On 17 February 2026, negotiating teams from Ukraine, the United States and Russia gathered in Geneva. This was already the third round since the Ukrainian and Russian delegations were reshuffled, but many aspects of the meeting were new.
For instance, the Russian delegation was for the first time taken out of the comfortable settings of the UAE and Turkiye and hosted for a trilateral meeting in Europe.
For the first time, national security advisers to the leaders of leading European democracies were also present at the talks, albeit in an observer role.
It was also the first time for a long time that Russia was once again represented by Kremlin aide Vladimir Medinsky.
His appearance sometimes created a sense of déjà vu. After all, it was Medinsky who faced Servant of the People faction leader Davyd Arakhamiia – who has also recently returned to the negotiation process – during the 2022 talks in Belarus and later in Istanbul.
However, the key "first" that became evident at the Geneva meeting was the limited authority of the negotiating teams. The talks have come very close to the stage where the issues under discussion go beyond the mandates defined by the leaders' directives.
This means that very soon the negotiations will either move to the level of those who issue these directives, or the entire process risks repeating the fate of the 2022 Istanbul agreements: everything could be discussed but not finalised.
The US President's Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who with Jared Kushner is representing the United States in the talks, effectively expressed the same view in an interview with Fox News when he spoke about the possibility of a swift summit between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and the United States.
Thus, the negotiation process is rapidly approaching the point at which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will face a complicated choice. Should Ukraine enter an irreversible process of a real peace deal, which would sharply contrast with its now largely forgotten Peace Formula? Or would it be better for Ukraine to seek additional support from its partners and continue the war, hoping for Russia's collapse?
This is a choice the president will have to make. Ukrainska Pravda explains why there is not much time left to make this decision.
The old-new team
On the evening of 20 November 2025, US media published a 28-point US "peace plan" for Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelenskyy had to urgently convene his negotiating team to discuss the overseas proposals with allies.
The team was headed by Andrii Yermak, then head of the Office of the President and an advocate of "victory plans". Responsibility for consultations with partners was assigned to Rustem Umierov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.
The delegation also included Yevhenii Ostrianskyi, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine; Defence Intelligence head Kyrylo Budanov; Andrii Hnatov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service head Oleh Ivashchenko; First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhii Kyslytsia; Oleksandr Poklad, Deputy Head of the Security Service of Ukraine; and Oleksandr Bevz, advisor to the head of the Office of the President.
The main task of the Yermak-Umierov-led talks was to prevent the US president from ultimately abandoning support for Ukraine and accusing it of being unwilling to pursue peace. Trump was kept on board, but the meetings did not produce more substantive results.
Meanwhile, as the negotiation track opened, the so-called Mindichgate corruption scandal gathered momentum in Ukraine. Yermak and Umierov were increasingly mentioned in the media as possible figures in an investigation into large-scale corruption in the energy sector. On 28 November 2025, as a result of Operation Midas, Yermak lost his position and his role as Ukraine's chief negotiator.
In the meantime, Umierov travelled extensively, discussing details of a potential peace agreement with allies in Europe and the United States. However, a major shift in the peace process came only after Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov was appointed head of the President's Office, replacing Yermak.
Formally, Umierov continues to lead the negotiating delegation, but in practice the new head of the President's Office has taken the initiative.
Budanov maintains contacts with both the Americans and the Russians. Servant of the People faction leader Davyd Arakhamiia has also contributed his connections. He has contacts among representatives of Donald Trump's "young team" and, since the 2022 talks, has been acquainted with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich and Kremlin aide Vladimir Medinsky.
Despite the redistribution of influence, the new negotiating team formed on 23 January 2026 consists largely of the same members as before. The only additions to the "Yermak-era" delegation were Budanov allies Arakhamiia and Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Head of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine.
Zelenskyy brought the "new" and the "old" together in one team, which also allowed him to establish cross-monitoring of what is actually happening in the peace negotiations. After the internal upheaval around Yermak, the president views the Budanov-Arakhamiia alliance as his own team – one that nevertheless requires close oversight.
The first round of trilateral talks between Ukraine, the United States and Russia took place in Abu Dhabi on 23-24 January. Media reports said the teams had made progress on military issues, while Zelenskyy described the meetings in the UAE as constructive.
The second round was held in Abu Dhabi on 4-5 February. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after the first day that the good news was that the "list of unresolved issues" between Ukraine and Russia had "significantly shrunk".
The third and most recent round took place in Geneva on 17-18 February. Following the meetings, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that significant progress had been achieved.
Fewer than 35% of Ukrainians believe the authorities are successfully conducting negotiations with the Russians and partners. However, despite widespread scepticism, the new phase of the talks has begun to produce tangible results.
Firstly, thanks to the efforts of the negotiating teams, a short "energy truce" was achieved — although Trump considers it solely his own achievement. It provided temporary but clear relief for Ukraine, which is facing its most difficult energy challenge of the war amid severe winter conditions.
More importantly, the brief pause in strikes on critical infrastructure demonstrated that Ukraine and Russia, despite mutual distrust and hostility, are in principle capable of implementing security arrangements.
Secondly, prisoner exchanges have resumed. On 5 February 2026, Ukraine was able to bring home 157 prisoners held by the Kremlin for the first time in five months. Even if the current negotiation process does not lead to a peace agreement, the release of POWs is a major outcome for hundreds of Ukrainian families.
According to Ukrainska Pravda's diplomatic sources, the exchanges are expected to continue in the near future and may involve hundreds more people.
Thirdly, the United States has agreed to monitor a ceasefire regime if political agreements are reached.
Despite these achievements, the negotiation process remains highly fragile. For example, as Ukrainska Pravda reported in early February, an assassination attempt on Vladimir Alekseyev, deputy head of Russia's Main Directorate of the General Staff (former GRU), in Moscow nearly derailed the talks. At the time, the Russian delegation was led by GRU chief Igor Kostyukov. Russian authorities immediately blamed Ukraine for the incident, but Kyiv denied any involvement.
In any case, the attack stalled the negotiation process for weeks, although momentum has now resumed.
Trump's son-in-law, Putin's aide and the new phase of talks
One of the key changes in the negotiation sector has been the appearance of Jared Kushner alongside the "forgetful" Steve Witkoff, whose activities have caused political irritation both in Kyiv and in European capitals.
The initial momentum for the current phase of negotiations came from the 28-point Witkoff-Dmitriev plan late last year. However, Kushner's arrival brought a sense of Trump being directly involved. It also shifted the focus of discussions from lengthy pseudo-historical debates to real issues of governing territories, military forces and resources – particularly resources.
According to a UP source familiar with Kushner, "Jared may not fully understand the historical essence of this war, but he understands the nature of commercial interest very well".
In simple terms, Kushner has been tasked with identifying economic incentives that could attract Russia and encourage it to engage seriously – rather than formally – in efforts to end the war.
Russia's behaviour reflects this approach. For the first two meetings of 2026, Moscow sent delegations led by military officials, in particular Igor Kostyukov. As a result, military representatives were able to agree, in general terms, even on sensitive issues such as mechanisms for monitoring a ceasefire.
Once the military had outlined their part of the overall framework, political figures returned to the talks – notably Kremlin aide Vladimir Medinsky – to work on formulas for resolving the most difficult issue: territory.
Notably, even Medinsky, who is known for lengthy historical explanations, appears to recognise the futility of extended lectures in Kushner's presence, limiting himself to brief historical allusions and focusing more on the realities of the war.
None of the parties is disclosing precise details of the negotiations.
However, it appears that the most recent meeting in Geneva discussed the possibility of troop disengagement and the creation of a free economic zone in a buffer area.
Sources within European political circles told Ukrainska Pravda that during a meeting with leaders of the so-called Coalition of the Willing at the Munich Security Conference, President Zelenskyy outlined various disengagement options in Donbas, including a potential simultaneous withdrawal of both sides' forces up to 40 km from the line of contact – although it is still difficult to imagine how such a scenario could be implemented.
There have also been suggestions that a proposed free economic zone could be overseen by a so-called Board of Peace under Donald Trump, which the US president launched with considerable fanfare on 19 February. Such ideas have reportedly been discussed during the negotiations.
In essence, the concept of a US-administered free economic zone resembles a hybrid of the approaches previously used by the current US administration in the Azerbaijan-Armenia and Israeli-Palestinian settlement efforts.
At the next meeting of the negotiating groups, which Zelenskyy has confirmed, energy specialists may also join the talks. This could indicate that discussions will address the sensitive issue of who should manage the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and under what conditions.
If this indeed happens and an acceptable mechanism is found, it would effectively mean that the work of the negotiating groups has reached its limits.
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The trilateral meeting in Geneva added another development to the negotiation process that can be described as a first.
At the very beginning of the full-scale invasion in late February 2022, Ukraine and Russia had maintained direct contact. However, after the mass executions in Bucha and other crimes committed by the Russians – which, among other things, made the signing of the Istanbul agreements impossible – there had been almost no official bilateral communication between the Ukrainian and Russian sides. The only exception was interaction between intelligence services on prisoner exchanges and certain other security issues.
Now, in Geneva, some of the first meetings without intermediaries appear to have taken place. It is publicly known, at the very least, that Kremlin aide Vladimir Medinsky held a lengthy conversation with Rustem Umierov and Davyd Arakhamiia.
But talks at the level of advisers do not end wars. The outcome of the war will be decided by their political leaders.
Of course, negotiators can continue to refine draft documents and debate the sequence of implementing agreements, as participants in the Minsk process did for years. However, from a strategic perspective, discussions will have to move to the level of leaders.
"Right now, I see that only at the level of leaders can we try to end this war. At the level of three leaders, we can really try to resolve the territorial issues, which are very sensitive, painful and complex", said Zelenskyy in an interview with British journalist Piers Morgan published after the third round of talks.
At times, the Ukrainian leader's position appears to contrast with the optimism of negotiators. While members of the Ukrainian delegation report constructive and substantive trilateral meetings, Zelenskyy has spoken of insufficient results, a lack of progress on political issues and an unwillingness to make further compromises.
"'Stay where we stay' – this is a big compromise. They took almost 20% of our territory. And we are ready to speak about peace at this moment, on the basis of 'Stay where we stay'. This is a big compromise," the president said in an interview with Kyodo News after the Geneva meeting.
Meanwhile, Russia understands that any chance of legitimising the territories it has seized in Ukraine in some form – and of launching major economic projects with the United States – depends on approval from Donald Trump. The US president has an opportunity to strike a "big deal" with Russia before May 2026, when the political cycle in the United States will intensify ahead of the midterm elections.
Ukraine is interested in peace, but the dynamics of its relationship with Trump suggest that the spring window may be one of the last opportunities for negotiations involving the United States. As the elections approach, the issue could become politically toxic for the White House, and Washington may simply shift responsibility elsewhere.
European allies, on the one hand, insist that Ukraine should continue fighting and promise financial and resource support. A source in the German government, for example, told us that Europe must be ready to support Ukraine for another 18 months to 2 years and has earmarked approximately €90 billion for this purpose.
On the other hand, the same EU partners have still been unable to secure the allocation of the loan approved by the European Parliament, while anti-Ukrainian actors such as the government of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continue to block the decision without consequence.
It appears that Ukraine and its leadership do not have much time for deliberation. The logic of the process itself will require Zelenskyy to make a fundamental decision: to enter preparations for a peace deal or to continue the war. And this question will have to be answered – at least internally – quite soon.
Roman Romaniuk and Anhelina Strashkulych, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Shoël Stadlen