When the Russian forces began stepping up their use of jet-powered drones, perhaps the most common question among Ukrainians was: "Why haven't we destroyed the launch sites yet?"
Although Ukraine's defence forces regularly attack Russian drone launch sites, the strikes have not produced an effect on the scale of Operation Spider's Web, in which a dozen Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers were destroyed.
The reason is that, over the past two years, Russia has built an extensive network of specialised drone launch facilities, capable of handling dozens of jet-powered and conventional drones every hour. In Ukrainian and Russian discourse, these facilities are dubbed "droneports" – a catch-all term for dedicated sites used to operate drones.
Ukrainska Pravda and CyberBoroshno, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) community, have looked into Russian drone launch sites and attacks on them. Read on to find out where Russian forces launch their UAVs from and why it is highly unlikely that these droneports will ever be destroyed.
Where does Russia launch its Shaheds from?
When the first Iranian-made Shahed loitering munitions arrived in Russia in autumn 2022, little preparation was needed before they could be put to use. The drones could be launched straight out of the box.
The only thing they needed was a site from which they could be launched.
Military airfields were among the first – and perhaps the most obvious – choices for launching the drones. They already had everything needed: secure perimeters, security personnel, ground staff, air defence systems and established logistics for receiving new drones. The airfields were also located away from civilian infrastructure and prying eyes.
Long runways also made it possible to use pick-ups and lorries as mobile launch platforms for Shaheds. Lightweight launchers were also deployed at the airfields. The UAVs took off from these launchers with the help of solid-fuel rocket boosters before switching to their piston engines for the rest of the flight. For the Russians, the existing airfield infrastructure was more than enough.
The first airfields used by Russian forces to launch Shaheds were in occupied Crimea and the border regions of Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. As the number of drones Russia received grew, so did the geographical scope of their deployment. Known launch sites included Cape Chauda, Yeysk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kursk and Seshcha.
The Russians later began using sites other than airfields to launch Shahed drones, including positions around Balaklava on Crimea's southern coast.
This enabled Russian forces to launch dozens of drones every week. The locations were also far enough from the combat zone to keep the launch sites relatively safe, yet close enough to Ukraine for the drones to reach Ukrainian territory within a few hours.
The droneports
When Russia acquired the technology to produce Shahed loitering munitions, another problem emerged: there was a shortage of existing airfield infrastructure.
Unlike the Shaheds supplied by Iran, Russia's domestically produced versions, known as Geran drones, had to be not only launched but also maintained. They had to be assembled, stored, inspected and prepared for launch somewhere. Although the existing infrastructure could support an increase in the number of launch sites, it was still not enough.
Therefore, as Geran production got underway, the Russians began preparing new launch sites in parallel.
Garages for assembling and storing drones began appearing at airfields already used as launch sites. Russia also built underground storage facilities large enough to accommodate both the drones and their warheads. Launchers were also being installed in revetments – protected bays surrounded by earth banks or blast walls.
Alongside the expansion of existing sites, new ones have begun to appear across Russia. In just a few months, large drone bases capable of launching hundreds of drones a day have sprung up on land that was previously covered by fields or forests.
Perhaps the best-known of these is Tsimbulova in Oryol Oblast, about 180 km from the Ukrainian border. Russian sources describe it as "the world's largest droneport". And with good reason: the site covers 5 sq km.
OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint ⟨Harbuz⟩ told Ukrainska Pravda: "The Alabuga began building the site in August 2024, and by February 2025, the main facilities had been completed. Its construction was directly linked to the expansion of drone production at Alabuga. This droneport has, in essence, become the first facility whose infrastructure was designed entirely for storing, maintaining and launching drones."
Tsimbulova has been equipped with runways and fixed catapult launchers for drones. The site also includes hundreds of garages and dozens of underground shelters.
The base's facilities are spread out across the site, with each one separated from the others and surrounded by earthworks. The droneports were built on the assumption that they would eventually be attacked. The Russians therefore sought to ensure that only a direct bombardment could destroy them.
The drones themselves can be stored not only inside buildings but also outdoors. Satellite imagery shows both Shahed attack drones and Gerbera decoy drones, which are also launched from these droneports.
The sites are supported by the infrastructure needed for day-to-day operations: solar panels, diesel generators, fuel depots and radio and navigation equipment for drone control. Each facility has its own access roads, parking areas and additional exit routes. It is also protected by air defence and electronic warfare systems intended to counter Ukrainian attacks.
Harbuz says: "The droneports were initially built much larger than 'necessary'. By the end of 2024, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine estimated the production rate of Shaheds at 2,000 units per month – roughly 64 UAVs a day – yet the droneport infrastructure at Tsimbulova could store up to 3,000 combat drones and 100 UAVs simultaneously. It was clearly built with capacity to spare."
In 2026, the infrastructure at Tsimbulova has continued to expand. New hangars and warehouses were built at the droneport, alongside larger specialised launchers for Geran-4/5 jet-powered drones. These drones can also be launched from mobile platforms mounted on vehicles.
An analysis of satellite images by Ukrainska Pravda estimates that Tsimbulova has 23 launchers for different types of drones, 387 garages and 26 underground storage facilities. The site is still expanding: the Russians are preparing to build four more launchers for jet-powered drones, plus 83 garages and underground shelters.
Another well-known droneport has been established at the site of the destroyed Donetsk airport (DAP). Despite being 50 km from the front line, the site now has hangars and drone launch pads used to launch drones towards frontline areas and targets in the rear.
Up to 95% of drone launches take place from bases in Russia's Bryansk, Rostov, Smolensk and Oryol oblasts, as well as in Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea. There are also research droneports where Russia tests UAVs in flight.
Although these sites are smaller than Tsimbulova, they have much the same basic infrastructure.
Ukrainska Pravda has identified at least 63 launchers at the main droneports, but the total could be higher. The sites can accommodate hundreds of drones and tens of thousands of combat components for them.
Can droneports be destroyed?
Ukraine's defence forces could not ignore the fact that Russians were launching Shaheds across Ukraine. Therefore, they gradually began targeting the drone launch sites, choosing their targets according to the capabilities and resources available to them.
Some of the first known strikes on Shahed launch sites were carried out in 2024. Ukrainian forces hit a Shahed depot near Balaklava and a storage facility for the drones near Yeysk.
After the strike, the area near Balaklava ceased to be used for Shahed launches. Yeysk was the first – and so far the only – case in which the impact of a strike could be seen in the launch figures. For the first time, Russia then went 48 days without launching Shaheds on Ukraine.
Russia's droneports have also been struck whilst under construction. On 26 December 2024, at least three Storm Shadow cruise missiles hit a facility between Tsimbulova and Rudnevo. Russian media outlet Astra said two Russian service members were killed and seven others were taken to hospital as a result of the strike.
A month later, the same complex was once again targeted by Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles. Ukraine's General Staff reported that more than 200 Shaheds had been destroyed. The images show damage to one of the warehouses.
Donetsk airport is another well-known target that has come under repeated attacks by Ukraine's defence forces. In a separate article, Ukrainska Pravda details how Ukraine's drone forces have been destroying Shahed launchers at the airport.
Because the airport is so close to the front line, Ukraine's 1st Separate Centre of the Unmanned Systems Forces has been able to regularly destroy Russian weapons, mobile fire groups defending the airfield and infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly used mid-range drones and even FPV drones to strike targets at the airfield.
(12) FP-2 drone strikes on the DAP. Video: Special Operations Forces
DAP itself is a good example of just how difficult droneports are to strike.
Harbuz says: "The Russians have built drone launch sites to make them as costly as possible for Ukraine's defence forces to destroy. Ammunition and fuel depots are concealed beneath concrete and earth. Conventional UAVs cannot penetrate these structures, and even if they do, the explosion is contained inside, preventing debris from reaching other depots and triggering a chain reaction.
If any facilities are destroyed, they can be rebuilt relatively quickly and cheaply. As the example of Donetsk airport shows, the Russians are adapting and expanding the drone launch site even there, despite constant Ukrainian strikes."
Therefore, the main objective of Ukraine's defence forces when striking drone launch sites is to disrupt Russia's ability to launch drones.
Falco, an officer with Ukraine's 1st Separate Drone Centre, tells Ukrainska Pravda: "The primary objective is to disrupt their ability to launch drones, so that they are unable to launch them for an extended period. This also affects the overall coordination of their actions and the cohesion of their units. It also makes it easier for our air defence units to engage aerial assets, because there are generally fewer of them."
There are several ways to disrupt drone launches: striking launchers and storage facilities, or creating an aerial threat over the droneport. The attacks can force launches to be postponed indefinitely, while the destruction of infrastructure can reduce the overall number of drones launched.
According to Falco, launch pads and storage garages are among the easiest targets to strike: they are stationary, and there may not always be personnel nearby. But the value of hitting static targets depends on the circumstances and the overall strategy. If a garage or warehouse is packed with explosives or drones, then it makes sense to strike it.
Over the past two years, Ukraine's defence forces have stepped up attacks on Russian droneports. Alongside DAP and Tsimbulova, they have repeatedly targeted sites at Navlya, Hvardiiske, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and elsewhere. The strikes have hit warehouses, launchers, garages and drones left out in the open.
In the latest attack on Tsimbulova, on 21 September, Ukrainian strikes hit a bunker used to store combat drones. One strike penetrated the bunker, and another caused an explosion on the surface. Separate strikes also hit drones near the launch sites.
The strategy behind the strikes has also evolved. Ukraine is no longer targeting only storage, preparation and launch sites, but has also begun striking relay stations used to control Geran and Gerbera drones. UAV ground control stations have reportedly been destroyed in Trubchevsk, Russia, and in the temporarily occupied settlements of Zaliznyi Port, Skadovsk, Chornomorsk and Olenivka.
These facilities are important too, but Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces have another target in their sights: the drone operators themselves.
"The most difficult target there is also the most valuable one: the operator," Falco says. "They don't stay near the launch sites for very long. So when you take out the people launching the drones, you're taking away a scarce resource. There aren't many operators to begin with, and the enemy then has to spend even more money training new crews."
Military personnel are not the only people involved in launching Russian drones. Staff from Alabuga take part in the process on a daily basis too. In its study of Russian drone launch sites, the Molfar Intelligence Institute released several classified Alabuga documents.
According to the documents, Alabuga employees complained about "unjustified risk" after a Ukrainian attack on a major droneport in Oryol Oblast in December 2024. They said they were expected to continue working even though Russian air defence systems could not prevent strikes on the launch sites. Many employees said they wanted to leave the sites – and Alabuga itself.
Employees were threatened that they would be shot in the knees if they did not come to work, and were forced to turn up. Apart from Alabuga staff, local residents are also enlisted to assemble drones. Staff at droneports, however, complain about the low efficiency of their work.
Meanwhile, keeping droneports out of operation requires constant pressure on Russian positions.
Falco concludes: "If we want to keep the pressure on, we need to increase the scale of our strikes. The more we can hit, the better. As a country, we are constantly moving towards the level we need. But it's not just about strikes. We also have to think about how the enemy may respond and plan our operations accordingly."
Another factor that could significantly disrupt the operation of Russian droneports would be the use of Ukraine's own ballistic missiles. Their speed and penetrating power could allow them to target drone operators during launches – as has already happened at Donetsk airport – and destroy underground depots.
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Susan McDonald