Anti-corruption detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov: I never believed Mindich was the key figure behind all these projects
The name of Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, a detective of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), was, until recently, known mainly to a narrow professional circle – those who closely follow the work of anti-corruption bodies. In July 2025, it entered the public domain following his detention, arrest and the almost five months he spent in a pre-trial detention centre.
On 21 July 2025, several dozen officers of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) stormed Mahamedrasulov's flat. The head of NABU's detectives unit was served with a notice of suspicion in criminal cases related to national security issues. The Security Service accused Mahamedrasulov and his father, Sentiabr, of selling industrial hemp to Russia.
The detention took place against the backdrop of developments that called into question the stability of the anti-corruption infrastructure as a whole. The following day, 22 July, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) voted for a bill that effectively stripped NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of their independence.
Prior to this, Mahamedrasulov had spent more than ten years working at NABU and had been involved in investigations into top-level corruption, the defence sector and the activities of state-owned companies. In the six months leading up to his detention, he had been working on materials that became part of Operation Midas – one of the most sensitive corruption cases of recent years.
After being released from custody on 3 December (a few days after Andrii Yermak, the president's former chief of staff, was dismissed from his post after his home was searched by anti-corruption agents), Ruslan Mahamedrasulov remains at NABU, acknowledging that the risk of further attacks on the anti-corruption system has not disappeared.
In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, he speaks in detail for the first time about the circumstances of his detention on 21 July, his nearly five months in solitary confinement in a detention centre, his work on Operation Midas, pressure from law enforcement agencies, and his own conclusions after ten years working in anti-corruption bodies.
Mahamedrasulov does not speak of revenge and he does not name names. He talks about a system in which a detective can become the target of persecution faster than a suspect can become the subject of a court verdict.
"Throughout the whole ten years of our work, cases that are socially significant have always been accompanied by law enforcement agencies subordinate to the authorities"
We spoke briefly before the interview about the fact that you have worked at NABU since its creation and never sought public attention.
I have never sought it. It's really not my thing. My work is partly covert. So you need to remain an unknown figure.
Circumstances have meant that your profile has become very public over the past six months. However, there is very little information about you. The only open-source information I managed to find is that you are from Horlivka in Donetsk Oblast, where your parents had a business. You then moved to Kyiv and have been working at NABU for ten years. Tell us a little about yourself.
We had a family business: a large logistics system. I was involved in it. But at a certain point I realised that the business was constantly under pressure from law enforcement agencies. I kept asking myself: why is this happening, on what grounds? All those grounds were unlawful, so I decided to understand what these claims against us were really about and enrolled to study law. I studied in Kharkiv, at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University. That was when I realised that most of these claims had been fabricated for the purpose of enriching certain individuals.
Did that help preserve the family business at the time?
It did. I was involved in the family business for a certain period, before working at the prosecutor's office. So yes, I advised my father in cases where the claims were fabricated and had no real basis whatsoever.
But then the war began, and you were forced to leave Horlivka?
By 2014 I was working at the prosecutor's office. For two years I worked in a department responsible for supporting the introduction of the new Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations. In other words, I was directly involved in implementing the new Code of Criminal Procedure in practice. I submitted my application to join NABU when I was working at the Kramatorsk Prosecutor's Office.
Is it true that you know the MP Fedir Khrystenko, as SSU Head Vasyl Maliuk said at a press conference? How did Khrystenko enter your life? [Khrystenko is a pro-Russian former MP, suspected of treason and abuse of power; he is known to have acted as an agent of the Russian secret services – ed.]
This is essentially twisting the facts. I worked in a department that dealt specifically with members of parliament and interacted with many of them. So to say that I interacted exclusively with Khrystenko is incorrect.
My interaction with him began shortly before he acquired the status of an MP. But my interaction with him was no different from my interaction with other MPs. We did not know each other before that. And I certainly never crossed paths with him in Horlivka.
Why did you decide to become a NABU detective?
It was a combination of factors… In general, by 2015 I was already planning to return to business. But my mother and a friend called me and said: apply to NABU, it's a new story. I called them in Kyiv and asked about it. They told me: yes, this really is a new vision of anti-corruption work; an independent body is being created, supported by international partners, and there definitely won't be a corruption story there. So I decided to apply.
Was there pressure throughout the time you worked at NABU?
Throughout the whole ten years of our work at NABU, cases that are socially significant and involve large sums of money have always been accompanied by law enforcement agencies subordinate to the authorities. Or they provided protection to certain figures once it became known that we were working on a case.
There were various cases of our activities being exposed. If you remember, there was a story involving an agent named "Kateryna", when equipment was installed in a safe flat. Then there was surveillance of NABU representatives, installation of technical devices on NABU employees – which also happened to me during the six months prior to my detention. There was monitoring of our technical departments. [Agent Kateryna is an undercover operative of Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau who, in 2017, played a key role in exposing corruption schemes involving former MPs Maksym Poliakov and Boryslav Rozenblat during the so-called "amber scandal". Her name has been changed for security reasons – ed.]
In fact, this isn't particularly difficult. On a national scale, there are not many of us, and it's not hard to keep track of us. Roughly 300 people. Compared to other services with 40,000–50,000 staff, that's a small number.
It was a systemic effort, not a spontaneous one.
"They believed that I was some kind of centre of influence"
On 21 July 2025, Security Service officers came to search your home. Do you have an answer as to why they came – and why, specifically, they came for you?
The detention made me feel like the number one terrorist in Ukraine. I understand why those measures were carried out – purely to put pressure on NABU and SAPO, to obtain important documents and information, and to attempt to recruit people afterwards, because all the NABU employees were frightened. Many were worried about their families, their parents.
As for me personally, there were several reasons. First, I worked a lot, and I had put together complete documentation about many people who were subjects of my work. In addition, they formed a certain picture for themselves that I supposedly had direct contact with the leaders of NABU and SAPO.
In other words, in the course of my work I was in constant communication with them. And they believed that I was some kind of centre of influence: that if they detained me and put pressure on me, I would supposedly give some incriminating testimony.
You understand that I was not the ultimate target. The main targets were [NABU Director] Semen Kryvonos and [SAPO Head] Oleksandr Klymenko. They wanted to gain control over them. I was simply another instrument for achieving that goal.
So your version is that at that point they were not aware that you were in any way involved in Operation Midas – that you were the person who installed the wiretapping equipment in Mindich's flat?
To put this into context, at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025 I was taking part in several similar processes, not only Operation Midas. So they knew that I was involved in such matters – that was actually one of the supposed claims against me, that I had been working in certain areas.
But at that moment, in your view, they did not suspect the wiretapping?
At that moment – no.
Read more: Could this be "Mindichgate"? A closer look at that friend of the president's
Can we talk a little about your role in preparing Operation Midas?
I hear very different versions of this story from various sources… Some say that I was either the head of the operation or that I was conducting investigative work. I want everyone to understand that I carried out a narrow range of tasks that I was specifically able to perform. I was not the senior investigator of the group; I did not conduct investigative activities at all. My task was to implement certain measures with regard to specific individuals.
Measures that we cannot describe?
Unfortunately, yes. For the most part they were standard measures provided for by criminal procedural law.
Let's talk about the accusations that were made against you on 21 July 2025. At a press conference that day, Vasyl Maliuk, Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, and Ruslan Kravchenko, Ukraine's Prosecutor General, voiced certain allegations against you. Is it correct to say that you have been in contact with Russia since 24 February 2022?
Of course that's not true – I have had no communication with Russia whatsoever. And if there had been any, I think they would have shown it. But they didn't show anything, because it simply doesn't exist. My position regarding Ukraine is clear, firm and transparent. In 2022 [at the beginning of the full-scale invasion], I was guarding the Office of the President. On 24 or 25 February, we joined that team. Those who stayed in Kyiv set up a unified group and went to the government quarter. There, we met Denys Monastyrskyi [Ukraine's former Minister of Internal Affairs], and we were assigned positions in the Office of the President, in the central building. We were stationed on certain floors, given combat positions, and we waited there.
And how long did you hold those positions?
Our personnel held them for over a month, but then we withdrew. We saw that Russia was supposedly planning to land paratroopers [to capture the office of the presidential administration], but on the first night, the second night, no one landed. So we decided to withdraw and took up positions in different districts of Kyiv. Later on, we were in Moshchun and in Bucha in the first days after their liberation, carrying out specific tasks as part of cooperation with the Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast branches of the Security Service of Ukraine.
Did you cross paths with Oleh Tatarov [deputy chief of staff] there?
No, I didn't see him, and we had no joint activities.
Did you see any Chechens?
I didn't see any Chechens either. [Zelenskyy had said that Oleh Tatarov was involved in the killing of Chechens in Kyiv during the early days of the full-scale invasion, but neither the Chechens nor Tatarov were actually there.] We saw a lot of corpses – even some that dogs had been feeding on.
That was after the liberation of Kyiv Oblast, right?
That was literally in the very first hours. We had specific tasks.
Then you moved to the Zaporizhzhia front?
In July, I moved there with a team from NABU. We joined a unit of the counterintelligence department of the SSU. We were seconded to the counterintelligence department and created a joint tactical-operational group in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. We worked with them for about six months and worked quite effectively. I think that was where we did our most significant work.
But later, you returned to work at NABU.
We blindly believed that during the war, there could be no corruption. Unfortunately, in November, we received information to the contrary. We were told: "That's it, guys. Corruption is becoming even worse, so you need to come back." We withdrew, returned to Kyiv, and began working again on our existing cases.
"It looks like outright racism: deciding that I'm under Russian influence solely because of my surname"
Let's return to the allegations against you. We heard an excerpt from a conversation of yours concerning industrial hemp.
Unfortunately, it's a ridiculous story.
I'll quote your words in the excerpt: "There's a state-level programme: they've had problems with cotton. Some Uzbeks came, they communicated with others and talked. […] Here's the thing: my father has hemp seeds, and I'm told there's a huge demand for them under Dagestan's state programme." Please explain again what this was about.
Even from the content of the conversation, it's clear that this is about Uzbekistan.
Because in the second sentence, you mention Uzbeks.
And even in the first one, I say they have problems with cotton, and cotton, as far as I know, is not grown in Dagestan [a republic of Russia in the North Caucasus on the Caspian Sea]. Why do I know about Uzbekistan? Because my parents are builders. After graduating in 1986, they went to Turkmenistan. It's a neighbouring country, but they are very similar in terms of climate and economy. There are two main sources of state income there: gas and cotton.
Yes, I know. I was born in Uzbekistan.
I've been to those countries often. My father was a supplier to a factory and constantly travelled around the region, and at that time, he frequently flew to Moscow as well. I knew about Uzbekistan. But I didn't know anything about Dagestan. I never lived there for any length of time. I visited it a few times as a child, and that's it.
As I understand it, this is because your father is from Dagestan…
Yes, my father is Lezgin, and so am I. [Lezgins are an indigenous north-east Caucasian ethnic group living in southern Dagestan.]
In fact, it's easy to put together a narrative: being Dagestani means selling industrial hemp to Dagestan.
Listen, this looks like outright racism. To decide solely on the basis of my surname that I'm under Russian influence or something like that. These are just assumptions justified by completely fabricated arguments.
Do you have any understanding of how long you were wiretapped? These were officers of the Security Service of Ukraine, as I understand it?
Yes. We assume it went on for about six months. Not within the framework of a criminal case, but under so-called OTCC [operational-tactical coordination] measures, anti-terrorist measures. That is, this is a story that doesn't fall under the Code of Criminal Procedure at all.
This instrument was originally created for counterterrorist activity or counterintelligence work against Russian intelligence or that of its allies. However, in this case, these measures were used exclusively against NABU employees, which, in my view, constitutes a direct violation of the law.
As I understand it, your parents were also wiretapped?
They were. Everyone was monitored. Over six months of surveillance of apartments, cars, phones and my contacts, the only thing they managed to "find" was suspicion based on a single conversation. Which has no continuation whatsoever, because Yusuf [Mahomedrasulov's interlocutor] later said that his friend was not interested in this information, and that was it – all communication ended.
To bolster this story further, they fabricated correspondence from my father on Telegram – a completely standard move, which is almost laughable. Because when you obtain access during covert investigative actions, you gain access to the actual account and can even send messages from it.
There seemed to be a price list, and it was in hryvnias.
It was even in Ukrainian.
So, a price list was allegedly sent to Dagestan in the Ukrainian language and in Ukraine's national currency, right?
A ridiculous story.
There are many such cases where people spent several months in pre-trial detention centres, where, as we understand it, someone artificially creates correspondence.
My father is 65 years old. On Telegram, he mostly makes calls. He almost never writes anything, except for very short messages. And here is a lengthy, substantive conversation, where my name is repeated three or four times. And at the very end, it says: "This needs to be done confidentially." They communicate the whole time using names and everything else, and only at the end do they suddenly remind each other about confidentiality. Such a cheap staging, absolutely fabricated correspondence.
We are working on this. I think there will be results to prove it.
We can only guess how many other cases have been fabricated in this way – cases involving not employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, but, for example, business representatives.
Even in my own work, there are several such cases. Business representatives, where the evidence was either on Telegram or in an email. And there are small details there as well – for example, VAT rates or Ukrainian legislation in Ukrainian. And when it's presented in court, they say: "Look, here is Ukrainian legislation, then Russian legislation – something is clearly not right."
"The story about Klymenko's 'wallet' is simply absurd"
Tell us about the conditions of your detention. As I understand it, you were held in the Lukianivka pre-trial detention centre?
On the first day after my arrest, I was taken to the temporary detention facility in Kyiv Oblast. Later, after the decision was issued by the Pechersk District Court, I was transferred to the pre-trial detention centre in Lukianivka. I was assigned a cell. As one of the operatives put it, "This is the worst we've got, sorry."
As I understand it, you were under constant video surveillance?
Yes. Constant video surveillance and in-cell monitoring. That is, cut off from contact with anyone. Designated operational officers repeatedly came for me and escorted me everywhere.
You were kept in custody in the hope that you would provide some significant testimony. Who did they want you to talk about, and what did they expect you to say?
I was given clear signals that I shouldn't have any contact with the media. That was because I had given interviews and, through my lawyers, offered certain explanations about my detention. Even in court, as you may have seen, eight guards surrounded the dock. I understand why: they were acting on instructions from senior management to make any communication with the media as difficult as possible.
So I was kept as isolated as they could manage. The aim was to ensure there was no chance for anyone to speak with me. I had one opportunity early on and I made a few comments. After that, the restrictions tightened and I couldn't say anything at all, either in court or in the remand prison.
You talk about "tasks". In your view, who was issuing them, and how did the chain of execution work?
I can't say who exactly issued them. I didn't record it and I spent almost five months in pre-trial detention. But one thing is clear to me: it was carried out within a power vertical.
So it's likely the President's Office?
As a NABU employee, I can't deal with assumptions. As far as I know, there's no documented proof of that. But if you look at the conduct of the courts, the SSU and the Prosecutor General's Office, it was strikingly co-ordinated.
In the absence of a full evidentiary record, they began to "produce" expert assessments. I've worked for more than 10 years and I know expert assessments usually take a month, sometimes six months. Here, they were completed in a day or a few days.
Did anyone try to pressure you into giving the testimony they wanted? Perhaps offering "deals" – say something about Klymenko or Kryvonos and you'll be released?
Not directly. First they try to break a person, to create conditions in which they become ready for "communication". I received indirect signals: you need to co-operate, be "friendly", give the "right" testimony. But nothing concrete was ever spelled out – clearly so I couldn't document it or relay it to management.
Law enforcement officers have informally told Ukrainska Pravda journalists that you are a very important person for Semen Kryvonos and especially for Oleksandr Klymenko, saying you are his "wallet" [financial backer]. What, in reality, connects you to Klymenko?
The "wallet" claim is simply absurd. During the searches, they saw my fiancée's flat and my flat. There's no wealth there. I bought the flat through the eOselia programme in 2024. It's an old place that needs doing up. [eOselia is a Ukrainian government housing programme offering affordable, preferential mortgage loans to key workers like soldiers, medics, teachers, and IDPs, enabling them to buy homes with low interest rates and longer terms through partner banks.]
They said it outright: "We're looking for money." What money? In Dnipro, they found €2,500 and it simply vanished. That was all my savings at the time.
This talk of "slush funds" and black cash is really a projection of their own experience. Nothing like that exists at NABU. Everything is clearly regulated. If you do your job – you do your job. You don't carry anyone's "wallet".
Klymenko and I have known each other for years, since the first recruitment round at NABU. We communicated strictly within the bounds of work, nothing more. Everything else is invented. We weren't friends. We didn't celebrate special occasions together. We didn't go on holiday together.
What are the prospects for this case now?
If you'd asked me before 21 July, I would have been confident it would be closed because there's nothing to it. But after watching how everyone involved has behaved procedurally, my view of the legal system has changed drastically. It feels like the old Soviet principle, "Show me the man, and I will show you the crime". And that's frightening. Because if this is how they treat NABU staff – people who know the law and the procedures – what happens to ordinary citizens or journalists?
Why do you think your pre-trial restriction was changed? Could it be linked to the searches of Yermak's house and the fact he wasn't served with a notice of suspicion? Could it have been part of an informal deal?
I think it's a combination of factors. There were repeated attempts to ensure that once I was out, I would "disappear" – stop speaking to the media and behave as if nothing had happened.
As regards the Yermak case, that is a separate story. There is solid material evidence in the Midas investigation and I hope that NABU detectives will bring the case to a proper conclusion within the law.
Do you see any personal risks now that the case has been transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office?
After the public statement by the head of the Prosecutor General's Office, I think any scenario is possible. It sounded to me like a direct threat, not just to me. To be honest, in a state governed by the rule of law this case shouldn't exist at all. It's been built, quite literally, out of nothing.
Was your family also targeted?
Yes. And it was done in a deliberately demonstrative way. My sisters were put under visual surveillance and other relatives were subjected to audio and video monitoring. The same cars kept appearing. It wasn't about documenting anything, it was about pressure. There were other incidents too: pressure on friends, beatings, people being held for several days to force testimony. It was systematic, in Kyiv and in Dnipro.
While you were in custody, you said Mindich was only the tip of the iceberg. What did you mean?
I'll explain. At the start, our work focused on the Defence Ministry and Karlsson's activities in that area. That was the main reason the investigation was launched. I never believed Mindich was the key figure behind all these projects. Given the scale and the way they were carried out, it's simply not possible.
So who was key?
I cannot say at this stage. The investigation is ongoing and no final procedural decisions have been made.
But could the case materials end up naming people from the country's senior leadership?
I hope so. But there is an old and very accurate saying: the important thing is not what we know, but what we can prove.
Not all knowledge can serve as evidence in court. Only those facts that can be properly substantiated will be included in the case files.
Many people now say the Midas trial could drag on for years, as happened, for example, in the Nasirov case. Do you share those concerns?
Unfortunately, yes. I have cases of my own that have been in court for years. For us, it's extremely painful because it shapes how people judge the results of our work.
Take the case of the United Mining and Chemical Company (UMCC), for instance. It still hasn't finished. The reasons are complicated: legislation, the Code of Criminal Procedure, court practice and the political factor. In one case we had nine defendants. Anyone who's been involved in proceedings like that understands how hard it is to keep them moving. Nine people can fall ill one after another and the process just stalls.
"The issue of NABU's independence remains critical. On 21 July, we saw how they can act completely outside the law – simply make a decision, attack and do it."
Many people link your case and the case of Viktor Husarov to attempts to dismantle the anti-corruption system. Do you see a risk now of a fresh attack on NABU and SAPO?
Yes, unfortunately I do. The situation has not fundamentally changed. The issue of NABU's independence remains critical. On 21 July, we saw how they can act completely outside the law – simply make a decision, attack and do it. This is a permanent process, and it cannot be resolved once and for all. The only thing that really works is the attention of the public, the media and international partners. When everyone acts like a single orchestra, institutions can be protected.
At what point did you realise things could head towards the worst-case scenario?
In the first few days after the events of 21 July. At that moment, I thought: that's it – 10 years of work, and we will simply be abolished or turned into a body under external control.
To be honest, I had already given up. But the way the public reacted came as a surprise to me. Even though they [the SSU and the Office of the President] had serious intentions to dig up dirt on me – they conducted over 100 searches across all my contacts.
More than 100 searches in your case?
Yes. More than 100. They essentially went through my phone book: contacts, sources of information. There were cases of people being beaten, held for several days and pressured to testify against me. It was a repressive machine.
What personal conclusions did you draw from your time in the pre-trial detention centre and everything you went through?
I realised I had simply overworked myself. For 10 years [at NABU] I hardly rested at all. I've got over 200 days of leave piled up. It was a massively nerve-racking and draining time. On top of that, I had two complicated operations on my head – in March and May. Followed by time in a pre-trial detention centre. Obviously, I need some rest.
But are you staying at NABU?
Yes, I am staying on for now. There are still other cases that must be finished.
Author: Sevğil Musaieva, Ukrainska Pravda
Translation: Myroslava Zavadska, Yelyzaveta Khodatska and Anna Briedova
Editing: Shoël Stadlen