What's going on within Ukraine's military amid the protests, and who could replace Syrskyi as commander-in-chief?

On the morning of 16 July, protests broke out across Ukraine for the second time since the start of the full-scale war.

This time, instead of coming out in support of the anti-corruption agencies, Ukrainians took to the streets with cardboard signs to protest against the dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Fedorov himself did not attend any of the protests, but he gave a candid and emotional press conference.

In the course of an hour, he described all the problems he had encountered at the Defence Ministry, drawing attention for the first time to the fact that brigade command posts and supplies are dependent on commanders' loyalty to the commander-in-chief. His main message: the war cannot be won with Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief.

Fedorov's remarks led the protesters to expand their demands – they began calling for Syrskyi's dismissal as well as Fedorov's return – and sparked a wide-ranging debate in military and political circles about replacing the commander-in-chief.

Is anyone in the military ready to replace Syrskyi? And would the president agree to that? After all, Zelenskyy has made no secret of his admiration for Bars (Syrskyi's alias) and turns a blind eye to the harrowing accounts that have emerged from his assault regiments.

The protesters have demanded that Mykhailo Drapatyi, who currently commands the Joint Forces grouping, be appointed as the new commander-in-chief. The military, as represented by the commanders of each branch of the armed forces, have stated their support for Syrskyi. The president has conducted video consultations with corps commanders.

Ukrainska Pravda has observed that over the past few tense days, a shared fear has taken hold among military officials and politicians – a fear of the "political general", a commander-in-chief with political ambitions. For the military, such a figure would be an outsider, someone unreliable and inconsistent. For the politicians, he would be a rival – a second Valerii Zaluzhnyi.

Ukrainska Pravda set out to explore whether a compromise position on a new commander-in-chief is possible, and what's been happening in the military since the mass protests against Fedorov's dismissal broke out.

Facebook battles

On 17 July, the second day of the protests in the square in front of Kyiv's Ivan Franko Theatre, MP Mariana Bezuhla posted part of an internal document on Facebook with the caption: "Syrskyi is silencing the military – they've been banned from any communications."

The implication was that military personnel now have to clear every social media post with the commander-in-chief himself.

In reality, the excerpt posted by Bezuhla was part of a directive issued by the commander-in-chief on 6 June – i.e. before the Fedorov affair – and contained no new prohibitions whatsoever. Ukrainska Pravda has read the document and can confirm that it's just another routine bureaucratic reminder about how military personnel should interact with the media and who they should clear it with if they want to give an interview.

As army communications officers have explained to Ukrainska Pravda, usually directives like this are issued after a "media breach" that led to a real or perceived information leak.

The commander-in-chief's pressure system has taken a different approach this time, in which the style of former deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar (who as far as Ukrainska Pravda is aware holds no official position in the General Staff's communications team) is faintly discernible. No prohibitions – just "wholehearted" support.

The message is: look, virtually all the commanders are standing up for us – Oleksii Neizhpapa from the Navy, Oleh Apostol from the Air Assault Forces, Ihor Plakhuta from the Territorial Defence, Anatolii Kryvonozhko from the Air Force, and so on.

Each of the commanders marshalled their writing skills to recall the defence of Kyiv, emphasise the principled and steadfast character of the current commander-in-chief, and stress the harmfulness of criticising the military command in wartime.

Some wrote that they were standing up for the importance of the commander-in-chief as an institution rather than for Syrskyi personally. Others, such as Rocket Forces and Artillery Commander Andrii Malinovskyi, stated outright: "Syrskyi is my commander!"

One communications officer within the defence forces who was given this task told Ukrainska Pravda: "A subjective observation about this 'apolitical' flashmob. The idea is to have a show of support from military commanders – no politics. But if you extrapolate this to the civilian world, this is a Kuchma/Yanukovych-era technique: the central authority, whether explicitly or implicitly, compels its subordinates up and down the vertical – the heads of regional and district administrations – to demonstrate their loyalty."

The assault regiments also chimed in with "wholehearted support" for Syrskyi – with the exception of his favourites, the 225th and 425th regiments, which evidently decided, in light of recent journalistic investigations into abusive practices, not to attract negative attention to Syrskyi.

The most interesting situation concerned the brigades from the Air Assault Forces.

It was the Air Assault Forces brigades that, as far as Ukrainska Pravda is aware, received that same "task" on Saturday morning – the one everyone on Facebook was talking about thanks to a post by Serhii Sternenko, a former adviser to the defence minister.

"Haven't you had enough surprises yet? Brigade commanders have to make videos in support of Syrskyi. And not all of them want to," an Ukrainska Pravda source in the defence forces wrote on Saturday morning.

In the end, the only representative of the Air Assault Forces who agreed to express support for the commander-in-chief was Apostol.

Not a single brigade in the Air Assault Forces posted a video.

Some brigades, such as those in the Ground Forces, received no talking points at all this time. Others received verbal instructions not to comment on the defence minister's dismissal.

Some of the things that happened were just ridiculous. Alina Mykhailova, commander of the Ulf medical service, received a call from the Unmanned Systems Forces command asking where her soldier Dmytro Koziatynskyi, one of the protest organisers, is currently serving. He left the military a year ago.

Another serviceman, from one of the assault units, told Ukrainska Pravda that he is required to report every evening on whether his subordinates who are on leave have been out protesting.

Casting for a new commander-in-chief?

On the second day of the protests, following Fedorov's unexpectedly candid press conference, Zelenskyy started calling the commanders of army corps, operational groups and military branches.

As far as Ukrainska Pravda has been able to establish, it was the first time corps commanders had been thus honoured. Brigade commanders were summoned to a one-off meeting in February 2025 by Andrii Yermak, then head of the President's Office, for no obvious reason.

It took three days to hold the series of video calls between the president, the military commanders and Pavlo Palisa, Deputy Head of the President's Office, who is believed to have overseen the organisational side of the process.

Those taking part could broadly be divided into three groups:

1) Commanders of corps deployed along the hottest sections of the front. These included Denys Prokopenko (Dobropillia), Ihor Obolienskyi (Kupiansk), Oleksii Maistrenko (Sloviansk-Kramatorsk), Valerii Skred, acting Commander of the 19th Corps (Kostiantynivka), Yaroslav Sydorov (Zaporizhzhia) and Andrii Biletskyi (Lyman).

One question remains unanswered: why did the president choose to meet Biletskyi separately, in person? The explanation may be more straightforward than it first appears. Biletskyi's corps is currently conducting offensive operations on the Lyman front, and he would have been unlikely to discuss the details in front of such a large group.

2) Commanders with somewhat greater authority – those leading operational groups and branches of the armed forces. They included Mykhailo Drapatyi, Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (responsible for the Sumy and Kharkiv sectors), and Oleh Apostol, Commander of the Air Assault Forces, who is currently overseeing the offensive on the Oleksandrivka front.

3) Deputy commanders. These included Volodymyr Horbatiuk, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who oversees cooperation with NATO, including weapons deliveries and joint military exercises, and Andrii Tkachuk, Deputy Commander of the Air Assault Forces.

Interestingly, just as he would later say publicly, the president asked the military commanders about the situation in their areas of responsibility, the challenges they are experiencing and how those challenges might be addressed. Not a word was said about Syrskyi, Fedorov or any potential successors.

"There was no discussion of political matters or appointments. We were asked about military issues – the situation in our area of responsibility, the tactical and operational situation, supply problems, what we have enough of and what we don't, personnel recruitment, ground robotic systems and drones," a source in the defence forces told Ukrainska Pravda.

Some observers have suggested that the president's three-day series of video calls looked rather like a casting for the next commander-in-chief. After all, they argued, that would be very much Zelenskyy's style.

Sources familiar with the meetings, however, told Ukrainska Pravda they believe the calls were primarily intended to ease public tensions amid the protests. From a communications perspective, the approach was a fairly astute one: we hear what people are saying, but we're not rushing into anything – we're working towards a considered solution.

Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the President's Office, offered reassurance: "The public has been heard. The situation is being handled professionally, constructively and in the best interests of our country. So I would ask everyone to stay calm [...] Work is underway. There will be results."

Meanwhile, discussions about the possible replacement of the commander-in-chief have been going on in military circles at every level for at least the past six months, if not longer.

"One thing to bear in mind is that Syrskyi has ensured he has virtually no obvious successor," one senior officer told Ukrainska Pravda. "But one of a leader's main responsibilities – besides winning battles, of course – is to develop other people. He's constantly travelling up and down the front line and there have been attempts on his life, so he should have thought about who would take over if anything happened. And there should have been several candidates, not just one."

In fact, according to Ukrainska Pravda's sources, Syrskyi has been grooming a successor – Air Assault Forces Commander Oleh Apostol. However, the commander-in-chief had no intention of handing over the post in haste.

Nor is it certain that Apostol wants the job at this particular moment.

Military sources have told Ukrainska Pravda that the shortlist of potential successors to Syrskyi remains more or less unchanged:

• Air Assault Forces Commander Oleh Apostol – Syrskyi's preferred candidate
• Joint Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi – widely regarded as the military's favourite
• Andrii Biletskyi and Denys "Redis" Prokopenko – commanders of two of the strongest corps within the defence forces, whose formations fight entirely or predominantly with personnel recruited within their own units.

Ukrainska Pravda asked the senior officer quoted earlier to assess the leading contenders. "Apostol is a strong, determined general, but he still needs more experience.

Biletskyi might struggle to win acceptance across the armed forces... because of his past views and the recent allegations about the abduction of people in Ternopil.

I can see Drapatyi as an option, but I also hear that some don't want him because he speaks his mind.

Prokopenko also needs more experience, but he's a quick learner, has good relationships with our partners, and has come to understand what it means to command a corps. He needs professionals around him."

Most of Ukrainska Pravda's military sources now believe Drapatyi is the frontrunner.

For a long time the President's Office was unwilling even to consider him. But now, in order to respond to the public's demand for fairness and accountability, it may have to make concessions. After all, Fedorov is no longer expected to be reinstated as defence minister.

It's also possible that none of the leading contenders is particularly eager to become commander-in-chief.

For some corps commanders, accepting the role would mean giving up the influence they currently wield over well-established and successful corps or operational commands. And given the rapid turnover of personnel within Zelenskyy's administration, plus the protesters with their cardboard signs in Franko Square, it's far from certain that the gamble would be worth taking.

"Whoever succeeds Syrskyi, I don't envy him," one senior military source told Ukrainska Pravda. "Wherever you look in the military, everything rests on the shoulders of capable commanders who rely on themselves rather than on the system."

***

On the evening of 19 July, after completing the third round of video calls with Ukraine's top military commanders, Zelenskyy announced that "key conversations" would take place on Monday.

According to Ukrainska Pravda's sources, he was referring to a Staff meeting which at least some of the commanders who briefed the president on the operational situation and current challenges are expected to join.

Only the president knows whether the appointment of a new commander-in-chief and chief of the General Staff will be on the agenda this time. The final decision has yet to be made.

By Olha Kyrylenko, Ukrainska Pravda

Translated by: Anastasiia Lipara and Anna Kybukevych

Edited by: Teresa Pearce