"No reform, only an illusory six-month reprieve": why military personnel are criticising Defence Ministry proposals
On 12 June, Ukraine's Ministry of Defence unveiled the details of its long-awaited military reform, including new contracts, fixed terms of service for the first time, increased payments and other changes.
In response, some service members began thanking Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov's team for "cleaning up the Augean Stables" that none of the previous defence ministers nor either of the commanders-in-chiefs had been willing to go anywhere near.
Most, however, have been unsparing in their criticism.
Ukrainska Pravda spoke with around 30 service members occupying various positions and levels of responsibility in order to gain a broad understanding of military reactions to the Ministry of Defence's proposals.
Interestingly, some of our interviewees have no intention of leaving the military any time soon, even under the new contracts, as they are convinced that the war will not end in the near future.
Below we outline the main grievances voiced by service members – often in remarkably direct and emotional terms – and explain several of the proposed changes that may have been misinterpreted.
The key provisions of the Defence Ministry's reform are as follows:
- New contracts are being introduced: contracts lasting 6-14 months for infantry and assault troops, and 24-month contracts for all other military specialisations. Upon completion of their contracts, service members will receive a guaranteed deferral from mobilisation for at least six months. Previously such deferrals did not exist, except under the "18-24" contract scheme for volunteers aged 18-24.
- In addition to the six-month basic deferral period, a cumulative deferral system is being introduced. The longer a service member remains in the military and the more time they spend in combat positions, the longer the deferral they will receive. In theory, this deferral could extend to several years.
- Since 13 June, service members who have gone absent without leave have been allowed to return directly to some of the military's most sought-after brigades without first passing through reserve battalions or the Military Law Enforcement Service, which previously served as an intermediary stage. This guarantees placement in their chosen unit rather than assignment to a regiment or brigade with priority staffing rights. The measure is temporary and will remain in effect until 20 September 2026.
- Soldiers and sergeants are being granted the right to transfer automatically through Army+ [a government app created for the military] within the corps under which their brigade is operating (this option will not be available to officers). For example, an infantryman serving in the 155th Brigade, which is fighting under the operational command of the 7th Air Assault Corps on the Pokrovsk front, may transfer to the 25th Air Assault Brigade if it is operating under the same corps and on the same front.
- Some categories of service personnel will receive higher pay. Rear-echelon personnel will earn UAH 30,000 (about US$668) per month, personnel serving at command posts UAH 70,000 (US$1,558), brigade commanders UAH 150,000 (US$3,338), corps commanders UAH 230,000 (US$5,119), and infantry and assault troops between UAH 300,000 and UAH 460,000 (US$6,700-10,242) per month.
Overall, the Defence Ministry's proposals are sensible and necessary. Moreover, had they been introduced in 2024, they would likely have been regarded as a major step forward.
Now, however, in 2026, in the twelfth year of the war, when one of service members' key demands is at least some form of partial demobilisation (we will return to this term shortly), the state's offer to "serve a little longer" feels less like recognition of their contribution and more like an insult.
Let's take a closer look at the concerns being raised by military personnel.
1. No clear terms of service
The first and most significant issue that service personnel raise regarding the new reform is that it totally fails to meet their expectations. The reform does not provide a clear answer to the question that matters most to them: WHEN WILL I BE ABLE TO GO HOME?
This issue is particularly acute for those who joined the military voluntarily between 2014 and 2022, as well as during the first few months of the full-scale invasion.
Consider this: a civilian who enlisted in 2014 and has managed to preserve both their health and their life until now has been fighting for 10 to 12 years (we have encountered many such people while reporting from the front). Someone who enlisted in 2022 has now been at war for more than four years.
"I genuinely don't understand why those who have been serving since the ATO-Joint Forces Operation period and who automatically had their service extended after 24 February 2022 [all contracts signed before 2022 became open-ended – ed.] should have to sign another contract at all. If anyone deserves priority when it comes to discharge, it's them," an officer from one of the Air Assault Forces corps told UP.
[The ATO or Anti-Terrorist Operation is a term used from 2014 to 2018 by the media, the government of Ukraine and the OSCE to identify combat actions in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts against Russian military forces and pro-Russian separatists. The Joint Forces Operation succeeded the ATO and lasted between 2018 and 2022 – ed.]
"Why, after four and a half years of service, should I have to serve another two?" a soldier deployed on the Dobropillia front, who has been serving since 2022, asked rhetorically.
"In my view, mate, we've been stitched up. Taken for fools behind our backs..." said an FPV drone pilot who has been fighting since the early days of 2022, quoting a song by Kuzma Skriabin.
Instead of offering a clear discharge date, the Ministry of Defence is proposing that all current service members serve an additional period – between six and 14 months for infantry personnel or 24 months for drone operators, logistics personnel and other specialisations. Only after completing this "additional" service would they receive a deferral from remobilisation for at least six months.
Those who choose not to sign the new contracts will continue serving until demobilisation. Among the service members interviewed by UP, this was by far the most common position.
A contract soldier and a mobilised soldier serving, for example, in the same trench will receive the same pay.
"And what if the war ends in six months but I still have 18 months left on my contract? What am I then, some kind of mug? I ask myself that every six months," explained Bohdan, who has been fighting since 2022, when asked why he intends to wait for demobilisation.
"I want to keep serving under mobilisation because, as a UAV operator, this contract offers me nothing new. The automatic transfer system has a limit of 50 people per brigade – first come, first served. As for the money, we already had logistics and support personnel who were earning more before this reform. Rear-echelon staff were getting UAH 50,000 (US$1,113) for almost a year. So what now – back to UAH 30,000 (US$668)?" said a UAV pilot currently serving in Sumy Oblast, explaining why he intends to remain under mobilisation.
"There is no reform. There is only an illusory six-month reprieve after two years on a contract," he added angrily.
Those who still believe in demobilisation – in the best possible sense of the phrase – are mostly former civilians who are prepared to devote themselves to military service during the active phase of the war but do not see themselves remaining in the armed forces once it is over. Not for higher pay, nor for any other incentives.
"As long as the war is being fought, I want to fight. Once it's over, all that's left is the army and army bulls**t. I don't particularly want anything here to keep me around after that," Bohdan added.
At a recent briefing dedicated to the reform, however, Fedorov's deputy, Mstyslav Banik, appeared to become the first official to publicly acknowledge that the ministry is not yet prepared to discuss demobilisation. Any large-scale demobilisation process and the transition of the military to a peacetime footing can only begin once hostilities have ended – and nobody knows when that will happen.
Banik asked journalists not to use the word "demobilisation" and instead to use the term "discharge".
2. Uncertainty over who will be eligible for discharge outside the contract system
Another aspect of the reform that warrants particular attention is the proposed "phased discharge of those who were mobilised earlier". This process is expected to begin as early as the end of this autumn and would run in parallel with discharges under the new contract scheme.
The first person to raise this possibility publicly was the president when announcing the military reform in early May. The Ministry of Defence later echoed the idea, including through statements by Fedorov and Banik.
For service members, however, the proposal remains entirely unclear.
On the one hand, many view it as a fragile source of hope that they may be able to leave the military without having to accept any additional conditions. On the other, they still do not know who exactly will be classified as having been "mobilised earlier", how pre-2022 service will be calculated and documented, or – most importantly – how long they will have to wait for their turn. This procedure is still being developed.
Those classified as having been "mobilised earlier" are expected to be discharged under a separate presidential decree.
In theory, if one assumes that Ukraine's armed forces currently number around one million personnel, and that only a few thousand service members can be discharged each month – perhaps even fewer – some individuals could end up waiting years for their turn.
"The number of service members discharged each month will depend on the situation on the battlefield, whether Russia announces a mobilisation campaign or not, and many other factors," Fedorov explained in an interview with Ukrainian TV channel 1+1.
This may be why he advises everyone, including those who have served the longest, to sign the new contracts. If their turn for discharge arrives before the contract expires – for example, in November 2026 – they would be able to return home.
According to the minister, in such cases a presidential decree would take precedence over the contract. However, the service members interviewed by UP remain sceptical that such a mechanism will work effectively.
3. All the attention and bonuses are for civilians that the state wants to recruit
Another source of discontent was that the military felt it was not the target audience for the reform.
From their perspective – and, in fact, judging by Minister Fedorov's own statements – the primary audience for this reform is civilians whom the state is trying to attract into the armed forces. In other words, the transformation of Ukraine's defence forces has begun with an attempt to make them a more comfortable and appealing place for newcomers: here are clear service terms and high salaries – just come and join.
In theory, this is an entirely logical step. It is meant to encourage civilians to join the army and replace those who already want to leave it. However, there are two caveats.
The first is that some military personnel see it as deeply unfair that civilians who have still not joined the military twelve years into the war are immediately offered better conditions.
"It turns out that the longer a person postpones joining the army, the better the conditions they are eventually offered. And those who enlisted when things were at their hardest once again remain outside all the new incentive programmes and speeches," writes Alina Mykhailova, head of the Ulf medical service, in her column.
"I don't want to cry betrayal, the guys [Fedorov's team – UP] have stepped into 'Augean Stables' that no one before them even dared to tackle. Although they say they spoke to service members at all levels, there is a sense that the logic underpinning this reform is very warped… What Alina [Mykhailova] wrote really resonates. Everyone is thinking about how to offer great conditions to those they want to recruit, while those who are already here 'have nowhere to go'," an officer named Hennadii shared his thoughts with UP.
One of our sources, a soldier from the 93rd Brigade who has been in the army for ten years, has not even read the news about the new contracts. He is convinced that the state will not release him from service for a long time. It should be noted that for a year of service between 2014 and 2022, the Ministry of Defence offers only one month of deferral, whereas for a year after 2022, it's six months.
In response to concerns about unfairness towards those already serving, the Defence Ministry says that, firstly, those who have served the longest should wait for the discharge procedure under a presidential decree. Secondly, a current serviceman can sign a new contract for 10 months, while a civilian can only sign one for 14 (as if this were truly a significant difference).
The second caveat – or rather, a concern about the logic of the reform – is that it is currently difficult to say whether it will work for civilians at all. Because if it doesn't, who will replace those leaving their posts? And will they even be able to leave?
"If there is no one to replace the current assault troops, if there are not enough conscripted personnel, then how will the state demobilise the current assault troops? It will be easier to rewrite the service terms on paper than to leave the front exposed. Although Fedorov's team promises to present changes to the mobilisation process at the next stage of the reform. If we see queues at recruitment centres rather than just polished presentations, then we will be able to be happy for our guys and see them off on leave. For now, the reform is viewed with scepticism," an officer from one of the assault regiments told UP.
UP also, out of curiosity, asked one conscription-age man who is currently avoiding service but regularly donates money whether the new contracts had inspired him. He replied that the topic of "new contracts" simply does not exist in his civilian bubble.
"It's being discussed on Threads, among the military, journalists – they are the ones thinking whether to sign a contract or not, reading into it. But civilians don't care, just as before. They are only thinking about whether their disability group [deferral based on a fictitious disability – UP], deferral or university admission will be cancelled. They have already decided for themselves that they will not go. Maybe only those who cannot afford a deferral will look into these contracts. If this had been adopted in 2024, maybe something would have changed. But now it's two years too late," the man said.
4. Lack of clarity on what to do with existing contracts and whether deferral will apply
The issue is that Fedorov's proposed contracts are not the only ones of their kind. Before them, there were million-hryvnia contracts for young people aged 18-24 (which, unfortunately, did not work out). Before those, there were standard army contracts for one, three or five years or contracts "until the end of the special period".
This means that part of the Ukrainian military (according to UP estimates, at least 25-30%) is already serving under various contracts. At present, they do not understand whether they should terminate their current contracts in favour of new ones, or how deferral will be calculated for them.
"Personally, I was really waiting for instructions on what those of us with 'until demobilisation' contracts [often signed in 2022 – UP] should do. Because I'm on one myself. And with every legislative change, these contracts are constantly overlooked. Yet a huge number of people signed them – practically everyone in my circle is on such a contract. It feels as though no one remembers them anymore," an officer from one of the Air Assault Forces corps told UP.
A few days ago, Deputy Defence Minister Mstyslav Banik clarified on his Facebook page that service members who already have contracts may either re-sign them under the new terms or serve out their existing ones. However, what this means for deferral remains unclear, and UP has so far been unable to establish this.
Service members themselves are awaiting official guidance, which is expected to be issued to military units, on whether it is worth re-signing their contracts.
Incidentally, there is another notable detail: following Banik's briefing, his remarks about the "special status of officers" – implying they are too valuable to be released from service – were widely reported.
However, as the Defence Ministry clarified to UP, this claim is incorrect. Officers can sign new contracts and expect deferment on equal terms with others. Banik himself, who is an active serviceman, has already signed a 24-month contract and expects to receive deferral after completing it.
5. Uneven salary increases
Perhaps the second most contentious aspect of the reform, after the lack of clear service terms, is the pay rises.
The main grievance among service members is that the increase has effectively bypassed UAV operators and technicians, who now account for the majority of battlefield strikes and have effectively replaced a significant number of other military specialisations. It has also only marginally affected rear-echelon personnel – logisticians, cooks, media staff and others.
Formally, the pay of rear personnel has indeed increased by as much as 50%, from UAH 20,000 (US$445) to UAH 30,000 (US$667).
However, when one considers the cost of food, fuel and rent in cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv or Pavlohrad – where many rear headquarters are based – it becomes clear that, firstly, this pay is meagre. Secondly, it falls far short of what would be expected for what should now be considered a prestigious profession.
While working in the east, UP regularly encounters service members in rear positions who rent rooms in the homes of elderly people because they cannot afford separate accommodation.
"If rear positions are so unimportant, then why do they exist? If they are necessary for the functioning of the army, then why are the people who have been ensuring its operation for years paid salaries that increasingly lag behind the realities of life?" Alina Mykhailova aptly asks in her column mentioned above.
At the briefing, UP asked Deputy Minister Banik why rear personnel receive such low pay and whether this aligns with the concept of fairness that the Ministry of Defence so strongly emphasises. He replied that the ministry would be happy to pay more, but is constrained by available resources.
Separately, several sources focused on assault troops and infantry in the context of salary increases. The question is whether high pay (UAH 300,000 (US$6,700) – UAH 460,000 (US$10,200) per month) can now, in 2026, motivate new recruits to join the infantry – that is, to undertake the most difficult and dangerous tasks.
An officer from one of the assault regiments, speaking to UP on condition of anonymity, is convinced that pay does not significantly influence the motivation of assault troops.
"Our fighters already earn significantly more than they did in civilian life – instead of UAH 10,000 (US$222) – UAH 20,000 (US$445), they now receive UAH 100,000 (US$2,200) – UAH 200,000 (US$4,450). For them, this is already a different income level, and it is sufficient. Increasing it to UAH 300,000 (US$6,700) – UAH 400,000 (US$8,900) makes little difference. Moreover, previous attempts to use financial incentives have not produced tangible results. We do have some who joined under the '18-24' contract, but overall, a million did not motivate young people. It is unlikely that the current increase will either," the officer said.
***
At the next stage of the reform, the Ministry of Defence promises to address the mobilisation process – in particular, Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres as its main instruments – as well as the two million Ukrainians who are evading military service.
What exactly will be changed and what methods will be used to work with draft dodgers remains unknown. To all journalists' questions about mobilisation – perhaps the most broken, painful, yet necessary process – the Ministry of Defence responds: "Wait and see."
Despite the justified criticism directed at Fedorov's team, it must be acknowledged that they have taken on some of the most difficult challenges of our time. And we all have a vested interest in seeing them resolved.
Let the walls of the stables come crashing down.
Olha Kyrylenko, UP
Translated by Anna Kybukevych and Yelyzaveta Khodatska
Edited by Susan McDonald