In part two of Ukrainska Pravda's interview with the former defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov discusses whether he helped defence companies secure contracts, whether he attempted to encroach on the commander-in-chief's authority, and what his answer would be if President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked him to come back to the Defence Ministry.
The full interview is available on Ukrainska Pravda's YouTube channel.
"It's like performing open-heart surgery with no electricity and not enough instruments"
Let's continue our discussion about mobilisation reform. You came in for a lot of criticism about this as defence minister. What do you think was the main problem? Why wasn't the reform completed, what went wrong, and why did it result in public criticism, including from the country's leadership?
This was the issue that people were most concerned about, so it was also the easiest way to attack our team. But as for why we didn't complete it – we were progressing exactly as set out in our plan.
I even had a meeting scheduled for Wednesday, before my dismissal, with all the key stakeholders involved in mobilisation. I was due to sign an order at that meeting [that would have required military enlistment offices' notification teams] to stop wearing balaclavas, introduce body cameras, bring all the enlistment offices into proper order, implement the digital processing system, and so on. It was meant to be the first step of the reform.
So we were on track according to the plan.
In June we launched the first phase, which covered length of service, deferments, pay, the recruitment of foreign nationals, transfers and more. There were over ten separate projects, and we completed them. Remember, there was no budget for this at all, so we had to optimise existing resources in order to launch the reform.
There are a lot of challenges when you're trying to reform the Defence Ministry during a full-scale war with limited resources. I'd describe it as performing open-heart surgery when there's no electricity, not enough instruments and the patient is still alive. You have to save them while keeping them alive.
We've talked about long-range strikes, and we've seen how effective they are – warehouses are on fire, Moscow's on fire. One of your innovations was mid-range strike drones (known as "middle strikes"), and it's something you really focused on. In particular, you announced a tender to produce 150 middle-strike drones...
We called them "Crimea-strikes".
Tell us what was achieved. I understand these drones have already begun to reach the military?
We started buying middle-strike drones in February. This was part of the plan we came in with – essentially to shift the war into the operational domain, into the enemy's operational depth. That has a direct impact on the front line.
We have dashboards tracking some corps where we can see that the more enemy assets we destroy at an operational depth of 40-60 km, the less pressure there is on infantry units on the front line, and the fewer offensive operations the enemy is able to conduct.
As we were unable to organise a sufficient number of large tenders fast enough, we even started transferring funds directly to military units so they could buy middle-strike drones themselves, because this is a window of opportunity that could soon close.
Has that window closed now?
Not yet, but it has its limits. Our objective was to win every technological cycle. Our objective was to get a foot in the door before it closed and create new opportunities.
But did this strategy work in Crimea?
The procurement of middle-strike drones has been completed, and deliveries will continue for some time. The money we allocated directly to military units is still being used. So now we need to keep on buying middle-strikes and adapt this strategy.
What happens next will depend on the decisions that are made now, because the Russians are adapting as well. They've started using drones that operate on mesh networks with AI. They've also redirected large numbers of Shahed and Molniya drones to frontline regions in an effort to isolate our logistics. This is a separate strategy that requires dedicated funding and many new solutions that are not yet obvious.
At the beginning of the summer, people were saying that Ukraine had gained the upper hand on the front line for the first time. Has that advantage been maintained as of the end of July 2026?
We had record results in May and June in terms of the amount of territory we liberated compared with what Russia occupied and how far it advanced. We also downed a record number of aerial assets – tens of thousands during that period. Even people living in frontline regions can't imagine the scale of the work being done by the Air Force and the corps. A lot do get through, but huge numbers are intercepted.
In Zaporizhzhia, for example, 97-100% of the Molniya drones launched are shot down – that's dozens, sometimes even hundreds, every day.
We'll see how the situation develops. The task is to ensure this [downing of targets] continues. We have the potential and all the resources needed to finally defeat and stop the Russians.
"I was never fighting particular people – only the system"
As we understand it, one of the criticisms voiced by the military and political leadership was that you exceeded your authority: that in making decisions, you encroached on the responsibilities of other officials, including the commander-in-chief.
Were these conflicts related to you overstepping your authority as defence minister?
That's fake news that people keep passing around.
We've heard it from very senior sources.
I understand. So have I. But there isn't a single fact to support it. The reality is that I never interfered at the tactical level – deciding what brigades, battalions or regiments should do. I always worked at the strategic level.
Of course, the Defence Ministry is responsible for procurement, but procurement itself can also be a way of winning the war. If you procure the right mid-range strike capabilities, the situation changes.
We carried out a number of operations at the strategic level, but that doesn't mean we were interfering in how the war was fought. For example, we had the idea of destroying all the equipment within a depth of 50-70 km simultaneously over the course of a few days. Last year we did that – we called it Operation Auchan. We destroyed 800 pieces of Russian equipment, and they were unable to conduct any mechanised offensives for six months.
So is that interfering in the war or not? I don't know. It doesn't seem like it, because it's an asymmetric idea that delivers rapid results without affecting the military's organisational structure in any way.
And this year, when I was defence minister, we carried out Operation Auchan 2 and destroyed 250 artillery systems. How did we arrive at the idea of that operation? We saw that casualties caused by artillery were increasing. So we developed specialised drones, worked with several military units, used cheap one-way drones, and we destroyed 250 pieces of artillery. As a result of that operation, our losses fell.
Is that interfering in the war? I don't know. We did it together with the military. It's not as though I sat in my office, came up with the operation on my own and carried it out myself. It was done together with effective units. That's precisely where our strength lies – in this network-centric approach.
We need to understand the role of the Defence Ministry as an institution at this stage of the war. To me, it should be like a platform – an effective partner that supports the very best. Your job is to constantly look for the best ideas and help implement them as quickly as possible together with the General Staff.
In this network-centric war, where units know better than anyone what needs to be done, you don't need to take over operational planning. Your job is to have a vision and, within that vision, support ideas that are developing fast and delivering results.
For example, a regimental commander comes to you and says: "Look, if you invest a certain amount of resources in this sector of Donetsk Oblast, I can reduce the pressure on the first line by fivefold." And we say: "Deal. We'll invest." That's it – the pressure eases. Result.
That was our role. If anything, I think the General Staff should appreciate that and act as a partner working alongside you.
Your critics also say that some companies received disproportionately large contracts through the Brave1 system. Did manufacturers ever approach you seeking to secure contracts outside that system?
It isn't possible to circumvent the e-points system. Manufacturers didn't approach me – they know me, and they know how the system works. Everything happens directly between the company and the military unit.
Besides, the e-points system is only one procurement mechanism. There are also direct government contracts, through which units receive a huge amount of drones.
What about those direct government contracts? Did anyone approach you regarding those?
During the first couple of months there were a few attempts to test the waters, but those were people who didn't know me yet. The ones who knew me didn't even bother.
Within two weeks we'd changed the approach to procurement. We came in and immediately changed it. After all, I'd been studying the Defence Ministry as a management system for four years. It's not as if I walked in thinking, "Right, how does this place work?"
We also succeeded in introducing competitive tenders for artillery procurement. We achieved savings of 16% on the first procurement – that's over US$100 million. A second tender worth US$2 billion is now underway. Thanks to competitive tendering, we cut the cost by US$1,000 per shell.
Every defence minister, particularly since the start of the full-scale invasion, has faced questions about their relationships with particular companies. Were there any companies that received a disproportionately large share of government contracts as a result of your decisions as defence minister?
I'll say it again: within two weeks of my taking office, we changed the rules of procurement. A ranking system was introduced, and the General Staff selected procurements based on that ranking. Our goal was to remove the human factor entirely and ensure that no official in either the Defence Ministry or the General Staff could influence which contracts were awarded.
Throughout my time as defence minister and minister of digital transformation, no company ever received any preferential treatment in order to secure a contract and achieve a particular outcome.
"Would I return as defence minister? 100%"
You've probably heard the claims that the protests taking place almost every day in Franko Square in Kyiv and the central squares of other Ukrainian cities are being paid for. I understand that this narrative is being actively pushed to the president as well.
Honestly, I don't know what's being pushed to the president. But I'm sure he doesn't believe that. It's usually either Russians or corrupt officials who think that sort of thing. I don't think any reasonable person could believe it. Anyone who does simply doesn't understand Ukrainian society.
We can see this narrative being extensively spread on Telegram channels, with various people being named as the sponsors of the "cardboard Maidan"...
That's just not how it works. Look, Trukha and other Telegram channels have been churning out stuff about me and the mobilisation reform every single day. But at the end of the day, we've seen tens of thousands of people at the protests who have a good grasp of the issues. Despite all that propaganda, they know exactly what's going on.
They're still just a passionate minority, Mykhailo.
I'm not convinced that's the case. I'm convinced there are millions of Ukrainians who aren't going out and protesting because they're working and getting on with their lives, but they know about these issues and understand exactly what's happening.
Our people are a lot wiser than some decision-makers give them credit for. So I don't believe this strategy can work. They can buy up every Telegram channel they like, they can open another thousand or even two thousand criminal cases – that's simply not how things work in this country. It always ends very badly for anyone who tries it.
Suppose President Volodymyr Zelenskyy comes back from his visit to the US, calls you into the President's Office and says, "Mykhailo, I've thought it over, and I think you should have another year to implement these reforms. Come back to the Ministry of Defence" – would you be willing to return?
One hundred per cent. What would I say, not only to the president, or even to myself, but to the active part of the public, which has made its position clear? There's no walking away from this situation anymore.
This is the second part of our interview with Mykhailo Fedorov. You can read the first part here.
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska and Anna Kybukevych
Edited by Teresa Pearce