How Ukraine's defence industry can outlast Washington's political cycles
U.S. Midterm elections saw the Democrats winning control of both chambers of Congress, delivering a decisive blow to Republican governance and marking a new stage of congressional resistance to President Donald Trump. While many rejoiced the success of the Blue wave, it is no more of a Democrat victory than it is a protest vote against the status quo. Post-election data suggests that voters were driven by heavy inflation, cost of living and economic insecurity. Additional post-election polling showed high dissatisfaction with both parties and an electorate driven by anger.
While the American voters hope for a change domestically, international observers question how the turning tide will affect their relationship with the U.S. Nowhere is that more important than in a war fighting Ukraine. President Zelenskyy has expressed hopes for increased U.S. support following the midterm election results. A Democratic Congress has greater control over appropriations, committee leadership, hearings and oversight of the Pentagon and administration. And yet, Congress does not control the U.S. foreign policy. The executive branch, under President Trump, controls implementation and the president retains the veto power.
The juxtaposition between the Congressional support and the executive delivery was recently exemplified by the delayed allocation of the $400 million in military aid to Ukraine, which Congress approved months prior to the actual disbursement. The instance illustrates that while Congress can authorize support, the executive branch still has to deliver it. Therefore, while the midterms strengthen Ukraine's position in Washington, they do not remove the political uncertainty surrounding American assistance.
Hence, Ukraine should not interpret Democratic victory as a reason to become politically identified with the party. On the contrary, the real lesson should be the opposite. American majorities change quickly: today's congressional majority can become tomorrow's minority. Given that U.S. holds elections every two years, maintaining a bipartisan line remains essential for Ukraine because if support for the country becomes associated primarily with one American party, it is Ukraine that eventually pays the price.
In fact, President Zelenskyy has experienced the complicated American party line dynamics in September 2024, when he visited the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania, a critical swing state and Biden's hometown. After he appeared with only Democratic representatives, House Speaker Mike Johnson accused the visit of looking like a partisan campaign event and demanded that Ukraine recall its Ambassador Oksana Markarova. This led to a troubled start of Kyiv – Washington relationship, and a lack of trust between the two Administrations.
Yet, both Democrat and Republican parties have a significant number of Ukraine supporters, and a number of Republican Senators were among those who challenged Pentagon delays over existing assistance. The objective should therefore be not to become closer to Democrats, but to use the new Congress to rebuild a broader American consensus around Ukraine. Kyiv still needs American military assistance, and previous experiences show that every new aid package can become another political battle.
Thus, the current political situation should be used as a political window to build something more durable. As observed by former Congressman (D) and Partner at Ballard Partners, Robert Wexler, "The new Congress will be made up of several Members with military and national security experience which bodes well for improved U.S. - Ukraine relations. It will also be another opportunity to focus on Ukraine's enormous value to the USA as we rebuild our military capabilities." The 2024 U.S. – Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement provides the framework for this cooperation, calling for defense research and development, increased Ukrainian production, U.S. financing and technology transfer, joint development and production and UAV manufacturing cooperation. The architecture is already in place, but the problem is the implementation.
In fact, a closer cooperation with the U.S. would greatly benefit the emerging Ukrainian defense technology sector. Ukraine's defense sector produced roughly $12 billion in 2025, up from about $1 billion in 2022; yet, it attracted only around $105 million in foreign investment. The usual explanation for limited investment lies in the lack of ease of doing business: legal uncertainty, weak IP protection and underdeveloped capital markets. However, a more significant issue is the fact that Ukraine lacks market access.
A Ukrainian drone company primarily dependent on the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for its contracts has a very different profile than the same company who is qualified to sell to the Pentagon and NATO markets. That changes its revenues, financing options and attractiveness to Western investors. A more supportive Congress can therefore help not only by sending American weapons to Ukraine, but by helping Ukrainian weapons enter the American market.
Importantly, the U.S. interested in obtaining Ukrainian battle-tested technology. Former Chief of Staff of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Noah Kroloff, who oversaw 240,000 employees, a $60 billion budget and 22 federal agencies, noted that "From a domestic national-security perspective, what Ukraine's defense industry is demonstrating during the war is that the U.S. defense establishment can adopt lessons from the application of modern symmetrical warfare in Ukraine. Technology is part of the answer, but how technology is applied, modified and adapted in the fight is a huge take away from what Ukraine is doing. There is also a question in what is next for integration into U.S. and NATO rearmament programs."
The Pentagon has already expressed its interest in evaluating new drone technology under its Drone Dominance program, designed to buy large numbers of inexpensive, NDAA-compliant drones rapidly and expand U.S. drone industrial base. Ukrainian technology has already entered the program; however, the participation requires much more than battlefield performance. Participating companies need to prove their compliant supply chains, certifications, production capacity, working capital and American industrial relationships. Here, the Ukrainian government has an opportunity to bolster its defense tech sector by removing the current barriers between Ukrainian battlefield technology and American procurement efforts. The U.S. is more willing to engage with a selected number of leading Ukrainian drone manufactures, then agreeing on a $50 billion blanket drone deal.
Ukraine should treat creating a faster route into U.S. procurement as one of its strategic priorities under the new political status quo in Washington. Additionally, Kyiv should welcome American capital to Ukraine, especially in the shape of joint-ventures and manufacturing opportunities. Becoming an integrated part of U.S. defense architecture would then allow Ukraine to achieve its most critical strategic priority – continued military assistance.
The midterm elections created an opening, but only Ukraine's defense industry can keep it open. Kyiv should use the next two years for a durable effort of building together with the U.S.: turning Ukrainian defense companies into suppliers, partners and investable businesses inside the American defense system. The ultimate measure of success will not simply be how much money the new Congress allocates to Ukraine. It will be whether, by the next U.S. election, Ukrainian defense technology has become valuable enough to the United States that supporting it is no longer only a foreign-policy decision but also a domestic American industry interest.
David Zaikin