"Russia and Iran are strategic partners, not allies": Hanna Notte on war, oil, and shifting power

Right before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Hanna Notte was in Moscow for a conference. People were out drinking to celebrate "Defenders of the Fatherland Day" – and almost no one who should have known believed that a large-scale war was about to start. "They thought it was a tactic, not that it would actually happen," recalls Hanna, who left Russia on 23 February 2022, literally the eve of the catastrophe. Since then, the expert who studies Russia has not been back to Russia.

Today, Notte is Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. She specialises in Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and arms control.

Notte has spent years studying how Russia projects power beyond its borders. In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, she explains why the war around Iran is currently more beneficial for Russia than it may seem, yet carries long-term risks; why Moscow and Tehran remain strategic partners, but not allies; and how Ukraine has unexpectedly emerged as a new player in the Middle East.

You study Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. Is the current war around Iran more of an opportunity or a problem for Russia?

I think in the short term, the benefits and the opportunities outweigh the risks for Russia. We've seen several benefits materialise for Russia over the last six weeks or so [the interview was conducted on the 15th of April – ed.], I think the most meaningful one being Russia's renewed ability to export oil and rising oil prices.

The International Energy Agency said yesterday that Russian oil revenues, or revenues from oil sales, doubled in March compared to February, and this is happening at a time when Russia has a record budget deficit. So it comes at a very convenient time for Russia – it gives the Russian economy some breathing space.

The second benefit for Russia will be in the diversion of Patriot interceptors from Ukraine to the US allies in the Persian Gulf – the Gulf Arab states. Even if the war were to stop tomorrow, Gulf states will need to replenish their interceptor stockpiles, and so there will probably be pressure on those stockpiles and less for Ukraine.

And the third benefit for Russia, I would say, is not so much a diversion of attention from Ukraine to the Middle East – because coming from Berlin, I do believe that the Europeans remain very focused on Ukraine, even after four years of this war – but what this war has done is it has again produced some friction in the transatlantic relationship, with the Trump administration being upset at European NATO allies about not providing more support in the Strait of Hormuz.

But what this war above all has done is I think it has undermined US credibility, and it is exposing the United States or the Trump administration as weak. And this is of course welcome from Moscow's perspective.

Now, having said all this, I do think that there are risks or challenges for Russia from the Iran war that could manifest over the medium to long term depending on how this war further plays out.

And I want to suggest three risks or challenges for Russia. One is if there's a protracted war or even another escalation, it could lead to significant dampening of global growth or even a global recession. I think the IMF downgraded its forecast for global growth yesterday.

And so while Russia benefits from higher oil prices, Russia will not benefit if there's a global recession, because then overall demand for Russian hydrocarbons will be dampened.

The other risk relates to potential trajectories in the war that could lead to anything ranging from a significant weakening of Iran via fragmentation of Iran, internal unrest, insurgency, all the way to potential regime change.

The Iranian regime looks quite resilient today, and it looks like it is sitting firmly in the saddle, but we are still in the middle of something, and we don't know where we will be three months down the line. So there are some risks for Russia in terms of how the Islamic Republic will look some weeks or months down the line, and of course, fragmentation of Iran or even regime change are very negative scenarios for the Russian Federation.

And the final undesired consequence of this war for Russia is that it has put Ukraine newly on the map as a partner for Middle Eastern countries in a way that Ukraine arguably wasn't before this war. Now we see the Ukrainian president negotiating drone defence deals with the Gulf Arab states; he was in Jordan to discuss security cooperation; he visited Damascus to meet with the new Syrian government. So there's a new interest in Ukraine as a defence and economic partner, and this is something that Moscow does not like.

How deep is the Russia-Iran relationship now?

To me, Russia and Iran are strategic partners. They're not allies.

Of course, the defence cooperation has deepened over the last four years. The most significant manifestation of that is with Russia acquiring the Shahed technology from Iran. Russia also gave political and some economic and some defence support to Iran in return.

If we look at what Russia is doing now in the current war, it is providing some humanitarian aid – by Azerbaijan mostly. It is providing quite intensive political backing to Iran, especially on the UN Security Council. And there's some military assistance. There is the sharing of targeting data. There is the provision of operational guidance on how to employ Shahed drones in strike waves. And there is some evidence that Russia is also providing some Shahed drone shipments to Iran.

But I don't think Russia can go much further in supporting Iran in this war. They're not military allies. Russia has made it clear time and again that it is not obliged to fight on Iran's behalf. There's no mutual defence clause in the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that they signed early last year. And we know that Russia also did not intervene last summer during the 12-day war.

So I don't think that they will intervene directly. They also cannot ship sophisticated weapons to Iran at this time for two reasons. One – and this has been a problem throughout the last four years – Russia doesn't actually have the bandwidth to do that, because its priority is Ukraine.

And secondly, Russia must also be prepared for the fact that probably the Israelis will strike any Russian weapons shipments bound for Iran, and we've already had some examples of this happening. The Israelis two weeks ago struck a shipment in the Caspian Sea on the Iranian side near an Iranian port which was presumably carrying Russian shipments to Iran. Israel did not comment on this much. They didn't call out Russia publicly, but they attacked the shipment.

So what this war is producing for Russia is also a situation where they have to walk a careful balancing act between Iran, their strategic partner, and Israel and the Gulf Arab states, which are also Russian partners. And you are already seeing growing friction again in the Russian-Israeli relationship because of this war.

The Russians complained that Israel targeted an RT journalist in southern Lebanon a few weeks ago, and the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the Israeli ambassador in Moscow. You had the situation with the shipment that was targeted in the Caspian Sea. And just a few days ago, the Russians sent a letter to Israel criticising the Israeli strikes near the Bushehr nuclear power plant in quite strong language.

I think there's a desire on all sides to not let the relationship blow up, but this is a situation that the Russians have to manage. And that's also why I think they will not go overboard in terms of supporting Iran.

So to put it in basic terms, to come back to your questions, Russia and Iran are partners. They share a common objective in wishing to undermine the United States and US allies in their respective regions. They share joint grievances against the international system as now not affording them the room to manoeuvre that they think they're entitled to. They will support each other. But Russian support to Iran is mostly support so that Iran can save itself – so some capabilities, some assistance, but short of direct military intervention, because Russia needs to prioritise Ukraine.

You mention Russia-Israeli relationships. Has anything changed or could change in this relationship because of this war?

For me, the Russia-Israel relationship has had its ups and downs already over the last four years against the backdrop of the full-scale invasion. Initially, the Israelis tried to mediate, remember, in March 2022 between Russia and Ukraine. They didn't join sanctions against Russia. Then the relationship soured a little bit when Yair Lapid took over the prime ministership in Israel. He, I think, criticised the Bucha massacre and was more forward-leaning in criticism of Russia, and you had a certain cooling in the Russia-Israel relationship.

It got worse after Hamas's October 7th attack and amid the Gaza war, where Russia opportunistically tapped into grievances over the Palestinian issue on the UN Security Council and you had a spike in opportunistic antisemitism in Russian state media and statements by Russian officials. But even as this was happening, at the highest level, at the strategic level, the Russia-Israel relationship remained intact.

Because the Israelis always knew, first of all, Russia is still present in Syria. So they have to deal with that. And the Israeli-Russian deconfliction channel on Syria stayed intact all the way until 8 December 2024, when Bashar al-Assad fell. And secondly, the Israelis always worry what more could Russia do for Iran.

And so from their point of view, they need a constructive channel with Moscow to make sure that Russia does not give sophisticated weapons to Iran. And I think they feel vindicated in this approach, because actually if we look over the last four years, yes, Russia has given some support to Iran, but it has not delivered the SU-35 fighter aircraft. It has not delivered sophisticated air defences.

So from an Israeli point of view, I think this approach was right, and it remains important even amid the current war. And I think the same logic applies to the Gulf Arab states. They need to deal with Russia for the same reasons and additional reasons: the fact that they sit together in OPEC+ and have to talk about oil production levels; the fact that you have thousands of Russian businesses also in the UAE. There are different layers of interests that tie these countries together that these countries have to navigate.

And this is the last thing I'll say on this – from all these countries' point of view, the worst-case scenario, and it is not an an improbable scenario, is that there will be no regime change in Iran, that the Islamic Republic stays intact, and that the current theocratic leadership stays, or maybe a leadership in which the IRGC will play a greater role.

Iran will be greatly weakened, but the regime is in power and it will need to reconstitute its military after this war, and who will Iran turn to? China and Russia. So there is a future of Russia-Iran cooperation that you also have to keep in mind from the perspective of these countries. And so you need channels to Moscow to talk about these things.

So you think that in the future, the Russian-Iranian relationship will be closer?

Not necessarily closer, but not weaker. Assuming that the regime stays in place, I think it will become even more dependent on Russia and China at least for a certain period because a lot of Iranian production sites and capabilities have been destroyed by Israel and the United States.

So it's going to be like a period after – I mean, it's not a perfect analogy, but after the Iran-Iraq war, after the 1980s, Iran needed to reconstitute militarily in the 90s, and they also turned to Russia during that period. So there could be a similar period where they need things from Russia and China to reconstitute. So we'll see a greater reliance by Iran on Russia and China.

And if Iran does not collapse, if it comes out of this war, it will have proven its resilience and also its utility in resisting the United States of America, and that will be useful to Russia in that regard.

So Russia will definitely keep its ties with the Islamic Republic intact, because that relationship gives Russia leverage with all other players in the Middle East. So I'm not necessarily seeing a much closer partnership, but I don't see a weakening of the partnership either.

As of now, who is more dependent on whom: Russia on Iranian drones, or Iran on Russia's diplomatic umbrella?

I think Iran is much more dependent on Russia than the other way around. I don't think that Russia at this time needs a lot from Iran in order to prosecute the war against Ukraine.

Russia has successfully localised the production of Shaheds and has even upgraded the systems in various ways: the anti-jamming capability, the speed, the warheads that they can carry. So they are more sophisticated weapons now than the original technology, and Russia is producing them in very high numbers now, so Russia doesn't really need drones from Iran anymore.

I also don't think that Russia needs Iranian ballistic missiles. There were some reported deliveries of Fath-360 ballistic missiles from Iran, but we never saw those deployed on the battlefield in Ukraine. And we also know that Russia is producing high numbers of ballistic missiles. So the short answer is, Russia doesn't need Iranian support to prosecute the war.

I think what North Korea provides Russia has long eclipsed the significance of Iranian support. That doesn't mean that Russia doesn't care about Iran being weakened – they can still work together in certain niche areas, they can maybe work together on new drone designs or other areas – but it's not existential for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

But Iran needs Russia right now mostly for diplomatic backing. The Russian veto on the UN Security Council is important, and we saw recently that Russia and China vetoed a Bahrain GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-sponsored resolution on the Strait of Hormuz at the UN Security Council which was seen as anti-Iranian, and the Russians ended up vetoing it.

That's important for Iran, but I will also note at the end here that politically and diplomatically, Russia is not that important a player in this war at the end of the day. President Putin tried to insert himself as a mediator or as someone putting forward suggestions early in the war, just like he tried last summer during the 12-day war. Donald Trump rebuffed him. And Pakistan emerged as a chief mediator or facilitator. The Chinese played some role getting us to the ceasefire last week.

And what you have is a certain, I would call it Russian diplomatic hyper-activity behind the scenes – Sergei Lavrov speaking constantly with counterparts in the region. This week he's in China also to discuss the Middle East.

But the Russians are not really playing a key role in mediating or facilitating with Iran, because other players don't want them at the table. And so they're important to Iran at the Security Council, but they're also not a key mediator between the United States and Iran.

On the mediation side, the only scenario in which Russia could play a role is if there is an agreement on what to do with Iran's highly enriched uranium. The Russians have offered for years to play a role, and there's a precedent in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] – Russia to ship the highly enriched uranium outside Iran and convert it into fuel – and the Russians keep reiterating this offer. So if we actually ever move into a phase where we have nuclear negotiations and a deal, there's theoretically a role for Russia if the United States is willing to let Russia play that role – and there's big question marks over that.

At the moment the two sides seem quite far away from each other, with the United States demanding a 20-year Iranian suspension of enrichment and the Iranians offering five years.

Is there any kind of scenario which will involve Russia more in the Iranian war and withdraw some Russian forces from Ukraine?

I'm quite sceptical. I do not think that Russia will intervene militarily.

The only scenario in which I could conceivably see it is: if this war produces a situation in which there's protracted internal instability inside Iran, I could see maybe some Russian emergency deployments, maybe PMCs [private military companies], to stabilise the regime. I don't see the Russian military intervening in fighting with the United States or Israel in this war – only this first scenario of stabilising the regime.

But even in that scenario, I think it would be calibrated. I think the Russian military has been quite risk-averse over the last four years while it has been fighting Ukraine. From Russian peacekeepers standing aside when Azerbaijan took over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, to the decision to abandon the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 and not surge Russian forces to help him withstand the rebel offensive, to the aversion to any entanglement in the war with Iran last summer – there's a pattern emerging here where I think the Russians understand that they cannot spare this kind of capacity.

And even in theatres where they have been going on the offence, like in the Sahel where after Prigozhin's failed mutiny, the Africa Corps has been deploying to more countries, it is in low numbers, and it is low-investment, low-risk deployments, because I think there is an understanding that, again, the priority is the war against Ukraine. And so for all of those reasons, I think it would be only under extreme and very specific scenarios that Russia could do something more for Iran.

Do you think it's because Russia just doesn't want to, or because it doesn't want to spoil the relationship with the US?

These factors are not mutually exclusive. Inability and political calculus can both play a role and both point in the same direction. I think there is a lack of bandwidth to do much for Iran at this time, so it's a lack of capacity. But it is also a political calculus. It is about not antagonising Israel, the Gulf Arab states and the Trump administration by being too forward-leaning in support of Iran.

But we have also seen so far that Russia has been getting away with providing some support for Iran. When Trump administration officials were confronted with the information that Russia is sharing targeting data with Iran – Donald Trump, Marco Rubio at one point – they essentially brushed this off as either inconsequential to the American war effort or, in Trump's case, even understandable when he kind of said, "Well, I guess Russia is doing for Iran what we are doing for Ukraine." So at this point, Russia is not paying a political price for the calibrated support it is giving to Iran.

My point is that if Russia were to escalate its support for Iran drastically, that could change. Not necessarily with the Trump administration, but perhaps with Israel and with the Gulf Arab States. So it needs to walk this balancing act of balancing these different relationships.

Ukraine has become useful for Iran's adversaries. What are the prospects of this, in your view?

Ukraine is becoming newly important to the Arab states for sure as a result of this war. The Ukrainian president towards Gulf Arab capitals. Ukraine has capabilities to offer that no one else has in that way, and expertise. And I really hope that the Ukrainian government is getting a good bargain for what it is offering to these countries.

So I think there is definitely a prospect for building more robust bilateral ties with all of these countries.

Will it mean that Ukraine can achieve a situation where these countries are also willing to reduce their cooperation with Russia? I honestly have doubts, because these countries have multi-layered long-standing ties with the Russian Federation too.

All these countries understand that Russia has a veto on the UN Security Council that it can wield. These countries look at Russia as a great power. The Gulf Arab states need to deal with Russia in OPEC+.

There are these complex layers of interests and ties. And so I think what the Arab states will do is they will expand their cooperation with Ukraine, no question, but they will try to do so without antagonising Russia. and they will also keep dealing with Russia. They are looking beyond Russia and Ukraine.

The Middle East is a region that's changing. It is a region that's at war. These countries are also hedging against an uncertain future in terms of the United States' presence and commitment to the region. They're looking towards China. They're looking towards other security partners. Saudi Arabia not so long ago signed a security agreement with Pakistan. So they're hedging for an uncertain future. They want a variety of partners and they don't want to put all their eggs in one basket. So that will apply to the Ukraine-Russia equation too.

And my last question for you today will be a more philosophical one: from your point of view, has World War III already started?

I don't look at what is happening in the world as a Third World War. We have a hot war in Europe, which I think will go on for some time. Even if we have a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, it does not solve the fundamental issue: the fundamental Russian intent to politically control Ukraine and in fact to revive the European security architecture as it crystallised after the end of the Cold War.

And we have a war in the Middle East now, which to me is the logical culmination point of October 7th, which is when Israel decided to take on Iran and the Axis of Resistance militarily, and did so in sequential steps and witnessed an opportunity to take on Iran, because its partners are weakened because you have a partner in the US administration that was amenable. So different factors came together for Israel to decide this is the time to do this. So we have this situation.

Now of course there are interlinkages between these theatres, because we have the Russian-Iranian partnership that we talked about, now we have a Ukrainian-Gulf partnership emerging, so there are these linkages because we are in an interconnected world.

My own view is that even with a Russian partnership with China, North Korea and Iran, which has without hesitation been incredibly important to the Russian war effort, I don't look at the world and understand it as being composed of a Russia-Iran-China-North Korea camp and the rest.

I think that the world is much more complicated. I think that a lot of players are hedging between different partners, between different powers. I don't think we're moving towards some kind of new bipolarity of democracies versus autocracies or CRINK [China, Russia, Iran and North Korea] versus the Western world. I think we're moving into something much, much messier and much more complex that is not going to fit into neat categories.