"Gryphon": Ukrainian forces combine robots with drones to strike Russians deep in the rear. Interview with the commander of "NC13"

In January of this year, the "NC13" strike UGV unit of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade tested a new tactic deep behind Russian lines. Since then, the unit has successfully carried out more than 100 similar operations, turning what began as an experiment into a proven combat system.

The new tactic was named "Gryphon" in honor of a service member from the unit who went missing in action in 2023 while carrying out a combat mission near Andriivka in the Donetsk region. It was in this area, near Bakhmut, that Oscar-winning Ukrainian director Mstyslav Chernov filmed the documentary "2000 Meters to Andriivka" during a different Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The concept behind the new tactic involves deploying kamikaze UGVs, essentially ground robots, deep behind enemy lines using heavy bomber drones. After landing, the robotic systems continue moving toward their targets and can be used to strike key positions, logistics, and personnel while also creating disruption in the enemy rear.

The "NC13" unit was also behind an operation that drew significant international attention about a year ago, when Ukrainian forces captured Russian positions without deploying infantry, using only UGVs and drones.

As a result, two Russian service members surrendered to the robotic systems, after which the machines escorted them to Ukrainian positions as prisoners of war.

Today, the new tactic is part of the Third Army Corps' large-scale operation known as "Vivaldi." Since the start of the offensive, Ukrainian forces have liberated 176 square kilometers of territory (68 square miles).

According to the Office of the President of Ukraine, Russian forces suffered more than 5,000 casualties, including those killed, wounded, and captured, during the first three stages of the operation. It is currently known that Ukrainian forces have taken 250 Russian service members as prisoners of war (POWs). The Third Army Corps separately reported 2,000 Russian personnel casualties during the latest stage alone.

Approximately 80% of logistics and 90% of wounded evacuation for Ukrainian troops during all three stages of the operation were carried out by unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs.

"NC13" commander Mykola Zinkevych, call sign "Makar," explains how the new "Gryphon" tactic works, how the idea of air-dropping ground robots emerged, what happened during the first operations, how Russian forces are reacting to the technology, and why he believes Ukraine is shaping the future of technological warfare.

He also discusses how Western partners are becoming less able to understand Ukrainian military technologies and, more broadly, the needs of modern warfare.

- Can you please explain, in general, what this new tactic involves?

- In general, this is a sabotage-operation tactic that was fully planned, developed, and implemented by the "NC13" strike unmanned ground systems unit of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade.

The tactic is genuinely new and has no equivalent anywhere in the world because no one had previously deployed unmanned ground vehicles from unmanned aerial vehicles.

The concept itself is that, using heavy bombers, we drop small ground-based kamikaze systems deep into enemy territory, at a distance of 5 to 15 kilometers (3 to 9.3 miles). From there, we carry out different sabotage operations: eliminating enemy personnel, destroying logistics, and so on.

- When did you begin using this tactic? Any first operation is essentially a test. How confident were you that it would work?

- We carried out the first operation about eight months ago (in January 2026- UP).

We spent quite a long time developing the tactic itself and modifying the equipment because standard ground-based kamikaze systems are not designed for this kind of use.

The engineers spent a great deal of time making it work. The pilots also had to learn how to operate with these systems and deploy them correctly. The planning department, accordingly, spent a lot of time preparing the operation.

But when it worked for the first time, the excitement was incredible. Our first operation went 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) deep behind enemy lines. We deployed two ground-based kamikaze systems near the target, and from there, the systems themselves moved into the shelter.

It was an enemy staging point where personnel were brought in. They would stop there to rest before moving on to carry out their missions. We eliminated that staging point using two ground-based kamikaze systems.

- What was the enemy's reaction? What did it look like from their side?

- In fact, the enemy did not understand what had happened, what system had been used, what had struck them, or what tactic we were employing.

Even now, it remains a major surprise for them because we operate in different sectors within the Third Army Corps' area of responsibility.

We combine different technologies in order to change the rules on the battlefield.

We have been able to strike the enemy from the air at significant depth for quite some time. We have also been using unmanned ground vehicles to strike enemy forces for a while.

But this combination (UGV + UAV) allows us to operate at greater depth, in areas where the enemy does not expect to be reached and where they feel relatively safe. So we are going to take that freedom away from them.

- How many such operations have been carried out so far?

- More than one hundred. We always work systematically. If something works once, twice, or three times, we still do not consider it a fully established capability because it could be accidental.

But when something is carried out more than ten times, it becomes a systematic approach. We have SOPs, standard operating procedures, in place for this tactic: how to use it, where it can be implemented, and what its capabilities are.

It can be used for reconnaissance, mining deep behind enemy lines, striking targets, hunting moving enemy personnel, disrupting logistics, and more. We have fully developed this tactic, identified all of its capabilities, and now use it as a full-fledged tool on the battlefield.

- War in general, and especially Russia's war against Ukraine, is a war of speed. Everything depends on who can come up with something new and adapt faster. Are the Russians already trying to do something similar?

- I am confident that we are far ahead of the enemy. Even when it comes to the systematic use of strike unmanned ground vehicles on the battlefield, which we have been doing for about a year, the enemy is still far behind.

So when it comes to tactics like "Gryphon," which we are discussing today, there is still a very large gap between us and them.

But I would not rule out the possibility that, over time, the enemy will begin copying this approach and using similar methods.

In fact, during more than 100 successful missions, there have been many almost meme-like moments when the enemy had no idea what they were looking at and would actually approach the robots to inspect them.

There was one occasion when we managed to completely disrupt a Russian mechanized assault that had been planned for foggy weather conditions. At the time, we were actively targeting one of the enemy's logistics routes. We eliminated several personnel over the course of the day.

They started to panic because they did not understand what was happening. They thought a sabotage and reconnaissance group, or SRG, had broken through into their rear. As a result, they canceled the mechanized assault they had planned for that day.

So these small robots can create very significant disruption.

In general, there was serious panic among enemy forces at the depth where we were operating. And panic is actually very important because if we create panic within enemy ranks, they begin to have problems controlling their personnel. Soldiers start refusing to carry out missions, which then creates panic at the command level because commanders do not understand what is happening in their rear, and so on.

That creates destabilization, and all of that works in our favor.

- Why exactly do they panic?

- Even when you know what it is, you can become even more afraid. You do not know where it might be waiting for you, where it might drive, where it might catch up with you, and so on. So in some ways, it is even better when they know.

You know, now you have to watch not only the sky, but also the ground beneath your feet. Not just for mines, but because something might come after you.

There was one interesting intercepted communication where an enemy soldier reported to his commander that a "Baba Yaga" (russian military slang for heavy bomber drones - UP) had flown in, landed, then started driving and chasing them.

It was pretty funny to listen to.

But it did catch them in the end.

- This tactic seems to have many advantages. Which one do you consider the most important?

- The absolute advantage of using any technology is that, first and foremost, we do not have to put people at risk. We preserve human lives.

For me, as the commander of a strike UGV unit and as a former infantryman, it is actually more important to preserve our own personnel, to protect Ukrainian infantrymen, assault troops, and soldiers, than it is to destroy the enemy. Destroying the enemy comes second.

And in fact, by destroying the enemy, we prevent them from advancing toward our forces and make life easier for our infantry. So above all, any technology helps us protect human life. Robots do not bleed, and human life is priceless. That is essentially our guiding principle throughout everything we do.

The next advantage, of course, is depth. The depth at which we can operate with these systems.

Yes, 10 to 15 kilometers (6.2 to 9.3 miles) is not the maximum range. Unfortunately, I cannot disclose the exact figures. But we are deployed and then continue moving very, very deep into enemy territory. The deeper we go, the more valuable, so to speak, the resources and targets we can destroy.

- You touched a little on the future. Is there already a vision for how this technology could develop? I will not ask exactly how, but should we expect it to be scaled up further?

- Yes. By the end of 2026, there will be many large-scale, exciting, and interesting stories, announcements, and new tactics from our unit.

We already have a number of newly implemented applications and tactics involving unmanned ground vehicles, (including the use of UGVs equipped with grenade launchers, which is also a new and unique tactic -UP).

It is simply not yet the right time to talk about them. And we have many more things planned. So we just need to wait a little longer.

- Western countries have traditionally been considered leaders in military technology. You speak with foreign military officials. How well do they understand the technological breakthrough currently taking place in Ukraine?

- I attended the Munich Security Conference in February and had the opportunity to speak with many foreign military officials, various partners, and government representatives.

In reality, they are very far behind. Absolutely.

They understand what we are talking about, what we are deploying, what we are using, and how it works. But they do not fully understand its importance and value on the battlefield, or just how much the battlefield itself has changed.

And I am more than certain that the rest of the world is lagging very, very far behind.

Even the technologies I see being introduced into militaries around the world are still quite far removed from what is actually being used on the battlefield between Ukraine and Russia.

Looking specifically at unmanned ground vehicles, I have seen their entire evolution on the front line, from 2024 until today.

We work, interact, and collaborate with many manufacturers. A great deal of equipment has been developed because we provided our expertise and doctrine.

I also have a certain number of systems produced by foreign manufacturers, and there is a very significant difference between them (Ukrainian and Western UGVs - UP).

We are not even talking about price, although the prices are extremely high. But in terms of actual battlefield use, Western systems still fall far short of the needs of the modern battlefield.

- Are foreign partners reaching out to Ukrainian military personnel often enough for this kind of expertise? Is there interest in contributing to the development of these innovations?

- I would say they do reach out, but not nearly as actively as they should. In my opinion, this is the kind of expertise people should be actively pursuing, not just occasionally asking, "So, what are you working on?"

No one knows what will happen in the world tomorrow. We live in a time when you never know what to expect.

- If Ukraine can offer something to its partners, what can it receive from them in return?

- Ukraine is the sword and shield of Europe. It is defending not only itself and its own future, but the future of the entire continent.

So every time other countries help us, they should understand that they are not only helping Ukrainians. They are also helping themselves.

Right now, Ukraine especially needs effective and timely weapons deliveries from its partners. First and foremost, this means air defense systems capable of protecting Ukrainian cities from attacks, as well as heavy weapons, including artillery and armored vehicles, that can help Ukraine regain the initiative on the battlefield.

Of course, this support must always be justified. Because Ukraine is doing everything possible to defend its territory, - liberate occupied land, and protect the future of the country and the nation, - that is why all of these processes and technologies have emerged.

The battlefield has effectively become a testing ground for innovation. On the one hand, that is a positive thing.

But on the other hand, it is deeply tragic, because every such achievement comes at a price. And that price is not paid in money. It is paid with the lives of Ukrainian service members and people who should have been the future of the Ukrainian nation.

- History has seen many cases where a promising technology or a major breakthrough emerged, but it was overlooked, underfunded, or never scaled up...

- This is not something that appeared only today. It is something that has been developed and planned over a period of time, has already been implemented for quite a while, and is constantly being modernized.

It will continue to evolve and eventually grow into something new.

Because there are technologies that work today. There are technologies that will work tomorrow. And there are technologies that worked yesterday but no longer work today.

But each of them becomes a driving force behind the next one.

Kateryna Lisunova, Ukrainska Pravda