Hero of Ukraine Serhii Volynskyi: Thousands died at Krynky. It was a huge failure, a tragedy, and hell on earth
Serhii Volynskyi, better known to Ukrainians by his alias Volyna, is one of those officers whose personal story is inseparably intertwined with the story of this war.
Crimea, Mariupol, Azovstal, captivity – these are more than just places and dates. They are the successive stages of Ukrainian resistance and Ukrainian tragedy that Serhii lived through together with his brothers-in-arms.
In 2014 he was a young officer in Kerch, when Ukraine was losing Crimea and the military chain of command was collapsing. In 2022 he was the commander of the 36th Marine Brigade, defending Mariupol and leading his fighters through a city that had become a trap, acutely aware of the price that would be paid for every decision.
This interview is not only a reflection on the past, but an attempt to tell it how it was. It is about a betrayal of the oath and the silence of commanders; about decisions that cost hundreds and thousands of lives; about the state's systemic failures in its treatment of the marines, from 2014 to the present day.
Volynskyi speaks about Mariupol without sentimentality or mythmaking, but with the painful precision of a man who witnessed the collapse of morale – and, at the same time, the birth of superhuman endurance and brotherhood in inhuman conditions.
This is also a conversation about responsibility – military, political and moral. About captivity as a whole different level of hell from which not everyone is able to escape, and about the Krynky offensive as a tragedy that has still not been officially recognised as such at the state level.
And about the fact that unless we can have an honest conversation about defeats, we are doomed to repeat them.
This is also the first full-length interview with the legendary commander, a major in the Marine Corps, since his release from captivity – keeping a promise he made to the interviewer in 2022.
The full conversation (in Ukrainian) is on the Ukrainska Pravda YouTube channel.
Out of a battalion of 300, only 20 left Crimea and went to mainland Ukraine
I first heard about you in 2014. You were serving in Kerch, which is my home city. It was just at the time when the Russian invasion [the annexation of Crimea] began. Could you recall those events?
We could start with the fact that your family used to bring us food when we were isolated [in the military unit – ed.].
After graduating from the National Army Academy in Lviv, I was assigned to the 501st Coastal Defence Battalion in Kerch, which later became a marine infantry battalion.
I look back on that time with a lot of emotion, because those circumstances had a huge impact on me as a young officer. We trusted our commander and were waiting for decisions from him. But we didn't get any decisions, and in the end he stayed to serve in the Russian Federation.
Fewer than 30 people left the unit and went back to Ukraine. All the rest betrayed their oath and stayed in the Russian Federation.
What happened to them?
We've assassinated some of them, but some are 100% still serving.
What was the mood like at the time among your brothers-in-arms who later betrayed their oath?
Initially, I think everyone was ready to carry out their duties. But then, during the isolation, when there was no clear leadership or orders, the entire military chain of command and discipline started to collapse.
I remember when the commander of the unit, [Oleksandr] Saiienko, brought the first Russian general onto the premises of the base. I barricaded myself with my subordinates in the officers' briefing room, blocked the door with a safe, threw a wire bed net over the windows, and demanded that he remove the Russian general. And we achieved that.
After that, we simply left the unit with our weapons and went underground, so to speak, until an evacuation was organised.
When did it become clear to you that we had essentially lost Crimea?
When missiles started being brought over on the ferry crossing. That was before the "referendum".
When we were leaving, there was a constant rumbling of vehicles for about five to seven days. Everyone realised what was going on. Then the Cossacks appeared and started beating up soldiers outside the military base. And when we saw that there were no police anymore, no free movement of civilians in the city, when the city emptied out, it was clear that something serious was happening. And that it was called war.
Do you keep in touch with the other soldiers who left Crimea back then?
Of course. We're like a family. For instance, Vasyl Kmet barricaded himself in that officers' room with me. He was tragically killed in action last year during assault operations while serving as a reconnaissance commander in a mechanised brigade.
You see, out of a battalion of 300 people, only 20 of us remained. And that group became the backbone on which the battalion was later rebuilt.
What things did the state fail to do that would have stimulated the development of the Marine Corps after 2014?
There are many things that were not done then and are still not being done today. The Marine Corps functions as an aggressive force that plugs gaps in different sections of the front. That's how it has been since 2014, and I think that's how it still is.
Today, there is still no clear doctrine defining how the state should treat the Marines. For example, if you compare the 140th Marine Reconnaissance Battalion and the Special Operations Forces Centre, the tasks they perform are absolutely identical. But a Special Operations Forces soldier earns UAH 40,000 (about US$920) per month, while a reconnaissance battalion soldier earns UAH 20,000 (US$460).
From 2014 onwards, the principle on which the Marines received resources, equipment and weapons was "whatever's left over". Up until about 2018, my battalion would almost always carry out missions in Humvees that had no vehicle armour at all. The doors were basically plastic, and the only thing that offered any protection was the windscreen.
What changed after 2018?
Equipment started to appear: infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), BMP-1s, BMP-2s, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) – not many of them, but at least some began to arrive. That was thanks to the command.
So can it be said that the role of the marines in Ukraine's military strategy was not defined at all after 2014?
I'm not even sure it's fully defined now. I don't understand how a Marine brigade differs today from an Air Assault brigade or an infantry brigade. What is the difference?
Why is that?
We've preserved the branch of service, but we've never learned how to make proper use of it. For instance, parachute jumps are still being practised. Honestly, I have no idea where on the front line people trained in parachuting would be deployed today, or what tasks they would carry out.
We painted Zs and Vs on our vehicles and drove through Russian checkpoints to Azovstal
Let's talk about the full-scale invasion. How did 24 February 2022 begin for Serhii Volynskyi?
At the battalion command post. At around 04:00, the air attacks and artillery strikes began.
Did you immediately realise the complexity of the situation that the Marine units in Mariupol were facing?
Probably not. My unit had been operating exclusively on the Mariupol front since 2014. All the positions, the city, all the communications were familiar and routine to us. It seemed to us that our experience and combat capability would be enough to repel any attacks and attempts by the enemy.
Why do you think that didn't happen? What went wrong?
I think it was because of the enemy's superior forces. First of all, we were losing in the air for a very long time. We had absolutely no air defence, and no support from our Air Force.
When we interviewed Denys Prokopenko, the commander of the Mariupol group of forces, in 2022 – just before he was taken prisoner – he said the enemy managed to cover the distance from the Crimean isthmus to Mariupol in just four days, practically in a march. That's how Mariupol ended up encircled.
Let's talk about the marine units. How did the marines try to repel the Russian attacks?
How? At the cost of our own lives.
That's clear. Can you describe the episode when a large number of marines ended up at the Illich Iron and Steel Works and were unable to reach Azovstal for a long time?
They broke through the Russian encirclement on 12 April. Up until then, extremely heavy fighting had been going on. The marines hadn't ended up at the Illich plant immediately. We'd held the first line, which had been prepared with engineering fortifications, until the very last possible moment.
On 1 March, the brigade commander gave the order to move closer to the Illich plant and deploy combat positions and a forward line there. And really, the marines only ended up at the plant because superior enemy forces pushed them back from the positions they had been holding.
For example, if we talk about Volonterivka, the settlement where our battalion was holding the defence, the marines literally clung onto every patch of ground with their teeth, through superhuman effort. Every destroyed building, every basement, every metre. It was an extremely brutal fight.
Can you tell us about the circumstances in which your commander [Volodymyr] Baraniuk was captured? That's a story that has yet to be told, it seems to me.
Look, it was decided to break out of the encirclement several times. But none of those decisions was ever implemented. During one of those attempts, the brigade commander simply disappeared together with a group of people. It wasn't until much later that we found out he'd been taken prisoner. At first, videos appeared showing his destroyed APC and a sticker on his personal weapon claiming he'd been killed.
Were those videos posted by propagandists?
Yes. Where else could we have found out where he was and what had happened to him?
So the brigade commander's effectively vanished, the city is half besieged – what's happening to the personnel at that point?
If you'll allow me, I'll take two steps back in the story. In March, when we realised we were completely encircled, I was organising communication between Baraniuk and the commander-in-chief. Then at a certain point it became clear that all the options we had were bad. After that, both the brigade commander and the personnel began to lose morale. At that stage it's hard to judge people, but you could say that we lost our combat potential.
By the time the brigade commander was gone, there was a clear division between the units carrying out combat missions and those providing combat support. And for the most part, it was the people who were performing combat tasks who decided to go to Azovstal.
"All the options were bad" – what did that mean? As I understand it, this was a communication between Baraniuk and Valerii Zaluzhnyi. What did the commander-in-chief say? That the only option was to surrender?
At that stage, there was no talk of surrender at all. There were two possible courses of action: break through towards Zaporizhzhia, or go to Azovstal. Valerii Zaluzhnyi ordered us to go to Azovstal. But Baraniuk was strongly opposed to that. He saw no sense in it and perhaps did not even believe it was possible.
Why?
Because Azovstal is deep inside a city that was already surrounded. Zaporizhzhia was a long way away, but in his view it offered at least some chance.
Why do you think the option of heading towards Zaporizhzhia was not chosen?
It was chosen. It failed twice. The first time was when Baraniuk disappeared along with the command group. The second was when his successors were operating along the same route. A very large number of people were killed as a result.
How many people were captured together with Baraniuk?
I don't want to give false figures, as no one knows the exact numbers. What we can say is that we had a brigade that undoubtedly suffered losses, both wounded and killed, but I think around 70% of the brigade survived. About 200 marines reached Azovstal with me, and around 40 people from other units.
Do you know what happened to Baraniuk?
As far as I know, he is currently being held in Donetsk, in a very serious condition. They are preparing to try him on charges of genocide…
…of the population of Mariupol?
Yes.
You very often hear complaints that it's extremely rare for Azov fighters to be included in prisoner swaps, and even more so for marines. Why do you think this is?
Russia takes this position on principle. We accomplished our combat mission professionally and with full dedication. That is precisely why Russia treats the Mariupol groups – the marines and Azov fighters – the way it does. The detention conditions are exceptionally brutal for this category of people.
Going back to spring 2022, how were you thinking at the time – was there a plan to rejoin Prokopenko when you were breaking through to Azovstal?
There was an order to break through to Azovstal. Very few people believed in it. When it became clear that a decision had to be made one way or another, I managed to establish contact with the commander of the Azov Regiment, Denys Prokopenko.
He flew the route we discussed [with a drone – ed.] and explained what was happening there. And on that very day it turned out that the Russians had stretched out the equipment they were using to block the city. I realised that it would create an element of surprise if we went along a route where no one was expecting us.
But there was a very high risk of being captured?
An extremely high risk.
So you could say that rejoining [Prokopenko] was a kind of miracle?
Yes, I believe that everything that happened in Mariupol, and everything that allowed people to survive, was a miracle.
We painted Zs and Vs [the letters the Russians marked their vehicles with when they launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – ed.] on our vehicles and drove straight through the central exit of the plant and along the main roads of the city with our headlights off. We didn't stop at the checkpoints. A machine gunner known as Batia ("Father") shouted "Friends!" at them in Russian – and that's how we made it to Azovstal.
How many people?
Up to 250 people in total.
How did you feel when you reached Azovstal via such a risky route?
Surprised, to be honest, but we were all happy. We realised that we had gone even deeper into an encircled city, that we wouldn't be able to break out fighting now, and that this was the last place of resistance.
And that's when the idea of extraction was floated. How did it emerge? You became the main spokesperson on the Ukrainian side, appealing to world leaders for the extraction of the Mariupol group of forces.
Negotiations were taking place in Türkiye at the time. We didn't have much hope of a political solution. Pope Francis even suggested that a Turkish ship could come, we could be airlifted by helicopter – there were a lot of almost impossible scenarios. Of course, we understood that it was highly unlikely, but we didn't give up hope.
One thing was absolutely clear: if we didn't speak out, if we did not help Ukraine in this negotiation process and highlight this story, then no decisions would be made at all.
So you decided to speak out? How did you feel about being the voice of Mariupol?
To be honest, both the personnel and the commanders of neighbouring units asked or suggested that I go public and tell people what was really happening. Later, when we arrived at Azovstal and the responsibility of leadership fell on me, a collective decision was made: we had to speak out, to look for ways and cling onto any opportunity with our hands, feet and teeth.
Did you ever think that you would write to Pope Francis, and that he would respond?
Hundreds of thousands of people were affected by this problem. There was a clear understanding that it was an extremely acute issue on a global level. I was confident that all the messages reached the people they were addressed to. Hundreds of people wrote back to tell us about what they had done to ensure that those people received the messages we sent.
Although, as I understand it, ultimately it was Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who played the decisive role in saving the Mariupol group of forces?
I am very grateful to the Turkish president for what he did personally for me and for taking on the role at all. I won't take it upon myself to say who did more and who did less. But I am sincerely grateful to everyone who cared about the fate of the civilians and soldiers who were defending their land there.
What do you think ultimately played the key role in the fact that you were able to go into captivity and that later the commanders were brought back?
I would rather not speak about myself specifically, but about the group of forces as a whole and the civilians who found themselves in that furnace of war. At that stage, I think it was the combined efforts of the Turkish president, other presidents, diplomats, journalists and concerned people all over the world. As for my personal story – with regard to the exchange of commanders, I am immensely grateful to the Turkish president.
When all the marines had left, we were the last to go with them
Tell us about the decision to leave Azovstal. How was it made? Was there any communication with the Russians?
Look, during that whole period I had only one instance of communication [with them]. It was when representatives of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence arrived at Azovstal – all the commanders spoke with the deputy head of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Before that, we had no communication at all.
What did you talk about with the deputy head?
By that time, orders had already been given to stop the defence and evacuate the civilians and the wounded, and we were already discussing the stages of evacuation and how the troops would be taken into captivity. The Russians undertook to preserve lives, health, dignity and honour, and to comply with international law.
I remember those videos of commanders leaving unarmed. I understand that your personnel also left unarmed?
Everything we could destroy, we destroyed. The conditions were that we had to hand over our personal weapons, and we surrendered them before leaving the plant and then followed the route that had been indicated.
In reality, very few people believed that commanders who had spent so long saving Mariupol and drawing the enemy's main forces onto themselves would come out of captivity alive. Did you have any sense that something might still happen after that period in captivity?
Since the order was given by the commander-in-chief and confirmed by the entire military and political leadership, there were some hopeful expectations. But they crumbled very quickly.
When?
As soon as we arrived at the penal colony. Or perhaps even before that.
What were the first few days in captivity like?
We decided to divide all our personnel into groups – sick women first – and then gradually we withdrew the positions that had been providing our own security. After that, the chief of staff and I went at the very end. When all the marines had left, we went with them last.
After that, we were disarmed, searched and put on buses. Then we were taken to the Olenivka prison camp. Upon arrival, we were stripped, interrogated, had questionnaires filled out, and were distributed among the barracks. And then the most "interesting" part began – when the interrogations, torture and various atrocities started.
What were the Russians most interested in during the interrogations? You were one of the faces and voices of Mariupol. I assume you got a lot of attention from them.
First of all, they were interested in how we got from the Illich plant to Azovstal. But that really wasn't a secret. They demanded that we take responsibility for criminal cases regarding shooting civilians and other vile things, so that they could fabricate charges.
In effect, they were demanding confessions about alleged war crimes by Ukrainian soldiers?
Yes.
If you confessed, could you expect a reduced sentence? Or was there no talk of leniency at all?
I think everyone understands that once there is a court verdict, the situation only gets worse. And when you know for sure that you committed no crimes and were defending people and territory… you also understand that you are a public figure and there is no way back. Defending your position was extremely hard and painful. For me it meant pain and health problems, and for many of the guys it cost them their lives.
How were the marines treated in captivity? Were you singled out in any way, or was everyone treated equally badly?
Everyone was tortured. It was an occasional process when they were looking for criminal cases. People who in their view were either witnesses or "guilty" were subjected to severe torture so that they would sign certain documents. Marines, Azov fighters, intelligence officers, border guards – absolutely everyone ended up in the disciplinary isolation block, where all these horrific things took place.
I don't want to ask about torture in detail – there are many stories from both civilians and POWs. What helped you psychologically not to break in those conditions?
It was 100% the people around me.
For example, Mykola, a soldier in the Territorial Defence Forces. I ended up in the same disciplinary cell as him. He fed me, helped me go to the toilet, covered for me, protected me – he did a lot of things like that for me. He's been exchanged, thank God. He's like my brother for life.
Did many of those who went through Olenivka come back from captivity?
Not everyone. This is an immense wound. And talking about whether it was a lot of people or not very many doesn't seem constructive to me. Every life is a whole universe, and we must do everything we can to ensure that everyone comes home.
After my return, the commander never contacted me – there were no offers of any positions
When you all returned, Denys Prokopenko went straight back to fighting, and Sviatoslav Palamar, as I understand it, is now focused on recruitment. How did you decide what to focus on after the prisoner swap?
After my return, the commander of the Marine Corps at the time never contacted me, not even once. I wasn't offered any positions. I was assigned to ground forces brigades with lower positions twice by orders from the commanders-in-chief. I took it personally and ended my service in the Armed Forces.
Why do you think that happened? Was it jealousy on the part of the command?
I believe that the whole story of what happened to the marines in Mariupol is deeply ambiguous.
Why?
Because we have drawn no conclusions from that tragedy at all. From how the strategic plans were implemented, as constantly presented by the ATO/JFO command. [The ATO or Anti-Terrorist Operation is a term used from 2014 to 2018 by the media, the Ukrainian government and the OSCE to identify combat actions in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts against Russian military forces and pro-Russian separatists. It was replaced by the term JFO (Joint Forces Operation) in 2018 – ed.] Because the opinions and perspectives of commanders and subordinates diverged. Because of the uncertain fates of the servicemen who defended Mariupol.
Who do you think should be held responsible for this?
We have the appropriate bodies that should investigate the whole story. As far as I'm aware, criminal proceedings have been opened. But nothing has been done.
As a state, we did not learn lessons from Ilovaisk or Debaltseve – and then came Mariupol. If this time we again fail to say honestly where we were right and where we were wrong, and fail to determine what should have been done at each stage, such episodes will continue to repeat in our history.
What are you doing now? You're involved in a charity, aren't you?
Yes, there's the Stalevi (Steel) charitable foundation, there are veterans' civic organisations, and there are projects related to mining, metals, railways and defence. Overall, we work on supporting the front, bringing people back from captivity, and helping veterans with rehabilitation, medical treatment and reintegration after their military service. We help people at every stage to rebuild their lives and find their place in civilian life. We also work jointly with all the state agencies involved in these issues.
Are you being heard? Are institutions willing to cooperate?
Yes. I think it is clear to absolutely everyone that the issue of POWs, active servicemen and veterans is of critical importance in this country today. And no one can afford to stand aside. We must all do everything possible to ensure these people have a dignified life, both during and after their service.
There is a major social project called Prapor Nadii ("The Flag of Hope"). It is a silent scream of our pain – the pain felt by families, wives, children, mothers. We must honestly admit to ourselves that POWs and missing persons – both military and civilian – are the deepest wound in Ukrainian society today.
Tell us about Prapor Nadii. We've seen these flags at Kyiv's central railway station.
The flags aren't just there – they're all over the country. They appear at every demonstration for missing persons and POWs. Ukraine must have its own symbol to remind Ukrainians and the whole world that it has an unhealed wound.
Command must bear responsibility for the Krynky operation
Let's talk about the operation in Krynky. It was a huge tragedy for the marines. What was the key mistake caused by, in your view?
The lack of objective intelligence.
That, of course, is the responsibility of the command.
It has long been the case that decisions are made based on the "talent" of commanders. But if we relied on objective intelligence, and if the leaders and heads of intelligence agencies provided an honest assessment of situations and their likely development, I think such situations would not arise.
As someone directly connected to the marines, you must have realised what was happening even at the planning stage of this operation. It wasn't exactly a huge secret – even journalists knew about it.
Journalists knew, yes. But nobody spoke about it openly, right?
Right.
I believe that any operation can be carried out, in general. But if we can clearly see that we're not succeeding at a certain stage in the operation, we shouldn't be sending thousands of people onto those cold banks, do you see what I mean?
Am I right in understanding that it was already clear that something had gone wrong in the first week of the operation?
I'm sure it became obvious to everyone when, at the tactical level, we failed to achieve the objectives that were supposed to have been achieved at the first stage. Given that we hadn't done that, why continue this whole performance?
Why do you think the command still made that decision?
It seems to me that someone committed to it at the initial stage and then they just couldn't go back on their words.
If the contingent sent to that sector of the front could not protect the skies, why leave people on soaked ground? It was a huge tragedy, and I believe we have to analyse tragedies like this. We shouldn't only focus on victorious narratives, because that doesn't lead to anything good.
We have to examine every tragedy in detail and understand what we did right and where we went wrong. As far as I know, until the commander at the time, Hnatov, briefed the president, after which air defence units were deployed and three Russian Su aircraft were shot down, Russia had been attacking with guided bombs almost with impunity.
…with guided bombs, and drones – everything they had…
And given that there was a water obstacle, extremely difficult logistics, poor supplies and poorly trained personnel, the operation was doomed to failure.
We saw videos clearly showing that people on those inflatable boats didn't even have life jackets. So the command failed in basic provision as well, let alone intelligence.
The tactical-level commanders who received those orders became victims. But everyone signed those orders from top to bottom – from the commander-in-chief to brigade commanders, right? So saying that some brigade commander or battalion commander failed to provide something is absurd.
No, it was the military command that should have provided the supplies. As I understand it, the problem was also that our partners did not supply enough of this equipment to the marines.
In my view, if you don't have the means, you don't carry out the operation. If you plan something, you have to be properly equipped.
I remember discussions about the fact that at some point the command realised there were not enough boats and not enough life jackets. The operation could have been postponed, but it wasn't.
At every stage of this operation, the whole country was collecting boats, engines, life jackets… The infantry were standing on the banks, in wet soil. You can't build proper fortifications there because everything is flooded. It's terrifyingly hard work. If we couldn't provide air defence, if we couldn't provide support with aircraft, missiles, if we couldn't ensure artillery fire, what kind of success are we even talking about?
Who should be held responsible for what happened in Krynky?
The command.
So, Sodol specifically?
Him as well, 100%. I believe Yurii Ivanovych has a lot of questions to answer, starting with Mariupol and ending at Krynky. I'm not going to give legal assessments, but we need clear answers as to why these decisions were made.
These decisions weren't just made once – they kept on being made over a period of time. The operation went on for nine months even though it was clear it would end in tragedy. Is this also about a reluctance to report bad news to the political leadership?
Of course. What other reasons could there be for not withdrawing people? Why did we later all start looking for pontoons together, for more evacuation vessels…
Were you involved in that?
We were, among others.
Can we estimate roughly how many people were killed in action in Krynky?
I'm convinced it was thousands. I know that more than 1,000 servicemen are currently listed as missing.
For me, every human life is an entire universe. I believe this was a huge failure, a tragedy, hell on earth. And I think it will be a lot harder now to find people who would be willing to get into cold boats and sail towards an unprepared shore.
Author: Sevğil Musaieva
Translation: Myroslava Zavadska
Editing: Teresa Pearce