Joseph Wen: China won't act like Russia did, seizing one piece of territory and waiting years before launching a full invasion
Taiwan is a small island thousands of miles away from Ukraine. However, it has quite a similar problem to Ukraine – living under the permanent threat of a much larger and more powerful neighbour.
Beijing speaks of so-called "peaceful reunification" – the official strategy of the Chinese government for annexing Taiwan, based on the "one country, two systems" formula. Beijing offers Taiwan the preservation of its self-governance, current socio-economic model and own authorities in exchange for recognising mainland China's rule over the island. Meanwhile, however, it is rehearsing a scenario that may look anything but peaceful: Chinese military aircraft already regularly enter Taiwan's air defence identification zone, while warships patrol around its waters.
Joseph Wen has spent years thinking about exactly that scenario. A co-founder of Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative (a Taiwanese civil society organisation working to strengthen defence research and strategic awareness among Taiwan's academic community and the broader public), Wen is part of a new generation of security thinkers trying to answer the question: what would a Chinese attack on Taiwan actually look like?
In conversation with Ukrainska Pravda, Wen explains why Taiwan matters more to Washington than many Americans admit, why Beijing may prefer a blockade to an invasion, what China has learned from Russia's failures in Ukraine – and why, despite facing a very different battlefield, Taiwan sees Ukraine's experience in civil resilience as one of its most valuable lessons.
This article is produced in partnership with Lviv Media Forum 2026 and features a speaker from this year's conference.
"Taiwan is far more critical to US national interests than Ukraine"
Taiwan and Ukraine are often compared in geopolitical discussions. Do you think the comparison is accurate?
If we are analysing the military environment, I would say the comparison is not quite accurate. Ukraine is a closed battlefield (primarily ground-based warfare), whereas Taiwan is an open battlefield (primarily sea and air warfare). Therefore, the two cannot truly be compared on equal terms.
From a geopolitical standpoint, I believe Taiwan is far more critical to US national interests than Ukraine. This ties directly to America's interests in the Pacific since World War II. If Taiwan were to be occupied by China, it would signify a total failure of US China policy since 1949. Unless the US decides to abdicate its leadership of the global order, it cannot tacitly allow China to invade Taiwan. By contrast, Russia's invasion of Ukraine feels more like an internal European affair to the present-day United States.
Some voices in the United States actually argue Washington should focus more on Taiwan than on Ukraine. Do you feel US support for Taiwan has strengthened since 2022?
I believe that while the US remains unchanged at the strategic level, its tactical support for Taiwan has significantly increased.
For instance, we are seeing a growing number of US military instructors arriving in Taiwan, and the volume of Taiwanese servicemen sent to the United States for advanced training has risen noticeably. These are tangible proofs of stronger tactical backing.
Donald Trump recently visited China and then said that the US won't defend Taiwan and are halting weapons deliveries to the island because Taiwan wants to start a war against China. Do you still trust the US while Trump is president?
I actually believe that for Taiwan, trusting the US is not a matter of choosing "to trust" or "not to trust". The US is currently the only nation in the world that sells weapons to Taiwan, our sole military ally, and our only "powerful" ally.
Consequently, we do not have much leverage or choice – this is the destiny of a small nation. However, positioned between the US and China, Taiwan is also presented with numerous opportunities and possibilities, which ultimately tests the wisdom of Taiwan's leadership.
I believe that as a n independent nation (or one that prides itself on being so), Taiwan cannot expect other countries to offer unconditional aid simply because we refuse to be ruled by China or because we possess a democratic system. Nor can we take American support for granted or view it as an obligation.
In other words, Taiwan must bolster its societal resilience and demonstrate a firm commitment to self-defence to the democratic world. To put it bluntly, given Trump's background as a businessman, I would say we need to "play to his interests".
At the same time, we must not be overly provocative toward China, nor should we completely sever all forms of exchange. This approach allows us to manage the risk of conflict with China while maintaining strong ties with the democratic world, all while waiting for strategic opportunities that favour Taiwan to emerge.
"Current China's policy towards Taiwan remains focused primarily on 'peaceful unification'"
How serious do you think the risk of military conflict over Taiwan is in the near future?
If "military conflict" refers to a full-scale war, I would argue it is highly unlikely to happen. However, if it refers to an "unintentional or accidental conflict", I believe the probability is quite high.
The reasoning is that Beijing does not have a rigid timetable for a military unification of Taiwan; its current policy toward Taiwan remains focused primarily on "peaceful unification".
However, China regularly exerts military pressure on Taiwan, compressing its maritime and air space. As a result, encounters between the maritime and air forces of both sides are becoming increasingly frequent. While this may not escalate into a full-scale war, the probability of an unpredictable, sudden military clash is actively rising.
This is actually a form of strategic waiting – essentially holding their ground until a situation emerges that is absolutely advantageous to them.
During this waiting period, their primary strategy is to gain wider international recognition for their "One China" policy while maintaining continuous military pressure on Taiwan. They are attempting to "accumulate small victories into a major victory". Because the stakes of a full-scale war are incredibly high, I agree that this "grey zone" approach is indeed the best strategy China can pursue at the moment.
Some analysts argue China is preparing not necessarily for an invasion, but for a blockade. How seriously does Taiwan take that possibility?
Taiwan's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are absolutely vital. If Taiwan's external maritime trade routes are severed, the island will immediately face a critical energy crisis.
Because of this vulnerability, Taiwan has begun developing its own indigenous submarine programme in recent years, alongside deploying land-based anti-ship missiles, largely because the Taiwanese Navy cannot currently acquire adequate regional air-defence vessels. These initiatives have already achieved preliminary results, so I would say the Taiwanese government takes this possibility very seriously.
Could China attempt a "decapitation strike" targeting Taiwan's political and military leadership first?
I think that would be extremely difficult. Unlike Venezuela, Taiwan is a robust democracy with an established system for leadership succession, meaning the strategic utility of a decapitation strike is not very high.
Consequently, I do not believe China would attempt this prior to a war. Instead, they are more likely to utilise legal warfare – such as unilaterally declaring Taiwan's leaders as "separatist criminals" – to seize the moral high ground and shape the international narrative that China is merely exercising domestic law enforcement over Taiwan.
"A surprise blitzkrieg is highly unlikely"
Which Chinese military capability has improved most dramatically in recent years and worries Taiwanese defence planners the most?
The weapon system that has given the Taiwanese military the biggest headache in recent years is China's long-range rocket artillery. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) has heavily expanded its long-range rocket artillery units recently.
These weapons are incredibly cheap and available in massive quantities. In a conflict, they could be used to rapidly deplete Taiwan's highly expensive air-defence ammunition in a very short window, and Taiwan currently lacks a highly cost-effective strategy to counter this.
In your view, what is China learning from Russia's war against Ukraine?
It's not just China; every country in the world has witnessed the sheer power and vital importance of drones in the war in Ukraine.
From my own observations, since the outbreak of the war, the PLA has frequently initiated small-scale drone training operations, and in April 2024, they officially incorporated small-scale drone operations into the PLA's official training syllabus.
How do you think Beijing reacted to the Russian military's performance?
I think everyone shares the exact same view regarding the Russian military's performance: it was terrible.
This display has undoubtedly made Beijing far more conservative regarding the potential use of force against Taiwan. For example, the war in Ukraine proved that relying solely on ballistic missile strikes to permanently knock out enemy airfields is not nearly as effective as previously assumed.
Putin threatened to take Kyiv in three days. What would the first 24-72 hours of a Chinese operation against Taiwan likely look like?
Because the Taiwan Strait is primarily a sea and air battlefield, a surprise blitzkrieg is highly unlikely – military movements on that scale are simply impossible to hide.
Therefore, I believe that in the days leading up to an attack, China would use "military exercises" as a pretext to legitimise its troop deployments around Taiwan and mask its actual force mobilisation.
"Ukraine's experience in building civil defence is invaluable to Taiwan"
Yes, we've already seen such "military exercises", when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What lessons did Taiwan immediately draw from it?
The core lesson was the critical importance of societal defence resilience. Initially, many people (including myself) assumed Kyiv was doomed. But the Ukrainian people proved that their will to resist was far more powerful than anyone anticipated.
Of course, this resilience didn't happen by accident; since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine began building a comprehensive civil defence system and public education programme. This is a crucial lesson Taiwan must learn. China will not act like Russia by seizing one piece of territory and waiting years before launching a full invasion; if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it will be a full-scale conflict from day one. Because there will be very little reaction time, Ukraine's experience in building civil defence is invaluable to Taiwan.
Does Taiwan cooperate with Ukraine in studying modern warfare lessons?
At the official military level, the possibility of cooperation is currently zero. This is partly due to Taiwan's lack of formal diplomatic recognition, and partly because Ukraine's foreign policy toward Taiwan has historically been very conservative. Therefore, I believe any meaningful engagement needs to start by deepening civil society and NGO exchanges.
Taiwan often talks about an "asymmetric defence strategy". What does that mean in practice?
In reality, there isn't a 100% consensus within Taiwan regarding what asymmetric warfare should look like. The most controversial component is the domestic submarine programme, which consumes a massive portion of the defence budget, and there is ongoing debate about whether it will yield an effective combat capability.
However, areas with little to no controversy include the development of drones and land-based anti-ship missiles.
Your organisation focuses on strengthening civil society's understanding of defence. Why is that as important as military preparedness?
Military and PLA studies are incredibly niche and unpopular fields among Taiwanese youth. Compared to the ruling party and the military leadership, young people do not easily perceive the immediate threat posed by China.
Our goal is to build a defence-focused discussion community specifically for Taiwan's youth. Older generations are difficult to persuade, so starting with the youth is a much more viable path. Almost no one has tried this in Taiwan before, but it is our mission.
However, many NGOs are working incredibly hard to promote civil education. Their primary focus is pushing for "China literacy" – helping young Taiwanese truly understand what kind of regime the Chinese Communist Party actually is, so that their first introduction to China isn't coming strictly from TikTok.
Isn't TikTok banned in Taiwan?
TikTok is not banned in Taiwan, though the Xiaohongshu app [the Chinese alternative to Instagram – UP] is. TikTok in Taiwan is rife with misinformation, and I believe adolescents are the most heavily impacted – as is likely the case in every country.
Because Taiwan is a democracy, the legal procedures required to ban an app are incredibly complex. Therefore, I believe what we can do instead is foster students' China literacy. During my school years, our textbooks only taught us about the traditional separation of powers and Taiwan's five-branch democratic system, while offering very little content on the Chinese Communist Party. I believe we must enable students to better understand China through their school curriculum.
What does "whole-of-society defence" mean in Taiwan in practical terms?
"Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience" is a cornerstone policy introduced by the [President] Lai Ching-te administration. The most critical objective of this policy is to ensure that ordinary citizens do not become a burden to society during a national emergency and, ideally, are equipped to help others.
Even if a nation possesses superior military hardware, if the public panics and society fractures, military operations lose the domestic momentum required to sustain themselves.
If China never invades Taiwan, but Taiwan spends decades preparing for it, would that still count as success?
No one can truly answer whether China will definitely invade Taiwan one day. However, I have always believed that when it comes to a Chinese invasion, "if you prepare for it, it won't happen; if you don't, it will".
We can go a hundred years without a war, but we cannot afford a single day without defence readiness. We live in a realistic and brutal world; how much weight you carry at the negotiating table depends entirely on your military strength and your economic leverage.