"There were a lot of people swarming around the Defence Ministry": ex-defence minister Fedorov on the reasons behind his dismissal

Few political events in recent months have generated as much attention as Mykhailo Fedorov's ousting as defence minister.

Officially it was part of a broader government reshuffle, but questions were almost immediately raised. Was this really just a reshuffle, or was it the result of a conflict over the future of the Ukrainian armed forces, defence procurement, and the principles of managing the war?

Following his dismissal, Fedorov publicly stated that it was driven by resistance to his reforms at the Ministry of Defence and influence from groups that have no interest in the rules of the game changing in the defence sector.

He also declined the other positions President Zelenskyy offered him, saying he saw no point in taking on a role where he would have no real authority to influence the course of the war.

In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Fedorov opens up for the first time about how he learned of his dismissal and answers our questions about his conflict with the General Staff, the pressure surrounding defence procurement, and why he believes his reforms met with such strong resistance.

He also discusses the war plan his team developed at the Defence Ministry, the future of mobilisation reform, and his role following his departure from the ministry, and explains why he believes that today's key debates should focus not on personalities, but on the strategy for achieving victory.

"Half an hour or an hour before the faction meeting, I was told Klymenko was going to be nominated"

Let's start with the most important question. What was the real reason for your dismissal?

I'd rather not speculate about that or recount my conversations with the president. There was nothing in those discussions that hadn't already been said publicly. There's been a lot of talk about a conflict, but I actually think the reasons lay elsewhere.

There were a lot of people swarming around the Defence Ministry, and me as minister, because we'd started to overhaul a wide range of internal processes. Judging by what started happening in the public discourse – the pressure, the involvement of certain law enforcement agencies in our work – it became clear from around early April that tensions were rising. It was obvious that it would eventually lead to something.

The changes we were making to procurement, tenders, and the overall way these processes are organised made a lot of people very unhappy. They began constantly trying to exert influence and spread negative narratives, not only around the president but across the wider media space.

Is it true that many major weapons manufacturers, some of which may be linked in one way or another to influential political figures, have no interest in seeing a clear and transparent arms procurement market emerge?

I think that's entirely plausible. A great many people in this country have ties to defence businesses. There were a lot of different signals and a lot going on within the Defence Ministry.

I spent seven years working in government, and I could never have imagined that there would be people in the Defence Ministry who were effectively appointed by private companies to head departments. Or that elements of the law enforcement system would have influence over certain processes. That gives you an idea of just how deeply entrenched the problem has become.

I was never fighting a particular person or group of people. Our focus has always been on building systems.

Our goal was to tackle the root of the problem as quickly as possible. First, to introduce competitive tenders. Second, to rebuild the management system within the Defence Ministry and recruit people differently, based on the objectives we set when we came into office.

I regarded pressure from various sides as simply part of the process. The priority was to rebuild the foundations, and once that was done, the problem would resolve itself.

What form did that pressure actually take? How did people try to stop your reforms, and who was behind it? Ukrainska Pravda sources in political circles say that David Arakhamiia, the leader of Servant of the People, the president's parliamentary faction, actively represented the interests of certain weapons manufacturers.

I would rather not name specific individuals. There were no direct threats. Everyone knows me and knows where I stand on these issues. I think the fundamental problem is that far too many senior officials simply cannot imagine that someone could hold a high-ranking government position without having ties to the defence industry.

It is entirely possible to change the rules of the game, open up markets and help those markets develop without pursuing your own commercial interests within them. That problem of culture and values is influencing decision-making today.

Why do you think the president ultimately sided with those groups within the defence sector in this conflict?

We don't know the ultimate reason for my dismissal. I think that when 90% of people are coming to you [to President Zelenskyy – ed.] and saying, "Something isn't right there, there's a problem, he has his own interests," then it may become difficult to see the situation objectively under that kind of pressure.

But I warned the president back in April. I said: "Look, people are going to come and tell you that there's something wrong with me, that I have political ambitions, that I own drone companies, that I've disrupted certain processes, and so on. You need to cross-check those claims with me, because I've trodden on the toes of a lot of people and companies. I need your support here."

You can see that Ukraine's largest Telegram channels were effectively bought, and they began working exclusively against me and my team. Criminal cases started to appear involving people who worked with me. The pressure ratcheted up month after month. And under that kind of pressure, it became increasingly difficult to continue implementing the reforms.

In the end, we saw where it led: to a government reshuffle, and today I am no longer in office.

So you also believe that the government reshuffle served as a cover for your dismissal. Is that correct?

It certainly looks that way. Unfortunately we lost several highly capable managers as a result of the reshuffle, including [former PM] Yuliia Svyrydenko.

I spent seven years working as part of the president's team. Together we delivered a great many projects and reforms and worked systematically. The defence minister is appointed by the president. If I'd been asked to resign and the reasons had been explained to me, I would have done so without hesitation. I've never fought to keep a position. I never wanted to become a minister; it was never an ambition of mine. I'm a manager. I know how to build systems and ecosystems. What matters to me is delivering results.

How were you informed that you were being dismissed? Did you have a conversation with the president?

About half an hour, maybe an hour, before the parliamentary faction meeting, I was told that Klymenko was being nominated.

Was it the president who told you?

Yes.

And what reason did he give?

The conflict with the General Staff. I don't want to recount my conversation with the president; those discussions were private. And I have nothing new to add beyond that.

About this conflict between the Defence Ministry and the General Staff that the president has repeatedly referred to: if there really had been such a conflict, wouldn't it have undermined the military's ability to function effectively?

In reality, there was no personal conflict between me and the commander-in-chief [Oleksandr Syrskyi]. It was more of a difference in worldview. We both came into office with a particular vision of how the war should be fought. That vision is broken down into specific reforms, projects and operations that need to be implemented.

I presented that vision to the president even before I was appointed, I believe. I've been developing it since 2023, continually refining it. I then presented it to the commander-in-chief and the chief of the General Staff. We had more of an institutional conflict about how that vision should be implemented. There was also a cultural difference. Young leaders should be given more freedom, decisions should be made more quickly, and reforms that have already been started need to be seen through.

As the Ministry of Defence, we did not block a single decision made by the General Staff or the commander-in-chief. That was my position both as a citizen and as defence minister: that regardless of our differences in outlook, we should never obstruct the army's work. The military is fighting around the clock and it must be as effective as possible, even if I disagree with some of its decisions.

But the president has said publicly that you and the commander-in-chief would not sit down and speak without him being involved.

I don't know; I can't comment on that. Actually we had a great many meetings, briefings and phone calls. We were, of course, working together on a day-to-day basis.

Without the president?

Of course.

Given that the president's initial decision was to remove you and keep Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi in post, that suggests he chose Syrskyi over you. Why do you think that happened?

I think you'd have to ask the president that. I really don't want it to seem as though we're trying to invent explanations after the fact or find reasons that may not exist. Nor do I want it to look as though I'm fighting to get my job back simply for the sake of returning to office. That's what concerns me most.

There's been a lot of commentary in the media claiming that 'Fedorov issued an ultimatum.' I did no such thing. I left office together with the rest of the government. The protests only began afterwards.

I did a press briefing, and after that I was offered several positions. I simply said that I have a clear vision of what should happen next. Wherever I am, I will continue pursuing that vision, but I have no interest in holding a purely token position. I see myself as a manager who knows how to build systems and deliver results. If I don't see results, it's extremely demotivating for me.

So there was no ultimatum. I was offered positions, and I replied: "No thank you. I'll continue working in another capacity." But if I am needed to implement this vision for the war, then as defence minister I would be able to continue that work and deliver the results I set out to achieve.

Why do you think the role of deputy prime minister for defence, or deputy prime minister for wartime innovation, would not have been enough to implement your plans?

From my experience in government, I can tell the difference between roles with real authority and roles that are mostly ceremonial.

A deputy prime minister without a ministerial portfolio is essentially little more than an adviser. You can suggest how the system should work, but you don't get to build a team or influence the final result. You could find yourself in an institutional conflict with the ministries you're supposed to be overseeing because you have no say in who leads them. You could fundamentally disagree with the policies they are pursuing. In practice it's more of a symbolic role, and one that would not allow me to use my strengths effectively.

You worked alongside the president for seven years, so you probably have a clear understanding of how Volodymyr Zelenskyy makes decisions. Who do you think influenced him in this decision?

Honestly, I don't know. It could have been anyone.

The decision itself was not unexpected. I had discussed it with the president many times.

Before or after your dismissal?

Both. I would say to him: "Look, a decision will have to be made, and a certain company could lose, say, US$100 million because of it. There could be a backlash.

For example, we don't need short-range shells; we need long-range ones, because our troops need ammunition that can hit targets more than 30 km away. But some companies have already invested money or they've been promised that contracts or international framework agreements are going to be signed. That could create problems, including political ones. How should we proceed?"

He would say: "Follow your conscience. Do what you believe is right. There are no instructions – act as you see fit."

So I wouldn't say the president gave me specific instructions or was directly involved in anything...

And yet here you are.

It's not a bad place to be.

"The president and I never had a final conversation, and we didn't fall out"

Turning to your dismissal, was there an ultimatum from Syrskyi and the senior military leadership along the lines of "It's either us or Fedorov"? Have you heard anything about that?

Honestly, I haven't, no. There might have been, or there might not have.

Your most recent public statement was about your decision to turn down the job of deputy prime minister. You said that only three positions in the state truly have the power to shape decision-making and influence the course of the war: commander-in-chief, president and defence minister. Many people interpreted that as a political statement.

Are we right, then, to understand that you see the rest of the government as largely decorative? And do you not consider your remark political, as many people have read it, including in the President's Office?

No, I don't see it as a political statement. It was an explanation of how the military-political chain of command shapes events on the battlefield.

What's happening with your team now?

Some members of the team are still at the Defence Ministry. I have no intention of taking everyone with me and leaving the ministry unable to function.

Some are gradually leaving the ministry, some have stayed at the Ministry of Digital Transformation, some are working with me. It's an ongoing process – nothing has been finally settled yet.

The president and I never had a final conversation. We didn't fall out, and we didn't agree to cut off contact. As far as I'm concerned, communication remains open. The main thing is to make sure Ukraine comes out of this situation stronger.

We've seen how enthusiastically the Russians reacted to your dismissal.

They shouldn't celebrate just yet – it's much too soon for that. I'm going to keep hunting them in every sector and killing them on an industrial scale. Everything will be fine.

Your press briefing following your dismissal caused quite a stir. We know how President Zelenskyy views members of his team speaking to the public. Did you discuss the terms of your departure with him – for example, whether you should avoid speaking publicly, holding press events or raising certain issues, including your disagreements with Oleksandr Syrskyi?

No, we didn't talk about that. The president knew I intended to hold the briefing. The point of it was to explain what we had achieved, point out the problems that remain and warn of the risks. And I think the fact that a new commander-in-chief has been appointed is a major victory for an engaged civil society. The Armed Forces now have renewed hope. A leader and a team with a different organisational culture have taken charge, and I am convinced this is exactly the kind of environment in which real leaders can emerge and develop.

It is a significant opportunity, and it must be seized. But there also needs to be a clear vision of what has to be done to make the Defence Ministry fully functional.

Did you propose Mykhailo Drapatyi to the president as a candidate for commander-in-chief?

My main recommendation was that the president meet a wide range of commanders – corps commanders and perhaps even brigade commanders and the heads of troop groupings – assess them personally, and make the decision himself. I did put Drapatyi's name forward. But there was, shall we say, a broader framework that still needs to be worked through: the overall approach, the structure and the specific people involved. That said, it's no secret that Drapatyi and I have worked together before and are closely aligned in terms of our values and organisational culture.

Many people are now saying that Drapatyi may struggle to achieve much without a dedicated structure around him to support him and reinforce his authority. They also argue that the structure will only work if certain other people are appointed to key posts.

Do you not think that in the current circumstances, replacing Syrskyi with Drapatyi will not be enough to counter the enemy effectively?

I think this conversation needs to be taken to a completely different level. Right now everyone is talking about certain people and the relationships between them. We should be talking about the plan. What do we want to achieve? What are our objectives, our vision? Organisational structures and specific people should always be chosen to serve a specific plan and vision.

When we arrived at the Defence Ministry, we had a clear vision: to force Russia towards peace through asymmetric action while preserving Ukraine's human capital. That vision did not depend on "black swan" events or partners that might step in tomorrow. It was based on the principle that we have to rely on ourselves.

In the air, the objective is to intercept as many threats as possible. To do that we need to build layered short-range air defence and systems that can identify every asset, and ultimately seize the initiative in the air. That's why Pavlo Yelizarov was brought into the Air Force and why we began strengthening short-range air defence. That's the air domain.

On land, the priority is to halt the enemy's advance. We need to inflict 200+ Russian casualties for every square kilometre they capture; at that rate, it would take them years to occupy the whole of Donetsk Oblast. We need to complete the corps reform, resolve the mobilisation problem, and continue to inflict the highest possible losses on Russian forces – up to 50,000 [a month] – while using technology to replace as many of our people on the battlefield as possible.

And the economic dimension, what the president calls "long-range sanctions": developing the technologies needed to achieve that result, targeting Russia's shadow fleet and imposing broader sanctions on the Russian economy as a whole.

And then there's cognitive warfare, which has now become a separate domain in its own right.

There is a document setting out the final vision, which rests on four essential pillars.

The first is building win-win relationships with our partners. That is why we've opened up our data for AI testing and have been providing weekly updates on our battlefield results – so that our partners would buy into the vision and stay committed to moving forward with us.

The second is staying ahead of Russia in every technological cycle. Disabling Russian Starlink terminals, for example, set them back years, because they currently have no comparable battlefield alternative. Or creating a jet-powered interceptor drone to engage fast-moving aerial targets.

The third is comprehensive digitisation. We can now track in real time how drones are operating, how many Russian troops are being killed per square kilometre, and how effective our defences are against Shahed-type attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles.

The fourth is fighting corruption. Unless inclusive institutions are built, strengthened and protected, corruption could undermine every other part of the war plan.

Out of everything you've just described, which element is now most at risk after your dismissal? Which reform is most likely to be abandoned?

It's hard to say. It depends who the next defence minister is.

For now, Yevhen Khmara is in place.

What became clear to me through my conversations with Yevhen, and with partners from various countries, is that you have to have a coherent vision of the war: what needs to be done, how the Russians can be defeated, how the war can be ended.

Secondly, you need a team – around 100 new people, at least, need to be brought into the Defence Ministry. A lot of people need to be replaced because the ministry still includes representatives of private companies, law enforcement agencies, and people who simply shouldn't be there. There are many highly capable professionals there too, but the organisational structure itself needs a comprehensive overhaul. We changed it three or four times in just six months.

You have to be able to change the rules of the game and adopt regulations. We've reached a point where we've started adopting three or four regulations a week, and they are fundamental. For example, opening up the private air defence market or opening up military service to foreign nationals, creating entirely new rules of the game.

By the way, something we didn't manage to do which I think the Defence Ministry should follow through on, is paying drone operators real money, straight into their bank accounts, for every Russian they kill. In other words, monetising e-points [earned by Ukrainian units for confirmed strikes on Russian soldiers and equipment – ed.] into cash payments for the operators, because we've now introduced high salaries for assault troops and infantry, but there is a problem with pay for UAV operators.

"Parliament removed me as defence minister, but it can't take away my vision or my ideas about what should happen next"

In your view, does the current structure have any kind of plan, even a temporary one? Because this is extremely important for everyone. Or will they implement your plan?

I think there are definitely discussions about a plan now. This has become a public debate. Ukrainians are incredibly wise people. I honestly didn't expect so many Ukrainians to understand, in such detail, what we're doing and that we actually have a plan.

And why is that important?

We never presented it publicly or spoke about the details. But so many Ukrainians understood that the plan existed, that we have managed to seize the initiative not simply because of the weather or the season, but because of specific actions taken according to that plan – and that the plan is now under threat.

That's why I don't think the Ukrainian public will let things move in a different direction now. The level of public engagement is a positive sign that our state institutions have started to falter.

I think our shared task is to emerge from the situation we're in today with an understanding that parliament needs to engage more with citizens and fulfil its responsibilities. We need a plan, and it needs to be updated. Perhaps the new team will come up with an even better plan, and that would be great.

Do you actually believe that?

I believe in Ukrainians. I believe anything is possible. Even the discussion we're having today is really about why we need a plan. Because the plan will determine who should be appointed, how everything will function going forward, and how society will be able to track the results.

Right now, the war plan has become part of politics, because the decision on how to protect the regions lies with both the local authorities and the central government. We face a number of challenges that need to be addressed, and not all the decisions are for the government to make. For example, there needs to be a dedicated fund to protect frontline regions. That also requires decisions by the local authorities.

So one of the aims of our conversation today, at least for me personally, is to talk about why the plan matters, why it needs to be updated, and why we need to keep moving forward. I'm certain that one way or another, there will continue to be discussions around it.

My team and I will definitely continue working on updating this plan and implementing it, wherever we are and whatever tools we have at our disposal.

In what way?

There are various tools. I think this will become clearer once we've finished our discussions with the president about the current situation. I believe we've come a long way together, and what is happening now – and what will happen next – depends, among other things, on how those discussions conclude. We'll see what comes next. But there are many tools. I've been approached by major international foundations, and by defence ministers as well.

We know the Italian defence minister offered you a role as an adviser, for example.

There are so many opportunities in Ukraine right now – to work, to teach, to establish innovation funds... One thing I can say for sure is that I'll stay in Ukraine. I won't go and work in another country. And I can also say for sure that whatever I do next will be connected with implementing this war plan.

I might focus on one particular domain within the plan, or on a specific technology that I believe has the potential to change the battlefield, and work on developing that technology. But I simply no longer have the moral right to do something unrelated, to leave Ukraine, or to walk away from everything we've been working on.

I have a good, effective team, and I know what needs to be done next. Parliament removed me as defence minister, but it can't take away my vision or my ideas about what should happen next.

During your meetings with the president, did you spend more time discussing the war or the political crisis that has unfolded?

You're determined to find out what happened there.

We don't have the opportunity to ask the president these questions, but we do have the opportunity to ask you, so we can't pass it up.

I don't want to repeat myself. The conversations I had with the president, despite their obvious public importance, were conversations between the two of us. I'd like them to stay that way.

But are we right in understanding that you don't consider that door to be completely closed? That there's still room for dialogue?

That may be my personal view, but our conversations didn't end with a final conclusion. That's why I believe that, in the interests of our country, we need to find the right way out of this situation.

"We need to look at mobilisation as a funnel"

Let's talk about mobilisation reform. To what extent do you think the criticism directed at you over it is justified, and what is the main problem?

I think mobilisation should be viewed as a funnel. At the end of that funnel is the final product – military service. That includes service conditions, length of service, pay, opportunities for career progression within the armed forces – in other words, a wide range of incentives and motivations that encourage people both to join the military and to stay there.

After all, Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom. In 2022 we saw hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians volunteer to fight without any terms and conditions, incentives or financial motivation. They did so because they wanted to defend their country. So we need to go on giving Ukrainians freedom and a sense of fairness within the armed forces.

Mobilisation is just one stage in that funnel – it's simply a process by which people enter the military. But people don't join, because either they don't want to or they're afraid of dying. That's a natural fear. We need to explain that not everyone who joins the armed forces dies, and that there are different ways to serve.

That's why we've opened up recruitment to foreign nationals. I believe that 50% of frontline service members or assault troops could be foreign citizens. We're already seeing this on the Zaporizhzhia front: large numbers of soldiers from African countries are fighting for the Russian Federation. In some sectors of the front, they even outnumber Russian troops. So opening the market to foreign nationals is one direction we can move in.

Secondly, we've increased pay for assault troops and infantry. Starting next month, they will begin receiving the US$7,000 [per month] we announced.

We've also made a number of other changes, such as allowing transfers within a corps. In other words, we started by improving the most important part of the system in order to fix mobilisation as a whole.

The next step is to introduce fixed durations of service and contracts, and we've already done that. We made several mistakes in the way we rolled these changes out. We should have engaged more with the public and opened up these reforms for public discussion. We can see that people are tired of so many decisions being made behind closed doors. We should have published the reform plan and said: let's discuss it with different expert groups.

We have everything we need to ensure that a Ukrainian who joins the armed forces feels free, is treated with dignity, understands their path within the military, and knows how the military is protecting them and fighting for their life. We've started analysing how we are losing personnel and what the underlying causes are.

Only then do we come to mobilisation itself. We had a clear vision of what needed to be done, who should be responsible for it, and how to build the right recruitment pool – how to identify exactly who we need and how to work with those people. I don't want to spoil anything now because I'm confident this reform will continue. I'll leave it to those who will implement it to present and explain it.

How long do you think it will take to implement?

Our goal was to present it in July and launch it in August so that by September this problem would no longer exist. That was the timeline. I presented it to MPs, and I believe I spoke about it publicly as well.

I know discussions on this reform are continuing within the Defence Ministry, and there will now be new appointments. The deputy minister who will be responsible for it – someone I wanted to appoint but didn't have time to – will continue to work on it. So I hope this reform will move forward.

Was the criticism justified? I think it probably was. Because the very conditions of military service – an awful lot of things – had to be changed in the space of six months. And you're working within a system that's doing all it can to ensure those changes don't happen. Now that system has been broken, and there is finally an opportunity to implement them.

When you say "the system", who do you mean?

I mean the system as a whole. The culture within it.

Do you think it has been broken now?

I think Drapatyi now has every opportunity to implement the asymmetric ideas for transforming the armed forces that we started. He has the opportunity to keep driving those changes forward.

For the first time, we've introduced fixed durations of service, deferments, and a number of other measures. Now these need to be fully embedded through the military's internal regulations so that service personnel can begin signing contracts.

This is the first part of our extensive interview with Mykhailo Fedorov. The second part will be published soon.

Sevgil Musaieva, Mykhailo Tkach

Translated by: Myroslava Zavadska, Ganna Bryedova and Anna Kybukevych

Edited by: Teresa Pearce