Serhii Sternenko: There are far bigger threats ahead of us than jet-powered Shahed drones

In the years since Russia's full-scale invasion, Serhii Sternenko has gone from being a civic activist and popular blogger to one of Ukraine's best-known volunteers, eventually becoming an adviser to the defence minister.

In 2025 he founded a charitable foundation, the Sternenko Community, which regularly supplies Ukraine's defence forces with drones.

Thanks to his large following [his YouTube channel has over 2 million subscribers – ed.], Sternenko was able to raise UAH 3.1 billion (about US$68 million) in donations in 2025 alone.

His work with the military and drone manufacturers has enabled him to deepen his defence tech expertise and develop his own vision for expanding Ukraine's unmanned capabilities.

Another milestone was his stint as an adviser to the defence minister in Mykhailo Fedorov's team. This six-month collaboration gave Sternenko an inside view of the government processes, decisions and constraints he had previously judged from the perspective of a volunteer.

In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Sternenko discusses how Ukraine is countering jet-powered Shahed drones, the new threats it could face from Russian drones and missiles, and what would happen if Elon Musk were to pull the plug on Starlink for the Ukrainian armed forces.

We also discussed the problems facing Ukraine's defence industry, and the bureaucracy and lack of transparency in government procurement that Sternenko encountered while he was at the Defence Ministry.

And we explored an uncomfortable truth about this war that Ukrainian society is still unwilling to accept.

This is an abridged version of the interview, edited for readability. You can watch the full conversation in the video.

"I don't think we completely missed the fact that Russia was scaling up its jet-powered Shaheds"

Hero of Ukraine Kyrylo Veres said: "War is like fashion – if you're even two or three months behind the trend, you're not in fashion." Which technologies are fashionable right now?

Uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) have been in fashion for a while now. They're not exactly this season's latest trend.

I'd say the hottest trend right now is interceptors designed to counter jet-powered Shahed drones. We're practically moving into mass production in Ukraine. Aerial evacuation is also becoming increasingly popular. I've already seen three cases of people being evacuated by air.

Since you brought up jet-powered Shahed drones – how did we fail to anticipate the Russians scaling up their production?

I don't think we completely missed the emergence and scaling up of Russia's jet-powered Shahed drones. We're actually responding quite quickly. If you look back through history, offensive weapons have always emerged earlier than the means to defend against them. The sword comes before the shield, so to speak.

Humanity has always been much better and faster at developing ways to destroy one another than at developing ways to protect ourselves from one another.

We knew as early as the second half of last year that the Russians had started producing jet-powered Shaheds. We'd already seen the first successful interceptions of the jet-powered Geran-3 Shaheds.

There are currently three different types of jet-powered Shaheds. The Geran-3 is the slowest and can be shot down using conventional interceptors. The Geran-4 is a faster jet-powered Shahed, capable of flying at 400 km/h or even faster. Then there's the Geran-5, which is more like a missile than a drone. It can reach speeds comparable to the Geran-4 and sometimes even higher. The difficulties arose specifically with intercepting Geran-4s and Geran-5s.

In short, we'd known about jet-powered Shaheds since the end of last year, so Ukrainian manufacturers were already working on new interceptors back then. Our foundation was involved as well.

Then I joined the Defence Ministry, and I know that manufacturers were brought together to discuss the issue. They were asked what support they needed. Unfortunately, though, the whole process isn't as fast as we'd like.

And the fact that we're now, nearly at the end of 2026, approaching something close to a mass-produced solution against jet-powered Shaheds actually represents very rapid progress.

It's true that, unfortunately, we weren't able to develop interceptors before the Russians scaled up their aerial attack capabilities. But it almost never works like that. Offensive weapons always emerge first.

Which solutions can we already discuss publicly?

Right now Ukraine has several types of interceptors at various stages of development, ranging from prototypes to mass production in small and medium-sized batches. These include electric-powered interceptors and interceptors equipped with small jet engines.

We've made the most progress with electric-powered interceptors, but in my view, they're the least promising when you consider the threats we'll face in the future, because they have speed limitations. We estimate that electric-powered interceptors will be able to reach speeds of 550-600 km/h and maintain that top speed for at least a few minutes.

The second category is interceptors powered by turbojet engines. These are the most promising, but they're also a lot more complex and expensive to manufacture because of the engines they require. We produce electric motors ourselves – not all of them, but we do have some domestic production capacity. The situation with turbojet engines is more complicated.

I know the government recently adopted a decision to make it easier to manufacture turbojet engines in Ukraine, but unfortunately, it isn't going to happen quickly.

I think the most promising solution will be to develop a multirole aerial platform – essentially, a large turbojet-powered drone, comparable in size to a Geran or Gerbera, that's capable of carrying other weapons systems, such as machine guns, interceptors and small surface-to-air guided missiles.

But as things stand, we're moving towards mass production of electric-powered interceptors and small-scale production of jet-powered ones, including the Bars missile-drone, a jet-propelled weapon that has been adapted for use as an interceptor.

These are the systems that Ukraine's senior military and political leadership were referring to when they said that restrictions on Starshield's operation had reduced our effectiveness in shooting down jet-powered Shaheds.

So essentially we took a jet-powered weapon that's part missile, part drone, and started using it as an interceptor. And it worked.

But I'll say it again: the future is platforms.

"Nothing works without communications"

In which areas are we currently ahead of the Russians technologically?

We're definitely still ahead of the Russians in the use of bomber drones – heavy multi-rotor UAVs.

I also think we're still ahead of them in terms of deploying certain communications and signal relay systems at the tactical level, which is extremely important.

But then they're way ahead of us in terms of implementing other types of communications and signal relay systems in Geran-class drones and large attack UAVs.

What types of communications do you mean?

I'm referring to signal relaying through mesh networks, among other technologies, on the Shahed drones the Russians use to attack Ukraine. In some cases they can now establish signal relay networks extending 200 km or more. Even if they can't maintain a live video feed all the way to the target, they can at least conduct aerial reconnaissance, gather additional intelligence and carry out other tasks from altitude.

In other words, the Russians have learnt to strike deeper into our territory while being able to observe exactly where they're hitting and assess the results of their strikes.

As for where we have the advantage, that's more a matter of frontline operations. We have much better systems for medium-range operations using Starshield, the military version of Starlink, but also other types of communications technology. One of these was implemented earlier this year by our foundation in cooperation with several manufacturers. We didn't develop the technology itself, but we helped put it into practice.

And we think it has enormous potential. I'd go so far as to say that it could partially replace Starlink for us. Not entirely, of course, but at the very least, our medium-range strike missions could be carried out using this communications system, which we've implemented and installed on FPV drones.

Is this a Ukrainian or a European development?

I'd rather not answer that for now. But what I will say is, developing this type of communications technology is only half the solution. The other half is figuring out how to organise the signal relay – in other words, how to integrate it all with the existing uncrewed systems.

That's the part our foundation worked on with several manufacturers, and it's performing very well at the moment.

Not long ago, Ukrainian troops ran into a lot of problems when the Americans restricted access to satellite communications. To put the scale of the problem into perspective, just how dependent are we on Starlink?

How dependent are we on the internet in general? That's a rhetorical question, isn't it?

Communications are the backbone, the bedrock, the foundation. Nothing works without them. Communications enable command and control, coordination between combat units. They make it possible to carry out complex coordinated missions involving drones.

And those are just a few of the areas where reliable communications are essential. They're a decisive factor in the operation of any uncrewed system.

Of course, in the future, when we have AI-powered drones that can identify and engage targets autonomously, communications may become less critical. But as things stand, we can't do without them.

That's why any disruption to communications within the Ukrainian military could have extremely serious consequences.

If Elon Musk were to wake up one day and say, "That's it, we're not giving the Ukrainians anything anymore," can you imagine roughly what would happen?

It would become easier for the Russians to advance along the front because our aerial reconnaissance and command and control capabilities would be disrupted. It wouldn't necessarily be a catastrophe, but the consequences would be serious.

Our air defence would become less effective, because it wouldn't just be a matter of some interceptors becoming inoperable – we'd also lose reliable communications and coordination between the units responsible for protecting Ukrainian airspace.

That's why it's so important for us to develop alternative solutions. I'm not just talking about other satellite communications systems. Even something as basic as laying fibre-optic internet cables should be part of building new fortifications from the outset.

We need to think about what other types of communications we can develop for our drones, at least for medium-range operations, so that we're not so dependent on Starlink. Just look at what happened to the Russians.

I remember very clearly how in January this year, when I was an adviser to the minister, Mykhailo Fedorov called us together for a meeting. Several deputy ministers and other people from Ukraine's defence sector were there too. When we discovered that the Russians had started using Starlink on their Italmas drones, we got together and immediately began brainstorming possible solutions.

After Starlink was disabled for the Russians, attacks involving remotely guided Italmas drones stopped. From that point on, they could only direct their drones towards targets using pre-programmed coordinates.

Their command and control capabilities on the front line were also seriously disrupted because by then, they too had become dependent on Starlink.

And all of this enabled us to carry out certain counteroffensive operations with fewer losses, particularly on the Zaporizhzhia front.

In other words, it effectively rendered the enemy blind and deaf, and naturally that worked to our advantage.

"The Russians are already scaling up production of small cruise missiles"

In your opinion, what's holding back Ukraine's defence tech sector the most today: technological limitations or government management?

Both factors have a significant impact.

Which has more?

Technological limitations, ultimately.

For example, we're talking about intercepting jet-powered Shaheds, but there are far bigger threats awaiting us next year. And we'll need more than just new types of interceptors to counter them.

Air defence can't be built around a single weapons system. It always requires a combination of measures and capabilities.

If we're talking about intercepting small cruise missiles in the future, we'll need homing seekers that can be installed on either surface-to-air missiles or the drones themselves. Or we'll need to use other guidance systems.

And we still have a long way to go before we can manufacture these systems on an industrial scale. It's not that simple. Our partners could share these technologies with us, or at least establish production themselves. But for one reason or another, that isn't happening. We're raising this issue with our partners and making sure they understand how important it is.

So, after jet-powered Shaheds, will the Russians start scaling up production of small cruise missiles?

That's exactly what's happening. They're already in the process of scaling up production. We can see them using dozens of Banderol-class missiles every month, launched from other drones.

Incidentally, this is another example of uncrewed platforms. They launch these small cruise missiles either from Orion drones or from helicopters.

They also have a new development called the Filin, as well as another system we've only detected very rarely, the Dan-T. So they're moving towards cheap, mass-produced small cruise missiles capable of reaching speeds of 600-700 km/h. Interceptors will become increasingly less effective against them.

Interceptors are important. We need them to counter relatively slow jet-powered drones and drones powered by internal combustion engines. Conventional interceptors have bought us a year to prepare to defend against new types of aerial attack weapons.

So we'll still need them, and they're not going anywhere. But we also need technologies of an entirely different class. And that's where we have gaps in our capabilities.

As for countering ballistic missiles, the situation is even more complicated. I'm not an expert in this field, but I understand that intercepting ballistic missiles is a challenge not only for us, but for our European partners as well.

When will the Russians reach the point of significantly scaling up the production and deployment of small cruise missiles?

They've already started mass-producing Banderol missiles. I think production will be ramped up significantly in the first half of next year. This will be an even bigger problem for us than the jet-powered Shaheds are now.

We need to start coming up with unconventional solutions right now. In fact, some solutions already exist, and I don't understand why we don't always implement them. Some would only require changes to organisational approaches.

For example, we could use jet-powered trainer and combat aircraft. They're comparable to Banderol missiles in terms of speed and could be used to shoot down these aerial threats with machine guns, even without surface-to-air missiles. But that's a question for the Air Force command.

"The procurement situation was worse than I thought"

You were an adviser to [former] defence minister Fedorov for just under six months. Did you learn anything about the government system that you hadn't known before and couldn't have learned without joining the Defence Ministry?

It's not that I learned anything totally new. I knew what I was getting into, after all – a vast bureaucratic machine. But some things genuinely surprised me.

Such as the fact that we can have 300 colonels on the staff of one of the agencies attached to the Defence Ministry. And there's nobody else there apart from those colonels. They just keep on multiplying, creating directorates within directorates and departments within departments just so they have these positions, and provide absolutely no practical benefit to the state.

I also discovered that the procurement situation was somewhat worse than I'd previously thought.

Was it chaotic?

It's not that. It's that the way the procurement requirements have been formulated is so opaque, it's just appalling. This is no way to do things.

But there were positive aspects too. I saw that even this vast, rigid government bureaucracy can move faster if the person leading it sets a fast pace and is personally committed to making decisions quickly.

When you were an adviser to the minister, you frequently commented on strikes against Crimea and deep inside Russia.

I still do, and I did before that as well.

Yes, but back then you were part of the Defence Ministry team. Why didn't those strikes ultimately force Putin to the negotiating table? That was the objective, wasn't it?

What the objective was and what the plan was are questions primarily for the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I gave my own assessment, and I believe it was correct.

At one point I said rather emotionally that this summer would be the worst ever for so-called Russia. And the summer of 2026 really was the worst for the Russian Federation, because Ukraine began to carry out unprecedented campaigns of aerial strikes, including attacks on Russian logistics. They had a serious impact on Russian logistics, particularly in the southern parts of Ukraine's temporarily occupied territories.

Why didn't that make Putin end the war? Because it wasn't enough.

For Putin to end the war, he has to feel that continuing it would pose an existential threat either to the Russian Federation itself or to him personally and his political regime.

We haven't reached that point yet, unfortunately. And it's not just us who have to work to get us there – our partners do too.

Just look at the situation we're in. We're fighting the Russian Federation, which has the active support of Iran. Iran has been weakened, but its support continues nonetheless. The North Korean army is fighting against Ukraine. They may be on Russian territory right now, but North Korean drone operators are targeting our people in Sumy Oblast.

The territory and infrastructure of another country, a co-aggressor – I'm talking about Belarus – are being used to carry out aggression against Ukraine. So you could say that we're fighting two countries that are fully engaged in aggression against us, a third that's involved to some extent, and a fourth that's helping them. And I'm not even going to go into the role of communist China.

Which of our European partners are fighting for Ukraine? Exactly. Not enough is being done right now to stop this war. They need to become more actively involved.

When Putin's launching drone attacks against European countries and the leaders of Norway and Finland call him on the phone, how do you think he interprets that?

And when the United States lifts sanctions against the Russian Federation, that's perceived as weakness.

Why on earth would Putin end the war when the response he gets from his potential targets is either encouragement or fear? So unfortunately we still have some very frightening times ahead of us. And by "us", I mean Europe as a whole.

I believe Europeans should be fighting for Ukraine today. They need to find a way to become more directly involved in destroying the Russian Federation's military potential.

Do you really believe they'd ever agree to that?

It's not a question of what I believe. The question is when they'll be forced to do it and in what capacity. As victims of aggression, or as allied states helping Ukraine?

And finally, what truth about Ukraine's current situation do you think our society is unwilling to face?

I wouldn't generalise about society as a whole. But some Ukrainians are still comforting themselves with the illusion that we can just reach an agreement with the Russians. Unfortunately, that's not the case.

This war is existential in nature, and reaching an agreement with them won't work. Our ancestors tried, and we know what that led to. It's a deeply unpleasant truth. I understand why some people think that way.

Because living with the knowledge that there's no simple solution to this is terrifying. Incidentally, it's the same reason why, on 23 February 2022, some Ukrainians believed there would be no full-scale invasion.

Because accepting that a full-scale war could break out in the 21st century, with missiles, bombs, civilians being killed and acts of genocide, is horrifying. But unfortunately that's the reality we face.

Roman Kravets, Ukrainska Pravda

Video and photo: Andrii Kovsh, Oleksii Klymov

Translated by Myroslava Zavadska

Edited by Teresa Pearce