Kyiv under S-400 fire: how Russia has turned air defence missiles into a weapon of terror and why they keep coming
Russia attacked Ukraine with 24 ballistic missiles on the night of 4-5 August, which the Ukrainian Air Force grouped under the combined Iskander-M/S-400 designation. Kyiv Oblast bore the brunt of the strike. With Patriot interceptor stocks running low, Ukrainian air defences were unable to bring down a single missile.
What makes the S-400 particularly notable is that it was designed as an air defence system to intercept incoming missiles, not to strike ground targets. It has nevertheless been repurposed by Russia, which has ramped up production, extended its range to Kyiv, and significantly expanded its strike capabilities.
Read on this Ukrainska Pravda story to learn what these missiles are, why they travel at such high speeds, and why their inaccuracy makes them especially dangerous to the civilian population.
How an anti-aircraft missile becomes a short-range ballistic missile
This is not the first time Russia has used air defence missiles to strike ground targets. In 2022, it employed older S-300 surface-to-air missiles against towns and cities near the front line.
Subsequent reports confirmed the use of the newer 48N6 missiles, compatible with later variants of the S-300 and the S-400. In 2026, Russia added the RM-48U to its arsenal, mass-producing the missile by converting decommissioned surface-to-air missiles. According to Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Russia manufactured 200 RM-48Us in 2025 and intends to produce more than 480 in 2026.
Russia has turned the ad hoc use of surface-to-air missiles into a stand-alone production effort that enables it to supplement Iskander short-range ballistic missiles during combined attacks. The result is a greater number of high-speed weapons per strike, despite their inferior accuracy and destructive power compared with purpose-built ballistic missiles.
The names S-300 and S-400 are commonly used as shorthand for missiles, although they actually refer to families of air defence systems comprising radars, command posts, launchers and several missile types. Rosoboronexport, Russia's state arms exporter, lists four missile variants for the S-400 alone: the 48N6E3, 48N6E2, 40N6E and 9M96E2. As a result, recovering a piece of wreckage from a 48N6 missile is not always enough to determine which specific air defence system launched it, as these missiles are often compatible with both later variants of the S-300 and the newer S-400.
The oldest missile relevant to this story, the 5V55R, weighs around 1.66 tonnes and carries a high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing about 130 kg. Its standard engagement range against aerial targets is up to 75 km. The newer 48N6 weighs around 1.8 tonnes and, depending on the variant, carries a warhead weighing between 143 and 180 kg, according to various reference sources.
Both missiles were designed primarily to destroy aircraft and incoming missiles in flight. Their warheads generate a large volume of fragmentation but lack the specialised penetrators or reinforced casings needed to breach concrete or underground structures. As a result, they are less effective than purpose-built surface-to-surface missiles against hardened point targets. Yet in urban areas, that limitation matters little. Travelling at high speed, the missile's mass and the spread of thousands of fragments can devastate a wide area even with a relatively modest warhead.
The 40N6 stands apart as the S-400's longest-range missile, with a claimed engagement range of up to 380-400 km against aerial targets. In November 2023, Ukrainian officials reported finding debris from a 40N6 on the Zaporizhzhia front. However, the presence of missile debris alone does not prove it was launched against a ground target rather than fired by Russian air defence units. Nor is there any public evidence that the 40N6 has been used systematically in ground-attack roles. Likewise, its maximum engagement range against aircraft should not be confused with its potential range in ground strikes, as the missile follows a different flight profile and relies on different guidance methods.
The S-300's ground-attack capability predates the full-scale invasion. In May 2011, three Russian air defence missile regiments carried out exercises at the Telemba training range, firing five combat missiles from a stationary S-300 system at ground targets. The Russian military claimed that all five had hit their targets. Results achieved on a test range, where target coordinates are known in advance, cannot be directly compared with long-range strikes under combat conditions. They do, however, confirm that the capability existed and had been practised.
The exact guidance algorithms used for ground attacks for all missile variants remain classified. The available technical information indicates that they employ inertial and radio-command guidance during the initial stages of flight. Once the missile passes beyond the radio horizon, however, guidance from the ground radar is no longer possible, and it continues towards the target using inertial navigation alone. This mechanism enabled the 48N6DM to cover more than 200 km in a strike on Kyiv, but it also explains why these missiles sacrifice accuracy for speed over long distances.
For this reason, describing these weapons as ballistic missiles comes with an important caveat. Neither the 5V55 nor the 48N6 is a true equivalent of the 9M723 missile used by the Iskander-M system. Instead, each follows a ballistic-like trajectory for much of its flight before descending into the designated target area during the terminal phase. There is no publicly available, verified data on the circular error probable (CEP) of strikes by these missiles, meaning the precise accuracy figures that occasionally appear in the media cannot be independently substantiated.
The absence of reliable accuracy data is particularly relevant when analysing individual strikes. Hitting a target on a test range or a large industrial site does not necessarily prove that the missile can reliably strike a small target at its maximum range. The longer it flies without radio correction, the further its performance diverges from that of a dedicated precision-guided munition.
Travelling at extremely high speed, the 48N6DM gives defenders only minutes to react. Ukrainian estimates put its top speed at about 2.5 km/s, which means it can cover 200 km in just a few minutes. During an attack on Kyiv Oblast in January 2023, the early warning system was not always able to issue timely alerts. The issue was not that the missile could not be detected, but that its short flight time left little time to determine whether an S-300 or S-400 launch was directed at an aerial or ground target.
Geography of the strikes: from Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia to Kharkiv
During 2022 and 2023, S-300 missiles were used primarily against regions close to the front line or the Russian border. Among the most devastating was the attack on a humanitarian convoy in Zaporizhzhia on 30 September 2022. Russia fired 16 S-300 missiles on the city and its outskirts, four of which hit the area around a car market and a convoy of civilian vehicles. The strike killed 32 people and injured 118 others.
Further south, Mykolaiv also came under S-300 attack. On 23 October 2022, a Russian missile struck a five-storey residential block. No fatalities were reported.
On 14 April 2023, Russia struck Sloviansk with eight S-300 missiles. Residential buildings, offices and commercial premises were damaged. The attack claimed 15 lives and injured 24 people, according to the final toll after search-and-rescue operations ended.
On the evening of 21 October 2023, two missiles struck a postal hub operated by Nova Poshta (Nova Post), Ukraine's largest private delivery company, in Novyi Korotych, near Kharkiv. Citing early reports, the prosecutor's office identified them as S-300 missiles launched from Russia's Belgorod Oblast. Bomb disposal experts recovered debris at the scene consistent with that assessment. Eight people were killed and 15 were injured.
These incidents demonstrate the key advantage of this type of weapon for Russia: the launchers are positioned close to the battlefield, enabling missiles to reach cities such as Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Sloviansk in a matter of minutes and leaving less time for warning systems to react.
When the S-400 reached Kyiv
On the morning of 14 January 2023, the Ukrainian command reported that S-400 missiles fired from the north had struck Kyiv. Photographs of missile debris showed markings that allowed experts to identify it as a 48N6DM. Russia's Bryansk Oblast was named as the likely launch area, although the exact coordinates and final conclusions of the expert analysis were not made public. This makes it more accurate to refer to the finding as a credible Ukrainian assessment rather than definitive confirmation.
The newer 48N6DM can travel significantly further than the older 5V55 and carries a heavier warhead. However, the S-400's maximum advertised range of 400 km should not be interpreted as the ability of all its missiles to accurately hit ground targets at that distance, as that figure primarily refers to the 40N6 missile's claimed performance against aerial targets. Regarding the Kyiv attack, Ukrainian experts attributed the strike to a 48N6DM missile that had covered more than 200 km.
In the summer of 2026, S-400 missiles are once again appearing regularly in Ukrainian reports alongside Iskander missiles. On 2 July, the Ukrainian Air Force recorded 24 missiles in the combined Iskander-M/S-400 category, four of which were intercepted. On 6 July, 23 missiles were recorded, but no interceptions of ballistic assets were reported. On 1 August, one of the 27 missiles in this category was shot down. On 5 August, none of the 24 missiles was intercepted. All four attacks were directed primarily at Kyiv or Kyiv Oblast. Based on publicly available data, it is impossible to determine what proportion of these missiles were S-400s.
The Russian attack on 14 July provided further physical evidence of S-400 use. A warhead and debris from an S-400 missile were found in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district. Since the exact variant was not determined, the evidence confirms the system's involvement but does not allow the missile to be definitively identified as either the 48N6DM or the 40N6.
The low interception rate during these attacks is a result of the missiles' flight profile, high speed and the limited number of systems capable of engaging them. Russia is taking advantage of Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors and increasing its use of ballistic missile strikes. Defending against these threats requires Patriot or similar systems, such as the SAMP/T, which Ukraine also operates. The result is a costly imbalance: even a missile with limited accuracy can force Ukraine to choose between exposing a critical infrastructure facility to destruction or using a valuable anti-missile interceptor.
RM-48U: from the disposal of old missiles to a mass-produced weapon
Debris identified as RM-48U was publicly shown in Ukraine for the first time after the combined attack on 20 January 2026. The missile is a refurbished dummy based on older 5V55 or 48N6 missiles withdrawn from service. It is compatible with S-300 and S-400 launch systems.
It was initially unclear whether the missile in question had been equipped with a conventional warhead or was being used as a decoy. In January, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine described RM-48Us in a report on the cost of the latest Russian attack as training missiles. By June, the same type was listed in intelligence data as the RM-48U missile designed for ground targets. This indicates that different variants or employment methods may exist within the same missile family.
The extent of the RM-48U programme became apparent only in 2026. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine reported that Russia had produced more than 200 RM-48U missiles in 2025, aims to produce over 480 in 2026 and has reached a production rate of up to 50 per month. As a result, the first publicly identified debris in January should not be interpreted as the missile's first deployment. It was merely the first case where its use could be tied to a clearly identified designation.
These figures change the perception of the RM-48U as a one-off effort to dispose of obsolete missiles. Instead, they point to a specialised production line that enables Russia to convert decommissioned surface-to-air missiles into offensive weapons or decoys. The RM-48U cannot match the Iskander in precision, destructive power or ability to defeat fortified targets. Instead, it adds more fast-moving assets to Russian attacks, further complicating Ukraine's early warning and missile defence efforts.
For air defence units, the difference between a live missile and a decoy becomes apparent too late. A high-speed target cannot simply be ignored on the assumption that it may not carry a warhead. It must still be tracked by radar, its trajectory assessed and a decision made on whether to launch an interceptor. This is precisely why the RM-48U retains military value even in its decoy configuration.
Not a replacement for the Iskander, but a second echelon of attack
For Russia, converting S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles into ground-attack weapons is a practical solution. It enables Moscow to tap into vast Soviet-era stockpiles, including missiles nearing the end of their service life, and takes advantage of launchers already deployed near Ukraine. The RM-48U programme expands on this approach by establishing a structured method for refurbishing decommissioned missiles. As Soviet-era reserves gradually diminish, developing new anti-aircraft missiles requires considerable investment and lengthy production cycles.
However, this is not a cost-free replacement for purpose-built ballistic missiles. The 5V55 and 48N6 have smaller warheads, limited ability to penetrate hardened structures and lower demonstrated accuracy against ground targets. Their use also draws on Russia's air defence reserves. Their advantage is distinct: they pose a fast, additional threat that can increase the number of missiles in a single attack and complicate Ukrainian interception efforts, as they require a different response than that used against drones or cruise missiles.
Ukraine's response cannot be limited to expanding its missile defence arsenal. Patriot and SAMP/T systems depend on a steady supply of scarce interceptors. Other measures are equally important: improving launch detection, providing earlier warnings, dispersing personnel and critical industrial facilities, and targeting launchers, radars and production sites linked to Russia's missile programme. The RM-48U's mass production indicates that this threat will persist even as Soviet-era 5V55 stocks decline. Russia is moving from using accumulated reserves towards maintaining a dedicated capability to produce and deploy new weapons.
Arkadii Dotsenko
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Susan McDonald