Taras Chmut: "If anyone thinks they can build an authoritarian system here, I've got news for them: the Ukrainian people won't let them"
In recent years it's become something of a tradition for Ukrainska Pravda to sit down twice a year with Taras Chmut, director of the Come Back Alive Foundation. Talking to him is a bit like checking a compass – it helps us understand where Ukraine is heading.
We'd been trying to set this interview up for several months. Chmut postponed it more than once, saying he did not feel there were any genuinely new or relevant issues he hadn't already commented on.
By sheer coincidence, we settled on an interview date without knowing that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was planning to disband prime minister Yuliia Svyrydenko's government and oust Mykhailo Fedorov from the Defence Ministry. In the words of singer Viktor Pavlik: "It all happened by itself." We could hardly have chosen a better moment for this conversation.
In this new interview, Taras Chmut speaks candidly about the conflict between the now ex-defence minister and then-commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.
During our conversation, Chmut describes the president's decision not to nominate Fedorov for the post of defence minister in new PM Serhii Koretskyi's government as "the biggest mistake of recent years".
He discusses the potential successors to Syrskyi, explains how the Ukrainian military has changed over the past year, and answers questions about the very public scandals surrounding the Skelia Assault Regiment and the 155th Brigade. We also took time to delve into the deeper reasons behind the public's hostility towards military enlistment office staff.
This is an abridged version of the interview, edited for readability. The full conversation is available in video format.
"Everyone knew conflict was inevitable"
So, Mykhailo Fedorov is no longer Ukraine's defence minister. How did you react to his dismissal?
With surprise, and profound confusion and disbelief at the way it all came about.
You know, it's interesting (he pauses). We're talking about the replacement of a minister who actually wasn't replaced, because the entire Cabinet was reshuffled, and that is what led to the change of minister.
So in order to replace one minister, we had to reboot the entire Cabinet and make the prime minister step down.
But in doing that, we are abandoning people who took on a challenge, who showed determination and readiness to get through last winter and keep on working. They're being cast aside because a minister someone didn't like had to be replaced.
And then, of course, we get this excuse about a conflict that had been there from the start and that the president knew about. Everyone involved knew about it, because these people had worked together for many years. The clash of ideologies was inevitable.
Let's go into more detail about the disagreements between Syrskyi and Fedorov. Mykhailo [Fedorov] has said quite openly that all of his initiatives were blocked. Clearly that wasn't the whole story. How extensive was this conflict in reality, do you think?
I think Fedorov's briefing was fairly specific.
There was a series of accumulated problems that, over the past six months, had escalated to the point where the ministry could no longer implement changes without the backing of the General Staff.
If the General Staff blocks something, you can't get anything done. Of course you can do some things, but you can't deliver the large-scale results expected by the president, the public and Ukraine's partners. That then turns into conflict, because the ministry takes the issue to the president and raises it with the Staff [of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief]. The military puts forward its point of view and defends its position, and it develops into open confrontation. Clearly, that has to be resolved.
The point is that the president obviously knew about all these disagreements when he appointed Mykhailo to the post. After all, Mykhailo wasn't appointed to the Defence Ministry out of nowhere. He'd been working on war-related issues at the Ministry of Digital Transformation since 2022. To some extent it functioned as a kind of shadow Defence Ministry, taking responsibility for drones, innovation, partners, procurement, transforming public procurement, permits and profit, and introducing the eScore system and other approaches to the use of drones on the battlefield.
In other words, they [Fedorov's team] came from within this environment. They knew these colonels, generals, brigade commanders and corps commanders. This wasn't a team that arrived from outside saying "Let's start building relationships from scratch." So everyone knew there would be conflict, and there was no way there wasn't going to be.
The president knew all of this as well. So what do you think happened?
He nominated Mykhailo for the position. Then, to my astonishment, he made this mistake [dismissing Fedorov – ed.].
Do you believe it was a mistake?
I believe it could prove to be the biggest mistake Ukraine has made in recent years – one that could ultimately lead us to lose the war.
The way things are now, it feels like 2021. Back then everything seemed fine, but there was this war going on somewhere – the ATO in the east. [The ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) is a term used from 2014 to 2018 to identify combat actions in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts against Russian military forces and pro-Russian separatists – ed.] There was some Russian political pressure, something happening at sea [during the annexation of Crimea]. Yet every year we heard the same thing – there won't be a full-scale war. Why? Because it was 'impossible'. Then the full-scale invasion happened, on a scale and of a magnitude no one had expected. And everyone remembers what happened then with the politicians and ministers – which ones fled the country and which ones got down to work and so on.
Now we are in a similar situation, because for some reason we think this is just what war looks like. Some offensive and defensive operations somewhere in the east, a bit in the north, a bit in the south, some attacks. We got through the winter, we'll get through the summer, then another winter, and the front line keeps shifting here and there.
The national 24/7 joint newscast tells us we've liberated another ten settlements, someone's been made a Hero of Ukraine, new units keep being established, [Russian] oil refineries and factories are burning every day. Overall things seem fine, and maybe they are. But it's an illusion.
The front line could collapse in an instant. If that happens, the Russians will break into operational space and seize territory on a scale we have not seen in recent years, comparable to our Kharkiv counteroffensive or their advance in February and March 2022.
Another major problem is that the public in the rear is demoralised, demotivated, disillusioned and exhausted. The military is exhausted and demoralised as well. All of this causes a series of problems to build up that go unaddressed year after year. Then, when we reach a critical point of no return, we start frantically trying to reform everything, expecting instant results: 'Come on, deliver mobilisation reform within a month.' But a problem that has built up over years can't be fixed in a month.
It takes as long to solve it as it took to build up. Yet we want quick fixes right here, right now.
Our partners are pouring money into the defence industry. We buy equipment, they provide us with equipment and help us use it, and we get media content that makes us feel good. You wake up in the morning, see that yet another Russian refinery or factory is on fire somewhere, and that's all great. But the question is: is there any correlation between that burning factory and the situation on the front line?
This creates the long-standing illusion that the war will keep on as it is now. We've forgotten that it could still take a very different course. And when that happens, it could be extremely painful.
If you listen carefully to Fedorov's briefing, he almost says outright that Syrskyi is an obstacle on the path to victory. Did those remarks alarm you, or did you not interpret them that way?
I didn't see it that way, perhaps because my perspective is somewhat narrow.
Unfortunately this is the result of years of problems building up and a sort of reverse natural selection. That's what happens when people rise through the ranks based on personal loyalty, obedience and a lack of initiative – people who tell their superiors what they want to hear.
This is the system we have unfortunately created within the Armed Forces and the ministries, and it continues to exist and develop. People in the army who tell the truth don't get to climb the ladder. Brigade commanders who report the real state of affairs are removed from their posts. Generals who speak honestly about the situation don't get promoted.
On the other hand, there are some people who do advance. Indeed, there have been some good appointments as well. But they are exceptions to the general rule.
It looks as though Syrskyi could soon be removed as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. Who do you think would be a worthy replacement? [Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed shortly after this interview – ed.]
I've had many conversations with intelligent people in this country, and naturally we've discussed various names.
There aren't very many – perhaps five to seven at most. I enjoy reading about World War II, and in Germany in 1943, for example, there was no shortage of candidates for senior general positions or leadership posts in the army, the command structure, the General Staff and so on. There was always an entire generation of capable, committed and well-trained officers, any one of whom could have excelled in those roles.
After more than ten years of war with Russia, we only have three to five suitable candidates, and we're not even sure about them. Can they handle it? Will they measure up to the previous commander-in-chief? Will the front line collapse? Will the army lose cohesion? This is yet another example of the accumulated effects of reverse natural selection within the military. It is not normal that when the commander-in-chief needs to be replaced, there are only a handful of compromise candidates available.
In a properly functioning management system, you would have almost an open competition for this position. You'd have dozens of excellent generals, each with their strengths and weaknesses, who could step into the role. That would be a healthy management system. Right now, we have three names, perhaps five at most. Let's name them: [Andrii] Biletskyi, [Mykhailo] Drapatyi, [Oleh] Apostol (pauses).
I've also heard [Ihor] Obolienskyi mentioned…
Yes, Obolienskyi. Who else? That gives us four people. But we need to replace both the commander-in-chief and the chief of the General Staff. So we have to choose two out of four. It's not acceptable that the state has spent years building a system in which there are so few people capable of taking on senior and highly responsible positions.
What do you think about Yevhenii Khmara being appointed as acting defence minister? What are your expectations of him?
I was surprised by the appointment because his previous position was acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine. For some reason he wasn't formally appointed to that post during the six months he held it. Now he's been moved to the Defence Ministry. It looks as though the President's Office wants to offset the backlash it received from the public, the military and Ukraine's partners by relying on Khmara's strong reputation. Fine, that might be sensible. But what are we talking about here? We're talking about how to minimise the backlash to a decision!
We are not talking about the war, the soldiers in the trenches, or Russia's forthcoming autumn and winter offensive campaign.
We're sitting here talking politics while a major full-scale war is going on – the biggest in Europe since World War II. We've accumulated an entire system of mistakes and problems that no one has had time to address and that are simply carried over from one year to the next. And as of today, we've had four defence ministers in a single calendar year.
These problems can't simply be solved in a month or six months. A new ministry team needs six to nine months just to figure things out, identify and replace key people, and start doing something.
(Irritated) No one has any issue with Khmara. No one. He's a Hero of Ukraine, an outstanding person, sensible, experienced – a lot of people have dealt with him and a lot of us work with him. There's nothing bad to say about him! But at the same time, we have to understand that the Defence Ministry is this vast machine with a budget of over a trillion hryvnias, many departments and directorates, and a huge number of responsibilities. The former Ministry of Strategic Industries is part of it now; it's responsible for state-owned companies like Motor Sich and Ukrnafta, along with human resources, international relations, procurement, logistics, combat operations, reform, mobilisation. It's a massive machine.
Mykhailo had been working within this entire system since 2022, and he still wasn't able to put a full team together at the Defence Ministry. They didn't fill all the vacancies for deputy ministers [or heads of] departments or directorates.
There are no people. No one wants to join this system. And no one will be foolish enough to now, after this "reset". They won't be able to recruit anyone, so the reverse selection will keep going. Colonels who should have been on their way out from the Defence Ministry or other bodies that no one even knows about, who've been sitting there for ten or twenty years, are now going: "Phew, no one's going to replace us, because there's no one to replace us with."
But someone still has to do the work. The paperwork still has to move every day.
"We're basically being sustained by the European money that's being poured into Ukrainian drones, which are what we're fighting with"
How would you assess the overall state of the Ukrainian army? How has it changed over the past year?
It's becoming more exhausted and worn down with every passing year. People have less and less motivation and desire to fight. Unfortunately, this demotivating effect is intensified by situations like the ones we have now at the Defence Ministry and within the Armed Forces. There's also a critical shortage of personnel. And yet unfortunately for some reason we continue to establish new units, military formations and amalgamations every year, sometimes justifying this by referring to the threat of an offensive from the north.
Why do we need to form seven new brigades? There are already brigades deployed in the north, so why can't those brigades just be properly reinforced? It's not clear. The idea that now we're going to form seven brigades in the rear, then replace seven brigades at the front and thereby launch a rotation mechanism is something we have tried many times, both under [former Commander-in-Chief] Zaluzhnyi and under Syrskyi. It won't work. That mechanism didn't work when the personnel situation was better, and it won't work now either.
On the positive side, we've made significant technological progress: FPV drones, mid- and long-range strike drones ("middle and deep strikes"), unmanned ground vehicles. These are what are sustaining us now. We're basically being sustained by the European money that's being poured into Ukrainian drones, which are what we're fighting with.
How would you assess the state of the Russian army right now? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
Let's start with the weaknesses. First, human life is worth nothing to them. Commanders rise through the ranks by reporting what they're expected to report. Extortion, punishment, physical violence and executions are widespread.
Secondly, there is a rejection of technology and a lack of leadership at the local level. It's a very rigid vertical system.
Thirdly, they are now facing something they didn't have to deal with in previous years: it's become hard for them to recruit people. Previously they had a pool of volunteers and professional soldiers, and then they simply bought people by offering ridiculous amounts of money. But now, because of the senseless way they've squandered their manpower, Russian men are beginning to see that those who hide live longer. And a lot of them are now starting to hide, leave the country, or find other ways to avoid being drawn into the military system.
Now for the things that are bad for us: they have a good 140-150 million people, so they can always scrape together another half a million or million people. Their other strengths include, of course, a vast natural resource base, access to China, and the ability to go on purchasing European, American and other components they need.
After every large-scale attack, a huge number of components manufactured all over the world are found in their weapons, and unfortunately it is extremely difficult to combat this at present.
Another strength is, of course, the sheer size of their country. That's both an advantage and a disadvantage. Its size allows them to manoeuvre across the country and relocate facilities, factories, people, production sites and airbases. That's an advantage. The disadvantage is that it's extremely difficult to protect everything. That's one of the reasons we're seeing the growing effectiveness of our long-range weapons.
Then there's the outward political unity of the Russian authorities. They don't have the same problems with ministries, they don't have conflicts like we do, they have no corruption investigations and no protests. It's a clear, rigid, authoritarian chain of command.
To get ahead of the question, that wouldn't work in Ukraine. If anyone wants to create something similar here: not going to happen. We are a different society. We're the descendants of the Cossacks – we rebel, protest, stage revolutions. We would rather die than submit.
So if any of our politicians thinks they can build an authoritarian system here based on the Interior Ministry and the Security Service of Ukraine, I have news for them: the public will never allow it.
Are you talking about anyone in particular here?
I'm speaking generally. I'm just getting ahead of the issue so that no one has any illusions (pauses).
"Everyone exaggerates victories and turns a blind eye to problems"
Investigations have recently been published in the media about the Skelia Assault Regiment, which has been accused of ill-treating soldiers, and there have been non-combat deaths of new recruits. What do you think of these reports?
The facts presented in these reports are horrific, unacceptable and intolerable. But if you want to ask whether they should be published because it supposedly undermines trust in the army, then what exactly is the problem? Is the problem that journalists are talking about it, or that people are being killed in the Skelia Regiment?
If the problem is that journalists are talking about it, then there's something wrong with all of us. And if the killings in Skelia are not addressed until journalists speak out about them, then journalists should speak out about everything, because the primary problem is the situation that has developed there.
The situation in such units is known to the relevant law enforcement agencies, which can be quite effective when necessary, and to the relevant commanders and superiors.
There is a fear of reporting the truth and a fear of making decisions, combined with the fact that such assault units are highly effective in offensive operations – the price they pay is losses comparable to the Russians'. But if a village is now shown on the map as being under our control and there's something to report to the president, then the conclusion is: "That means we did well." This has led to everyone turning a blind eye and failing to act as they should.
So if there is no other way, then yes, unfortunately, we need to talk about this, although the Armed Forces themselves should be the first to be interested in preventing such situations.
Is the state doing enough to prevent such brutal incidents from occurring in the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
No, it isn't, because once again I have to return to the issue of reverse selection.
It's easier to pretend that nothing is happening, accentuate the positive and turn a blind eye to the negative.
The army is diverse, and so are the people in it. Unfortunately, sometimes situations like the one that occurred in the 155th Brigade do arise. The question is how the authorities react and whether those who know about it allow the middle ranks to become detached from reality. That is extremely frightening.
You mentioned the former commander of the 155th Brigade. This is the case in which some servicemen from that brigade abducted two men in Kyiv Oblast and later killed them. The former brigade commander, who is accused of issuing the criminal order, is now in custody. How do you think such a horrific case was possible? What is broken in the system?
Because they used to be able to get away with such things before – for smaller incidents or even more serious ones. That breeds impunity and a sense that anything is permitted.
It's compounded by the vast sums of money now circulating within the military, to which brigade commanders have direct access. All of this creates a deeply disturbing system in which the leadership covers things up because, by knowing about these crimes, it is able to control those responsible.
The middle tier of command – brigade and regiment commanders, for example – can do whatever it wants, and there will be no consequences because the leadership protects them. It becomes a self-perpetuating system.
How can that cycle be broken?
At the very least, there needs to be a reset of the whole approach. Law enforcement agencies need to investigate these kinds of cases – the ones they already know about. And for them to do that, someone has to allow them to.
This particular case only unfolded the way it did because of the media attention. There may be many similar cases. Things like this do happen.
Why? Because there is impunity and no punishment. Because this kind of behaviour is tolerated by both the state and the leadership of the Armed Forces.
On 8 July there was a brawl between local residents and enlistment officers in Lviv that attracted nationwide attention. Was it the result of the authorities' failure to manage mobilisation properly?
This is the result of a whole range of unresolved problems that have been building up since 2022. It's an organic consequence.
It reflects what the public genuinely thinks about mobilisation, enlistment offices, politicians and MPs. These are deeply worrying signals that could lead to very serious consequences.
Who should be responsible for ensuring that mobilisation is carried out properly?
This is not solely a problem for the enlistment offices. It is not solely a problem for the Ground Forces, Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada (parliament) or the President's Office.
The entire chain of command, from the president down to the enlistment offices, is responsible for the outcome. Accordingly, the president must lead an overhaul of the entire system. And to be honest, that is a task that will take around two years. Nothing worthwhile can be done quickly.
From what you have seen, is anyone actually working on this?
No.
So the problem is still being ignored?
The problem has been recognised, but everyone wants to solve it in one fell swoop. Or we start doing something, then we reshuffle the teams, start again – and then reshuffle the teams again.
At some point, someone has to make an unpopular decision that affects everyone. The right outcome is not one where everyone is happy. It's one where everyone is equally unhappy. I'll say that again: everyone, and in equal measure.
But the root of the problem lies in how the army is employed. Until we address the situation on the front line, improve training and preparation, deal with cases like Skelia and the 155th Brigade and give the public confidence that incidents like this won't happen again – it's only then that something will start to change.
Finally, what do you expect to happen on the front line over the coming months, particularly in the autumn and winter?
I don't have a forecast, but a great deal depends on what happens within the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.
Things on the front line are definitely not going to improve. The question is how much worse they will get. If they get a lot worse, the front line could collapse. Nonetheless, there is still a certain amount of momentum – perhaps around six months – during which previously procured equipment will continue to arrive.
It's time we started to make systemic changes across the security and defence sector. It's time we launched genuine structural reforms. Fighting fires is all well and good, and presentations and slick videos are too. But without institutional transformation, without deep-rooted reform, we will not win this war.
The Russians appear to be counting on the fact that they are like a huge block of stone – they can keep fighting for a long time, while we eventually crumble. Our task is to make sure they're the ones who crumble first. And that means we have to be more effective.
Throughout this interview we've been talking about our own shortcomings, problems and mistakes. We have not been talking about Russian might or Russian military genius.
The average Russian is a dickhead who dies somewhere in Donbas. Their commanders are much the same. But their system was built for people like that. That's how they fight. And they could still win that way.
It would be deeply humiliating to lose to a Russian dickhead. Let's make sure, together, that we don't.
Roman Kravets, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Teresa Pearce