One warm summer day, at around four o'clock in the afternoon, a resident of the Simferopol district in Crimea – whose name we'll keep secret – joined the queue at a petrol station. There were a lot of cars ahead of him already, so he knew it would be a long wait. But he had no choice. He needed to set off on a trip the next day and his fuel tank was almost empty, with barely enough petrol to make it home.
Over the next eight hours, he crawled his way towards the pump, metre by metre. He watched as some drivers turned up and cut in ahead because someone else had been saving a place for them while queueing themselves. He was equally irritated by others who were waiting despite still having at least half a tank full.
It's not hard to imagine how he felt when the filling station ran out of petrol moments before his turn finally came. He had to spend the night in his car so as not to lose his place in the queue.
He eventually managed to get some petrol at around 11:00 the following day, after spending 19 hours waiting in his vehicle. He was allowed to buy just 20 litres (about 5.3 gallons) – the current limit per customer in Crimea – before finally driving home.
This is just one of the many stories that have flooded Crimean social media over the past two weeks. Occupied Crimea is facing an unprecedented fuel crisis unlike anything seen before.
The crisis is the result of a series of strikes by Ukraine's defence forces on the logistics infrastructure that supplies fuel to the peninsula. The long queues at petrol stations, with no guarantee that fuel will be available even after hours of waiting, are only the most visible symptom.
In this article, we explore how occupied Crimea descended into a "logistics lockdown", what disrupted its usual fuel supply routes, and what might happen next.
Managed shortage
"Logistics lockdown" is a term coined by Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. On 27 May, he announced an expansion of mid-range attacks (known as "middle strikes"), which target Russian positions at distances of 150-300 km. The objective is to systematically destroy Russian logistics and military capabilities in the operational rear.
"Our task is to further increase pressure on the Russians behind the front lines and deprive them of the ability to conduct active assault operations," Fedorov said. "Over the past few months, we have quadrupled the destruction of enemy logistics, storage points, equipment, command posts and supply routes in the operational rear. The pattern is already visible on our dashboards: the more Russian logistics are destroyed, the fewer assault operations take place along the line of contact."
Fedorov added that as part of the programme's first phase, the Ministry of Defence, together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, had allocated an additional UAH 5 billion (about US$111 million) to procure modern middle-strike assets.
The effects of the "logistics lockdown" had been felt in Crimea several days before Fedorov's announcement. The occupation administration in Sevastopol introduced the first fuel restrictions as early as 22 May, limiting sales to 20 litres per vehicle "until the situation stabilises". Just two days later, petrol disappeared from filling stations operated by TES, one of Crimea's two largest fuel chains.
On 30 May, the 20-litre limit for AI-95 petrol was extended across the entire peninsula. Sergei Aksyonov, the Russian-installed head of the occupation administration, urged residents not to stockpile fuel.
Ironically, only last December Aksyonov had promoted a new fuel supply logistics mechanism that he claimed would eliminate the risk of shortages altogether, assuring residents they could now be confident that fuel would always be available.
Local social media channels were instantly filled with reports of empty petrol stations and kilometre-long queues at those that still had supplies.
The arrival of summer only exacerbated the crisis. On 4 June, the occupation authorities banned sales of fuel for cash. Aksyonov promised to send local officials to every petrol station to monitor the pumps and record the registration numbers of the vehicles that were being filled up using ration coupons.
To show that officials were sharing the burden, the Crimean authorities reduced the use of official vehicles to one car per "ministry".
On 6 June, Sevastopol switched to fuel sales via QR codes, which could only be obtained through the Russian messaging app Max. The system was simple: the number of QR codes corresponded to the amount of fuel available. Codes for the following day were released at 22:00 and snapped up within seconds.
It wasn't long before the fuel shortage hit public transport. Around 400 buses across Crimea stopped running. Transport companies began cutting routes. The main beneficiaries were taxi drivers with gas-powered vehicles, and taxi fares skyrocketed.
The crisis soon spread beyond the fuel market. Sugar, cereals and sunflower oil began to disappear from supermarket shelves, and some retailers introduced purchase limits on certain products.
An anonymous Crimean activist told Krym.Realii (Crimea.Realities), a regional Radio Liberty project: "Large retail chains with their own warehouses and storage facilities are still holding out, but even they already have shortages. The authorities are urging them to eke out supplies from their warehouses, so in recent days some popular cereals can still be bought in the morning, but by the afternoon the shelves are empty. Pensioners have already bought up almost all the sugar. A lot of small shops that relied on direct supplier deliveries are closing because they have no stock left."
The occupation authorities are trying to contain price increases through agricultural fairs, where products are traditionally sold more cheaply than at markets. In addition, several retail chains and producers have pledged not to raise mark-ups above 5% on a range of basic food items.
Serhii Sapiehin, director of the Psychea Scientific and Technical Centre, describes the situation in Crimea as a managed shortage that is already showing signs of becoming a systemic logistical problem for the occupation authorities.
"It's still too early to speak of a complete collapse. As long as healthcare, utilities, food deliveries, public transport and basic military supply continue to function, this remains a managed shortage. However, if the disruptions spread from petrol stations to the broader economy, essential services and military logistics, then it becomes a systemic crisis," he explains.
In Sapiehin's assessment, Crimean residents are likely to begin seeing signs of a systemic crisis within a month.
No petrol, no tourists
On 8 June, reports of petrol shortages began emerging from Russia's Krasnodar Krai as well. Locals were quick to identify the culprit: Crimeans crossing the Kerch Bridge to buy fuel. In reality, however, it is not possible to transport large quantities of fuel back to Crimea this way, as private vehicles have long been prohibited from carrying more than 100 litres of liquid across the bridge.
The shortage immediately gave rise to a new business opportunity. Reselling petrol on the black market became highly profitable, with some sellers asking RUB 450 per litre (around US$6.24; for comparison, a litre of A-95 at Ukrnafta stations cost US$1.67 on 15 June). Some people paid up, while others reported the new entrepreneurs to the authorities. Several sellers were detained by security forces and had their fuel confiscated. The formal charge was doing business without registration or a licence. Some were forced to apologise on camera, with the videos later posted on Crimean Telegram channels.
But it wasn't just fuel resellers that aroused public anger. Anyone perceived as wasting petrol also became a target.
"Where can I send a video? It's outrageous what's going on in Yalta!" one user complained in the comments on Sergei Aksyonov's Telegram channel. "A sightseeing boat is sailing with zero passengers on board while Crimea is facing a catastrophe – there's no petrol/diesel! How is this possible? Boats are cruising around empty or half-empty while ordinary people can't fill up their cars."
The queues at petrol stations and the growing flood of complaints on social media inevitably hit one of Crimea's most sensitive sectors: tourism. According to Russian media reports, hotel bookings in Crimea were down by a third in the two weeks following the onset of the fuel shortages compared with the same period in 2025. Meanwhile, the cancellation rate reached 79%, all while the cost of holidays in Crimea rose by 17-25%.
One hotel in Saky attempted to salvage the tourist season by offering 10 litres of petrol free with bookings of at least two nights and 20 litres for stays of three nights or more. The promotion did not last long – not because the hotel ran out of rooms, but because it ran out of fuel. Another villa owner proposed an even more inventive deal, offering free accommodation in exchange for 100 litres of petrol. It's not known whether anyone accepted.
"The tourist season adds another layer of demand," notes Serhii Sapiehin. "It isn't just fuel for visitors' cars. It also means additional pressure on shops, hotels, catering services, transport, water deliveries, food supplies and service providers. As a result, even a relatively small reduction in fuel supplies can be felt much more acutely during the holiday season."
The power of middle strikes
After occupying part of Ukraine's south, the Kremlin set about developing a land corridor to Crimea. The route became particularly important after Ukraine's first successful attack on the Kerch Bridge in October 2022. According to Vasyl Maliuk, former head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian forces stopped using the bridge for military logistics altogether after the Ukrainian strikes.
Nevertheless, the Rostov-on-Don–Taganrog–Mariupol–Melitopol–Simferopol route remained relatively secure for a long time. It was used by both civilians and the Russian military, as Ukraine's defence forces simply lacked the capability to strike this logistical artery.
Everything changed when Ukraine began deploying middle-strike drones on a large scale. The land corridor to Crimea was one of the first targets. Ukrainian drones started hunting military and freight vehicles, including fuel tankers. Drones were also used to mine roads. The campaign gradually expanded. According to Ukrainska Pravda, at least 27 units from various branches of Ukraine's defence forces are now known to be conducting strikes at ranges of up to 300 km.
As early as mid-May, the Ukrainian attacks prompted Volodymyr Saldo, the Russian-installed governor of the occupied part of Kherson Oblast, to restrict lorry traffic along the section of the land corridor under his control.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued to strike fuel logistics facilities within Crimea itself. On 30 May, the 412th "Nemesis" Brigade hit the Feodosiia maritime oil terminal, a key hub for the supply of fuel and lubricants to the peninsula by sea.
A week later, the terminal was targeted again, this time by Ukraine's Special Operations Forces. Another target during that operation was the Semykolodezianska oil depot, where Russian forces store fuel oil and diesel. On the same night, drones also attacked an Atan fuel depot containing 17 storage tanks of various types.
Ukraine's strikes have also targeted rail infrastructure and bridges leading to Crimea. In early June, Ukrainian forces hit the Chonhar Bridge, one of the key crossings linking the peninsula with mainland Ukraine. As a result, freight traffic had to be rerouted via a pontoon crossing or diverted to alternative routes.
"The destruction of the Chonhar Bridge adds 140 km to the journey, and along a route where Ukraine has significantly greater strike capabilities to control the road," military expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi told Ukrainska Pravda.
On 11 June, Ukrainian forces attacked several bridges connecting Crimea with Kherson Oblast. According to Ukrainian sources, drones struck a convoy of around 50 lorries carrying military equipment and fuel that had gathered near one of the crossings.
"The fuel crisis is a continuation of the consistent efforts by Ukraine's defence forces to isolate Crimea and transform it, in logistical terms, from a peninsula into an island. 'Crimea is an island' used to be a popular phrase in Russia. We're turning it into an island for the occupiers," Mykhailo Honchar, president of the Strategy XXI Centre for Global Studies, told Ukrainska Pravda.
Honchar recalled that after the Ukrainian strikes on the Kerch Bridge, Russia was forced to go back to using train ferries between Crimea and the Port of Kavkaz. However, that route has also gradually been lost. In April, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence reported that drone strikes had disabled the Slavyanin, the last remaining train ferry operating across the strait.
"The remaining option is for tankers carrying petroleum products to arrive at the ports of Feodosiia, Kerch and Sevastopol. But that also carries significant risks, because experience has shown that such vessels can be destroyed quite effectively by our drones," Honchar noted.
The challenge is not only getting fuel onto the peninsula, but also storing it in sufficient quantities. That is becoming more difficult as fuel storage facilities are themselves being increasingly targeted by Ukrainian drones. For this reason, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of supplies has become critically important for Crimea's occupation authorities.
The Kerch Bridge and anti-drone nets
Could Russia resume supplying fuel to Crimea via the Kerch Bridge? At present, vehicles weighing more than five tonnes are not allowed to cross. Following the latest attack in the summer of 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine reported that the bridge's supporting structures at the impact sites were in a critical condition.
Nonetheless, Russia continues to upgrade the bridge's defences.
"They may use it to a limited extent. But again, they understand that if we see the bridge being actively used for these supply chains, we will make decisions about striking it. Especially since we have the capability to do so," military expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi explains, arguing that Russia is unlikely to restore freight traffic across the bridge to its previous levels.
Most of the experts interviewed by Ukrainska Pravda believe the most likely scenario is that Russia will attempt to cover the land corridor to Crimea with anti-drone nets. These nets have long been used along other supply routes, although it is understood that they cannot provide 100% protection.
Pavlo Lakiichuk, head of security programmes at the Strategy XXI Centre for Global Studies, says that what the defence forces are currently doing in Ukraine's south resembles the formation of a blood clot in an artery.
"They identify pressure points and create blockages there. If key sections become clogged, you can cover the rest with nets, but traffic still won't be able to move," he says.
According to Serhii Sapiehin, Crimea's population consumes approximately 4,000 tonnes of fuel per day, of which around 2,500 tonnes are for civilian use.
"That means Crimea requires about 120,000 tonnes of fuel per month, or roughly 2,200 railway tank cars. These are enormous volumes that cannot pass unnoticed by Ukraine's defence forces. So there is little reason to expect any improvement in fuel supplies to Crimea," he concludes.
Rustem Khalilov, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Teresa Pearce