Autumn 2026 has seen Russia step up its attacks on Ukraine's west. In August it was rare for jet-powered drones to reach the west, but by October the attacks had become massive and were happening several times a day. On 18-19 October, the Ukrainian Air Force downed 36 Geran-2 and Geran-4 jet-powered drones in five western oblasts: Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Volyn and Lviv.
The Russians receive a vital boost from signal repeaters located in Belarus, which has effectively become a corridor for Russian drones heading for Ukraine's west, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said. These relay stations amplify the signal for UAVs while they are en route.
Andrii Demchenko, spokesperson for the State Border Guard Service, told Ukrainska Pravda that boosting signals isn't the only way the regime of self-proclaimed Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko is helping Russia. Russian drones quite often fly into Belarusian territory too.
"They can enter from Chernihiv Oblast, travel through Belarusian territory, then reenter Ukraine within the boundaries of Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts," Demchenko explained.
But even greater danger is looming, as Russia is keen to deploy ballistic missile systems on Belarusian territory as well. If missiles are launched from there, the whole of Ukraine's west will be under threat, as ballistic missiles could reach Lviv or Ivano-Frankivsk, for example, within minutes.
Will Lukashenko dare to openly join the war by permitting the launch of ballistics from Belarusian territory? And is it realistic to jam the signals of the relay systems that are helping Russian drones? Ukrainska Pravda took a closer look.
Belarusian signal repeaters: not a new story
This isn't the first time Ukraine has documented the use of signal repeaters in Belarus. In June 2026, Zelenskyy said that four relay stations in Belarus' Homiel (Gomel) and Brest oblasts were adjusting Shahed drone strikes on Ukrainians.
Zelenskyy issued an ultimatum to Lukashenko, giving him a week to turn the relay systems off or Ukraine would do it itself. Following these threats, Belarus switched off the signal boosters. It's just a few minutes away from
In September, after a three-month pause, the signal boosters started working again. Demchenko explained that it isn't worth looking for any hidden motives behind the relay systems' reactivation – quite simply, Belarus is incapable of standing up to pressure from Russia.
For Russia, the signal repeaters are an essential component in their attacks, as its forces have been unable to freely use Starlink satellite communication terminals on strike assets since the beginning of 2026. Ukraine had appealed to SpaceX because Russian drones had begun using Starlink terminals for guidance during attacks, and the US company set about disconnecting unverified terminals.
Russia is working on developing its own network, Rassvet, which could become an alternative to American satellite systems, but for now it is too soon to talk about full-scale deployment. The system is still being tested, so the relay stations have been vital to Russia in the execution of its attacks.
How do signal repeaters work?
Aviation expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi explained to UP that relays operate on a fairly simple principle. The base is an ordinary mobile telecommunications mast, which looks no different from civilian infrastructure from the outside. It is fitted with digital equipment for transmitting and receiving radio signals, as well as high-gain antennas directed towards Ukrainian airspace.
The structure is connected to a stationary power supply and also works on fibre optics. As a result, communication is established between strike groups of drones and ground control stations. The signal can cover territory to a depth of up to 140 km.
Khrapchynskyi explained that the network functions in such a way that a drone in the air is not the end user – it relays the signal to other drones. The mast on the border transmits a signal 100-140 km to the first drone, which can then transmit the signal for a further 50-70 km to another drone.
"Once a multi-hop aerial chain is set up, a strike group can advance 200 km deep into Ukrainian territory – up to 300 km if conditions are favourable," he said.
If the volumes of data being transmitted are small, a single ground-based relay system is capable of serving and maintaining up to 50 drones in the network simultaneously. But if a target needs to be confirmed, or manual guidance is required, the situation is quite different. In that mode, one base station can serve 1-3 drones at a time at most.
"This technical factor explains the shift in Russian tactics that we've been observing recently: the enemy is increasingly splitting massive raids into small, compact waves," Khrapchynskyi said.
Relay stations work the same way for both classic drones and high-speed jet-powered types. Khrapchynskyi notes that cheap drones often cover the main strike echelon with their radio field.
Where are they and how much do they cost?
The Russians position relay stations as close as possible to the border with Ukraine to ensure the signal remains stable. There must be no serious obstacles in the line of sight between the antenna and the receiver. The closer the station is to Ukrainian territory, the less of an impact terrain and woods will have on signal quality.
Photographs taken on 9 April at the opening of a new Belarusian border outpost in the village of Hdzień give proof of the stations' location. Khrapchynskyi spotted a mast with a large amount of antenna equipment in the images posted. The outpost is just 1.8 km away from the Ukrainian border – about 100 km away from the centre of Kyiv as the crow flies.
In addition to Hdzień, there are relay stations in at least four other Belarusian settlements in Homiel Oblast, according to the eRadar monitoring Telegram channel:
- Chojniki – a town approximately 45 km from the border
- Machnavičy – a village about 35-40 km from the border
- Dzierbinka – a village about 8-10 km from the border
- Buda-Safijeŭka – a village less than 5 km from the border
Given the sensitivity of the topic, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine declined to provide UP with information on the actual number of relays located in Belarus, so this data has not been officially confirmed.
Khrapchynskyi estimates that it costs up to US$20,000 on average to equip one base mast. To establish a signal along the main flight routes, Russia needs to deploy about 18-22 stations of that type.
"From a financial point of view, this is a dirt-cheap solution for Russia and Belarus," he said. "There's no need for expensive military tech here – the system is built on commercial dual-use solutions, mostly Chinese-made."
Can Ukraine counter this?
If Ukraine were to physically destroy masts on Belarusian territory, it could be falling right into Moscow's trap. A direct strike would provide the Kremlin with the perfect excuse to finally drag the Belarusian army into open combat operations.
Khrapchynskyi believes the best way of dealing with the problem may be to attempt to jam the connection between the Belarusian masts and Russian drones using electronic warfare.
Ballistic missiles: not a new story 2.0
At the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia stationed between 24 and 36 launchers in Belarus. According to Belaruski Hajun, an independent Belarusian military monitoring media outlet, in 2022 at least 721 missiles were fired on Ukraine from Belarusian territory, using Iskander systems, older Tochka-U tactical missile systems, and S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems.
Back then, Kyiv and Zhytomyr oblasts, as well as Ukraine's north-western regions, came under heavy attacks from the direction of Belarus. Ukraine's problem was its complete lack of Patriot or SAMP/T air defence systems, meaning that any Iskander launch meant an almost guaranteed strike. In 2026 Russia's objective is somewhat different: to stretch Ukraine's scarce air defence systems, for which there is a shortage of interceptor missiles, Khrapchynskyi noted.
A Russian Iskander-M battalion comprising four self-propelled launchers is still permanently stationed in Belarus. There are also Soviet-era ballistic systems – 36 Tochka-U launchers armed with modified missiles.
And Belarus plans to scale up its missile infrastructure even further: journalists from Skhemy (Schemes), a Radio Liberty project, have documented preparations for such plans. As early as September 2025, satellite imagery showed that three permanent specialised hangars had been built at the 465th Missile Brigade's base in Asipovichy (Osipovichi), Belarus.
"Each of these hangars is designed to house a full battalion set of 12-13 special vehicles: four launchers, four transporter-loader vehicles, and command and support equipment. In total, this site can routinely accommodate a full-fledged missile brigade – up to 12 launchers and nearly 40 pieces of support equipment," Khrapchynskyi said.
What missiles could be launched?
If Russia carries out its plans, various types of weaponry will be deployed from Belarusian territory, depending on specific combat missions. For strikes on critical infrastructure and logistics hubs in Ukraine's west, Khrapchynskyi believes the Russians may use the upgraded Iskander-1000 missile, which has a range of up to 550 km. They also have North Korean KN-23 missiles in service, which have a range of over 600 km.
"The Russians don't even need to move these ground launchers right up to our border and expose them to strikes," Khrapchynskyi said. "They can just operate from deep within Belarusian territory, targeting Lviv or Volyn oblasts with a flight time of two to three minutes."
If state-of-the-art missiles with ranges of 500-600 km are launched from Belarus' Brest and Homiel oblasts, it won't be just the closest targets like Lutsk and Rivne that will be under threat, but also Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi – essentially the entire western rear right up to the foothills of the Carpathians, Khrapchynskyi said.
The missiles' flight time to these oblasts, if launched, would be extremely short:
- Lutsk and Rivne – up to 1½-2 minutes
- Lviv, Ternopil or Ivano-Frankivsk – up to 2½-3½ minutes
"For civilians, the air-raid siren will sound at almost the same time as the explosions or a few dozen seconds before impact, which completely eliminates the usual time buffer that the western regions have had when attacked by cruise missiles or Shahed drones," said Khrapchynskyi.
Is it realistic to expect help from our partners?
Ukraine's air defence system would be under extreme pressure in such a scenario, Khrapchynskyi explained. Assistance from allies (when available) in terms of intelligence sharing is already instantaneous – a satellite detects the thermal plume of a missile's engine within seconds of its launch and reports it immediately – so we can't expect this process to become any faster.
The only partner assistance that would be truly effective is the deployment of additional missile defence systems on Ukrainian territory.
Clearly the US Aegis Ashore missile defence base which opened in November 2024 in Redzikowo, Poland, would be a lifeline for Ukraine. However, it is part of NATO's missile defence system and therefore depends on the Alliance's political decisions, Khrapchynskyi stressed.
What should we expect from Lukashenko?
For now, the scenario of ballistic missile strikes on Ukraine from Belarusian territory is still a potential rather than an inevitable development. It all depends on whether Lukashenko bows to Russian pressure and drags Belarus into an open war.
Igar Tyshkevich, an expert on Belarus and Russia, suggested in a comment to Ukrainska Pravda that Lukashenko may comply with the Kremlin's demands if his negotiating track with the US and Poland fails. In September, the self-styled Belarusian president met with US President Donald Trump's special envoy, John Coale. They agreed on the release of 25 Belarusian political prisoners in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions against two Belarusian companies. Meanwhile, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski recently said he believes it is possible to "unfreeze" Poland's relations with Belarus.
There are currently no signs of any deadlock in efforts to mend relations with the West, so it would not at all be in Lukashenko's interests to launch missiles from his territory.
"He really loves power – his own power," Tyshkevich said. "There is only one condition on which this formula could be broken: if he suddenly decides that being the president of an independent (or at least relatively independent) country is less advantageous than being a governor in Russia. Or if there's a coup d'état in Belarus that brings overt Moscow appointees to power – in that case the probability would increase significantly."
Still, some Belarusians are not so sure about the firmness of Lukashenko's position. For instance, Belarusian journalist Kseniya Halubovich told Ukrainska Pravda that it might not be so easy for the self-proclaimed president to say no to Putin.
"If Russia decides to use Belarusian territory for a provocation or to launch ballistic missiles, Minsk's ability to say no to Moscow will be very limited," said Halubovich.
The track record of Belarus's cooperation with – or rather dependence on – Russia shows that this is indeed the case. The Belarusian defence industry has worked in Russia's interests throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Between February 2022 and August 2025, Russia received at least US$1.2 billion worth of weaponry from the Lukashenko regime, the Belarusian Investigative Center has noted.
Belarusians risk becoming hostages to Putin's pressure on Lukashenko. If the self-styled president allows ballistic missiles to be launched from Belarusian territory, the geography of the war could expand to include another country. In that case, Belarusians would very likely be facing retaliatory strikes, just as Russia is right now.
Tetiana Kryvishyn, Natalia Bodnar, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Anatolii Tereshchenkov and Solomiia Shvak
Edited by Teresa Pearce