Why South Korea has fallen out with Ukraine but seeks reconciliation with North Korea: Korean expert explains

Just two weeks ago, relations between Ukraine and South Korea seemed almost trouble-free. Russia and North Korea were deepening their military cooperation, North Korean soldiers were fighting against Ukraine, and Kyiv and Seoul appeared to have an increasing number of shared security interests.

On 23 September, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met his South Korean counterpart Cho Hyun in New York. They discussed strengthening political dialogue, trade, investment, Ukraine's reconstruction, and the common threats posed by military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

The meeting was a continuation of an eventful year in bilateral relations. In July, Volodymyr Zelenskyy met South Korean President Lee Jae-myung for the first time. Seoul announced an additional US$100 million in non-military assistance to Ukraine. Economic cooperation also held considerable potential: a framework agreement between the two countries provided for up to US$2.1 billion in preferential South Korean loans for Ukraine's reconstruction by 2029.

But on that very same day, 23 September, relations between the two countries began to deteriorate rapidly.

During his address to the UN General Assembly, Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had transferred two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea. Both soldiers had been captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia's Kursk Oblast in January 2025.

On the face of it, this should have been seen as an example of successful cooperation between Kyiv and Seoul. After all, South Korea had previously advocated the transfer of prisoners to its territory, where they could live in safety.

Instead, on 24 September, President Lee Jae-myung publicly accused Ukraine of violating a confidentiality agreement. According to Seoul, the transfer was supposed to remain undisclosed to protect the prisoners themselves and their families still living in North Korea. Ukraine denied that any such agreement existed.

South Korea demanded an official explanation and an apology. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha described the situation as a diplomatic misunderstanding. His South Korean counterpart, Cho Hyun, later confirmed that he had received a letter of apology but said it fell short of Seoul's expectations.

On 2 October, Lee Jae-myung threatened Ukraine with further measures unless Kyiv acknowledged its breach of the agreement and issued a public apology. He also criticised Ukrainian statements about the threat of a military conflict between North and South Korea, accusing Kyiv of using rhetoric that could push the Korean Peninsula towards war.

On 8 October, the diplomatic crisis escalated to the recall of an ambassador: South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its decision to bring its ambassador to Ukraine, Park Ki-chang, back to Seoul.

Ukrainian–South Korean relations had thus entered one of their most serious political crises since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion.

All this is happening as President Lee Jae-myung seeks to ease tensions with North Korea and restore inter-Korean dialogue. Pyongyang, however, has shown little interest in reciprocating.

Quite the opposite. On 7 October, Kim Jong Un sent Vladimir Putin a birthday message in which he called the Russian president his "dearest friend", reaffirmed his commitment to developing the strategic alliance with Moscow, and once again expressed support for Russia's "sacred war".

While Seoul is looking for ways to reconcile with Pyongyang, North Korean troops are gaining combat experience in Russia's war against Ukraine, and Moscow is helping North Korea develop its military technologies.

Why did the transfer of two prisoners of war provoke such a strong reaction from South Korea? Does Seoul's policy of reconciliation with Pyongyang stand any chance of success? What is North Korea gaining from its involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine, and how could this change the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula?

Ukrainska Pravda spoke about these issues with Sangmin Shim, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, who specialises in international law and security affairs. His analytical articles and commentary on security and environmental issues in East Asia have appeared in international publications, including the American magazine The National Interest, as well as leading South Korean newspapers such as Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo.

Although Shim is critical of certain policies and approaches pursued by the current South Korean administration, he is not a political opposition figure. His perspective is primarily that of an independent policy expert, shaped by his background in international law, diplomacy and national security. He previously taught international law at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and has advised the government on legal and foreign policy issues.

The crisis in Ukrainian-South Korean relations

Ukrainian-South Korean relations are experiencing their first political crisis since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. South Korea recently even recalled its ambassador from Ukraine. Why has the issue of the two North Korean prisoners become so sensitive for President Lee Jae-Myung's administration?

Well, this is my personal take, but I believe the South Korean government is so pro-Russian that anything potentially sensitive for bilateral relations between North Korea and the Russian Federation is largely discounted. That is what we are seeing today. Even though Ukraine has graciously sent those North Korean prisoners to South Korea, the South Korean government is not really appreciative of it. South Korea is so preoccupied with normalising relations with the Russian Federation that the many gestures the Ukrainian government approaches us with do not really count from the South Korean perspective. This is a truly sad matter, in my view.

Did the situation with those two North Korean prisoners create any domestic debate in South Korea?

In the general public's view, it is great that these prisoners have been transferred to South Korean territory to live in a free state. But the current South Korean government is extremely worried about the consequences of having these North Korean prisoners on its territory.

They fear the possible negative effects of holding them in South Korean custody, which makes them highly sensitive about their presence. This is completely irrational from my perspective. South Korea has always strongly argued for the transfer of Korean prisoners of war to its territory, as the government deems these POWs to be its own citizens.

There is a total inconsistency in logic between the South Korean government's general policy and what they are doing in this specific situation.

Inter-Korean tensions

What we see in the news now is that the South Korean president wants to ease tensions and restore inter-Korean relations and dialogue. But how realistic is this when there appears to be very little interest in dialogue from North Korea?

This might be my personal judgement, but looking at the South Korean government's attempts to ease tensions with North Korea, I don't think it is going to happen. The North Korean government is completely focused on differentiating the two regimes. Pyongyang believes that any ties it might have with South Korea will not bring any real benefit to the prosperity of the North Korean regime. Therefore, the North Korean regime has decided to totally sever ties with South Korea, and that is exactly what they are doing. Unfortunately, the South Korean government is not ready to give up its hope for reconciliation with North Korea. This is where the real tragedy begins.

We also see that North Korea has physically reinforced the separation. They are building barriers, laying mines, and fortifying the border with South Korea. From your point of view, is this just another period of rising tension, or has Kim's "two hostile states" policy changed these relations?

From what I can see, North Korea is highly focused on differentiating between the South Korean and North Korean regimes. They started by laying mines to prevent South Korean troops from crossing into North Korean territory. This is extremely unfortunate, and as you know, it has led to unnecessary casualties among South Korean soldiers. I do not know how this issue can be resolved between the governments of South Korea and North Korea, but I really hope it will be smoothed over. I hope we can find common ground to talk to each other, with the understanding that this issue should not destroy us. There are still many factors that can influence a hopeful outcome in the future.

President Lee's opponents accuse him of being overly cautious about provoking North Korea. How strong is this criticism inside South Korea, and does it explain the unusually sharp reaction to Ukraine?

There is a deep political divide between the progressive and conservative fronts. The conservative front argues that any engagement with North Korea is basically a concession. Meanwhile, the progressive front believes it is a necessary step toward reconciliation. So, there is a huge divide regarding how they want to move forward in the current situation.

President Lee also criticised Ukraine's statement regarding a possible future conflict between North and South Korea, saying such rhetoric could push the peninsula towards war. Why is this topic particularly sensitive for him?

This is anyone's guess, but as I perceive it, a high-ranking official from the Ukrainian Presidential Office stated that ignoring the ties between North Korea and the rest of the world would have a ripple effect on South Korea's security. But is South Korea ready to accept that?

They believe that through peaceful inter-Korean relations, we will have better relations with every country south of the Korean peninsula. But this is unproven. So we will continue to have contentious relations with both the Ukrainian and North Korean governments.

The role of the North Korean military in the war in Ukraine

North Korea has already sent roughly 15,000 troops to Russia, and thousands of them have reportedly been killed or wounded. Before this, North Korea lacked military experience in such a large-scale war. How different is the North Korean army today because of its experience in Ukraine?

After sending their forces to defend or take over the Kursk region, those North Korean troops have gained valuable battlefield experience in modern warfare — particularly combining drone warfare with conventional warfare. From a South Korean perspective, this is not something we can easily discount. South Korea now needs to prepare for potential provocations from North Korea. However, the current government is not taking this seriously. Because this administration leans pro-Russia, pro-China, and pro-North Korea, they do not see these signs of provocation as something to truly worry about. I am sorry to criticise my government, but this appears to be the reality.

And have you already seen evidence that the lessons learned by North Korean soldiers have been incorporated into North Korean training or doctrine at home?

What I can see from the collaboration between North Korean and Russian forces is that the Russians have been sharing technical advice to further develop North Korea's military expertise — particularly in military tactics and drone warfare. Because of this, North Korean forces are in a better position. I do not know how else to put it, but those North Korean forces are now superior to South Korean forces in terms of dealing with drone warfare and other non-conventional forces involvement.

So, could you say that soldiers returning from Russia will eventually form a new, combat-experienced elite within the North Korean military?

First of all, the initial group sent to Russian territory consisted of combat troops from their special operations forces. They sent about 10,000 of their best elite troops, and the results speak for themselves. The involvement of these forces has genuinely contributed to retaking territories crucial to the Russians from Ukrainian control. This has had a major effect. I do not know if this trend can continue, because the North Korean government will also face difficulties with the continuous mobilisation of its armed forces. We do not know how the next stage will play out.

Let us look at the evidence the North Korean government is presenting. They are doing everything they can not to reveal the presence of their personnel on the battlefield. They want to limit their manpower to factories and other workforces – helping Russian forces and industries build stronger weapon systems. So, from what I perceive, North Korean personnel are not going to be seen anywhere near the front lines. But what I really want to emphasise in this case is that North Korea is collaborating with the Russian government and military to build up Russian stockpiles, ensuring the Russian military is prepared for incoming attacks from Ukraine or other countries.

We have a fairly good picture of what is moving from North Korea to Russia: soldiers, ammunition, and missiles. But we know much less about what is moving in the opposite direction and so from your point of view, what's North Korea actually getting in return from Russia?

I mean, what North Korea really hopes to gain from the collaboration with the Russian regime is that they will get military expertise in terms of ballistic missiles development and other top-notch military development. And in turn those current regimes will provide war forces in the form of manual labour and everything to provide the help necessary for the Russian Federation to rebuild their drone systems. So, then they will be able to compete with Ukraine in terms of non-conventional forces engagement.

The Russian government is seeing that the Ukrainian government will not be able to provide all the necessary supplies for all the necessary equipment for forever. And then this is going to be a kind of a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine in which both will be subject to having to pay the highest consequences from this military conflict. This is so sad but this is also a fact.

If North Korea is developing the capacity to mass produce Shahed-type drones with Russian assistance, how would that change the threat facing South Korea and is South Korea prepared for the kind of mass drone warfare we have seen in Ukraine?

I mean, we have heard the most recent report from the National Security Advisor of the Korean Republic that if North Korea has been engaging too much in this Russia-Ukraine conflict, this would be the best opportunity for Korea to start taking over the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and making the whole Korean Peninsula as a unified nation. But this is not going to be the case that I have been seeing because this is not going to involve the political discussions between the major powers and basically the military aspect will not resolve the matters as we see it.

So what I perceive to be the case is that whatever happens in the territories between Ukraine and Russia will not have any consequences for the inter-Korean relations.

Inter-Korean relations will have to be dealt with by their own dynamics. Meaning that Russia, the United States, Japan, Korea and both North and South Korea will have to be sitting at the same table to negotiate away the differences. This is not going to be a short-term matter but it has to include the case of negotiations.

How Ukraine іs perceived in North Korea

Maybe you know how North Korean propaganda explains Ukraine to its own population? What have North Koreans been told about why their soldiers are fighting and dying thousands of kilometres from home?

I mean the North Korean government is ready to just decorate their lost lives as their national heroes. But this is not going to be the case if the loss of the lives and casualties continues to accrue for the North Korean regime. We have a report that records those current casualties at around 3,000 soldiers who have lost their lives and then another 33,000 soldiers who have basically lost their capability to re-engage in the world.

But with the intensification of the war and tensions within Russia and Ukraine, this will lead to more casualties for North Koreans. And I don't know if the North Korean government will be able to continue to persuade their general public with this loss of life as an unavoidable matter.

I don't know, but the North Korean government is not a democratic nation but they will not be subject to national approval or to answering the questions of the people but they will still feel the pressure from the North Korean populace about the loss of life that has been the consequence of the involvement of North Korean troops in the Ukrainian military conflict.

Is Ukraine portrayed as an enemy in its own right or is it simply as part of a larger confrontation with the United States and the West?

This is a really interesting question. Between the US and Ukraine, they don't seem to have much differences. But by just looking at the recent episode between the Ukraine and Republic of Korea, they seem to have some impending conditions to be dealt with between these two nations.

But from my perspective, these would be only diplomatic matters and if these matters were to be entrusted with both countries' foreign ministers, these differences will be easily negotiated away. What matters to Korea for now is that the current president of the administration. He's so active in voicing criticism about the Ukrainian government. This is not going to be helpful for settling the battle between Ukraine and South Korea. I really hope that the South Korean president will stay silent for at least for the next two weeks for the two ministers to be able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

And from your point of view, how much do the average North Koreans actually know about the scale of their country's involvement in Russia's war?

From the conservative people's point of view, this government is so pro-North Korea and they suspect that North Korea has a huge influence over the matters of the South Korean government, but I don't believe this. But whatever is the case with the North Korean and the South Korean government, I suspect that the South Korean government needs to be in a better position to fight away the incoming threats from North Korea.

Basically in terms of cybersecurity and maritime security. But without those concerns, we have to see that the South Korean government is going to live their lives as if nothing has happened. This is not going to be a very positive case for the South Korean population.

And what happened with thousands of soldiers who return home with direct experience of Russia, of modern warfare, of modern technologies which are most likely not represented in North Korea?

I mean, these North Korean soldiers who have been sent back to the North Korean territories have returned with better experience with drone warfare and better experience with modern warfare. So they may have something to say to their military leadership. But what are considered to be the barricades with these North Koreans, they have been so exhausted with the too-stressful battlefield conditions. So, they may be the key. I mean, this is my hopeful suggestion, but these people will be the driving forces for asking for more changes regarding the South Korea and North Korea territories. And then, if the current administration fails to address these questions then there will be more political decisions, moving forward.

And could these people potentially be a problem for the regime now?

This is another matter that we don't really know the answer to. Military and civilian society have been in co-existence for a long time. But what I perceive in that case is that the military, they are taking the upper hand with the civilian structures. So whatever situation may arrive, it's going to be down to the hands of the military that will take the final decisions.

How South Korea іs helping Russia and what the consequences could be

What we see in the recent investigation by Reuters is that South Korean petroleum product experts have reportedly helped Russia with fuel shortages caused partly by Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries. How is this issue perceived in South Korea or is it even discussed there?

There are two different opinions about this matter. For conservative people, this is a really serious matter because it seems to be the case that the South Korean government is basically just looking away in the case of helping the Russian economy by support with petrochemical fuels.

But at the same time, from a purely technical perspective, the South Korean government is not prohibited from providing petrochemical products to the Russian Federation because this is not going to be subject to any country's sanctions regimes. So this is kind of revealing a kind of difference between many different countries' sanctions regimes.

From my perspective, it should be right to tighten the grip upon the differences in the different countries' sanction regimes. But at the same time, we have to hold our countries to settle out the differences between many unlike-minded nations to achieve the core missions of these sanctions which is to weaken the fighting ability of the Russian Federation in terms of the battlefield between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

From the Ukrainian perspective this trade could be the next major source of tension between Seoul and Kyiv. From your perspective, how could these South Korean-Ukrainian relations be mended?

I mean, we have current issues between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea, but I strongly believe that this case will be settled away between the diplomatic negotiations between these countries.

What I perceive to be the more worrisome outcome is if the South Korean president Lee Jae-myung continues to press hard on the relations between Ukraine and the Korean Republic. And if that would be the case, then there's not going to be a case for these two bilateral regimes to be reconciled pretty much soon. Because as long as the president's mandate is not going to be met, there's not much that the South Korean foreign minister will do proactively to settle the differences. So all it might come down to is the president changing his position between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea.

In a way, the revealing of the identity of the prisoners, those North Korean soldiers, would not be so much to disrupt the bilateral relations between these countries. It's really important that the South Korean government is so aware of this importance and also about the importance of not being too far away from these two government's positions.