Who should be in charge of the war?

This article is based upon my experiences in MOD UK and Army and Joint staff during the first Gulf War, Bosnia and with NATO in Kosovo.

I turned for support to my US defence academic friend and author Dr Thomas Durell Young a former member of staff at the US war college, and a former Policy Director in MOD Bulgaria Retired Colonel Vladimir Milenski. We all worked variously together with MOD Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 and between us on reform in over 15 other countries worldwide.

I apologize in advance to my female military friends for using he throughout this article, but it reflects simplicity of writing before translation not denigration of your amazing contribution to the national war effort.

Introduction: War Does Not Suspend Democratic Defence Governance, it severely tests it

In a democratic state at war, the defence system must be able to fight effectively while remaining politically controlled, legally accountable, strategically coherent and operationally agile.

War increases pressure on institutions, but the defence system must not become insular or a power on its own. War does not remove the need for clear authority, lawful responsibility and public accountability. On the contrary, the greater the stakes, the more important it is to know who governs defence, who advises government, who generates forces, who plans strategy and campaigns, who commands operations, and who answers for results. Today this is not totally clear in Ukraine.

The institutional question is therefore not primarily one of terminology. Different democratic states use different titles for organisations and posts.

What matters is whether these offices form a coherent system in which authority, responsibility, military advice, operational command, force generation, political control and accountability are clearly separated where necessary and integrated where useful – and most importantly society can see who is in charge and responsible for each task.

There is no doubt that to achieve a well–oiled, well–managed system the key requirement is outstanding teamwork. The fastest and best process is always two friends working together with a common purpose. Lack of trust, institutional arrogance, poor teamwork, bureaucracy or unclear tasks lead to delay – and delay kills.

In this regard the Minister and senior commanders, MOD, General Staff (GS) and Joint Staff (JS) must function as a single organism, working closely together not in opposition.

I have been lucky to work in a combined MOD/General Staff in UK with teams of officers and civil servants serving together. Meetings contained staff from all relevant HQs from MOD to units and many key decisions could be made and implemented immediately without need for bureaucracy. The civilian component came with different, less narrow thinking and skills, and added to achieving results hugely. Sharing work openly is vastly better than strict ownership.

In Ukraine, the main headquarters are the MOD and the General Staff (GS) (Most countries would call this HQ, Defence Staff as it is more than just army). We suggest a third strand is needed as Joint Staff, which should manage the fighting. UK and many NATO countries have an operational Joint Staff HQ and US have the regional combatant commands (COCOMS) reflecting their world view. Together, these three HQs would form a leadership triangle with clear and separate tasks. I have worked variously at all three levels. Depending on the issue in need of resolution, one headquarters leads the staff work, while the others support it.

The next day the task and leadership requirement may be totally different. States that inherit command structures from the Soviet military tradition and then introduce institutions associated with modern democratic and NATO ways of defence management are always challenged in who does what, how and when.

The problem is not that one idea, or vocabulary is "Eastern" and another "Western." The problem is that mixed systems often create parallel chains of authority, overlapping staff, unclear responsibility and commanders who are held accountable for outcomes without being given the authority or resources to achieve them. The current Ukrainian Joint Staff is a case in hand. It was given a role on the battlefield for which it was not intended. And in truth, it was never Joint either.

For a democratic state at war in 2026, the central principle should be simple: responsibility must follow authority. No institution or part of an institution should be able to use power without accountability, and no commander should be given responsibility without sufficient authority and resources to complete the task.

The Ministry of Defence: Civilian Authority, Policy, Resources and Accountability

The Ministry of Defence is the civilian political–administrative authority responsible for governing and enabling defence. In a democratic state, MOD is an arm of government and not an operational headquarters. It should not function as a parallel military command. Its legitimacy comes from constitutional authority, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary oversight and the rule of law.

In wartime, the responsibilities of the Minister remain the same, but he must do them faster and with more focus. He not only has to lead the whole defence system but also be a hands–on manager for MOD encouraging the staff to be proactive, supportive, innovative, and fast working. His ministry must also be operational 24/7, ready and able to react to emergencies. And the strong political role of this post is why a civilian, preferably an experienced politician, should always be appointed.

Military ministers may think and understand well the fighting task but are unused to the political and civil signals. They rarely understand the requirements for political briefing, networking and consensus building to get the best overall defence result.

The ministry task is complex. It must translate national political objectives into defence policy and strategic guidance; managing resources, the budget, procurement, mobilisation policy, personnel policy, international assistance, defence industry and sustainment. It must coordinate with government, parliament, other ministries, allies and civil emergency structures; and at the same time ensure legality, transparency, democratic oversight and anti–corruption controls.

The minister must also personally keep the defence committee constantly briefed about problems with any of the above tasks and especially the possible requirements for new or changed laws. Some Ministers in Ukraine have seen working with Parliament as the enemy instead of a vital and fundamental part of the defence system. The failure to pass many vitally needed laws in 12 years of war highlights this mistake exactly.

The ministry must also hold the military leadership accountable for readiness, plans, performance and use of resources. This does not mean political micromanagement of operations. It means that civilian authority as part of government sets objectives, provides means, defines limits, demands professional advice, evaluates performance and accounts to the democratic state. Its role is not to be military but to brief government and parliament, set strategic direction, provide the maximum resources available, oversee performance and carry political–administrative responsibility.

There is no doubt that to achieve a well–oiled, well–managed system the key requirement is outstanding teamwork across the whole system. I learned this well in MOD, but I also learned that we military are poor at arguing and getting our point across. Too often we use emotions and military arrogance to make our point where our civilian colleagues want hard logical arguments and facts. I learnt the hard way with papers and briefs returned covered in red ink and questions like "Why?" and "where is the proof?" spread all over them.

In this regard the Minister and senior commanders, MOD, General Staff (GS) and Joint Staff (JS) must function as a single organism, working closely together not in opposition. To do this, however, they all need common and high–quality briefings from the staff. They usually only know what the staff presents to them; they are not deity. Honesty is everything. Where there is a combined MOD/GS with teams of officers and civil servants working in tandem such as in UK or the Pentagon, most decisions can be made and implemented immediately.

In Ukraine with a separate MOD and General Staff the leadership must constantly look for new processes and better ways to design coordinated and collective team work to get the fastest and most coordinated results. The NATO or Continental Staff system for the military is arguably the best method for this, but it must be used in all its concepts and methods not just a renaming of the old methods. Ukrainian staff still have not grasped the essence of this tool. But this needs another article.

The Chief of Defence / Commander–in–Chief: Strategic Military Leadership and Professional Advice

The Chief of Defence, or Commander–in–Chief (CinC) of the Armed Forces is the senior professional military authority of the state. The title may vary, but the function must be totally clear. This officer is the principal military adviser to the President, government, Minister of Defence and national security bodies, and is responsible for the strategic military leadership of the armed forces as an institution. All three authors agree they have seen more Commanders–in–Chief fail than succeed.

The main reason is failing to grasp that they are not there to run defence like a CEO, and they are not just king of the castle as too many want to be. They must be the expert conduit between society and government, and the military system, ensuring that information and activity flows both ways smoothly and correctly.

The role requires translating political objectives into military strategic options; advising honestly on risk, feasibility, costs and consequences; directing the development of campaign–level plans through the staff system; ensuring jointness and equality across every aspect of the defence system; maintaining morale, readiness, discipline, professional standards and strategic coherence. The list and scope is enormous in its breadth and importance. This is why the Commander–in–Chief should not be the fighting commander. When he takes this role to himself the other key defence tasks that need his time suffer from neglect of proper command attention – and then like the TCC and mobilisation, the whole system degrades.

A further key role for any Commander–in–Chief is to select and provide advice to the President on which officers of all services, not just army, are suitable for high ranks, especially for operational command. Equally, the Commander must advise the President about senior officers who must be moved for failing to achieve results because of lack of ability, staleness or physical tiredness.

Accountability for the Commander–in–Chief flows upward to the civilian leadership through lawful oversight mechanisms like briefing President, Minister and Parliament regularly.

The Commander–in–Chief is responsible for the professional quality of this personal military advice, which means that those below him must also brief him honestly with trust that even when giving bad news they will not be judged or punished for this as has happened too often in the past. He is also responsible for the strategic employment of the armed forces, the integrity of the command system and the readiness and morale of the force.

The Commander–in Chief should be strong enough to lead the military institution through good and bad, but he must always remain subordinate to democratic authority.

The Chief of Staff: Staff Authority, Not Independent Command

The role of Chief of Staff is often the most sensitive in a mixed system. Chief of Staff is subordinate to the Commander–in–Chief and in Ukraine should be the daily manager of the defence system on his behalf by managing the General Staff. He is responsible for staff processes and quality at all levels, planning quality, coordination, staff discipline and ensuring military options developed inside the Joint Staff are fully supported by the system. This officer may be powerful in practice because good staff work shapes strategic decisions, but the authority should be exercised under the Commander–in–Chief and not as an independent command function.

If the Chief of General Staff issues orders, those orders should be staff orders issued under the authority of the Commander–in–Chief not personal command directives. The guiding formula is straightforward: the Chief of General Staff should be powerful as a staff coordinator and the lead manager of the armed forces, but not independent as a commander.

The General Staff: Strategic Staff, The Engine Room of Change and Creating a Stronger Future.

The General Staff, or Defence Staff as named in many contemporary systems, should be understood as the strategic staff that serves the Commander–in–Chief. Its purpose is to convert political direction and strategic military guidance into business plans, force development, mobilisation arrangements, readiness systems, doctrine, training policy, logistic priorities and strategic assessments. With these activities General Staff has a simple three–fold role.

First is supporting the Joint Force Commander with the resources he needs to conduct the fight.

Second is to create new and innovative military resources for the future, and third is to ensure that the whole defence system in the rear is focused upon supporting war as efficiently as possible. This means creating tight processes and effective organisations everywhere with no waste or delays.

Thus, the General Staff is the military brain of the institution and must remain focused upon the future. It should not become a rival command chain and should not be involved in the daily direction of the war or pull tasks to itself that are proper tasks of the subordinate services and agencies like the army or air force.

This distinction is especially important in countries shaped by the Soviet military inheritance. In Soviet–derived systems, the General Staff often accumulated planning, force management, mobilisation, operational direction, intelligence and direct command functions. That model reflected a different political–military logic: centralised control, vertical authority, limited civilian policy capacity, staff–driven command and secrecy over accountability.

In a contemporary democratic system, such concentration of functions creates serious risks: duplication of authority, unclear responsibility, staff interference in command, excessive centralization, extremely slow decision cycles, weakened joint command and poor accountability for operational outcomes. The more intense the war becomes, the more damaging these frictions and disfunctions become to the fighting force.

The General Staff should therefore not directly command operational formations and be involved in warfighting. When they are the staff risk being busy with the wrong tasks, slowing decision–making, weakening operational commanders and destroying the clear link between authority and responsibility. They also lose the focus of their own key tasks and create delays that slow the others they deal with.

The Joint Force Commander: Commander of all Current Joint Warfighting Operations

The Joint Force Commander should be the operational commander responsible for the conduct of assigned campaigns and operations. His task is to win the war. This role is essential because modern war is Joint by nature. Every single capability including civil–military cooperation cannot be managed as separate single service efforts. They must all be integrated under an operational commander with real authority over assigned forces.

The Joint Force Commander's responsibilities should include commanding assigned forces in the operational area; planning and executing campaigns and major operations; identifying needed resources for the upcoming operations, integrating service and functional components; allocating operational priorities; synchronizing effects; reporting progress, risk, losses, needs and opportunities; and adapting operations within the strategic guidance received. He must also highlight operational gaps and weaknesses.

The key is that the title must be matched by authority. If every significant tactical or operational decision is controlled by the General Staff or the political center, the appointment becomes hollow and accountability disappears. A Joint Force Commander who is responsible for operational outcomes must have the authority to command assigned forces, set operational priorities and make timely decisions within strategic guidance.

The Joint Force Commander should be accountable to the Commander–in–Chief for his military performance, and through that chain to civilian authority. This accountability should be based on mission, resources, constraints and delegated authority. It should not be reduced to blame after failure or praise after success; it should be continuous discipline of reporting, assessment, adaptation and lawful command.

Joint Staff: The Operational Warfighting Machinery of Joint Integration

The Joint Staff should manage and coordinate the war fighting organization. It should focus on fighting the war through Joint operational and intelligence integration, translating and directing strategy to subordinate formations and then supporting their operations. It is the staff mechanism through which the armed forces integrate all possible capabilities into a coherent and coordinated war fighting system focused on a single warfighting strategy. When a state has both a General Staff and a Joint Staff, the distinction between them must be precise and with no overlap of cause for misunderstanding.

A well–designed Joint Staff enables the Joint Force Commander to plan, coordinate, assess and adjust joint operations on behalf of the country. His staff support operational–level planning both for close, medium and deep operations with a key aim to both focus battlefield effect and to direct resources where the strategic and operational needs demand. The staff prepare orders and directives for joint operations, work closely with MOD and the General Staff on resource requirements, maintain the recognized operational picture, coordinate with allied headquarters and link national military strategy with campaign execution.

There is always a danger that a Joint Staff can become either redundant if the General Staff take too much operational power, or too weak to integrate the services effectively if the legal authorities are not strong enough. Either outcome is deeply harmful for the war effort. Equally if the Joint Staff try to duplicate the General Staff, they add bureaucracy without authority. When the staff lack influence and real authority, joint operations remain dominated by service and agency interests or by improvised ad–hoc coordination. The result is operations that lack focus, coherence and coordination. Operations and ammunition are wasted on activities that do not have the desired cumulative effect of defeating the enemy. The Joint Staff must therefore have a defined role and clear access to the Commander–in–Chief. It is also vital that the Joint Commander and Chief of Staff have common purposes, are like minded with shared experiences, and even better, are good friends.

The Central Democratic Principle: Responsibility Must Follow Authority

The principle that responsibility must follow authority is the normative heart of democratic wartime defence governance. It protects the state from two equally dangerous failures: institutions that exercise power without accountability, and commanders who are blamed for outcomes they were not empowered or resourced to influence.

In such a system, accountability should be distributed as follows:

• Political leadership is accountable for political objectives, war aims, mobilisation of society, alliances, national resilience, and acceptable risk.
• The MOD is accountable for defence policy, resources, institutions, procurement, personnel, sustainment, and oversight.
• The Commander–in–Chief is accountable for professional military advice, strategic military leadership, readiness, and use of the armed forces.
• The General Staff is accountable for the quality of development plans and R&D, assessments, readiness systems, mobilisation, force development, and staff work.
• The Joint Staff is accountable for war fighting, joint integration and operational planning.
• The Joint Force Commander is accountable for the conduct of assigned operations.
• Armed forces (army/navy etc.) are responsible for delivering trained forces ready and equipped for combat

This distribution of accountability does not fragment command; it clarifies it. Political leaders remain responsible for political aims and national risk. Civilian defence authorities remain responsible for policy, resources and oversight. Senior military leaders remain responsible for professional advice, readiness and strategic coherence. Operational commanders remain responsible for the conduct of assigned operations. The system works when each level has enough authority to discharge its responsibility and enough oversight to prevent abuse.

Each principal defence office should therefore have a statutory duty list that answers five questions: what decision or product the office must deliver; by when it must be delivered; to whom it must be submitted; what authority is granted to deliver it; and what evidence will be used to assess compliance. Legal accountability should include periodic reporting to the Minister of Defence, government, President or parliament; written records of military advice and decisions; deadlines for operational assessments and readiness reports; audit trails for resources; and explicit consequences for failure to perform lawful duties.

Conclusion: Clarity Is a Strategic Capability and Battle Winner

For a democratic state at war in 2026, the decisive institutional test is not the number of headquarters, staff or command titles, but the clarity of authority, responsibility and accountability among them. A state may have a Ministry of Defence, a Chief of Defence or Commander–in–Chief, a General Staff, a Joint Staff, a Chief of General Staff and a Joint Force Commander. But unless their roles are clearly distinguished, the result may be duplication and weakness rather than strength.

Ukraine's challenge is especially demanding because it must fight a high–intensity war while transforming inherited command structures. The aim should not be cosmetic adoption of Western terminology, nor rejection of every inherited practice simply because of its origin. The aim should be a genuinely democratic and joint wartime defence system: civilian–led, professionally advised, operationally effective, legally accountable and clear enough that every major decision and action has an identifiable owner.

Institutional clarity is not an administrative luxury. It is a strategic capability. It shortens decision cycles, strengthens trust between civilian and military leaders, improves the use of resources, enables joint operations, reduces politicisation and makes accountability possible. In war, these are not secondary virtues. They are the key conditions for endurance, adaptation and victory.

Glen Grant