It's been clear since his presidency began that sharing power is not something Volodymyr Zelenskyy likes to do. He hasn't resorted to excessive micromanagement as his predecessor Petro Poroshenko did, or built complex systems of checks and balances in the style of Leonid Kuchma (who was president in 1994-2005). But he has never let anyone who might outshine him into his inner circle.
For years, those close to President Zelenskyy have been people who made no claim to an independent political identity, but knew how to ensure unconditional loyalty and maintain control over everything happening around them.
Andrii Yermak, the former head of the President's Office, was the perfect embodiment of this. His dismissal seemed to mark the end of a major political era. But at the President's Office, reshuffles don't always mean a change in the rules of the game.
The new head of the Office, Kyrylo Budanov, had no desire to become "another Yermak", but neither did he change the team working there.
But politics in Ukraine has not stood still. The ousting of defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov, the latest "cardboard protest", and further special operations by the anti-corruption agencies, dubbed Carthage and Forrest Gump – which led to the dismissal of Iryna Mudra, a deputy head of the President's Office, and the flight of Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko – were bound to trigger another restructuring of the architecture of power.
One thing never changes: throughout the political turbulence, Zelenskyy remains the central figure in every configuration of power, and access to him is still one of the key factors that determines how influential a person can be in Ukraine today.
Who has the greatest influence over Zelenskyy today? Has Yermak really lost his former all-powerful position for good? And whose status has risen since the recent series of scandals? Ukrainska Pravda takes a closer look.
New favourites vying for a place at Zelenskyy's side
Andrii Yermak has not been seen in the building on Bankova Street, where the President's Office is located in Kyiv, since he stepped down as its head. However, several people in the president's team who spoke to Ukrainska Pravda said that "Yermak is still a contact in Zelenskyy's phone". Since being formally served with a notice of suspicion in the case involving the construction of the high-end Dynasty housing complex, Yermak has been communicating with the president by phone.
In July, Ukrainska Pravda reported that Yermak had been involved in arranging Mykhailo Fedorov's dismissal as defence minister. Moreover, at the height of the conflict between Fedorov and former commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi in the summer of 2026, Yermak travelled to a command post in a frontline area to meet Syrskyi.
Nevertheless, Yermak's absence from the President's Office on Bankova Street and his detachment from the daily flow of events have significantly limited his ability to influence developments in real time, depriving him of the near-omnipotence he once enjoyed.
"All of Andrii's power rested on his proximity to the president," a senior official at Bankova told UP off the record. "It's not possible to exert the kind of influence that he had from afar. I'd say he's lost 90% of his former power. He might still speak to the Big Man, but he certainly can't call people with his stupid ideas or assign them tasks."
Since Yermak's dismissal, one of the people most frequently seen in Zelenskyy's office has been his adviser, Dmytro Lytvyn, who oversees all of the president's media communications, co-writes speeches for his key public appearances, and advises him on how to respond to "attacks" by world leaders – which regularly brings him into conflict with Serhii Kyslytsia, First Deputy Head of the President's Office.
Lytvyn has taken over one of Yermak's functions: continually finding new enemies around the President's Office. He interprets other politicians' actions and statements as he sees fit, and Zelenskyy listens to him.
"Dima is no fool," one senior official says of Lytvyn. "He understands the president's personality and knows how to exploit it. Lytvyn's role goes beyond the media. His access to the president enables him to put forward his own perspective on all the challenges facing the authorities – from foreign policy and the war to personnel decisions and even the economy."
But Lytvyn isn't the only person whose position has been given a boost by the changes at the Office. Since Yermak's dismissal, the influence of Davyd Arakhamiia, leader of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction, has grown considerably.
Just a year ago, Arakhamiia was on the verge of being formally notified that he was a suspect in a treason case. Now he is one of Zelenskyy's main pillars of support.
"It's true that Davyd has grown closer to the president and can get into his office without much difficulty. That's hardly surprising. Look at our team – Davyd is almost the only one who's been there from the very beginning. The others have been rendered toxic by either Yermak or NABU [the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine]," one member of Zelenskyy's team explains with a note of irony.
As leader of the Servant of the People faction, Arakhamiia marshals votes in parliament, both within the ruling parliamentary majority and beyond it, among other factions and groups. His control over Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, is his main asset, and it enables him to influence government appointments.
Arakhamiia was directly involved in last summer's Cabinet reshuffle and actively advocated for Fedorov's dismissal.
At least three ministers in the new Cabinet are close to him: Veterans Affairs Minister Vitalii Kim, Justice Minister Denys Maslov, and Communities Minister Vitalii Bezhin.
Maslov and Bezhin were Servant of the People MPs under Arakhamiia's leadership before joining the government, while Kim is a long-time friend of his.
Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal could also be considered an ally. During Shmyhal's long tenure as prime minister, he and Arakhamiia developed a working partnership.
Beyond parliamentary affairs, Arakhamiia is also actively involved in negotiations. He is officially a member of Ukraine's negotiating team in talks with the United States.
Arakhamiia also maintains friendly contact with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who is in direct contact with Vladimir Putin.
Arakhamiia first crossed paths with Abramovich at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, when the Russian oligarch presented himself as a "neutral party" during talks in Istanbul between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations.
In June 2026 Abramovich travelled to Kyiv, where he met with President Zelenskyy. It's hard to believe that Arakhamiia was not involved in arranging the meeting.
Another interesting contact of Arakhamiia's is self-proclaimed Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko. In the early days of the full-scale invasion, Arakhamiia acted as an intermediary between Zelenskyy and Lukashenko after the Ukrainian president refused to communicate directly with Putin's ally. Ukrainska Pravda sources say Arakhamiia has maintained his contact with Lukashenko.
The head of the parliamentary majority is also actively thinking about creating new political actors (parties).
Over the past six months, Ukrainska Pravda has repeatedly heard from various sources that Arakhamiia is seriously considering launching a political project that could fill the space once occupied by the pro-Russian parties Opposition Platform – For Life and Opposition Bloc. Vitalii Kim and Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov, both of whom enjoy a high level of public recognition, could become the public faces of that political force.
"Remember how Ostap Bender was portrayed by Ilf and Petrov? Such an energetic, charismatic person, so good at manoeuvring and scheming, right? Well, if you pitted Bender against Davyd, Davyd would have him for breakfast," one of the most senior members of Zelenskyy's team laughs.
The president's enforcers
Since Andrii Yermak's dismissal as head of the President's Office, Deputy Head Oleh Tatarov's position has only got stronger. Within the President's Office, Tatarov is responsible for the law enforcement and security agencies. Over the years, he has also acquired considerable practical political experience, developing a keen understanding of who's who in the power hierarchy and how to deal with people from very different backgrounds.
Tatarov retains considerable influence over the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), the Ministry of Internal Affairs – including the National Police – and certain courts.
The recent high-profile NABU cases have worked in Tatarov's favour. For example, he had a long-standing feud with Iryna Mudra, who was responsible for liaising with the judiciary at the President's Office.
"Ira and Oleh had separate areas of responsibility, but they crossed paths at important meetings. Whenever legal issues came up, they would start arguing," says one source close to the President's Office.
"To give you an idea of the extent of their mutual dislike, Oleh would openly call Ira stupid in front of other people. He couldn't stand her, and she couldn't stand him either," adds another member of Zelenskyy's team.
After Mudra was served with a notice of suspicion, Tatarov was effectively rid of a rival within the President's Office.
His conflict with Ruslan Kravchenko, the former prosecutor general, was far more serious.
As Ukrainska Pravda reported earlier, Kravchenko had been conspicuously purging Tatarov's allies from the Office of the Prosecutor General, refusing to coordinate his work with Tatarov, and deliberately moving towards an open confrontation.
Operation Carthage knocked the prosecutor general out of the game altogether. Before fleeing to Vienna, Kravchenko had issued notices of suspicion against the heads of the anti-corruption agencies, SAPO and NABU. However, the notices were promptly revoked by his deputy, Maksym Krym. According to Ukrainska Pravda sources, Tatarov himself was involved in their annulment.
Following the scandals surrounding Kravchenko, Tatarov has generally strengthened his position within the Office of the Prosecutor General.
"To avoid unnecessary questions and problems, Oleh steers clear of direct contact with the acting prosecutor general and isn't installing his own people there," says one senior law enforcement official. "Instead, he discusses work-related matters with the deputies, primarily [Oleksandr] Khomenko. Overall, people in the prosecutor's office listen to Tatarov these days."
Another key figure in the law enforcement system for Zelenskyy is Oleksandr Poklad, the acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU).
Poklad demonstrated his effectiveness and conspicuous loyalty to the president and to Yermak when he headed the SSU's Counterintelligence Department. Yermak was among those who lobbied for Poklad's further promotion.
One indication of Zelenskyy's particular regard for Oleksandr Poklad is that when he was first deputy head of the SSU, the president gave him special assignments, bypassing Yevhen Khmara, then the service's acting head.
Ukrainska Pravda sources who have worked with Poklad describe him as a tough and at times even ruthless individual.
Sources within the governing team describe the SSU chief as the "guardian of Zelenskyy's political system", someone who employs a wide range of methods to achieve the president's objectives.
One example of what the acting SSU chief is capable of was the operation to bring Fedir Khrystenko, an MP wanted on suspicion of treason, back to Ukraine. According to the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia newspaper, Poklad personally travelled to the United Arab Emirates to detain him.
Poklad also has another, less obvious task on Zelenskyy's behalf: keeping Kyrylo Budanov's influence in check.
A public feud between the two men has been simmering since the days when Budanov was head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence.
The animosity goes back years and stems from rivalry between the intelligence agencies. In March 2022, Denys Kirieiev, a banker who was a member of the Ukrainian delegation in negotiations with Russia, was shot dead in central Kyiv by SSU officers. The SSU claimed that Kirieiev had been a Russian spy.
However, according to sources within Defence Intelligence, Kirieiev had worked for Ukrainian military intelligence for years and was personally close to Budanov. People in Budanov's circle are convinced that Poklad was behind the killing.
The extremely strained relationship between Budanov and Poklad was further exposed by the events of early September 2026, when their rivalry escalated into an open armed confrontation between Defence Intelligence and Security Service units.
The immediate trigger was an SSU operation. Several days before the clashes, SSU operatives had effectively abducted Stepan Kaplunov, deputy commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), a formation that operates under Defence Intelligence's direction. The SSU claimed that Kaplunov had been plotting to carry out a terrorist attack against a Russian opposition figure. According to law enforcement sources cited by Suspilne, the intended target was Akhmed Zakayev, head of the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile. Kaplunov himself said that the purpose of his detention was to force him to give testimony specifically against Kyrylo Budanov.
The behind-the-scenes power struggle culminated in street clashes between Defence Intelligence and Security Service special forces in Kyiv's Berezniaky neighbourhood on 2 September.
The lonely general
The appointment of Kyrylo Budanov as head of the President's Office in January 2026 did not mean that Volodymyr Zelenskyy wanted a new Andrii Yermak. The president had entirely different objectives in mind.
First, reputation. After the corruption scandals and Yermak's departure, the president needed someone the public could trust. Budanov fitted the bill.
In a poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in July 2026, 61% of the respondents said they trusted Budanov. For comparison, the figures were 56% for Zelenskyy, 63% for Mykhailo Fedorov and 66% for former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
Second, the president wanted to strip Budanov of his influence over Defence Intelligence. In the course of the full-scale war, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence has grown into an organisation with vast capabilities: combat units, international operations, and contact with foreign intelligence agencies as well as all the key military figures and politicians both in Ukraine and abroad. According to Ukrainska Pravda sources, Budanov now has relatively few levers of influence over the agency.
The new Defence Intelligence chief, Oleh Ivashchenko, actively coordinates his actions with SSU chief Oleksandr Poklad. A senior law enforcement officer told Ukrainska Pravda that Ivashchenko is doing everything he can to get rid of Budanov's influence within Defence Intelligence.
Third, politics. Political strategists and pollsters have long viewed Budanov as a potential independent political player. That means a possible rival to Zelenskyy is now working alongside him at the President's Office – a situation that brings to mind the saying "Keep your friends close and your enemies closer."
"Budanov knows what Zelenskyy wants, and Zelenskyy knows what Budanov wants. That's how they manage to coexist, pretending that everything's fine," one Ukrainska Pravda source says of their relationship.
Budanov has also shown an interest in several areas beyond the President's Office. In recent months, for instance, he has been working extensively with parliament.
According to Ukrainska Pravda sources in the Verkhovna Rada, he has been helping Davyd Arakhamiia secure votes and personally negotiating with parliamentary groups.
A senior member of the Servant of the People party says: "Budanov asks us for a weekly breakdown of how everyone is voting. And he isn't just interested in our faction, but the entire parliament. He looks into why some groups refuse to vote and what their demands are, and considers different ways to reach a compromise. He goes around meeting people, listening, making suggestions and negotiating where Davyd cannot."
Budanov's contacts are not limited to the president's parliamentary majority. He can also talk to Petro Poroshenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko – politicians with whom relationships have long been difficult for the current government.
Another area of his work is engagement with the business community. Budanov chairs the Council for Entrepreneurship Support and draws on contacts he established during his time at Defence Intelligence.
But his main task remains the negotiations on ending the war with Russia.
Officially Ukraine's negotiating delegation is led by Rustem Umierov, but according to Ukrainska Pravda sources, Budanov handles most of the political coordination of the negotiations.
The former intelligence chief has established informal communication channels to facilitate rapid information sharing and coordinate positions. He previously spoke extensively with Keith Kellogg, the former US special presidential envoy for Ukraine, and is now in contact with Donald Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
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One year on from Yermak's departure from Bankova, the system of influence over the president is no longer monolithic. The days when a single key person controlled access to the head of state are over.
The Yermak era has given way to a more complex arrangement in which various players, with differing ambitions and methods, seek to gain the president's ear.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains the sun around which this system revolves, and an official's influence is still determined by their access to him. Yet his new inner circle – from media adviser Dmytro Lytvyn and indispensable political intermediary Davyd Arakhamiia to hard-line security officials Oleh Tatarov and Oleksandr Poklad – lacks the unity that once characterised the team.
Will this new system prove robust enough to maintain control of the country through domestic turbulence and a gruelling war?
This autumn has shown that the president continues to set the rules of the game. Yet his new inner circle, like the one before it, is becoming not only his main source of support, but also one of his greatest challenges.
Volodymyr Fomichov, Roman Kravets, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Teresa Pearce