7th Air Assault Corps Commander Lasiichuk: If Pokrovsk had simply let the Russians through, Dobropillia would no longer exist

7th Air Assault Corps Commander Lasiichuk: If Pokrovsk had simply let the Russians through, Dobropillia would no longer exist
Photo: press service for the 7th Air Assault Corps

Journalists covering the war rarely get the opportunity to put their own questions, and those of the soldiers and officers they interview, directly to senior military commanders.

These commanders are usually surrounded by walls of secrecy and military bureaucracy and, to be frank, rarely have time to speak to the media. Yet their accounts are often precisely what is needed to understand the bigger picture, either adding context to widely accepted versions of events or challenging them.

A little while ago, Ukrainska Pravda had the opportunity to interview Yevhen Lasiichuk, commander of the 7th Air Assault Corps and a Hero of Ukraine.

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Last year, he was responsible for the defence of Pokrovsk, a battle that Ukrainska Pravda has covered in several extensive and critical articles. For the past few months, his corps headquarters has been operating on the Huliaipole front, from where Russian forces are seeking to advance towards the city of Zaporizhzhia.

We travelled to a frontline city in Ukraine's south to meet Lasiichuk and spent more than three hours talking to him. That was not enough to fully understand him as a person or a commander, but it was enough to form an initial impression. His willingness to discuss difficult and sensitive issues left us with a largely positive one.

Lasiichuk's face gives little away. He occasionally smiles when talking about the superiority and distinctive qualities of Ukraine's Air Assault Forces. But he tenses up almost imperceptibly when discussing the defence of Pokrovsk, particularly the nearby village of Lysivka, which not all Ukrainian troops managed to leave.

In this wide-ranging interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Lasiichuk outlines Russian tactics in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, shares his experience of working with assault units, argues that mid-range strikes are effective, and gives what we believe is his most detailed and candid account yet of the defence of Pokrovsk.

Russia's plan to cut off Zaporizhzhia, the effectiveness of corps command and the future of assault units

The Huliaipole front has virtually disappeared from the news over the past six months. The last major reports concerned Russian forces capturing a command post belonging to a Territorial Defence brigade and offensive operations by the 1st Separate Assault Regiment in early 2026.

Could you explain what's happening here now? What sector have you been assigned, and where are Russian forces trying to advance?

Looking at the situation, the enemy's overall objective here remains unchanged: to capture the city of Zaporizhzhia. What we're seeing now is a strategy aimed at cutting off the city's transport links. They're trying to do that, and they're already striking bridges and dams with guided aerial bombs, destroying infrastructure in the city itself, including its electricity supply.

I believe the preparatory stage [of this effort to cut off Zaporizhzhia's transport links – ed.] is already under way.

Doesn't that frighten you?

How could it not frighten me? We need to do our jobs so that nobody has reason to be frightened.

When it comes to Zaporizhzhia, we need to consider two fronts simultaneously: Orikhiv to the south and Huliaipole to the east.

As for our sector, the Huliaipole front, activity is increasing. Our early estimates indicate that there are around 50,000 enemy troops here.

Potential routes for a Russian advance towards Zaporizhzhia, according to Lasiichuk
Potential routes for a Russian advance towards Zaporizhzhia, according to Lasiichuk
Graphic: Andrii Kalistratenko

How far have Russian troops managed to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions?

We've found and driven out enemy troops as far as 15 km behind our positions. We know from POWs that their orders are to penetrate as deeply as possible and plant their rag of a flag. Those sent to do this usually surrender without a fight. They understand they won't make it.

Obviously, the Russians are attacking the 3rd Army Corps and the Operational Group Centre, as well as Azov. Zaporizhzhia is probably the next most intense area of fighting. There have even been mechanised assaults here over the past two months, which I find surprising, because in Pokrovsk that would have been outright suicide.

Why are the Russians trying so hard to advance here? After cutting off Zaporizhzhia's transport links, they want to bypass the city from the north and reach [the city of] Dnipro.

What might cutting off Zaporizhzhia's transport links actually look like?

If they cut off Zaporizhzhia by targeting the bridges and dams... Pontoon bridges and temporary crossings are only short-term solutions. They're not sustainable. I think they'll prioritise airstrikes on bridges, which, by the way, have already happened here. They've also destroyed heavy goods vehicles to block roads and create chaos.

The initial stage [of this logistics lockdown operation] is already under way. FPV drones are reaching the city centre. This week, they even struck the local administration building and tried to hoist their flag.

Losing Zaporizhzhia would effectively be comparable to losing Donbas. There's a direct road from Zaporizhzhia to Dnipro. However, it's also possible that this is a diversionary operation intended to draw our forces away from Donbas itself.

You've been operating on the Huliaipole front for two months now. Tell us frankly: what can a corps commander actually achieve in a sector where he's been deployed without his own brigades?

First of all, a corps is a command structure. It has to be effective in any given sector, regardless of which troops are assigned to it. Yes, it's a little harder when you're working with brigades that aren't organically part of your corps. But we've already had that experience in Pokrovsk. The only brigade of our own that was permanently there was the 25th. The 79th was there briefly as well. All the others were Ground Forces and Marine Corps brigades.

Now I have an assault component: the 5th and 92nd Assault Brigades and the 225th Regiment. I suppose it's largely thanks to them that we're able to maintain our balance and strengthen our capabilities. Brigades are tools for carrying out the tasks defined and planned by corps command. And those tools can change.

The objective I've set myself here is to improve the effectiveness of all the brigades as much as possible. Whether they're Ground Forces or assault brigades, I need to bring them all up to the standard of the Air Assault Forces. Because I genuinely believe that Air Assault Forces brigades are considerably more capable.

A proud paratrooper, Lasiichuk praises his branch of the military and considers it the most effective of all.
A proud paratrooper, Lasiichuk praises his branch of the military and considers it the most effective of all.

How can you improve the effectiveness of brigades that aren't part of your own corps? What can you do to help them?

When we first arrived here, every brigade planned its operations differently and, in my opinion, there wasn't much coordination between them. We established a common framework: who plans what and when, and how those plans are reported to higher command. The aim was to create a unified coordination system and a shared understanding of the battlefield.

We made every brigade use Delta [Ukraine's battlefield situational awareness system – ed.]. Not all of them had been using it. And I'm talking about experienced brigades that were already carrying out combat missions, not a newly formed brigade that had recently joined us.

Everyone needs to operate within the same digital information environment. That's how their effectiveness will improve. With Delta, a brigade commander can do more than simply see where their positions are. They can also analyse different actions and events.

For example, an assault group is hit by an FPV drone while advancing towards a target. We investigate whether it was a radio-controlled drone or one using fibre-optic guidance, and we record that information. Those figures then help us determine what decisions need to be made. Perhaps we need to deploy more electronic warfare systems in that area.

We've also established a joint electronic warfare and air defence centre on the Huliaipole front, with representatives from every brigade. There was nothing like that here before. Everyone worked independently, looking after their own brigade. Now they're all in one place and can see what the others are doing.

Before the interview, we manage to catch a glimpse of this joint electronic warfare and air defence centre. It is a spacious room filled with monitors displaying the situation in the airspace and live feeds from reconnaissance and strikes against Russian forces.
Before the interview, we manage to catch a glimpse of this joint electronic warfare and air defence centre. It is a spacious room filled with monitors displaying the situation in the airspace and live feeds from reconnaissance and strikes against Russian forces.

So you approach the commanders of brigades that aren't part of your corps and ask them to assign, say, two specialists each to the joint air defence and electronic warfare centre. Surely they're reluctant to give you their best people?

Of course they are! (laughs)

And I tell them I don't just want competent people. I want their very best. But we communicate, and I explain everything to them. If a brigade commander sees that this approach is effective, they'll assign good specialists to it. Over the past two months, we've met with the commanders repeatedly to discuss how everything should work.

We're now detecting 400, 450, sometimes 500 aerial targets a day. When we started, it was around 200. That's not because the Russians are launching more of them. It's because we've become better at detecting them. We can confirm that we're destroying approximately 70% of those targets. We jam another 20%, but we don't have visual confirmation that they've been destroyed. That leaves roughly 10% [that reach their targets].

Does that remaining 10% include guided aerial bombs?

No. Guided aerial bombs aren't included in those figures at all, because they're virtually impossible to destroy in flight. You can interfere with a guided bomb's navigation to some extent, but it'll still hit something. Maybe not the forest line it was supposed to hit, but the one next to it. Guided aerial bombs are the biggest problem in our sector. Looking back, I can say they were also the main problem in Pokrovsk.

In October, 200 guided aerial bombs struck a single settlement on the Huliaipole front.

Destroying Russian aircraft at their airfields remains one of the few ways Ukrainian forces can counter Russian guided aerial bombs.
Destroying Russian aircraft at their airfields remains one of the few ways Ukrainian forces can counter Russian guided aerial bombs.

Before your 7th Corps arrived, the 225th Assault Battalion was apparently the key unit on the Huliaipole front. Does it actually follow your orders?

Of course it does. I consider it an effective unit. I understand how sensitive the reports circulating about discipline in this regiment are...

They're more about how personnel are treated...

Yes, we read the news too. But I employ this regiment as a combat unit. It's not an organic unit of my corps, so I can't make personnel changes there or impose my own approach.

I use it as a tool, and it's quite effective on the battlefield. There's discipline, the troops are well trained, and the headquarters staff are highly capable. They make extensive use of digital systems. I consider the regiment effective.

What do you think the future should look like for Ukraine's assault units? Should they remain within the existing Ground Forces and Air Assault Forces corps, or should they become a separate branch with their own command structure?

That's difficult to answer. As you know, it hasn't yet been decided whether they'll become a separate branch of the military or remain subordinate to individual corps, with a separate command structure within the Ground Forces.

In my view, there are effective [assault] units. As far as I know, the 225th is currently with us in the 7th Corps, the 425th is with Azov, and the 33rd is with the 3rd Corps. They're operating at full strength in the most threatened sectors and delivering results.

For a corps commander, units like these represent a substantial reserve force. They can be deployed to halt the enemy or help units holding defensive positions regain ground they've lost.

So you support keeping them within the existing corps?

Probably, yes. For example, the 225th Regiment is currently operating in the sectors of three brigades holding defensive positions. In one sector, where the Russians are deploying their forces in preparation for an offensive, the 225th is blocking its advance. In the other brigades' sectors, it is even trying to regain lost ground, bringing in troops from those same brigades to consolidate the recaptured positions. I believe this is an effective tactic.

The president recently said in an interview with Fox News that he was prepared to freeze the war along the current line of contact. If that were to happen tomorrow, for example, how advantageous or disadvantageous would the Ukrainian forces' position be on the Huliaipole front?

Ideally, we'd have taken control of Huliaipole by then… That would be the best outcome. To take the settlement and bring it back under our control, into our territory.

It's difficult to say whether we'd be in a better or worse position. Our corps is responsible for a line of contact stretching almost 100 km. There are areas where we hold the high ground and others where the situation is difficult, but we're trying to compensate for those disadvantages through our drone capabilities.

If it happened tomorrow, we'd hold the current line of contact.

The impact of mid-range strikes

During the summer, I filmed two units from your corps operating mid-range strike drones – American Hornets and Ukrainian Chakluns. The soldiers were delighted that they could now reach Russian logistics. But throughout the filming, I kept wondering whether taking out individual fuel tankers and pickup trucks really weakens the Russians holding the line of contact. More broadly speaking, was the decision to prioritise mid-range strike drones in the summer of 2026 the right one?

It was absolutely the right decision, 100%. Huliaipole is a good example of how mid-range strike drones are being used. We're constantly striking targets here with them. We take out everything that moves with our "aircraft" [fixed-wing drones]. And it's more cost-effective than, say, using long-range artillery, where we're restricted by ammunition limits. HIMARS missile strikes are even more expensive. So frontline and mid-range strike drones are excellent at carrying out our missions.

Our corps' 237th Battalion is doing everything it can to destroy anything heading towards Huliaipole. The aim is to prevent any logistical supplies from reaching the city at all.

The way I imagined this working, using Pokrovsk as an example, was that Ukraine's defence forces would destroy every vehicle travelling along the key Selydove-Pokrovsk road, and eventually the Russians would stop sending vehicles along it altogether. That would leave the Russian forces in Pokrovsk without drones, ammunition or food – effectively putting them under a logistical lockdown. But that hasn't happened. Why?

It all comes down to resources. Going back to Pokrovsk, we were only just learning how to use mid-range strike drones there. We were trying out different drones, testing how to deploy them and training our personnel. Meanwhile, we couldn't afford to launch mid-range strike drones every minute. That's not how it works. Reconnaissance identifies a target – for example, an approaching convoy – and then we launch the drone, which flies towards the target and strikes it.

We used heavier drones, weighing 60-100 kg, such as those made by Fire Point, to strike command posts, for example.

Besides, the Russians were constantly changing their routes [into Pokrovsk]. To use mid-range strike drones effectively, we needed to know which road they were using that day, rather than, say, whether they would approach across a field.

According to Lasiichuk, Ukraine's defence forces were right to prioritise mid-range strike drones this summer, but completely cutting off Russian logistics would require even more drones and trained crews
According to Lasiichuk, Ukraine's defence forces were right to prioritise mid-range strike drones this summer, but completely cutting off Russian logistics would require even more drones and trained crews

Did you notice, for example, that after a month of mid-range drone strikes along the Selydove-Pokrovsk road, the Russian forces were launching fewer drones from Pokrovsk? In other words, is there a measurable indicator that would demonstrate the effectiveness of mid-range strike drones?

I'll give you another indicator. The Russians, realising how much damage we were doing to its logistics and how effectively we were operating, increased the number of strikes on our mid-range drone launch sites. They were actively conducting reconnaissance to locate where we were launching these drones from and trying to destroy those sites. That's an indicator.

But did this give Ukraine's defence forces an advantage on the battlefield? Did it weaken the Russian forces?

It is already known that the Ministry of Defence used funds earmarked for military personnel's salaries at the end of the year, among other things, to purchase mid-range strike drones. So I'd like to understand just how justified that risk was.

If we look at Pokrovsk from a broader strategic perspective, rather than focusing solely on mid-range strike drones, the city fulfilled its primary purpose: it held back the Russians' rapid advance deeper into our territory.

Pokrovsk tied down the Russian forces. Its defence lasted not a week or a month but, as the previous commander-in-chief stated, two years.

At the time, we estimated the Russian force to be up to 170,000 troops across Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad combined. The Selydove-Pokrovsk road you mentioned probably accounted for about 5% of their logistical supplies. There were plenty of roads leading to Myrnohrad, both dirt roads and tarmac roads.

I understand what you're saying about "blocking all the roads". We tried to do that, including with mid-range strike drones, but completely cutting off every route is genuinely very difficult.

Is there a better chance of imposing a logistics lockdown on the Russians in Huliaipole, which is a much smaller settlement?

The day before you arrived, 18 vehicles were struck on the approaches to Huliaipole. We're working to make our strikes here as effective as possible. A unit from the Unmanned Systems Forces is also actively operating here as part of our integrated reconnaissance and strike system.

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I'm doing everything I can to force the Russians either to abandon Huliaipole and stop bringing supplies into the city or to choose another route for its movements. Apart from bringing artillery and infantry into Huliaipole, they've also turned it into something of a hub for their drone operators, including Rubicon [a Russian military drone unit]. They have a huge number of launch sites there.

It's difficult to assess our own effectiveness, but I believe we're on the right track.

Can your drones reach Russia's key supply routes from here?

Yes, we can strike even further afield, as far as the Sea of Azov and Mariupol.

Their main supply route runs from Mariupol and turns north before reaching Berdiansk, where it branches off into smaller logistics routes. Initially, supplies are transported in a five-tonne lorry, then transferred to a smaller lorry, then an even smaller vehicle, then to a convoy of motorcyclists and so on. We target them at every stage. Naturally, we're most effective along the line of contact because that's where the targets are closest.

Incidentally, our corps' unmanned systems battalion, the 237th, has now been deployed here. It operates both at tactical depth, providing support wherever the Russians are trying to advance, and at operational depth, reaching targets 100-120 km away. It's a very effective tool at the disposal of the corps commander.

Another distinctive feature of this battalion is that it operates heavy Fire Point drones. We've trained its personnel and they have the necessary certificates. The unit carries out missions almost every week, both for the corps and for the Pivden (South) Group of Forces as a whole.

If the US completely cuts off Ukraine's access to Starlink, will the front collapse?

No, it won't collapse. Our effectiveness in carrying out deep strikes will decrease, that's true. Operations will become more difficult because both command posts and the weapons systems that directly carry out strikes rely on Starlink. But we'll continue holding back the Russians with all the other capabilities we have here.

Sacrificing Pokrovsk, whether holding Myrnohrad was justified and almost hourly reports to Syrskyi

I spent a long time thinking about how to ask you about Pokrovsk in a way that would cover everything that's been troubling me, and I've decided to suggest something.

I'll describe how I saw the fall of Pokrovsk, and how it was seen by the soldiers I was in contact with. Then I'll ask you, as someone who saw far more than any of us, both as commander of the 25th Brigade and as commander of the 7th Corps, to comment on this account and, if possible, add anything you think is missing.

Here's my understanding of what happened. Around 13-17 July 2025, a small group of Russian infantrymen infiltrated Pokrovsk through gaps between Ukrainian positions near the village of Zvirove, southwest of the city. Once inside Pokrovsk, they mostly hid in basements, waiting for reinforcements and occasionally engaging Ukrainian soldiers in small-arms firefights.

In late July, the 25th Brigade conducted its first mop-up operation in Pokrovsk, but by early August, the Russians had infiltrated the city for a second time, and Ukrainian forces were unable to drive them out.

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Neither mop-up operation produced the expected results, probably for three reasons. Firstly, the Ukrainian group of forces operating on the Pokrovsk front had failed to block Russia's infiltration routes into the city. Secondly, too few troops were deployed for the clearing operations, with the first clearing group consisting of no more than 30 soldiers. Thirdly, the Russians had air superiority.

By the end of November, the Russians controlled most of the city. Ukraine's defence forces still held positions in northern Pokrovsk, but these no longer had any significant impact on the situation.

We recount to Lasiichuk what soldiers repeatedly told Ukrainska Pravda's editorial team during the summer and autumn of last year, when the battle for Pokrovsk was underway
We recount to Lasiichuk what soldiers repeatedly told Ukrainska Pravda's editorial team during the summer and autumn of last year, when the battle for Pokrovsk was underway

Let's start with Russian activity. Pokrovsk wasn't the only front where the Russians were attacking and trying to build on its gains. At the same time as its offensive against Pokrovsk, it was also attacking Myrnohrad, trying to break into the city from different directions. And Myrnohrad isn't a village – it's a very large city. It has two distinct parts, several neighbourhoods and districts. And you need at least a platoon to hold a single building in a settlement.

Russian activity in Myrnohrad was on a par with that in Pokrovsk.

At the time, we were using the forces and resources available to block Russian troops who had infiltrated both cities. We needed to close the gaps in our defensive line.

One of the problems that arose then was Russian activity on the Dobropillia front, where they had made a fairly deep advance and were trying to exploit that success. Unlike in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, this wasn't infiltration [as it was in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad], but an actual advance.

You mean the major Russian breakthrough towards Dobropillia in the summer of 2025? The one that looked like a pair of rabbit ears?

Yes, they're now called "rabbit ears". At that point, the military leadership needed to respond to Russia's offensive operations. Faced with a choice between Pokrovsk and Dobropillia – in other words, where to deploy the reserves – they chose Dobropillia, and that was the right decision. Otherwise, the Russians would have seized a broad stretch of the front to operational depth.

And they would have outflanked the whole of Donetsk Oblast – from the south through Dobropillia and from the north through Barvinkove…

Yes. That's why the military leadership decided to stabilise the situation right there [near Dobropillia] and regain as much lost ground as possible. Some of our corps' brigades were deployed there too.

On our front, we were trying to contain the Russians within Pokrovsk itself. We had established several layers of defensive lines and deep shelters, but there was no brigade to take up defensive positions inside Pokrovsk.

All the brigades were positioned, on average, about 10 km from the city.

Am I right in understanding that in the summer of 2025, the defence forces sacrificed the mopping up of Pokrovsk, and ultimately Pokrovsk itself, in order to thwart the Russians' plan to encircle a large part of Donetsk Oblast?

We were not privy to the strategic plan for further operations. I could not have known then what would happen here in six months or which units would be brought in to reinforce us. But at that point, the situation was such that Pokrovsk was being held by the forces and resources available there.

There was no one else there. The forces were committed elsewhere, to an area that was considered more important than holding this city.

All right, the likely idea is clear. Let me return to the details: you said that by the time the enemy had infiltrated Pokrovsk, the defensive line was south of the city itself?

Yes, considerably further south, on average 10-15 km away. That was where we were holding the line.

At the time, the enemy was actively advancing on Zvirove and then on Troianda. These are settlements where it is difficult to locate the enemy. We were searching for enemy troops there, while they were already infiltrating Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, bringing in companies and battalions.

The next stage involved close-quarters combat in Pokrovsk, with drone operators coming under small-arms fire [from the enemy – ed.]. This, in turn, forced operators to move to a safer area further north. And when an operator is pulled back, the reconnaissance and strike zone is also pulled back.

The main factor, of course, was air power. The enemy had air superiority and carried out 100-150 guided aerial bomb strikes on Pokrovsk every day. They struck at 06:00, 09:00, 12:00 and continued until the evening. They targeted both military personnel and civilians.

Another thing that made our task much more difficult was that the enemy would change into civilian clothes. We had to spend a lot of resources figuring out who was who.

Holding Pokrovsk would have required enormous resources.

At the time, a coordination centre for counter-sabotage operations had been established, comprising special forces from the Special Operations Forces, the Alpha unit and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU). The latter even flew in by helicopter…

I take it the helicopter operation was more of a show of force, intended to have a psychological impact on the enemy? How many DIU personnel could possibly be deployed from a single helicopter to go and mop up the city?!

You're spot on. It was a highly targeted, specialised tool for a specific task. Special forces are not designed to mop up the whole of Pokrovsk – they simply wouldn't have been enough.

How many personnel would have been needed to fully clear Pokrovsk of the Russians?

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We estimated that holding the city itself would have required three brigades. As for mopping it up, I think at least one effective Air Assault Forces brigade, properly prepared and trained.

How many personnel were actually in the city? Which units were stationed there when the urban fighting began?

There were command posts, pilot positions and one brigade holding the settlement itself. All [the infantry – ed.] were further south.

What happened next to the troops stationed further south, below Pokrovsk? Did you bring them into the city?

Given the resources available, we responded with mobile defence. We covered various sections of the front and increased firepower against the areas where the enemy was advancing. We withdrew our troops from settlements south of Pokrovsk.

What happened in Lysivka, which lies south-east of Pokrovsk? As far as I know, not all Ukrainian troops managed to withdraw from the settlement. They held it until the very end, and I believe it was fighters from your former brigade who were stationed there.

By late autumn 2025, the village of Lysivka had found itself in a deep pocket between Russian positions
By late autumn 2025, the village of Lysivka had found itself in a deep pocket between Russian positions
DeepState map as of 19 November 2025

Lysivka was held by the 25th Brigade. It was a very important settlement because it was the gateway to Pokrovsk. Lysivka blocked the [enemy's] main Selidove-Pokrovsk road, along which the Russians tried every day to advance in armoured vehicles, in convoys and on foot. It was important to hold that settlement.

Yes, indeed, when the enemy had already begun outflanking our positions, a decision was made to switch to mobile defence and take up positions in the forested areas and strongpoints further north. To say that Lysivka was lost because the enemy had encircled it – no, that is not the case.

What do you know about the soldiers who did not withdraw from Lysivka?

I can only say one thing: this is combat, and combat always involves risks. Because our troops held the enemy back there, we were able to straighten the line of contact at a strategic level, build the next defensive line and move a unit there.

Unfortunately, not all personnel were evacuated from the settlement.

How many people are we talking about?

I cannot say for security reasons.

The discussion about Lysivka was the most tense part of our hour-and-a-half-long interview.
The discussion about Lysivka was the most tense part of our hour-and-a-half-long interview.

Was there a chance to get them out, to save them?

I would like to emphasise how quickly the enemy's drone capabilities developed and expanded, allowing them to increase the size of the kill zone – an area subjected to continuous strikes. Carrying out logistics to the settlement became almost impossible.

All the equipment available to the enemy, including its latest developments, like Rubicon, was deployed on the Pokrovsk front. This was not isolated use but large-scale deployment of fibre-optic drones, fixed-wing drones with fibre-optic control, and even fixed-wing kamikaze drones. Unfortunately.

You have also stressed several times that the corps had to defend not just one city but two at once – Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. As far as I know, the last drone pilots left Myrnohrad in February 2026, passing through Russian positions.

What was the military rationale for holding the city for so long? There had been no logistical access to it for quite some time.

Myrnohrad served the same purpose as Pokrovsk. For the enemy, it was a point towards which they were advancing in force in order to turn it into a springboard for further military operations. In other words, they wanted to build up their forces in the city and then move out along other routes, advancing north and west. But, once again, this ultimately meant that they became bogged down in urban combat.

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It was very important to keep the pilots behind the infantry [in Myrnohrad – ed.]. The pilots are precisely the ones responsible for the infantry's ability to hold its ground: they support it with reconnaissance and firepower and provide logistics.

The front line in Myrnohrad held until the very end, including individual buildings and neighbourhoods. Therefore we kept the pilots there as well. I know they do not like engaging in small-arms combat with the enemy – that is essentially not their job – but we tried to set up secure positions for the pilots and establish additional defensive lines.

So you see Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad as settlements that tied down the enemy and slowed its advance?

Yes, slowing its advance in two directions at once: north towards Dobropillia and west towards Hryshyne.

The enemy's plans involved launching a very rapid offensive. Some assault groups were tasked with advancing north towards Dobropillia without stopping in Pokrovsk. It was Pokrovsk that prevented them from doing so. Pokrovsk tied the enemy down in street fighting.

The Russians also suffered enormous losses there. Our missiles, aircraft and HIMARS were all deployed. We had group targets, and when striking them, we could wipe out up to 10 enemy troops at a time.

The operation in Pokrovsk was extremely difficult. However, I believe it was very important in containing the enemy's offensive operations.

Lasiichuk believes that Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad played a key role in drawing Russian forces away from Dobropillia.
Lasiichuk believes that Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad played a key role in drawing Russian forces away from Dobropillia.

How often did the then commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi visit you on the Pokrovsk front?

To give you an idea, reports to the commander-in-chief were made two or three times a day. This was throughout the defence of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad – I cannot separate the two, because it was a single operation in which we were holding the enemy back. The commander-in-chief visited very frequently.

How well-informed, in your opinion, was Syrskyi about the actual situation in Pokrovsk?

I think he was as well-informed as was humanly possible. He knew where the positions were and where the line of contact was being held. He had a very clear understanding of the situation.

I've been waiting for an opportunity to ask someone who was present in this photo what exactly is happening in it. This was taken on 1 November 2025. It looks as though everyone is listening to Oleksandr Syrskyi either with surprise or perhaps a hint of disbelief.

A year ago, this photo sparked quite a heated reaction on social media: people argued that the expressions on the faces of everyone looking at the commander-in-chief spoke louder than any official statements about the situation being under control.
A year ago, this photo sparked quite a heated reaction on social media: people argued that the expressions on the faces of everyone looking at the commander-in-chief spoke louder than any official statements about the situation being under control.

This is a planning meeting for counter-sabotage operations. You can see that DIU is represented there as well. It's a working environment.

Look, there could be no doubts or mistrust. If we had had any doubts, Pokrovsk would not have held out; we would not have been able to hold it. This is an official working environment. Sometimes it is very difficult to deploy units against an enemy force that outnumbers them.

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One last question. A couple of weeks ago, you opened the Marun Hub in Kyiv – a stylish, functional space for civilians and military personnel right on Kyiv's main street, Khreshchatyk. I was glad to attend its opening. I'd like to ask where the corps got the money for this?

I can tell you even more: this is not the only Marun Hub; it's already a network of hubs. We have one in Dnipro, one in Vinnytsia, and now one in Kyiv. I think there will eventually be one at every military unit within the corps.

Our corps is involved in more than just combat operations on the battlefield. We also have a humanitarian division that supports veterans – our men and women – provides training for local residents and promotes the militarisation of the population.

I set myself the task of creating dedicated spaces where all this could take place. We selected the locations, chose the name Marun Hub and found partners willing to help. They support us and help develop this initiative because they see its value.

I cannot openly name our partners, but they are businesses in frontline areas that understand the importance of the war and the value of every person taking part in combat operations. In addition, the hub also helps raise awareness of our units and supports recruitment and mobilisation. We are not just looking for assault troops; we also need IT specialists.

Photo from the opening of Marun Hub in Kyiv. Seated next to Corps Commander Lasiichuk are the husband and wife Olena Kondratiuk, Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, and Oleksandr Bohutskyi, CEO of Starlight Media (Starlight Media is owned by Viktor and Olena Pinchuk).
Photo from the opening of Marun Hub in Kyiv. Seated next to Corps Commander Lasiichuk are the husband and wife Olena Kondratiuk, Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, and Oleksandr Bohutskyi, CEO of Starlight Media (Starlight Media is owned by Viktor and Olena Pinchuk).

And what is in it for the businesses that decided to invest in Marun Hub? What do they want from you in return?

I don't think they want anything from me personally [smiles – ed.]. These are businesses with facilities located not far from the front line. They want to make the Armed Forces more effective and ensure that our territory remains ours.

Just look at Avdiivka or Pokrovsk – no one will ever rebuild anything there. Neither the mine nor any other business – there is nothing left there.

The main task of every service member and every Ukrainian is to strengthen the country's defence capabilities in one way or another. Marun Hub is one of the ways I contribute. I can see that it works.

Olha Kyrylenko for Ukrainska Pravda

Translated by Myroslava Zavadska, Tetiana Buchkovska and Anna Kybukevych

Edited by Susan McDonald

war Armed Forces technology army weapons
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