees.

Subordinate regulations can be changed by a single authority. Amendments to the law require parliamentary approval and the president's signature, making arbitrary interference significantly more difficult.

This is particularly important given that government ministers and senior officials belong to the very category of individuals whose alleged misconduct may become the subject of high-level corruption investigations.

If a justice minister or another senior official becomes a suspect in a corruption case, the current system allows examinations to be conducted by institutions administratively subordinated to the body they lead. The existence of such dependence alone undermines trust in the outcome.

Legislative safeguards will not eliminate all risks, but they can substantially reduce opportunities for interference through personnel decisions, disciplinary mechanisms, or changes to internal rules.

High-quality and timely expert examinations mean faster investigations, better substantiated charges, stronger evidence, and more predictable outcomes.

An independent forensic institution is not needed for the convenience of anti-corruption institutions. It is needed to ensure that the fate of high-level corruption cases depends on evidence — not on the ability to pressure experts, delay examinations, or obtain conclusions by a phone call.

Oleksandr Klymenko, Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office