As the gaps between infantry positions widen, what factors prevent Ukrainian forces from holding back the Russians?
Former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi noted in a recent article that despite many developments on the front line since 2022, the current situation on the battlefield of the Russo-Ukrainian war can still be described as a stalemate. He added, however, that there is a steady trend suggesting that Russia is beginning to break out of this deadlock.
On the other hand, DeepState, a Ukrainian group of military analysts, have reported that the Russians' advance slowed by almost half in September compared to August.
At first glance, that statistic suggests that Ukraine's defence forces have managed to find a way to curb the Russians' gradual advance. But in reality, the situation on the ground cannot always be measured in statistics or accurately represented by coloured areas on a map.
Ukrainska Pravda spoke with soldiers on the front line and at headquarters to gain an understanding of the main problems preventing the defence forces from holding back Russian pressure on the battlefield.
The infantry shortage
The shortage of personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is no secret. Spring 2022 is long past and the days when volunteers queued outside enlistment offices long gone. Problems with mobilisation and troops going AWOL have been at the centre of public attention for months.
Although the actual figures regarding the Ukrainian Armed Forces' personnel shortfall remain classified, you only have to visit the Vacancies section on Reserv+, the Ukrainian government mobile app where military-aged men can update their personal data, to see that the defence forces are in need of people.
The people most in demand are mechanics, drivers, UAV operators, medics, artillerymen, repair specialists – the list goes on.
In this article, we'll examine the most pressing problems faced by the defence forces.
Infantry is still the most acute need on the front line. At this stage of the war, when the use of heavy equipment is extremely limited, the role played by soldiers in the trenches has become even more crucial. When there are not enough of them, organising a stable defence is extremely challenging.
The shortage of manpower means that many units are unable to hold their positions, repel Russian attacks effectively, rest properly or conduct the required rotations. As a result, field commanders are often forced to prioritise certain areas, leaving others more vulnerable.
Example:
A lack of infantry is being reported along many sections of the front line. Currently one of the worst-affected areas is the Novopavlivka front (where the borders of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts meet). The Russians have been exploiting this problem in recent months by using infiltration tactics – advancing in small tactical groups through the undermanned Ukrainian positions.
Because of the Russians' numerical superiority in infantry, Ukrainian forces often have to avoid direct clashes, which leads to the two sides' positions overlapping. As a result, more and more grey zones – areas not fully controlled by either side – are appearing on the maps created by OSINT analysts.
Gaps between positions and the absence of a stable line of contact
One of the consequences of the infantry shortage is that increasingly often there are simply not enough soldiers to man frontline positions. As a result, the distance between neighbouring positions can range from 200-300 to 500-700 metres, and sometimes even a kilometre.
To put this into perspective for those in peaceful Kyiv: it's roughly 500 metres from St Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery to St Sophia's Cathedral, and about one kilometre from St Michael's to the Golden Gate. At the line of contact, these distances are vast. In other words, they represent gaps wide enough for Russian infantry to slip through.
Captured Russian soldiers have calmly stated in interviews that, for example, they encountered no armed resistance from Ukrainian troops on their way to Pokrovsk in July 2025. This is almost certainly because along their route – from Selydove to Zvirove, a village southwest of Pokrovsk, and right up to the city's outskirts – the infantry presence was minimal (and in some areas, possibly non-existent).
"In the zones of brigades N and M, and to be honest, in our area too, there are gaps," an officer from one of the brigades stationed on the Pokrovsk front told Ukrainska Pravda. "Some positions only exist for the sake of box-ticking – they're manned by soldiers who are concussed or wounded. They're there so that the higher-ups can tell themselves we still hold those positions."
The fact that so many gaps have formed between Ukrainian infantry positions, and that Russian troops have been able to get through them, has resulted in a new feature of this stage of the war – there is no stable line of contact.
This means that Ukrainian positions are often located extremely close to Russian ones – as seen, for example, on the Dobropillia salient – and that Russian infantry, and not just reconnaissance and sabotage units, are managing to enter frontline towns such as Kostiantynivka and Yampil.
"I'm not used to working like this," one serviceman from the 19th Army Corps admitted in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda. "I used to know where my infantry positions were, and that other units were positioned behind them. Now there's no line of contact at all."
Because there aren't enough infantrymen on the battlefield, drone operators and mortar crews, who are typically stationed 3-5 km behind the line of contact, are being forced to take up infantry roles.
"My guys who operate the 82mm mortar have engaged in direct combat," the same source added.
In the worst cases, which Ukrainska Pravda has also learned about, Russian troops have even reached Ukrainian artillery positions. That's 10-15 km behind the line of contact.
A bumpy transition to the corps system
The shift to a corps-based structure within the Ukrainian Armed Forces was first announced back in the winter.
In the spring, Ukrainska Pravda published an in-depth analysis of the reform, explaining why the Ukrainian Armed Forces decided to undertake such a large-scale reorganisation in the midst of active combat operations.
Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov announced on 1 October that the transition to the corps system was complete and that "although there were a few issues", all the newly established corps were already conducting their assigned missions within the designated operational groupings.
However, many of the servicemen Ukrainska Pravda spoke to described this statement as premature.
Formally, all the corps have indeed been created, but the level of understaffing remains high, even within the headquarters of the new units.
The main advantage of switching the defence forces to a corps-based structure, according to advocates of the reform, was supposed to be the establishment of stable command and control structures. Yet this has not fully materialised, as various temporary operational tactical groups, tactical battle groups and other formations are still operating in many areas.
There are also questions about whether the corps really are keeping to their assigned sectors of responsibility. In many sections of the line of contact, the transition remains incomplete. Despite this, the General Staff is already planning to create new formations, such as the Assault Forces and Air Defence Unmanned Systems Troops within the Air Force.
Given the overall shortage of personnel and the incomplete transition to the corps system, finding resources for these new formations is going to be extremely difficult.
Example:
The best evidence that it's too early to say that the corps transition is complete is provided by the Dobropillia front, which Ukrainska Pravda recently covered in detail.
This sector is officially the responsibility of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine. However, in practice, only one brigade – Chervona Kalyna – operates directly under this corps' command. All the other units in the area are attached from elsewhere.
We are not evaluating the results of combat on this front; we are simply noting that in reality, the corps-based system has yet to start functioning as intended.
Micromanagement by Syrskyi and constant changes in military leadership
In June 2025, Ukrainska Pravda was the first media outlet to report on how Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, directly manages frontline operations. Syrskyi personally appoints and dismisses corps commanders, decides the amount of reinforcements each brigade receives, issues orders to battalions that should be given by the brigade leadership and so on.
Ukrainska Pravda and its sources in the defence forces have observed that this dependence of the entire front on a single individual has only worsened over the past three months.
Initially, Syrskyi started regularly visiting and directly guiding operations on the Dobropillia salient, which the defence forces are now in the process of cutting off. Going by the commander-in-chief's public statements, he has attended eight meetings and briefings with local commanders in just three and a half months.
Ukrainska Pravda sources say assault units in this area are mainly directed by Syrskyi and Oleh Apostol, the Airborne Assault Forces commander, even though operational command officially falls under the First Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine.
Then President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the establishment of the new Assault Forces, which are likely to consolidate and expand the units directly under Syrskyi's command, effectively giving him control over a "mini-army" of Ukraine's most capable units. Critics within the military have christened it "Syrskyi's guard" or "Syrskyi's pocket army".
In fairness, it must be said that not all military leaders oppose the formation of the Assault Forces. Some commanders told Ukrainska Pravda that the move is completely logical and even long overdue.
"Units like the 3rd, 5th and 92nd, which are called assault units, fight like infantry. As far as I understand, these new Assault Forces are supposed to be different. It's a sensible decision," one former brigade commander said.
A colonel familiar with the matter told Ukrainska Pravda: "The problem isn't the expansion of Syrskyi's reserve. Every commander should have a reserve, and the commander-in-chief even more so. The problem is that only Syrskyi has a reserve like this. No other commander actually has one. They might on paper, but they don't in reality.
Syrskyi moves his reserve wherever he wants – he can send it to Sumy Oblast or Dobropillia as he pleases. But when the 7th Air Assault Corps requested four to six assault groups for the Pokrovsk front, the commander-in-chief wrote on the operational order: 'Create them yourselves'," the officer said angrily.
The creation of the Assault Forces is not the only new development that illustrates the extent of Syrskyi's centralised control.
Ukrainska Pravda learnt that at the end of September he disbanded the Dnipro Operational Strategic Group (formerly known as Khortytsia), which had been headed by Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi for eight months.
The Dnipro Operational Strategic Group was responsible – albeit only to a certain extent, given the high level of involvement from Syrskyi and the General Staff – for a significant stretch of the front from Zaporizhzhia to Kharkiv Oblast, including managing the distribution of ammunition between brigades. All of its functions are now being transferred to groups of soldiers and newly formed corps.
What's next for Drapatyi? He will remain Joint Forces Commander and he and his team will move to the north-eastern front, where he will lead one of the groups. His area of responsibility will be roughly halved.
One of Ukrainska Pravda's sources, an experienced military officer who is clearly unhappy with the changes, described this as "a way of getting rid of a competitor".
"On one hand, this is a logical step, because the Operational Strategic Group layer is disappearing – and with the transition to a corps system, it has to disappear," the colonel mentioned above told Ukrainska Pravda. "But on the other hand, this action changes nothing, because Syrskyi still commands everything. What sort of reform is this? Not a single corps is commanding a full set of troops; no one has the authority to manoeuvre. We tried to get rid of tactical groups, but now they've created another one in the Serebrianka Forest."
Drone challenges
This is the most controversial area, as both the Ukrainian and the Russian sides frequently issue contradictory claims, often asserting that the other side has the advantage when it comes to drones. The reason why their estimates vary so wildly is because discussions tend to be generalised rather than focused on specific types of drones.
If the situation is examined in context, it's clear that Ukraine continues to lead in innovation while Russia relies on mass production, a factor that is becoming increasingly evident both on the front line and in rear areas.
Since the full-scale invasion, both sides have created dedicated drone forces and scaled up their UAV units. Ukraine is developing the Drone Line, while Russia is highly focused on its Rubicon centre – elite drone units that are deployed in the hottest frontline sectors, where they create significant challenges for Ukrainian troops.
A major concern for the defence forces is the fact that Russia has significantly ramped up production of the long-range drones commonly referred to as Shahed-type drones.
Examples:
Russia's UAV strategy was clearly demonstrated in the ousting of Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, where Rubicon systematically disrupted the defence forces' logistics, forcing them to withdraw from the Russian territories they had seized.
Russia is now applying the same tactics in Donetsk Oblast, complicating the Ukrainian forces' logistics on supply routes such as the Izium-Sloviansk road.
Scaling up the production of Shahed-type drones has enabled Russia to conduct daily attacks deep inside Ukraine, overloading air defences in major cities and putting critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, at risk.
Rear units pulling back from the line of contact
Since late spring and early summer, heightened Russian air and drone activity has been forcing Ukrainian support units to move further away from the line of contact.
The first time Ukrainska Pravda heard about such a relocation was in tragic circumstances. In late April, we were travelling with troops when we witnessed the city of Druzhkivka being bombed yet again. A vehicle depot belonging to one of the mechanised brigades was engulfed in flames after a strike by Russian guided aerial bombs. The following day, the same site was hit again.
By order of senior command, all logistics and support units were moved 40-50 km from the front line.
For rear unit commanders, this decision has made logistics significantly more difficult in already strained conditions, particularly because of limited fuel.
"Before, to get a few tonnes of fuel, I'd need 40 litres and a couple of hours. Now it's 300 litres and nearly 24 hours," says one logistics commander.
Senior leadership, however, see this directive as a necessary measure to protect both personnel and equipment.
Two months later, Ukrainska Pravda journalists went back to Donetsk Oblast and realised that even without the targeted bombings, the rear units would inevitably have moved away from the line of contact. Russian FPV drones now dominate areas up to 10-15 km deep and they target vehicles travelling along the key routes. All logistical operations have become extremely dangerous.
Along with the logistics units, the soldiers themselves have begun seeking accommodation further away from the line of contact. Some troops fighting in Donetsk Oblast now live in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, meaning they spend significantly more time travelling to their positions.
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The recent good news from the Dobropillia salient, which the commander-in-chief now reports on almost daily, has obscured the much more challenging situation faced by the defence forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, in Kupiansk, and along the Novopavlivka and Lyman fronts, as well as near Kostiantynivka.
Former rear cities in Donetsk Oblast like Druzhkivka are now targets for Russian FPV drones. The buildings and streets of Dobropillia are being destroyed one by one. Every week the front line edges deeper into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
There are now only two major cities in the whole of Donetsk Oblast where civilian life still goes on, although both endure almost daily strikes from guided aerial bombs and drones.
Yet the military command at multiple levels chooses to close its eyes to the evident internal issues within the Ukrainian army, and the President's Office, which plays a role in every decision taken in this country, will not risk any drop in its approval ratings that would enable the so-called draft dodgers' faction and its sympathisers to gain influence.
All the while, the gaps between infantry positions continue to widen.
Authors: Olha Kyrylenko, Yevhen Buderatskyi, Ukrainska Pravda
Translation: Tetiana Buchkovska, Ganna (Anna) Bryedova
Editing: Teresa Pearce